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Opus Dei

http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/opus_dei_to_produce_italian_cartoon_and_miniseries_on_st._josemaria_escriva/

Rome, Italy, Oct 2, 2008 / 01:34 am As the eightieth anniversary of its October 2, 1928 founding approaches, Opus Dei is producing an Italian TV cartoon and mini-series on the life of its founder St. Josemaria Escriva. The cartoon is in its production phase at Mediaset, a media company owned by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Opus Dei spokesman Pippo Corigliano told ANSA on Wednesday that the children's cartoon will give a "necessarily simple" view of the Spanish priest who founded the organization and was canonized in 2002. The miniseries, developed by the media company RAI, aims to include more diverse opinions of the saint. Opus Dei has about 90,000 members in 90 countries, a few of whom are priests. While about one third of the lay members are celibate, living in Opus Dei centers and devoting themselves to social and charity work, the majority lead regular family lives.

Opus Dei

http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/subdivisions/opusdei.shtml

A profile of Opus Dei, the Catholic organisation that played a major role in 'The Da Vinci Code' novel. [ British Broadcasting CorporationHome ](/) Last updated 2009-08-10 A profile of Opus Dei, the Catholic organisation that played a major role in 'The Da Vinci Code' novel. Opus Dei is a [Catholic](/religion/religions/christianity/catholic/) organisation with around 85,000 members worldwide and about 500 members in the UK. Members are encouraged to promote their faith through their professional work and their everyday lives. Critics accuse the organisation of being secretive and elitist but members wholeheartedly reject this. Despite these very public criticisms, thanks to the publicity the organisation has been getting from The Da Vinci Code phenomenon, UK numbers are rising. Jack Valero, Opus Dei spokesman in the UK, claimed that they got two to three enquiries a day - up to 50 a month - from people looking to join. Opus Dei describes itself as "a personal prelature of the Catholic church that helps people seek holiness in their work and ordinary activities". In other words, they try to help others through their regular work and their day-to-day life. Joining Opus Dei is a long process. Often people are invited along to a meeting, although according to their website any lay Catholic may ask to join Opus Dei as long as they are at least 18 years old. It takes over five years to join, with a person's commitment to joining having to be renewed each year, before a lifelong commitment is possible. Opus Dei is a strong advocate of traditional Catholic values, focusing particularly on spreading the Catholic teaching that every individual is called to become a saint and an apostle of Jesus Christ and that ordinary life is a path to sanctity. It also lays particular stress on the unique character of Roman Catholicism - as compared with other churches and faiths. There are three types of members of Opus Dei: numeraries, associates and supernumeraries. Associates and numeraries make up about 25% to 30% of members. They are celibate, live with other members and, on occasion, practice corporal mortification - the most controversial of Opus Dei's traditions. Corporal mortification is the practice of physically enduring a minor amount of suffering. Some of the celibate members of Opus Dei sometimes practice traditional Catholic penances such as using the cilice (a light metal chain with prongs which is worn round the thigh) and the discipline (a woven cotton strap). These are practices which Opus Dei states Catholics have used for centuries. The Opus Dei website states the motivation for these voluntary penances is to imitate Christ and to join him in his redemptive sacrifice (cf. Matthew 16:24), and that they can also be a way to suffer in solidarity with the many poor and deprived people in the world. The majority of Opus Dei members are supernumeraries. They account for around 70-75% of members and they are usually non-celibate, married men or women. Contributors from Opus Dei and a Greek Orthodox church discuss self-denial, fasting and corporal mortification with a Muslim chaplain. In order to see this content you need to have both [Javascript](/webwise/askbruce/articles/browse/java_1.shtml) enabled and [Flash](/webwise/askbruce/articles/download/howdoidownloadflashplayer_1.shtml) installed. Visit [BBC Webwise](/webwise) for full instructions The fact that Opus Dei was designated a personal prelature in 1982 by [Pope John Paul II](/religion/religions/christianity/pope/johnpaulii_1.shtml) has meant that some critics have referred to its position as being similar to that of a "church within the Church". Admittedly this is a unique position to be in - it is the only personal prelature within the Catholic Church. However Opus Dei's members argue that this unique position does not in any way mean that its members are held in a specifically high regard by the Vatican, or given any special treatment. Personal prelature is a canonical term meaning that the jurisdiction of the Catholic Church over Opus Dei covers the members of Opus Dei rather than a geographical area like a diocese. A personal prelature operates in a very similar way to a religious order; however, there are no geographical limits, and its members are lay-people rather than monks or nuns. Those Catholics who belong to Opus Dei also continue to be part of the congregation at their local church. Unlike members of religious orders, the members of Opus Dei join by means of private contracts and not vows. In order to join a member must ask to do so, and they must also be convinced that they have received a vocation. Opus Dei is seen by many to be a fairly wealthy organisation. Members have to donate a significant part of their income to Opus Dei. It is a decentralised organisation and does not publish its general accounts so it is difficult to be precise over the state of its finances. The orgranisation has sponsored a network of institutions across the UK, such as Netherhall House and Kelston Club for Boys in Wandsworth. Some estimates put the number of centres and charitable ventures owned by Opus Dei at more than twenty-five. Opus Dei appeared frequently in the press in 2003 because of its importance to the plot of The Da Vinci Code. The novel (and film adaptation) paints it as an all-powerful, wealthy and secretive cult-like Catholic sect. Beyond this portrayal, the methods Opus Dei members employ to encourage others to join the organisation have been attacked by critics. Much of this stems from a statement by Opus Dei's founder, Spanish priest Josemaría Escrivá. In 1975 he was quoted as saying "...we must be a little crazy ...you must kill yourselves for proselytism." The Opus Dei Awareness Network is one of the most vocal opponents of Opus Dei. Dianne DiNicola, its executive director has said: "The biggest problem we have with Opus Dei is that a person is not free to make their own decisions. They live in a controlled environment and all the while Opus Dei hides behind the Catholic Church." Critics have also described it as a sort of Catholic freemasonry - accusing it of being secretive and manipulative. Opus Dei members respond to these allegations by emphasising the fact that all members are free to join, and leave, as they please. The allegations of secrecy and aggressive recruiting tactics are more often than not attributed to misinterpretations of the way Opus Dei was viewed in the past - the existing organisation has taken great pains to present itself in a more moderate way. It has been suggested that Opus Dei has a wealth of important and powerful members in both the religious and the political spheres. However, Opus Dei does not publish official lists of members, believing membership is a private matter. Opus Dei's UK spokesman Jack Valero denies the belief that many key figures at the Vatican are Opus Dei members: "The number of people from Opus Dei working in the Vatican is very reduced: five or maybe six people, including the spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Valls. The influence of Opus Dei in the Holy See has been exaggerated." An Opus Dei member in the British government attracted questions in May 2006. Questions were raised over Ruth Kelly's suitability for the role of Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; however, she insisted as a practising Catholic her faith would not influence decisions she needs to make for her job. Asked if she thought homosexuality was a sin, Ruth Kelly stated: "I don't think it's right for politicians to start making moral judgements about people. That's the last thing I would want to do. What I think the question is, is what are my political views and as a politician those are the ones I'm accountable for to the public. As a politician I think anybody should be free from discrimination and I'll fight to the absolute end to make sure that is the case." 1928 Josemaría Escrivá, a 26-year-old Spanish priest, creates Opus Dei. His vision is to extend the Sunday religiosity of working people into their everyday lives. He is initially seen as a heretic by the church hierarchy. 1933 The first Opus Dei centre opens in Madrid, an academy teaching law and architecture. 1936 The Spanish civil war unleashes anti-clerical persecution and Escrivá goes into hiding. 1939 Escrivá supports General Franco's victory and starts to proselytise throughout Spain. 1946 Opus Dei extends to Britain, Portugal and Italy. Escrivá regularly visits Britain and calls it a "crossroads of the world". 1950 Opus Dei's secretive constitution is published. It states: "No one must reveal to anyone that they themselves belong to Opus Dei." Opus Dei is given final and complete approval by Pope Pius XII. 1975 Escrivá dies, leaving behind a thriving and affluent movement with about 60,000 members. 1981 Revelations in The Times about Opus Dei's practices, such as corporal mortification, prompt Cardinal Basil Hume to announce he is against the recruitment of members into Opus Dei who under 18 in Britain. 1982 Pope John Paul II establishes Opus Dei as a personal prelature, confirming its growing status in the Catholic Church. 2002 John Paul II canonises the founder of Opus Dei, Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer, in a 'fast track' process only 27 years after his death. Thousands of supporters pack St Peter's Square for the canonisation. 2003 The Da Vinci Code is published. 2006 Opus Dei uses The Da Vinci Code movie to promote its work. A website competition offers the chance to meet a genuine Opus Dei member. BBC © 2014 [The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites. Read more.](/help/web/links/) This page is best viewed in an up-to-date web browser with style sheets (CSS) enabled. While you will be able to view the content of this page in your current browser, you will not be able to get the full visual experience. Please consider upgrading your browser software or enabling style sheets (CSS) if you are able to do so.

Opus Dei

http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/subdivisions/opusdei.shtml

A profile of Opus Dei, the Catholic organisation that played a major role in 'The Da Vinci Code' novel. [ British Broadcasting CorporationHome ](/) Last updated 2009-08-10 A profile of Opus Dei, the Catholic organisation that played a major role in 'The Da Vinci Code' novel. Opus Dei is a [Catholic](/religion/religions/christianity/catholic/) organisation with around 85,000 members worldwide and about 500 members in the UK. Members are encouraged to promote their faith through their professional work and their everyday lives. Critics accuse the organisation of being secretive and elitist but members wholeheartedly reject this. Despite these very public criticisms, thanks to the publicity the organisation has been getting from The Da Vinci Code phenomenon, UK numbers are rising. Jack Valero, Opus Dei spokesman in the UK, claimed that they got two to three enquiries a day - up to 50 a month - from people looking to join. Opus Dei describes itself as "a personal prelature of the Catholic church that helps people seek holiness in their work and ordinary activities". In other words, they try to help others through their regular work and their day-to-day life. Joining Opus Dei is a long process. Often people are invited along to a meeting, although according to their website any lay Catholic may ask to join Opus Dei as long as they are at least 18 years old. It takes over five years to join, with a person's commitment to joining having to be renewed each year, before a lifelong commitment is possible. Opus Dei is a strong advocate of traditional Catholic values, focusing particularly on spreading the Catholic teaching that every individual is called to become a saint and an apostle of Jesus Christ and that ordinary life is a path to sanctity. It also lays particular stress on the unique character of Roman Catholicism - as compared with other churches and faiths. There are three types of members of Opus Dei: numeraries, associates and supernumeraries. Associates and numeraries make up about 25% to 30% of members. They are celibate, live with other members and, on occasion, practice corporal mortification - the most controversial of Opus Dei's traditions. Corporal mortification is the practice of physically enduring a minor amount of suffering. Some of the celibate members of Opus Dei sometimes practice traditional Catholic penances such as using the cilice (a light metal chain with prongs which is worn round the thigh) and the discipline (a woven cotton strap). These are practices which Opus Dei states Catholics have used for centuries. The Opus Dei website states the motivation for these voluntary penances is to imitate Christ and to join him in his redemptive sacrifice (cf. Matthew 16:24), and that they can also be a way to suffer in solidarity with the many poor and deprived people in the world. The majority of Opus Dei members are supernumeraries. They account for around 70-75% of members and they are usually non-celibate, married men or women. Contributors from Opus Dei and a Greek Orthodox church discuss self-denial, fasting and corporal mortification with a Muslim chaplain. In order to see this content you need to have both [Javascript](/webwise/askbruce/articles/browse/java_1.shtml) enabled and [Flash](/webwise/askbruce/articles/download/howdoidownloadflashplayer_1.shtml) installed. Visit [BBC Webwise](/webwise) for full instructions The fact that Opus Dei was designated a personal prelature in 1982 by [Pope John Paul II](/religion/religions/christianity/pope/johnpaulii_1.shtml) has meant that some critics have referred to its position as being similar to that of a "church within the Church". Admittedly this is a unique position to be in - it is the only personal prelature within the Catholic Church. However Opus Dei's members argue that this unique position does not in any way mean that its members are held in a specifically high regard by the Vatican, or given any special treatment. Personal prelature is a canonical term meaning that the jurisdiction of the Catholic Church over Opus Dei covers the members of Opus Dei rather than a geographical area like a diocese. A personal prelature operates in a very similar way to a religious order; however, there are no geographical limits, and its members are lay-people rather than monks or nuns. Those Catholics who belong to Opus Dei also continue to be part of the congregation at their local church. Unlike members of religious orders, the members of Opus Dei join by means of private contracts and not vows. In order to join a member must ask to do so, and they must also be convinced that they have received a vocation. Opus Dei is seen by many to be a fairly wealthy organisation. Members have to donate a significant part of their income to Opus Dei. It is a decentralised organisation and does not publish its general accounts so it is difficult to be precise over the state of its finances. The orgranisation has sponsored a network of institutions across the UK, such as Netherhall House and Kelston Club for Boys in Wandsworth. Some estimates put the number of centres and charitable ventures owned by Opus Dei at more than twenty-five. Opus Dei appeared frequently in the press in 2003 because of its importance to the plot of The Da Vinci Code. The novel (and film adaptation) paints it as an all-powerful, wealthy and secretive cult-like Catholic sect. Beyond this portrayal, the methods Opus Dei members employ to encourage others to join the organisation have been attacked by critics. Much of this stems from a statement by Opus Dei's founder, Spanish priest Josemaría Escrivá. In 1975 he was quoted as saying "...we must be a little crazy ...you must kill yourselves for proselytism." The Opus Dei Awareness Network is one of the most vocal opponents of Opus Dei. Dianne DiNicola, its executive director has said: "The biggest problem we have with Opus Dei is that a person is not free to make their own decisions. They live in a controlled environment and all the while Opus Dei hides behind the Catholic Church." Critics have also described it as a sort of Catholic freemasonry - accusing it of being secretive and manipulative. Opus Dei members respond to these allegations by emphasising the fact that all members are free to join, and leave, as they please. The allegations of secrecy and aggressive recruiting tactics are more often than not attributed to misinterpretations of the way Opus Dei was viewed in the past - the existing organisation has taken great pains to present itself in a more moderate way. It has been suggested that Opus Dei has a wealth of important and powerful members in both the religious and the political spheres. However, Opus Dei does not publish official lists of members, believing membership is a private matter. Opus Dei's UK spokesman Jack Valero denies the belief that many key figures at the Vatican are Opus Dei members: "The number of people from Opus Dei working in the Vatican is very reduced: five or maybe six people, including the spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Valls. The influence of Opus Dei in the Holy See has been exaggerated." An Opus Dei member in the British government attracted questions in May 2006. Questions were raised over Ruth Kelly's suitability for the role of Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; however, she insisted as a practising Catholic her faith would not influence decisions she needs to make for her job. Asked if she thought homosexuality was a sin, Ruth Kelly stated: "I don't think it's right for politicians to start making moral judgements about people. That's the last thing I would want to do. What I think the question is, is what are my political views and as a politician those are the ones I'm accountable for to the public. As a politician I think anybody should be free from discrimination and I'll fight to the absolute end to make sure that is the case." 1928 Josemaría Escrivá, a 26-year-old Spanish priest, creates Opus Dei. His vision is to extend the Sunday religiosity of working people into their everyday lives. He is initially seen as a heretic by the church hierarchy. 1933 The first Opus Dei centre opens in Madrid, an academy teaching law and architecture. 1936 The Spanish civil war unleashes anti-clerical persecution and Escrivá goes into hiding. 1939 Escrivá supports General Franco's victory and starts to proselytise throughout Spain. 1946 Opus Dei extends to Britain, Portugal and Italy. Escrivá regularly visits Britain and calls it a "crossroads of the world". 1950 Opus Dei's secretive constitution is published. It states: "No one must reveal to anyone that they themselves belong to Opus Dei." Opus Dei is given final and complete approval by Pope Pius XII. 1975 Escrivá dies, leaving behind a thriving and affluent movement with about 60,000 members. 1981 Revelations in The Times about Opus Dei's practices, such as corporal mortification, prompt Cardinal Basil Hume to announce he is against the recruitment of members into Opus Dei who under 18 in Britain. 1982 Pope John Paul II establishes Opus Dei as a personal prelature, confirming its growing status in the Catholic Church. 2002 John Paul II canonises the founder of Opus Dei, Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer, in a 'fast track' process only 27 years after his death. Thousands of supporters pack St Peter's Square for the canonisation. 2003 The Da Vinci Code is published. 2006 Opus Dei uses The Da Vinci Code movie to promote its work. A website competition offers the chance to meet a genuine Opus Dei member. BBC © 2014 [The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites. Read more.](/help/web/links/) This page is best viewed in an up-to-date web browser with style sheets (CSS) enabled. While you will be able to view the content of this page in your current browser, you will not be able to get the full visual experience. Please consider upgrading your browser software or enabling style sheets (CSS) if you are able to do so.

Opus Dei

http://www.icsahome.com/articles/opus-dei-moncada-en5-2

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Former Members Families and Friends Researchers Mental Health Others Counseling Resources Member E-Library Log-In Membership/Donations ICSA Publications ICSA Today Issues Intl. J. of Coercion, Abuse, & Manipulation Clinical Bibliography Cult Recovery: A Clinician's Guide to Working With Former Members and Families Abstracts Wounded Faith Help Others Mental Health Committee Religion Committee Education Committee Research Committee Graduate Study About Us Resources FAQs Topic Collections Articles 1979–2019: The Changing Population of ICSA 2012 Paul R. Martin Lecture - Thought Reform 2013 Conference Awards at ICSA Annual International Conference A 30-year Odyssey.doc A Comparison of Different Countries' Approaches A Few Things I've Learned A Personal Experience of TM A Psychosocial Analysis of the Terrorist Group A Recovery-from-Addictions Model A Remarkable Consensus A Safe-Haven Church An Introduction to the Basics of a Safe Religious Community A Workshop for People Born or Raised in Cultic Groups Abstract Surrealism—My Journey Back to Myself After ISKCON Abuso Psicológico en Grupos: Taxonomía y Severidad de sus Componentes Academic Disputes and Dialogue AFF Statement on China and Falun Gong An Investigation into Cult Pseudo-Personality: What Is It and How Does It Form? An Investigation of a Reputedly Psychologically Abusive Group An Open Letter to Clergy Anxiety and Decision-Making Are Cultic Environments Psychologically Harmful Are "Sound" Theology and Cultism Mutually Exclusive Arts A 30-Year Odyssey Aspects of Alternative Spirituality Aspects of Concern Regarding Legion of Christ Assessment of Psychological Abuse Attacks on Peripheral vs Central Elements of Self Austrian Perspectives on Cults Back From the Brink Bad Fruits of the Legion of Christ Bishop Farrell Differences of Opinion Born and Raised in Aesthetic Realism Born Into a Doomsday Cult Born or Raised in Closed, High-Demand Groups Boston Church of Christ Movement Boston Church of Christ Movement Abridged Building Resistance - Tactics for Counteracting Manipulation and Unethical Hypnosis Business and the New Age Movement By Their Fruits Ye Shall Know Them - Case of the Legion Challenging Authority Changes in the North American Cult Awareness Movement Characteristics Associated with Cultic Groups Characteristics of Cults and Cultic Groups Checks on Power and Authority Child Custody and Cults Child Fatalitites From Religion-Motivated Medical Neglect Children and Cults Children and Cults: A Practical Guide Choosing A Church Cleansing Ritual Clinical Case Studies of Cult Members Clinical Update on Cults Closed Cults Open Conferences Clubs, Neotribal Enclaves and Cults: Variations on the Theme of Organizing Members Coerced Confessions Cold Reading Coming Back Home Coming out of the Cults Common Myths and Misconceptions About Cults and Cultic Groups Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions Coping with Triggers Counseling Former Cultists: The Brief Intermittent Developmental Therapy (BIDT) Approach Crazy Wisdom Creativity and Cults Cult A Love Story Cult Formation Cult Involvement Suggestions for Concerned Parents Cult Is As Cult Does Cultic Dimensions London Bombings Cultic Issues and Religious Freedom Cultism and American Culture Cults A Natural Disaster Cults and Globalization Cults and Sex Trafficking Cults in American Society A Legal Analysis Cults in Court Cults What Clergy Should Know Cults, Psychological Manipulation, & Society Cults, Religion, and China Culture Shock - The Challenge of Building or Rebuilding a Life Curiosity and Willingness to Learn Current Status of Federal Law Concerning Violent Crimes Against Women & Children Dallas Former Member Support Group Deception in Transcendental Meditation Deception, Dependency, and Dread Deprogramming Survey Desperate People Do Desperate Things Destructive Cult Conversion - clark et al. Dialogue and Cultic Studies Diana, Leaving the Cult Divergent European Cult Policies Dr. Paul Martin—A Good Leader and a Wonderful Counselor Dreams of ISKCON Dysfunctional Churches Editor's Corner Employing Trafficking Laws to Capture Elusive Leaders of Destructive Cults Ethics of Evangelism European Muslims Evaluating Your Cult Involvement Exit Intervention: A New Approach to Saving Family Members From Destructive Groups Fair Game Families Helping Families Family Dynamics During a Cult Crisis Family Life In and Out of a Cult Fiabilidad Test-Retest y Validez Diagnostica Finding and Losing My Religion For Families Who Suspect That a Loved One May Be Involved With a High-Demand Group (Cult) Former Members and Health-Care Reform Forty Years in the Wilderness Free Speech and Cultic Litigation Interview With Attorney Peter Skolnik Free Speech Survey Report Freemen Soverign Citizens From Counterculture to Krishna Cult - Memories and Reflections From Deprogramming to Deradicalization From Deprogramming to Thought Reform Consultation From Survivor to Thriver From the Fire to a Blessing Field Fundamental Human Rights in ISKCON Getting Involved in a Cult Government, Thought Reform, and Native History Governments and Cults Groucho Marx and Cult Recovery Growing Up With Strictly Religious Parents Grupos de Manipulación Psicológica en Cataluña Her Critical Voice Wouldn't Die History and Purpose of Model Presentations History of the Wellspring Retreat and Resource Center House of Judah, the Northeast Kingdom Community, and 'the Jonestown Problem How a Dysfunctional Family Functions Like a Cult How Can Faith Communities Help Survivors of Spiritual Abuse? How Can Young People Protect Themselves Against Cults How Could Anyone Join a Cult How the United States Marine Corps Differs from Cults How to Find Information on a Group How We Rescued Our Daughter How You Can Use ICSA Resources to Help Yourself or a Loved One I Really Believed That This Way of Living Was Right ICSA Recovery Workshops: The Colorado Model Ideological Intransigence-Demo Centralism-Cultism If You Want To Know How I Got Brainwashed Impact on Children of Being Born Into/Raised in a Cultic Group Important Issues to Consider When Choosing a Spiritual Teacher Influence Influence of a Charismatic Antisocial Cult Leader Info-Cult at 35 Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned Inside the Walls of a Libertarian Ideology Interacting with Cults: Police Introduction to the Monograph Introduction to Traumatic Narcissism Issue Is Human Universal Energy a Cult Masquerader? Is Psychological Distress Among Former Cult Members Related to Psychological Abuse in the Cults Jones on Jesus Large Group Awareness Trainings Leaving a Cult for Music Legal Considerations Les rapports d'inspection des écoles privées Lessons From Adjacent Fields Cults and Radical Extremist Groups Lessons Learned Lessons Learned from SGAs about Recovery and Resiliency Lets Get Lost Letter to a Former Member Life After Centrepoint Litigating Against Cults in Japan Practical Issues Lost Love Manipulative Therapists Marriage After the Cult Mediating to Settle Conflicts in Cultic Groups Some Useful Methodologies Mental-Health Issues in Cult-Related Interventions Mommy, Did You Get to See the Dolphins Moving On: Dealing With Family Members Who Have Caused Us Harm My Perspective of Rosanne Henry and Leona Furnari's Presentation to the Annual SGA Workshop My Unexpected Journey My Voice Myth and Themes of Ex-Membership New Books on Polygamy New Religions and Public Policy On Breaking the Code of Silence On Dialogue Between the Two Tribes of Cultic Studies Researchers On Using the Term "Cult" Origins and Prevention of Abuse Overview: Support Groups Paradise and Promises Chronicles of My Life With a Self-Declared, Modern-Day Buddha Pathological Psychoanalysis Paul R Martin Memorial Lecture Peace at Last Physical Child Abuse in Sects Pink Slip! Pitfalls to Recovery Points for Pastors Post-Cult After Effects Post-Cult Financial Recovery Post-Cult Problems - Giambalvo Preliminary Taxonomy of Psychological Abuse Strategies Prevalence Preventing Cultic Deviations in Europe Preventing Cutic Deviations - Reply to Singelenberg Preventive Education - A North American Perspective Problem Solving An Approach Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse Psychiatric Association Statement on Repressed Memories Psychological Abuse: Theoretical and Measurement Issues Psychological Coercion and Human Rights Psychological Makeup of a Pakistani Muslim Suicide Bomber Psychological Manipulation, Hypnosis, and Suggestion Psychologists Survey Questionnaire Study Preliminary Report Questions and Answers about Memories of Childhood Abuse Raised in Cultic Groups Reading List: Undue Influence 101 Ready to Mine: Zen's Legitimating Mythology and Cultish Behavior Reasons for Leaving Rebuilding the Jigsaw Reclaiming Life Stories Recovery: From Victim to Survivor to Thriver Reflections on Post-Cult Recovery Reflection on the Life of Daphne (Lady) Vane Reject the Wicked Man Religion et Secte Religion Versus Cult Religion, Revisionists, and Revolutionary Suicide Religious Cults, Human Rights, and Public Policy: The Secular Perspective Religious Exemptions From Child Abuse Statutes Religious Justifications for Child Sexual Abuse in Cults Religious Liberty and New Religious Movements Reply to Dr Robbins Report of the Task Force Report of the Task Force Summary Research on Destructive Cults Research Survey on Spiritual Abuse Resisting the Pressure to Choose Between Parents Responding to Jihadism Retribing the Planet Shamanism Repurposed for Modern Times Saved by Our Son Second-Generation Religious Cult Survivors Implications for Counselors Sex Therapy With Former Cult Members Sexual Abuse and the Charismatic Crisis Sifting the Wheat from the Tares Sister My Sister Six Conditions Social Influences on Youth Some Things I Learned Spiritual Abuse Across the Spectrum of Christian Environments Spiritual Pain and Painkiller Spirituality Stairway to Heaven State Intervention Against The Baptist Church of Windsor Staying Safe: Observing Warning Signs of a Dangerous Liaison Supporting Human Rights Suppression of Free Speech Report on a Survey Survey Physicians Survivor Nineninethree Teaching Young People Ten Steps to Critical Thinking The ABCs of Dangerous Cults The Art of Hoping - Anonymous The Challenge of Defining Cult The Definitional Ambiguity of Cult The Ethics of Evangelism and Cult Recruitment The Genesis, Text, and Implications of Utah House Bill 214: Office for Vict The Gentle Wind Project The Grammatical Fiction The Heart of Cult Recovery: Compassion for the Self The History of Credibility Attacks Against Former Cult Members The Identity of Cult Members in the Narrative Aspect The Impact of a Modern-Day Polygamy Group on Women The Influence Continuum The Law to Protect Victims of Manipulation The Legion of Christ and Regnum Christi - A Parents Perspective The Marriage of the Lamb The Potential for Abuse in the Guru-Disciple Relationship The Relational System of the Traumatizing Narcissist The Results of the International Cultic Studies Association's 2008 Questionnaire The Role of Cognitive Distortion The Role of the Family The Spartiates As Charismatic Cult The Strategic Interaction Approach The Theory That Won't Go Away An Updated Review of the Role Hypnosis Plays in Mind Control The Unique Characteristics of Postcult Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Suggested Therapeutic Approaches.docx The Vatican Report: Sects or New Religious Movements Thought Reform Exists Thought Reform Programs Too Good to be True Teacher Tratamiento jurídico y policial de las dinámicas de persuasión coercitiva Traumatic Abuse in Cults Traumatic Abuse in Cults A Psychoanalytic Perspective Treatment of Satanism Un análisis de las estrategias y consecuencias del terrorismo Understanding Eastern Groups Urban Legends and Other Misconceptions Using Legal Analysis to Address Claims of Spiritual Abuse Vulnerability Weaponizing Therapy We Disagree—Let's Talk! Why Diversity and Dialogue Are Necessary, and How W We Weren't Crazy What Changed My Mind What Counselors Should Know About Cultic Dynamics What Do We Need to Know About Being Born or Raised in a Cultic Environment? What Impact Does Cult Involvement Have on a Member What Impact Does Cult Involvement Have on a Member's Family What Is a Cult What Is a Cult Definitional Preface What is Hypnosis What is New Age What Is Real? The Lure and Perils of Hidden Wisdom What Is the Impact of Leaving a Cultic Group What Messages Behind Cults When Critical Thinking Doesn't Help Why It Fails and How to Make It Happen When Endings Are Beginnings David's Story When the Cult Leader Hoists a Whilte Flag When You're Asked About Cults Why Cults Are Harmful Neurobiological Speculations Why Did I Endure Why I Had to Escape a Fundamentalist Cult Why We Need To Become Spiritual Consumers Wild Geese Working with Cult-affected Families Writing Betrayal of the Spirit You Do Not Have to Be a Fool to Be Fooled Zealotry and American Identity Zen and the Art of Student Abuse Zen and the Art of Winning in Court Books Links Bookstore ICSA Book Reviews Arts Joan Capellini Scholarship Fund Contact ICSA Member Portal More Home Events Annual Conference Overview Congreso Internacional ICSA 2024 Barcelona Mental Health Events Wounded Faith Webinars Events for Victims Researcher Events Family Events Other Events How can we help you? Former Members Families and Friends Researchers Mental Health Others Counseling Resources Member E-Library Log-In Membership/Donations ICSA Publications ICSA Today Issues Intl. J. of Coercion, Abuse, & Manipulation Clinical Bibliography Cult Recovery: A Clinician's Guide to Working With Former Members and Families Abstracts Wounded Faith Help Others Mental Health Committee Religion Committee Education Committee Research Committee Graduate Study About Us Resources FAQs Topic Collections Articles 1979–2019: The Changing Population of ICSA 2012 Paul R. Martin Lecture - Thought Reform 2013 Conference Awards at ICSA Annual International Conference A 30-year Odyssey.doc A Comparison of Different Countries' Approaches A Few Things I've Learned A Personal Experience of TM A Psychosocial Analysis of the Terrorist Group A Recovery-from-Addictions Model A Remarkable Consensus A Safe-Haven Church An Introduction to the Basics of a Safe Religious Community A Workshop for People Born or Raised in Cultic Groups Abstract Surrealism—My Journey Back to Myself After ISKCON Abuso Psicológico en Grupos: Taxonomía y Severidad de sus Componentes Academic Disputes and Dialogue AFF Statement on China and Falun Gong An Investigation into Cult Pseudo-Personality: What Is It and How Does It Form? An Investigation of a Reputedly Psychologically Abusive Group An Open Letter to Clergy Anxiety and Decision-Making Are Cultic Environments Psychologically Harmful Are "Sound" Theology and Cultism Mutually Exclusive Arts A 30-Year Odyssey Aspects of Alternative Spirituality Aspects of Concern Regarding Legion of Christ Assessment of Psychological Abuse Attacks on Peripheral vs Central Elements of Self Austrian Perspectives on Cults Back From the Brink Bad Fruits of the Legion of Christ Bishop Farrell Differences of Opinion Born and Raised in Aesthetic Realism Born Into a Doomsday Cult Born or Raised in Closed, High-Demand Groups Boston Church of Christ Movement Boston Church of Christ Movement Abridged Building Resistance - Tactics for Counteracting Manipulation and Unethical Hypnosis Business and the New Age Movement By Their Fruits Ye Shall Know Them - Case of the Legion Challenging Authority Changes in the North American Cult Awareness Movement Characteristics Associated with Cultic Groups Characteristics of Cults and Cultic Groups Checks on Power and Authority Child Custody and Cults Child Fatalitites From Religion-Motivated Medical Neglect Children and Cults Children and Cults: A Practical Guide Choosing A Church Cleansing Ritual Clinical Case Studies of Cult Members Clinical Update on Cults Closed Cults Open Conferences Clubs, Neotribal Enclaves and Cults: Variations on the Theme of Organizing Members Coerced Confessions Cold Reading Coming Back Home Coming out of the Cults Common Myths and Misconceptions About Cults and Cultic Groups Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions Coping with Triggers Counseling Former Cultists: The Brief Intermittent Developmental Therapy (BIDT) Approach Crazy Wisdom Creativity and Cults Cult A Love Story Cult Formation Cult Involvement Suggestions for Concerned Parents Cult Is As Cult Does Cultic Dimensions London Bombings Cultic Issues and Religious Freedom Cultism and American Culture Cults A Natural Disaster Cults and Globalization Cults and Sex Trafficking Cults in American Society A Legal Analysis Cults in Court Cults What Clergy Should Know Cults, Psychological Manipulation, & Society Cults, Religion, and China Culture Shock - The Challenge of Building or Rebuilding a Life Curiosity and Willingness to Learn Current Status of Federal Law Concerning Violent Crimes Against Women & Children Dallas Former Member Support Group Deception in Transcendental Meditation Deception, Dependency, and Dread Deprogramming Survey Desperate People Do Desperate Things Destructive Cult Conversion - clark et al. Dialogue and Cultic Studies Diana, Leaving the Cult Divergent European Cult Policies Dr. Paul Martin—A Good Leader and a Wonderful Counselor Dreams of ISKCON Dysfunctional Churches Editor's Corner Employing Trafficking Laws to Capture Elusive Leaders of Destructive Cults Ethics of Evangelism European Muslims Evaluating Your Cult Involvement Exit Intervention: A New Approach to Saving Family Members From Destructive Groups Fair Game Families Helping Families Family Dynamics During a Cult Crisis Family Life In and Out of a Cult Fiabilidad Test-Retest y Validez Diagnostica Finding and Losing My Religion For Families Who Suspect That a Loved One May Be Involved With a High-Demand Group (Cult) Former Members and Health-Care Reform Forty Years in the Wilderness Free Speech and Cultic Litigation Interview With Attorney Peter Skolnik Free Speech Survey Report Freemen Soverign Citizens From Counterculture to Krishna Cult - Memories and Reflections From Deprogramming to Deradicalization From Deprogramming to Thought Reform Consultation From Survivor to Thriver From the Fire to a Blessing Field Fundamental Human Rights in ISKCON Getting Involved in a Cult Government, Thought Reform, and Native History Governments and Cults Groucho Marx and Cult Recovery Growing Up With Strictly Religious Parents Grupos de Manipulación Psicológica en Cataluña Her Critical Voice Wouldn't Die History and Purpose of Model Presentations History of the Wellspring Retreat and Resource Center House of Judah, the Northeast Kingdom Community, and 'the Jonestown Problem How a Dysfunctional Family Functions Like a Cult How Can Faith Communities Help Survivors of Spiritual Abuse? How Can Young People Protect Themselves Against Cults How Could Anyone Join a Cult How the United States Marine Corps Differs from Cults How to Find Information on a Group How We Rescued Our Daughter How You Can Use ICSA Resources to Help Yourself or a Loved One I Really Believed That This Way of Living Was Right ICSA Recovery Workshops: The Colorado Model Ideological Intransigence-Demo Centralism-Cultism If You Want To Know How I Got Brainwashed Impact on Children of Being Born Into/Raised in a Cultic Group Important Issues to Consider When Choosing a Spiritual Teacher Influence Influence of a Charismatic Antisocial Cult Leader Info-Cult at 35 Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned Inside the Walls of a Libertarian Ideology Interacting with Cults: Police Introduction to the Monograph Introduction to Traumatic Narcissism Issue Is Human Universal Energy a Cult Masquerader? Is Psychological Distress Among Former Cult Members Related to Psychological Abuse in the Cults Jones on Jesus Large Group Awareness Trainings Leaving a Cult for Music Legal Considerations Les rapports d'inspection des écoles privées Lessons From Adjacent Fields Cults and Radical Extremist Groups Lessons Learned Lessons Learned from SGAs about Recovery and Resiliency Lets Get Lost Letter to a Former Member Life After Centrepoint Litigating Against Cults in Japan Practical Issues Lost Love Manipulative Therapists Marriage After the Cult Mediating to Settle Conflicts in Cultic Groups Some Useful Methodologies Mental-Health Issues in Cult-Related Interventions Mommy, Did You Get to See the Dolphins Moving On: Dealing With Family Members Who Have Caused Us Harm My Perspective of Rosanne Henry and Leona Furnari's Presentation to the Annual SGA Workshop My Unexpected Journey My Voice Myth and Themes of Ex-Membership New Books on Polygamy New Religions and Public Policy On Breaking the Code of Silence On Dialogue Between the Two Tribes of Cultic Studies Researchers On Using the Term "Cult" Origins and Prevention of Abuse Overview: Support Groups Paradise and Promises Chronicles of My Life With a Self-Declared, Modern-Day Buddha Pathological Psychoanalysis Paul R Martin Memorial Lecture Peace at Last Physical Child Abuse in Sects Pink Slip! Pitfalls to Recovery Points for Pastors Post-Cult After Effects Post-Cult Financial Recovery Post-Cult Problems - Giambalvo Preliminary Taxonomy of Psychological Abuse Strategies Prevalence Preventing Cultic Deviations in Europe Preventing Cutic Deviations - Reply to Singelenberg Preventive Education - A North American Perspective Problem Solving An Approach Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse Psychiatric Association Statement on Repressed Memories Psychological Abuse: Theoretical and Measurement Issues Psychological Coercion and Human Rights Psychological Makeup of a Pakistani Muslim Suicide Bomber Psychological Manipulation, Hypnosis, and Suggestion Psychologists Survey Questionnaire Study Preliminary Report Questions and Answers about Memories of Childhood Abuse Raised in Cultic Groups Reading List: Undue Influence 101 Ready to Mine: Zen's Legitimating Mythology and Cultish Behavior Reasons for Leaving Rebuilding the Jigsaw Reclaiming Life Stories Recovery: From Victim to Survivor to Thriver Reflections on Post-Cult Recovery Reflection on the Life of Daphne (Lady) Vane Reject the Wicked Man Religion et Secte Religion Versus Cult Religion, Revisionists, and Revolutionary Suicide Religious Cults, Human Rights, and Public Policy: The Secular Perspective Religious Exemptions From Child Abuse Statutes Religious Justifications for Child Sexual Abuse in Cults Religious Liberty and New Religious Movements Reply to Dr Robbins Report of the Task Force Report of the Task Force Summary Research on Destructive Cults Research Survey on Spiritual Abuse Resisting the Pressure to Choose Between Parents Responding to Jihadism Retribing the Planet Shamanism Repurposed for Modern Times Saved by Our Son Second-Generation Religious Cult Survivors Implications for Counselors Sex Therapy With Former Cult Members Sexual Abuse and the Charismatic Crisis Sifting the Wheat from the Tares Sister My Sister Six Conditions Social Influences on Youth Some Things I Learned Spiritual Abuse Across the Spectrum of Christian Environments Spiritual Pain and Painkiller Spirituality Stairway to Heaven State Intervention Against The Baptist Church of Windsor Staying Safe: Observing Warning Signs of a Dangerous Liaison Supporting Human Rights Suppression of Free Speech Report on a Survey Survey Physicians Survivor Nineninethree Teaching Young People Ten Steps to Critical Thinking The ABCs of Dangerous Cults The Art of Hoping - Anonymous The Challenge of Defining Cult The Definitional Ambiguity of Cult The Ethics of Evangelism and Cult Recruitment The Genesis, Text, and Implications of Utah House Bill 214: Office for Vict The Gentle Wind Project The Grammatical Fiction The Heart of Cult Recovery: Compassion for the Self The History of Credibility Attacks Against Former Cult Members The Identity of Cult Members in the Narrative Aspect The Impact of a Modern-Day Polygamy Group on Women The Influence Continuum The Law to Protect Victims of Manipulation The Legion of Christ and Regnum Christi - A Parents Perspective The Marriage of the Lamb The Potential for Abuse in the Guru-Disciple Relationship The Relational System of the Traumatizing Narcissist The Results of the International Cultic Studies Association's 2008 Questionnaire The Role of Cognitive Distortion The Role of the Family The Spartiates As Charismatic Cult The Strategic Interaction Approach The Theory That Won't Go Away An Updated Review of the Role Hypnosis Plays in Mind Control The Unique Characteristics of Postcult Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Suggested Therapeutic Approaches.docx The Vatican Report: Sects or New Religious Movements Thought Reform Exists Thought Reform Programs Too Good to be True Teacher Tratamiento jurídico y policial de las dinámicas de persuasión coercitiva Traumatic Abuse in Cults Traumatic Abuse in Cults A Psychoanalytic Perspective Treatment of Satanism Un análisis de las estrategias y consecuencias del terrorismo Understanding Eastern Groups Urban Legends and Other Misconceptions Using Legal Analysis to Address Claims of Spiritual Abuse Vulnerability Weaponizing Therapy We Disagree—Let's Talk! Why Diversity and Dialogue Are Necessary, and How W We Weren't Crazy What Changed My Mind What Counselors Should Know About Cultic Dynamics What Do We Need to Know About Being Born or Raised in a Cultic Environment? What Impact Does Cult Involvement Have on a Member What Impact Does Cult Involvement Have on a Member's Family What Is a Cult What Is a Cult Definitional Preface What is Hypnosis What is New Age What Is Real? The Lure and Perils of Hidden Wisdom What Is the Impact of Leaving a Cultic Group What Messages Behind Cults When Critical Thinking Doesn't Help Why It Fails and How to Make It Happen When Endings Are Beginnings David's Story When the Cult Leader Hoists a Whilte Flag When You're Asked About Cults Why Cults Are Harmful Neurobiological Speculations Why Did I Endure Why I Had to Escape a Fundamentalist Cult Why We Need To Become Spiritual Consumers Wild Geese Working with Cult-affected Families Writing Betrayal of the Spirit You Do Not Have to Be a Fool to Be Fooled Zealotry and American Identity Zen and the Art of Student Abuse Zen and the Art of Winning in Court Books Links Bookstore ICSA Book Reviews Arts Joan Capellini Scholarship Fund Contact ICSA Member Portal 404 The page you have entered does not exist Go to site home Report abuse Report abuse

Springbok

https://www.britannica.com/animal/springbok-mammal

[References & Edit History](https://www.britannica.com/animal/springbok-mammal/additional-info) [Quick Facts & Related Topics](/facts/springbok-mammal) springbok Our editors will review what you've submitted and determine whether to revise the article. - Also called: - springbuck - Related Topics: [South Africa](/place/South-Africa) [antelope](/animal/antelope-mammal) springbok, (Antidorcas marsupialis), graceful, strikingly marked [antelope](https://www.britannica.com/animal/antelope-mammal) of the [gazelle](https://www.britannica.com/animal/gazelle) tribe, Antilopini (family [Bovidae](https://www.britannica.com/animal/bovid), order [Artiodactyla](https://www.britannica.com/animal/artiodactyl)). The springbok is native to the open, treeless plains of southern Africa. It once roamed in enormous herds but is now much reduced in numbers. It is the symbol and nickname of the national rugby team of [South Africa](https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Africa). Although closely related to true gazelles (genus Gazella), the springbok is placed in a separate [genus](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/genus) because of a unique structure on its back that it displays when excited, consisting of a patch of white hair that is normally hidden beneath a skin fold but is erected during a special form of jumping known as pronking. The species name marsupialis refers to this concealed organ, which also happens to be lined with sebaceous scent glands. [ Britannica Quiz Wild Words from the Animal Kingdom Vocabulary Quiz ](/quiz/wild-words-from-the-animal-kingdom-vocabulary-quiz) Native to southwest Africa, where it is the most abundant plains antelope, the springbok was once a dominant migrating species, along with the black [wildebeest](https://www.britannica.com/animal/gnu) and the [blesbok](https://www.britannica.com/animal/blesbok), in South Africa's vast Highveld and [Karoo](https://www.britannica.com/place/Karoo) regions, where it is still common on the farms and ranches that have subdivided and transformed this [vast](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/vast) ecosystem. Migratory populations of springbok still exist in [Botswana's](https://www.britannica.com/place/Botswana) [Kalahari](https://www.britannica.com/place/Kalahari-Desert) and in the subdesert and desert of [Namibia](https://www.britannica.com/place/Namibia) and southwestern [Angola](https://www.britannica.com/place/Angola). Of the several recognized subspecies, which are adapted to different climatic and ecological conditions, the Highveld-Karoo variety (Antidorcas marsupialis marsupialis) is the smallest, and the variety of Namibia's Kaokoveld (A. marsupialis hofmeyri) is the largest. Its shoulder height is 69–87 cm (27–34 inches), and its weight is 27–48 kg (59–106 pounds). The heavily ringed horns are 35–49 cm (14–19 inches) in length (smaller and thinner in females) and have an unusual stethoscope shape with hooked tips pointing inward. The coat is pale to rich cinnamon brown with [extensive](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/extensive) areas of white including the head, ears, underparts, backs of legs, rump, and tail. A heavy black side stripe, narrow cheek stripe, and tail tip contrast with the white markings. A mixed feeder comparable to Thomson's gazelle, the springbok grazes during the rainy season and browses on foliage, forbs, and tsama melons during the dry season. It drinks when water is available but can subsist indefinitely on browse with a water content of at least 10 percent. Springboks have an annual [rut](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/rut) that commences at the end of the rainy season when the animals are in peak condition; most young are born six months later in the spring, October and November, shortly before the rainy season begins. However, the timing may vary by as much as two months, reflecting the springbok's adaptive response to the variability of arid climates. Females conceive as early as six to seven months of age, whereas males take two years to mature. Rutting males defend territories of 25–70 hectares (62–173 acres) with loud grunts, attacking vegetation with their horns and depositing middens of urine and dung in a ritualized display. Outside of the mating season, females and males often occur in mixed herds, which [aggregate](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregate) at water holes and at bursts of vegetation created by local thunderstorms. Although the spinal crest of white hair can be erected independently and pronking can be performed without unfolding the crest, the full display combines high, stiff-legged bounds with bowed back and lowered neck, during which the hair of the rump patch and spinal crest merge to form a big white patch. Springboks have been clocked at 88 km (55 miles) per hour, as fast as any gazelle, but they can be outrun by [cheetahs](https://www.britannica.com/animal/cheetah-mammal) over a short distance and by wild [dogs](https://www.britannica.com/animal/canine) over a long distance. [Richard Estes](/contributor/Richard-Estes/5118)

Orthoptera

https://www.britannica.com/animal/orthopteran

[References & Edit History](https://www.britannica.com/animal/orthopteran/additional-info) [Related Topics](/facts/orthopteran) orthopteran Our editors will review what you've submitted and determine whether to revise the article. - Related Topics: [ice bug](/animal/ice-bug) [phasmid](/animal/phasmid) [Orthoptera](/animal/Orthoptera) [Dictyoptera](/animal/Dictyoptera) [Exopterygota](/animal/Exopterygota) orthopteran, broadly, any member of one of four [insect](https://www.britannica.com/animal/insect) orders. Orthopteran has come to be regarded as the common name for these related groups, which exhibit considerable morphological, physiological, and paleontological [diversity](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diversity). Although sometimes the insects are combined into the order Orthoptera, several orders are generally implied in the term orthopteran. Among the orthopterans, [cockroaches](https://www.britannica.com/animal/cockroach-insect) and [mantids](https://www.britannica.com/animal/mantid) are placed in the order Dictyoptera, although they are sometimes placed in Blattodea and Mantodea, respectively, which may be considered as separate orders or as suborders of Dictyoptera. The grylloblattids (order [Grylloblattodea](https://www.britannica.com/animal/ice-bug)) and [walking sticks](https://www.britannica.com/animal/walkingstick) (order Phasmida) are given ordinal rank also. On the other hand, members of the suborders Ensifera ( [katydids](https://www.britannica.com/animal/long-horned-grasshopper), [crickets](https://www.britannica.com/animal/cricket-insect), and camel crickets) and Caelifera ( [pygmy sand crickets](https://www.britannica.com/animal/pygmy-sand-cricket), [grasshoppers](https://www.britannica.com/animal/grasshopper-insect), and [locusts](https://www.britannica.com/animal/locust-insect)) are considered to [comprise](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comprise) the order Orthoptera. For completeness of discussion, all of these groups, handled here as four separate orders, are included in this article. Orthopterans, abundant in tropical regions throughout the world in both numbers of species and individuals, are common in the summer months in temperate regions, when their relatively large size and chirping sounds attract considerable attention. Zoologists have long been interested in cockroaches, one of the oldest insect groups known. Most of the 24,000 species of orthopterans are plant feeders, with mouthparts adapted for chewing. Locusts, known as pests since biblical times, are very destructive to agricultural products. General features Orthopterans may be [bizarre](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/bizarre) in appearance, unusually large in size, or show peculiar behaviour. They range in size from a few millimetres to more than 30 centimetres. Some tropical walking sticks resembling tree twigs are more than 30 centimetres (11.8 inches) long, and others, much smaller, resemble leaves of plants. The size range of present-day cockroaches is typical of the diversity of body size among orthopterans: tiny flightless cockroaches (Attaphila), living as commensals in the nests of ants, are only two millimetres long when mature, whereas a species of Megaloblatta found in [South America](https://www.britannica.com/place/South-America) reaches 10 centimetres in length with a wing span of almost 19 centimetres. [ Britannica Quiz Match the Baby Animal to Its Mama Quiz ](/quiz/match-the-baby-animal-to-its-mama-quiz) Approximately 24,000 species of orthopterans have been identified. Throughout the U.S. there are about 1,300 species; not all of them [inhabit](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/inhabit) any one place. There are more species (e.g., 282 in Arizona) in southern and southwestern sections of the U.S. than in the North (e.g., 103 in all the [New England](https://www.britannica.com/place/New-England) states). Of the 600 species found in Europe, Great Britain has only 35, including four established, introduced species (adventives). The largest families of orthopterans are worldwide in range, although all have decreased numbers of species in cold temperate zones. Few mantids or walking sticks, for example, occur outside tropical or subtropical areas. There are about 20 mantid species and 27 walking stick species in the southern regions of the U.S., compared with the 400 mantid species and 600 walking stick species that have been identified in Central and South America. A few northern groups include the grylloblattids and several [genera](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/genera) of grasshoppers. Importance Among the orthopterans are many species that are either harmful to agricultural products or are [pests](https://www.britannica.com/science/pest-vermin). Grasshoppers are capable of causing widespread devastation of the agricultural crops grown in many countries throughout the world. In cattle-growing regions there often is competition between grasshoppers and livestock for available forage. [Mormon crickets](https://www.britannica.com/animal/Mormon-cricket) (a common name for species of the genus Anabrus that originated during the early years of the Mormon settlement in Utah) are major pests of both crops and open rangeland in the western part of the U.S. during seasons that are favourable for their development. Cockroaches, known throughout the world as domestic pests, are a frequent [nuisance](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/nuisance), especially in warm-temperate to tropical areas. Although cockroaches occasionally carry organisms such as bacteria or parasites that produce intestinal diseases, they are more generally considered to be mechanical carriers of contaminating filth. Mantids, predators on other insects, have become adapted to resemble the flowers, tree trunks, or grass stems on which they await their prey. Crickets, katydids, and grasshoppers are known for the songs they produce using stridulatory mechanisms, and research concerned with song production is an active field. The biology of [migratory](https://www.britannica.com/science/migration-animal) grasshoppers or locusts involves hormones that promote transformation of nonmigratory, solitary, shorthorned grasshoppers into [gregarious](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gregarious) hordes of locusts capable of causing great destruction. This transformation has been studied in attempts to control these pests.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.businessinsider.co.za/rand-trading-has-increased-by-182-most-of-it-is-outside-south-africa-2020-1

[AOC wants to impeach SCOTUS justices following Trump immunity ruling](/aoc-impeachment-articles-supreme-court-trump-immunity-ruling-2024-7) [The top arguments for — and against — Biden dropping out of the race](/joe-biden-drop-out-reasons-for-against-2024-7) [It's suddenly a whole lot harder to get a promotion](/promotions-salaries-cut-career-advancement-stagnation-2024-7) [Italian officials will pay up to $32,000 for you to move to Tuscany — but there's a catch](/italy-pays-to-move-tuscany-residence-in-mountains-2024-6) [SCOTUS decision would give Trump the immunity to run rampant just in time for a possible 2nd term: experts](/scotus-would-let-second-term-president-trump-run-rampant-experts-2024-7) [Biden warns that the Supreme Court has fundamentally changed the country with its immunity ruling](/biden-warns-scotus-fundamentally-changed-the-country-in-immunity-ruling-2024-7) [Nordstrom Anniversary Sale preview, including editor-favorite deals you can shop now](/guides/deals/nordstrom-anniversary-sale-dates-early-access-and-deals-2024) [A chip war over Taiwan will put Nvidia and Apple in a tight spot](/ai-taiwan-china-chip-war-2024-6) [The shadowy new way employees are cheating their way to the top](/shadow-stand-ins-workers-secretly-outsourcing-their-jobs-2024-6) [](/trump-tests-limits-scotus-immunity-ruling-wants-manhattan-conviction-tossed-2024-7) [Trump is already testing the limits of the SCOTUS immunity ruling](/trump-tests-limits-scotus-immunity-ruling-wants-manhattan-conviction-tossed-2024-7) Trump wants his criminal conviction in the New York hush-money trial thrown out after the Supreme Court handed him a big win on presidential immunity. [](/apples-iphone-16-heres-what-we-know-ai-battery-i2024-7) [The iPhone 16 is less than 3 months away — here's what to expect](/apples-iphone-16-heres-what-we-know-ai-battery-i2024-7) [](/man-arrested-charged-shooting-delivery-drone-retailer-challenge-2024-7) [Police say a man shot a Walmart drone. Armed Americans could pose a headache for air deliveries.](/man-arrested-charged-shooting-delivery-drone-retailer-challenge-2024-7) [](/kevin-costner-horizon-box-office-numbers-yellowstone-analysis-2024-7) [Kevin Costner mortgaged his home and put $38 million of his own money into 'Horizon.' Box-office numbers suggest this was a terrible idea.](/kevin-costner-horizon-box-office-numbers-yellowstone-analysis-2024-7) [](https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/ai-stocks-to-invest-artificial-intelligence-data-center-energy-companies-2024-6) [The big winners of the AI boom are the most boring companies imaginable](https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/ai-stocks-to-invest-artificial-intelligence-data-center-energy-companies-2024-6) [](/chicken-soup-for-soul-decline-of-americas-most-influential-brands-2024-3) [The long, strange decline of one of America's most influential brands](/chicken-soup-for-soul-decline-of-americas-most-influential-brands-2024-3) [](/red-flags-how-to-spot-good-italian-restaurant-from-chef) [The 5 red flags a chef looks out for when dining at a high-end Italian restaurant](/red-flags-how-to-spot-good-italian-restaurant-from-chef) [](/bear-season-three-salaries-restaurant-workers-chicago-carmy-syndey-richie-2024-6) [Here's what the cast of 'The Bear' would actually make working at their restaurant](/bear-season-three-salaries-restaurant-workers-chicago-carmy-syndey-richie-2024-6) Season three of "The Bear" may have you saying "yes, chef," but here's how much the staff would actually make in today's world. [](/giant-phantom-jellyfish-rare-viking-cruise-submersible-2024-6) [A luxury Viking cruise ship helped scientists encounter the rarely-seen giant phantom jellyfish ](/giant-phantom-jellyfish-rare-viking-cruise-submersible-2024-6) Tourists in a submersible witnessed a rarely seen giant phantom jellyfish during a Viking cruise to Antarctica. The ships marry luxury and science. [](/old-photos-how-tech-ceos-looked-starting-company-compared-now) [See how different Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and other tech CEOs looked when they first started their companies](/old-photos-how-tech-ceos-looked-starting-company-compared-now) Many Big Tech CEOs shed more nerdy personas from their companies' early days. Here's a look at tech's biggest names then and now. [](/is-gentle-parenting-making-me-a-pushover-2024-7) [Gentle parenting isn't easy](/is-gentle-parenting-making-me-a-pushover-2024-7) I'm not intentionally gentle parenting, but I also want to have a relationship with my kid. I think parenting older kids is easier.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.futuregrowth.co.za/insights/sa-s-agriculture-sector-a-key-driver-of-economic-growth/

Responsible Investing: A Fixed Income Perspective [View More](https://www.futuregrowth.co.za/insights/responsible-investing-a-fixed-income-perspective5) Futuregrowth is eager to support this vision, through responsible investment in the sector, that yields an appropriate risk-adjusted return for our client funds. In the wake of the Land Bank saga - which in April 2020 saw the biggest agricultural funder in the country default on its debt, precipitating a severe liquidity challenge - the SA agricultural market is in need of alternative sources of funding. Land Bank once funded close to 30% of agricultural debt in the country, without which we risk a loss of employment in the sector, loss of GDP and export revenue, and rising food inflation if we become more reliant on imported foods. We have embarked on a strategic initiative at Futuregrowth to grow our presence in the agricultural sector from both a debt and an equity perspective, alongside a broader strategy to support infrastructure investment across various critical sectors of the economy. 1. Volatility influenced by climate change, political actions, and social change, amongst other factors. Variable weather conditions and climate change cause a fluctuation in yields, which impacts local and global supply dynamics. This creates volatility in volumes and crop prices. Geopolitical influences and government actions: Global supply and demand pressures emerge when governments take actions to subsidise production (as is evident in the EU and USA) or when they ban exports due to concerns about domestic supplies (this has been known to occur in Russia). Another significant global influence is China, with the US-China trade tensions being a recent source of volatility for certain agricultural commodities. Locally, policy uncertainty around land expropriation has had an impact on the ability to access capital investment in the sector. Changing consumer preferences due to lifestyle and social factors shift demand away from certain product groups in favour of others[2]. 2. Complexity: Agriculture is not homogenous - there are many different crops and food types, each with their own unique and fragmented supply chains. There is diversity within each crop, in terms of how and where it is produced, and by whom. The complexity is intensified by environmental factors, which influence regional and yearly production and are difficult to accurately predict. 3. Scrutiny: Role players in the agriculture and food value chain are under pressure to improve the traceability of (and information about) the food we eat. Consumers are rightfully becoming more conscious about the content and safety of our food, together with how it is produced and the environmental and social impacts of this. Notwithstanding these complexities, agriculture is widely anticipated to be a key driver of economic growth both locally and internationally. Within a troubled global economy, the agriculture and food value chain sectors remain a strong outlier, driven by population growth, urbanisation and the rise of the middle class. South Africa has a highly diversified, market-oriented agricultural economy that extends across various product ranges, including all major grains (except rice), oilseeds, deciduous and subtropical fruits, sugar, citrus, wine, most vegetables, livestock, and a well-developed poultry and egg industry. Value-added activities include the processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables, dairy products, livestock and grain mill products, amongst others. The outstanding performance of the sector last year - with growth in all four quarters - was in sharp contrast to other sectors of the economy. Stats SA reported growth in agricultural GDP of 5.9%[3] in the fourth quarter of 2020, bringing the overall agricultural GDP growth to 13.1% year-on-year (relative to a 7% economic contraction for the country as a whole). This outperformance was underpinned by high levels of agricultural output following favourable production conditions (on the back of a La Nina weather pattern); high commodity prices; strong export demand; and a favourable rand exchange rate. The sector was also classified as an essential service, allowing it to remain operational during the lockdowns. The SA agricultural sector remains a net exporter, with exportable volumes of various commodities growing annually, subject to weather conditions. In 2020, SA's agricultural exports hit $10.2 billion, a 3% increase from the prior year and the second largest level on record. At the same time, agricultural imports fell 8%, leading to a 26% annual increase in the agricultural trade surplus, which widened to $4.3 billion in 2020. The top 10 export products were citrus, grapes, wine, apples and pears, maize, nuts, sugar, wool and fruit juices, with Africa and Europe serving as the largest markets for SA agricultural exports (followed closely by Asia). Citrus, as a sub-sector, experienced a notable increase in demand due to the pandemic-related demand for Vitamin C. Citrus exports hit a record high in 2020, with SA cementing its position as the second-largest exporter of fresh citrus in the world, after Spain. This follows a period of citrus production growth in response to a spike in global demand (especially for soft citrus and lemons) and the attractive investment returns and profit margins. This growth in citrus demand is expected to be sustained throughout 2021 and beyond. Favourable weather has resulted in increased summer crop plantings, raising the prospect of an even larger maize harvest than in 2019/2020. Industry estimates suggest the country could export 2.8 million tons of maize in 2021/2022, the largest volume since the 1994/1995 season. SA wine grape production is also expected to be larger than in 2020, and there is general optimism about the 2021 harvest in the horticulture subsector, as well as in other field crops. The Citrus Growers' Association (CGA) recently indicated that the SA citrus industry is likely to break all previous export season records with an estimated 158.7 million cartons in 2021, up from 146 million cartons in 2020. The high yields and positive prospects for the sector should curtail food and overall consumer inflation - and enhance the sector's contribution to GDP. The anticipated growth in agricultural exports from SA is however likely to place pressure on the country's logistics infrastructure, from handling facilities to transport (road and rail) and the shipping ports. Industry players (such as the CGA) have expressed concern over the country's logistics systems, after struggling with port congestion and a shortage of refrigeration equipment in recent years. The expected bumper harvest in 2021, and the long-term prospects for this key sector require that we overcome current operational inefficiencies and avoid those that might erupt in future. We need an efficient and cost-effective logistics industry that can facilitate the movement of commodities, not only between SA provinces, but also to export markets. This presents an opportunity for infrastructure investment in the sector. The bullish outlook for the sector, in an otherwise strained post-COVID economy, also presents an opportunity for agricultural R&D. In line with global trends to meet the rising food demand driven by population growth, agricultural R&D in SA could contribute towards higher yields and lower post-harvest losses. Many regions globally have reached their agricultural land expansion frontiers, such that increasing agricultural output requires increased productivity. Optimising yields through intensive input use, new cultivars and better production practices will hopefully increase agricultural sustainability and resilience in the longer term. A growing focal area for R&D, according to agricultural economist Dr Thulasizwe Mkhabela, relates to zoonotic diseases, food-borne pathogens, and vaccine development for livestock diseases. There is also scope for the development of digital innovations in the SA agricultural sector (agri-tech), particularly those that address the constraints and needs of smallholder farmers. If unchecked, the negative impacts of agricultural development that prioritises maximum productivity by exploiting natural resources while disregarding the complex hidden costs (financial and otherwise) of food production, will prevent us from meeting our growing demand for food and fibre on a sustainable basis. The long-term health of the agricultural sector relies heavily on the sustainability of farming methods. Farming practices must not only ensure profitable yields but also the wellbeing of the factors of production: the environment, the farm workers and the surrounding communities. In seeking institutional investment, agri-businesses must also ensure that their governance structures; financial reporting systems and processes; risk management frameworks and internal control environments are investment ready and can be held up to scrutiny. One of the greatest uncertainties facing SA agriculture in recent years has been around the implementation of land reform. The general perception is that government's execution of land reform strategies has been poor, resulting in various failures. Without a clear land reform policy framework that is well-executed, the inequalities of the past will continue to increase - and we run the risk that the core of the commercial agricultural sector, which is a key driving force of the economy and food security in the country, will collapse. In October 2020 the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development announced that the government would be making 896 farms (totaling 700 000 hectares of under-utilised or vacant agricultural State land) available for emerging farmers. This is part of government's contribution to the land reform programme, which has seen 135 117 hectares of land released under 30-year leases to selected emerging farmers since February 2020, with women and youth being prioritised in the beneficiary selection. I view this as positive. That said, robust and transparent criteria for awarding the land is critical to create confidence in a corruption-free process. Further, availing government land is one step, but other important aspects will be: 1. the readiness of the beneficiaries to farm, i.e. their know-how of farming; and 2. the ability of the farmers to access the necessary resources, such as finance and infrastructure. Mentoring and support will be crucial to set the beneficiaries up for success. Further, for emerging farmers to access capital to develop their land, we need blended finance models to be developed between government and the private sector - and for these to be implemented as soon as possible. Strong public-private partnerships will be crucial to the success of the reform initiatives. Overall, we at Futuregrowth are cautiously optimistic about the South African agricultural sector and its ability to be a source of future GDP growth. Despite the effects of the COVID pandemic, no major structural changes in the demand for food are expected on a global level over the next decade. Population growth continues to drive increased absolute demand, although individual countries will experience different trajectories in the demand for specific commodities. Implementation risk continues to threaten the SA government's efforts to reform the sector. Consumers are expected to increasingly emphasise safety, reliability of quality and supply, and ethics in food production systems. We see areas for investment opportunity in agri-tech; agriculture and food value-chain-related logistics and infrastructure; and in thriving agricultural sub-sectors such as citrus production and export, amongst others. [4] Environmental, social and governance (factors) [3] Annualised, seasonally-adjusted quarterly [2] E.g. we expect to see a shift away from red meat in developed countries due to environmental concerns and perceptions about health, whereas rising consumer incomes in developing countries are expected to have the opposite effect. [1] [http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf](http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf)

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.futuregrowth.co.za/insights/sa-s-agriculture-sector-a-key-driver-of-economic-growth/

Responsible Investing: A Fixed Income Perspective [View More](https://www.futuregrowth.co.za/insights/responsible-investing-a-fixed-income-perspective5) Futuregrowth is eager to support this vision, through responsible investment in the sector, that yields an appropriate risk-adjusted return for our client funds. In the wake of the Land Bank saga - which in April 2020 saw the biggest agricultural funder in the country default on its debt, precipitating a severe liquidity challenge - the SA agricultural market is in need of alternative sources of funding. Land Bank once funded close to 30% of agricultural debt in the country, without which we risk a loss of employment in the sector, loss of GDP and export revenue, and rising food inflation if we become more reliant on imported foods. We have embarked on a strategic initiative at Futuregrowth to grow our presence in the agricultural sector from both a debt and an equity perspective, alongside a broader strategy to support infrastructure investment across various critical sectors of the economy. 1. Volatility influenced by climate change, political actions, and social change, amongst other factors. Variable weather conditions and climate change cause a fluctuation in yields, which impacts local and global supply dynamics. This creates volatility in volumes and crop prices. Geopolitical influences and government actions: Global supply and demand pressures emerge when governments take actions to subsidise production (as is evident in the EU and USA) or when they ban exports due to concerns about domestic supplies (this has been known to occur in Russia). Another significant global influence is China, with the US-China trade tensions being a recent source of volatility for certain agricultural commodities. Locally, policy uncertainty around land expropriation has had an impact on the ability to access capital investment in the sector. Changing consumer preferences due to lifestyle and social factors shift demand away from certain product groups in favour of others[2]. 2. Complexity: Agriculture is not homogenous - there are many different crops and food types, each with their own unique and fragmented supply chains. There is diversity within each crop, in terms of how and where it is produced, and by whom. The complexity is intensified by environmental factors, which influence regional and yearly production and are difficult to accurately predict. 3. Scrutiny: Role players in the agriculture and food value chain are under pressure to improve the traceability of (and information about) the food we eat. Consumers are rightfully becoming more conscious about the content and safety of our food, together with how it is produced and the environmental and social impacts of this. Notwithstanding these complexities, agriculture is widely anticipated to be a key driver of economic growth both locally and internationally. Within a troubled global economy, the agriculture and food value chain sectors remain a strong outlier, driven by population growth, urbanisation and the rise of the middle class. South Africa has a highly diversified, market-oriented agricultural economy that extends across various product ranges, including all major grains (except rice), oilseeds, deciduous and subtropical fruits, sugar, citrus, wine, most vegetables, livestock, and a well-developed poultry and egg industry. Value-added activities include the processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables, dairy products, livestock and grain mill products, amongst others. The outstanding performance of the sector last year - with growth in all four quarters - was in sharp contrast to other sectors of the economy. Stats SA reported growth in agricultural GDP of 5.9%[3] in the fourth quarter of 2020, bringing the overall agricultural GDP growth to 13.1% year-on-year (relative to a 7% economic contraction for the country as a whole). This outperformance was underpinned by high levels of agricultural output following favourable production conditions (on the back of a La Nina weather pattern); high commodity prices; strong export demand; and a favourable rand exchange rate. The sector was also classified as an essential service, allowing it to remain operational during the lockdowns. The SA agricultural sector remains a net exporter, with exportable volumes of various commodities growing annually, subject to weather conditions. In 2020, SA's agricultural exports hit $10.2 billion, a 3% increase from the prior year and the second largest level on record. At the same time, agricultural imports fell 8%, leading to a 26% annual increase in the agricultural trade surplus, which widened to $4.3 billion in 2020. The top 10 export products were citrus, grapes, wine, apples and pears, maize, nuts, sugar, wool and fruit juices, with Africa and Europe serving as the largest markets for SA agricultural exports (followed closely by Asia). Citrus, as a sub-sector, experienced a notable increase in demand due to the pandemic-related demand for Vitamin C. Citrus exports hit a record high in 2020, with SA cementing its position as the second-largest exporter of fresh citrus in the world, after Spain. This follows a period of citrus production growth in response to a spike in global demand (especially for soft citrus and lemons) and the attractive investment returns and profit margins. This growth in citrus demand is expected to be sustained throughout 2021 and beyond. Favourable weather has resulted in increased summer crop plantings, raising the prospect of an even larger maize harvest than in 2019/2020. Industry estimates suggest the country could export 2.8 million tons of maize in 2021/2022, the largest volume since the 1994/1995 season. SA wine grape production is also expected to be larger than in 2020, and there is general optimism about the 2021 harvest in the horticulture subsector, as well as in other field crops. The Citrus Growers' Association (CGA) recently indicated that the SA citrus industry is likely to break all previous export season records with an estimated 158.7 million cartons in 2021, up from 146 million cartons in 2020. The high yields and positive prospects for the sector should curtail food and overall consumer inflation - and enhance the sector's contribution to GDP. The anticipated growth in agricultural exports from SA is however likely to place pressure on the country's logistics infrastructure, from handling facilities to transport (road and rail) and the shipping ports. Industry players (such as the CGA) have expressed concern over the country's logistics systems, after struggling with port congestion and a shortage of refrigeration equipment in recent years. The expected bumper harvest in 2021, and the long-term prospects for this key sector require that we overcome current operational inefficiencies and avoid those that might erupt in future. We need an efficient and cost-effective logistics industry that can facilitate the movement of commodities, not only between SA provinces, but also to export markets. This presents an opportunity for infrastructure investment in the sector. The bullish outlook for the sector, in an otherwise strained post-COVID economy, also presents an opportunity for agricultural R&D. In line with global trends to meet the rising food demand driven by population growth, agricultural R&D in SA could contribute towards higher yields and lower post-harvest losses. Many regions globally have reached their agricultural land expansion frontiers, such that increasing agricultural output requires increased productivity. Optimising yields through intensive input use, new cultivars and better production practices will hopefully increase agricultural sustainability and resilience in the longer term. A growing focal area for R&D, according to agricultural economist Dr Thulasizwe Mkhabela, relates to zoonotic diseases, food-borne pathogens, and vaccine development for livestock diseases. There is also scope for the development of digital innovations in the SA agricultural sector (agri-tech), particularly those that address the constraints and needs of smallholder farmers. If unchecked, the negative impacts of agricultural development that prioritises maximum productivity by exploiting natural resources while disregarding the complex hidden costs (financial and otherwise) of food production, will prevent us from meeting our growing demand for food and fibre on a sustainable basis. The long-term health of the agricultural sector relies heavily on the sustainability of farming methods. Farming practices must not only ensure profitable yields but also the wellbeing of the factors of production: the environment, the farm workers and the surrounding communities. In seeking institutional investment, agri-businesses must also ensure that their governance structures; financial reporting systems and processes; risk management frameworks and internal control environments are investment ready and can be held up to scrutiny. One of the greatest uncertainties facing SA agriculture in recent years has been around the implementation of land reform. The general perception is that government's execution of land reform strategies has been poor, resulting in various failures. Without a clear land reform policy framework that is well-executed, the inequalities of the past will continue to increase - and we run the risk that the core of the commercial agricultural sector, which is a key driving force of the economy and food security in the country, will collapse. In October 2020 the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development announced that the government would be making 896 farms (totaling 700 000 hectares of under-utilised or vacant agricultural State land) available for emerging farmers. This is part of government's contribution to the land reform programme, which has seen 135 117 hectares of land released under 30-year leases to selected emerging farmers since February 2020, with women and youth being prioritised in the beneficiary selection. I view this as positive. That said, robust and transparent criteria for awarding the land is critical to create confidence in a corruption-free process. Further, availing government land is one step, but other important aspects will be: 1. the readiness of the beneficiaries to farm, i.e. their know-how of farming; and 2. the ability of the farmers to access the necessary resources, such as finance and infrastructure. Mentoring and support will be crucial to set the beneficiaries up for success. Further, for emerging farmers to access capital to develop their land, we need blended finance models to be developed between government and the private sector - and for these to be implemented as soon as possible. Strong public-private partnerships will be crucial to the success of the reform initiatives. Overall, we at Futuregrowth are cautiously optimistic about the South African agricultural sector and its ability to be a source of future GDP growth. Despite the effects of the COVID pandemic, no major structural changes in the demand for food are expected on a global level over the next decade. Population growth continues to drive increased absolute demand, although individual countries will experience different trajectories in the demand for specific commodities. Implementation risk continues to threaten the SA government's efforts to reform the sector. Consumers are expected to increasingly emphasise safety, reliability of quality and supply, and ethics in food production systems. We see areas for investment opportunity in agri-tech; agriculture and food value-chain-related logistics and infrastructure; and in thriving agricultural sub-sectors such as citrus production and export, amongst others. [4] Environmental, social and governance (factors) [3] Annualised, seasonally-adjusted quarterly [2] E.g. we expect to see a shift away from red meat in developed countries due to environmental concerns and perceptions about health, whereas rising consumer incomes in developing countries are expected to have the opposite effect. [1] [http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf](http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf)

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.futuregrowth.co.za/insights/sa-s-agriculture-sector-a-key-driver-of-economic-growth/

Responsible Investing: A Fixed Income Perspective [View More](https://www.futuregrowth.co.za/insights/responsible-investing-a-fixed-income-perspective5) Futuregrowth is eager to support this vision, through responsible investment in the sector, that yields an appropriate risk-adjusted return for our client funds. In the wake of the Land Bank saga - which in April 2020 saw the biggest agricultural funder in the country default on its debt, precipitating a severe liquidity challenge - the SA agricultural market is in need of alternative sources of funding. Land Bank once funded close to 30% of agricultural debt in the country, without which we risk a loss of employment in the sector, loss of GDP and export revenue, and rising food inflation if we become more reliant on imported foods. We have embarked on a strategic initiative at Futuregrowth to grow our presence in the agricultural sector from both a debt and an equity perspective, alongside a broader strategy to support infrastructure investment across various critical sectors of the economy. 1. Volatility influenced by climate change, political actions, and social change, amongst other factors. Variable weather conditions and climate change cause a fluctuation in yields, which impacts local and global supply dynamics. This creates volatility in volumes and crop prices. Geopolitical influences and government actions: Global supply and demand pressures emerge when governments take actions to subsidise production (as is evident in the EU and USA) or when they ban exports due to concerns about domestic supplies (this has been known to occur in Russia). Another significant global influence is China, with the US-China trade tensions being a recent source of volatility for certain agricultural commodities. Locally, policy uncertainty around land expropriation has had an impact on the ability to access capital investment in the sector. Changing consumer preferences due to lifestyle and social factors shift demand away from certain product groups in favour of others[2]. 2. Complexity: Agriculture is not homogenous - there are many different crops and food types, each with their own unique and fragmented supply chains. There is diversity within each crop, in terms of how and where it is produced, and by whom. The complexity is intensified by environmental factors, which influence regional and yearly production and are difficult to accurately predict. 3. Scrutiny: Role players in the agriculture and food value chain are under pressure to improve the traceability of (and information about) the food we eat. Consumers are rightfully becoming more conscious about the content and safety of our food, together with how it is produced and the environmental and social impacts of this. Notwithstanding these complexities, agriculture is widely anticipated to be a key driver of economic growth both locally and internationally. Within a troubled global economy, the agriculture and food value chain sectors remain a strong outlier, driven by population growth, urbanisation and the rise of the middle class. South Africa has a highly diversified, market-oriented agricultural economy that extends across various product ranges, including all major grains (except rice), oilseeds, deciduous and subtropical fruits, sugar, citrus, wine, most vegetables, livestock, and a well-developed poultry and egg industry. Value-added activities include the processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables, dairy products, livestock and grain mill products, amongst others. The outstanding performance of the sector last year - with growth in all four quarters - was in sharp contrast to other sectors of the economy. Stats SA reported growth in agricultural GDP of 5.9%[3] in the fourth quarter of 2020, bringing the overall agricultural GDP growth to 13.1% year-on-year (relative to a 7% economic contraction for the country as a whole). This outperformance was underpinned by high levels of agricultural output following favourable production conditions (on the back of a La Nina weather pattern); high commodity prices; strong export demand; and a favourable rand exchange rate. The sector was also classified as an essential service, allowing it to remain operational during the lockdowns. The SA agricultural sector remains a net exporter, with exportable volumes of various commodities growing annually, subject to weather conditions. In 2020, SA's agricultural exports hit $10.2 billion, a 3% increase from the prior year and the second largest level on record. At the same time, agricultural imports fell 8%, leading to a 26% annual increase in the agricultural trade surplus, which widened to $4.3 billion in 2020. The top 10 export products were citrus, grapes, wine, apples and pears, maize, nuts, sugar, wool and fruit juices, with Africa and Europe serving as the largest markets for SA agricultural exports (followed closely by Asia). Citrus, as a sub-sector, experienced a notable increase in demand due to the pandemic-related demand for Vitamin C. Citrus exports hit a record high in 2020, with SA cementing its position as the second-largest exporter of fresh citrus in the world, after Spain. This follows a period of citrus production growth in response to a spike in global demand (especially for soft citrus and lemons) and the attractive investment returns and profit margins. This growth in citrus demand is expected to be sustained throughout 2021 and beyond. Favourable weather has resulted in increased summer crop plantings, raising the prospect of an even larger maize harvest than in 2019/2020. Industry estimates suggest the country could export 2.8 million tons of maize in 2021/2022, the largest volume since the 1994/1995 season. SA wine grape production is also expected to be larger than in 2020, and there is general optimism about the 2021 harvest in the horticulture subsector, as well as in other field crops. The Citrus Growers' Association (CGA) recently indicated that the SA citrus industry is likely to break all previous export season records with an estimated 158.7 million cartons in 2021, up from 146 million cartons in 2020. The high yields and positive prospects for the sector should curtail food and overall consumer inflation - and enhance the sector's contribution to GDP. The anticipated growth in agricultural exports from SA is however likely to place pressure on the country's logistics infrastructure, from handling facilities to transport (road and rail) and the shipping ports. Industry players (such as the CGA) have expressed concern over the country's logistics systems, after struggling with port congestion and a shortage of refrigeration equipment in recent years. The expected bumper harvest in 2021, and the long-term prospects for this key sector require that we overcome current operational inefficiencies and avoid those that might erupt in future. We need an efficient and cost-effective logistics industry that can facilitate the movement of commodities, not only between SA provinces, but also to export markets. This presents an opportunity for infrastructure investment in the sector. The bullish outlook for the sector, in an otherwise strained post-COVID economy, also presents an opportunity for agricultural R&D. In line with global trends to meet the rising food demand driven by population growth, agricultural R&D in SA could contribute towards higher yields and lower post-harvest losses. Many regions globally have reached their agricultural land expansion frontiers, such that increasing agricultural output requires increased productivity. Optimising yields through intensive input use, new cultivars and better production practices will hopefully increase agricultural sustainability and resilience in the longer term. A growing focal area for R&D, according to agricultural economist Dr Thulasizwe Mkhabela, relates to zoonotic diseases, food-borne pathogens, and vaccine development for livestock diseases. There is also scope for the development of digital innovations in the SA agricultural sector (agri-tech), particularly those that address the constraints and needs of smallholder farmers. If unchecked, the negative impacts of agricultural development that prioritises maximum productivity by exploiting natural resources while disregarding the complex hidden costs (financial and otherwise) of food production, will prevent us from meeting our growing demand for food and fibre on a sustainable basis. The long-term health of the agricultural sector relies heavily on the sustainability of farming methods. Farming practices must not only ensure profitable yields but also the wellbeing of the factors of production: the environment, the farm workers and the surrounding communities. In seeking institutional investment, agri-businesses must also ensure that their governance structures; financial reporting systems and processes; risk management frameworks and internal control environments are investment ready and can be held up to scrutiny. One of the greatest uncertainties facing SA agriculture in recent years has been around the implementation of land reform. The general perception is that government's execution of land reform strategies has been poor, resulting in various failures. Without a clear land reform policy framework that is well-executed, the inequalities of the past will continue to increase - and we run the risk that the core of the commercial agricultural sector, which is a key driving force of the economy and food security in the country, will collapse. In October 2020 the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development announced that the government would be making 896 farms (totaling 700 000 hectares of under-utilised or vacant agricultural State land) available for emerging farmers. This is part of government's contribution to the land reform programme, which has seen 135 117 hectares of land released under 30-year leases to selected emerging farmers since February 2020, with women and youth being prioritised in the beneficiary selection. I view this as positive. That said, robust and transparent criteria for awarding the land is critical to create confidence in a corruption-free process. Further, availing government land is one step, but other important aspects will be: 1. the readiness of the beneficiaries to farm, i.e. their know-how of farming; and 2. the ability of the farmers to access the necessary resources, such as finance and infrastructure. Mentoring and support will be crucial to set the beneficiaries up for success. Further, for emerging farmers to access capital to develop their land, we need blended finance models to be developed between government and the private sector - and for these to be implemented as soon as possible. Strong public-private partnerships will be crucial to the success of the reform initiatives. Overall, we at Futuregrowth are cautiously optimistic about the South African agricultural sector and its ability to be a source of future GDP growth. Despite the effects of the COVID pandemic, no major structural changes in the demand for food are expected on a global level over the next decade. Population growth continues to drive increased absolute demand, although individual countries will experience different trajectories in the demand for specific commodities. Implementation risk continues to threaten the SA government's efforts to reform the sector. Consumers are expected to increasingly emphasise safety, reliability of quality and supply, and ethics in food production systems. We see areas for investment opportunity in agri-tech; agriculture and food value-chain-related logistics and infrastructure; and in thriving agricultural sub-sectors such as citrus production and export, amongst others. [4] Environmental, social and governance (factors) [3] Annualised, seasonally-adjusted quarterly [2] E.g. we expect to see a shift away from red meat in developed countries due to environmental concerns and perceptions about health, whereas rising consumer incomes in developing countries are expected to have the opposite effect. [1] [http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf](http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf)

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.futuregrowth.co.za/insights/sa-s-agriculture-sector-a-key-driver-of-economic-growth/

Responsible Investing: A Fixed Income Perspective [View More](https://www.futuregrowth.co.za/insights/responsible-investing-a-fixed-income-perspective5) Futuregrowth is eager to support this vision, through responsible investment in the sector, that yields an appropriate risk-adjusted return for our client funds. In the wake of the Land Bank saga - which in April 2020 saw the biggest agricultural funder in the country default on its debt, precipitating a severe liquidity challenge - the SA agricultural market is in need of alternative sources of funding. Land Bank once funded close to 30% of agricultural debt in the country, without which we risk a loss of employment in the sector, loss of GDP and export revenue, and rising food inflation if we become more reliant on imported foods. We have embarked on a strategic initiative at Futuregrowth to grow our presence in the agricultural sector from both a debt and an equity perspective, alongside a broader strategy to support infrastructure investment across various critical sectors of the economy. 1. Volatility influenced by climate change, political actions, and social change, amongst other factors. Variable weather conditions and climate change cause a fluctuation in yields, which impacts local and global supply dynamics. This creates volatility in volumes and crop prices. Geopolitical influences and government actions: Global supply and demand pressures emerge when governments take actions to subsidise production (as is evident in the EU and USA) or when they ban exports due to concerns about domestic supplies (this has been known to occur in Russia). Another significant global influence is China, with the US-China trade tensions being a recent source of volatility for certain agricultural commodities. Locally, policy uncertainty around land expropriation has had an impact on the ability to access capital investment in the sector. Changing consumer preferences due to lifestyle and social factors shift demand away from certain product groups in favour of others[2]. 2. Complexity: Agriculture is not homogenous - there are many different crops and food types, each with their own unique and fragmented supply chains. There is diversity within each crop, in terms of how and where it is produced, and by whom. The complexity is intensified by environmental factors, which influence regional and yearly production and are difficult to accurately predict. 3. Scrutiny: Role players in the agriculture and food value chain are under pressure to improve the traceability of (and information about) the food we eat. Consumers are rightfully becoming more conscious about the content and safety of our food, together with how it is produced and the environmental and social impacts of this. Notwithstanding these complexities, agriculture is widely anticipated to be a key driver of economic growth both locally and internationally. Within a troubled global economy, the agriculture and food value chain sectors remain a strong outlier, driven by population growth, urbanisation and the rise of the middle class. South Africa has a highly diversified, market-oriented agricultural economy that extends across various product ranges, including all major grains (except rice), oilseeds, deciduous and subtropical fruits, sugar, citrus, wine, most vegetables, livestock, and a well-developed poultry and egg industry. Value-added activities include the processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables, dairy products, livestock and grain mill products, amongst others. The outstanding performance of the sector last year - with growth in all four quarters - was in sharp contrast to other sectors of the economy. Stats SA reported growth in agricultural GDP of 5.9%[3] in the fourth quarter of 2020, bringing the overall agricultural GDP growth to 13.1% year-on-year (relative to a 7% economic contraction for the country as a whole). This outperformance was underpinned by high levels of agricultural output following favourable production conditions (on the back of a La Nina weather pattern); high commodity prices; strong export demand; and a favourable rand exchange rate. The sector was also classified as an essential service, allowing it to remain operational during the lockdowns. The SA agricultural sector remains a net exporter, with exportable volumes of various commodities growing annually, subject to weather conditions. In 2020, SA's agricultural exports hit $10.2 billion, a 3% increase from the prior year and the second largest level on record. At the same time, agricultural imports fell 8%, leading to a 26% annual increase in the agricultural trade surplus, which widened to $4.3 billion in 2020. The top 10 export products were citrus, grapes, wine, apples and pears, maize, nuts, sugar, wool and fruit juices, with Africa and Europe serving as the largest markets for SA agricultural exports (followed closely by Asia). Citrus, as a sub-sector, experienced a notable increase in demand due to the pandemic-related demand for Vitamin C. Citrus exports hit a record high in 2020, with SA cementing its position as the second-largest exporter of fresh citrus in the world, after Spain. This follows a period of citrus production growth in response to a spike in global demand (especially for soft citrus and lemons) and the attractive investment returns and profit margins. This growth in citrus demand is expected to be sustained throughout 2021 and beyond. Favourable weather has resulted in increased summer crop plantings, raising the prospect of an even larger maize harvest than in 2019/2020. Industry estimates suggest the country could export 2.8 million tons of maize in 2021/2022, the largest volume since the 1994/1995 season. SA wine grape production is also expected to be larger than in 2020, and there is general optimism about the 2021 harvest in the horticulture subsector, as well as in other field crops. The Citrus Growers' Association (CGA) recently indicated that the SA citrus industry is likely to break all previous export season records with an estimated 158.7 million cartons in 2021, up from 146 million cartons in 2020. The high yields and positive prospects for the sector should curtail food and overall consumer inflation - and enhance the sector's contribution to GDP. The anticipated growth in agricultural exports from SA is however likely to place pressure on the country's logistics infrastructure, from handling facilities to transport (road and rail) and the shipping ports. Industry players (such as the CGA) have expressed concern over the country's logistics systems, after struggling with port congestion and a shortage of refrigeration equipment in recent years. The expected bumper harvest in 2021, and the long-term prospects for this key sector require that we overcome current operational inefficiencies and avoid those that might erupt in future. We need an efficient and cost-effective logistics industry that can facilitate the movement of commodities, not only between SA provinces, but also to export markets. This presents an opportunity for infrastructure investment in the sector. The bullish outlook for the sector, in an otherwise strained post-COVID economy, also presents an opportunity for agricultural R&D. In line with global trends to meet the rising food demand driven by population growth, agricultural R&D in SA could contribute towards higher yields and lower post-harvest losses. Many regions globally have reached their agricultural land expansion frontiers, such that increasing agricultural output requires increased productivity. Optimising yields through intensive input use, new cultivars and better production practices will hopefully increase agricultural sustainability and resilience in the longer term. A growing focal area for R&D, according to agricultural economist Dr Thulasizwe Mkhabela, relates to zoonotic diseases, food-borne pathogens, and vaccine development for livestock diseases. There is also scope for the development of digital innovations in the SA agricultural sector (agri-tech), particularly those that address the constraints and needs of smallholder farmers. If unchecked, the negative impacts of agricultural development that prioritises maximum productivity by exploiting natural resources while disregarding the complex hidden costs (financial and otherwise) of food production, will prevent us from meeting our growing demand for food and fibre on a sustainable basis. The long-term health of the agricultural sector relies heavily on the sustainability of farming methods. Farming practices must not only ensure profitable yields but also the wellbeing of the factors of production: the environment, the farm workers and the surrounding communities. In seeking institutional investment, agri-businesses must also ensure that their governance structures; financial reporting systems and processes; risk management frameworks and internal control environments are investment ready and can be held up to scrutiny. One of the greatest uncertainties facing SA agriculture in recent years has been around the implementation of land reform. The general perception is that government's execution of land reform strategies has been poor, resulting in various failures. Without a clear land reform policy framework that is well-executed, the inequalities of the past will continue to increase - and we run the risk that the core of the commercial agricultural sector, which is a key driving force of the economy and food security in the country, will collapse. In October 2020 the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development announced that the government would be making 896 farms (totaling 700 000 hectares of under-utilised or vacant agricultural State land) available for emerging farmers. This is part of government's contribution to the land reform programme, which has seen 135 117 hectares of land released under 30-year leases to selected emerging farmers since February 2020, with women and youth being prioritised in the beneficiary selection. I view this as positive. That said, robust and transparent criteria for awarding the land is critical to create confidence in a corruption-free process. Further, availing government land is one step, but other important aspects will be: 1. the readiness of the beneficiaries to farm, i.e. their know-how of farming; and 2. the ability of the farmers to access the necessary resources, such as finance and infrastructure. Mentoring and support will be crucial to set the beneficiaries up for success. Further, for emerging farmers to access capital to develop their land, we need blended finance models to be developed between government and the private sector - and for these to be implemented as soon as possible. Strong public-private partnerships will be crucial to the success of the reform initiatives. Overall, we at Futuregrowth are cautiously optimistic about the South African agricultural sector and its ability to be a source of future GDP growth. Despite the effects of the COVID pandemic, no major structural changes in the demand for food are expected on a global level over the next decade. Population growth continues to drive increased absolute demand, although individual countries will experience different trajectories in the demand for specific commodities. Implementation risk continues to threaten the SA government's efforts to reform the sector. Consumers are expected to increasingly emphasise safety, reliability of quality and supply, and ethics in food production systems. We see areas for investment opportunity in agri-tech; agriculture and food value-chain-related logistics and infrastructure; and in thriving agricultural sub-sectors such as citrus production and export, amongst others. [4] Environmental, social and governance (factors) [3] Annualised, seasonally-adjusted quarterly [2] E.g. we expect to see a shift away from red meat in developed countries due to environmental concerns and perceptions about health, whereas rising consumer incomes in developing countries are expected to have the opposite effect. [1] [http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf](http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/facts_brochure_mockup_04_b.pdf)

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.sharedata.co.za/v2/scripts/Shares.aspx

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Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.standardbank.com/sbg/standard-bank-group/contact-us/ourfootprint

[Angola](http://www.standardbank.co.ao) [Botswana](http://www.stanbicbank.co.bw) [Côte-d'Ivoire](http://www.stanbicbank.com.ci) [DRC](http://www.standardbank.cd) [Eswatini](http://www.standardbank.co.sz) [Ghana](https://www.stanbicbank.com.gh/) [Kenya](https://www.stanbicbank.co.ke/) [Lesotho](http://www.standardlesothobank.co.ls) [Malawi](http://www.standardbank.co.mw) [Mauritius](http://www.standardbank.mu) [Mozambique](https://www.standardbank.co.mz/) [Namibia](http://www.standardbank.com.na) [Nigeria](http://www.stanbicibtcbank.com) [South Africa](https://www.standardbank.co.za/) [Tanzania](http://www.stanbicbank.co.tz) [Uganda](http://www.stanbicbank.co.ug) [Zambia](http://www.stanbicbank.co.zm) [Zimbabwe](http://www.stanbicbank.co.zw) As a connected, real economy bank, our insight and experience helps unlock opportunities and mitigate risk for our broad range of clients. Our differentiator is our long-term commitment to Africa, our home, underpinnned by a heritage of over 150 years on the continent Stanbic House Plot 50672, Off Machel Drive Fairgrounds Office Park Private Bag 00168 Gaborone Botswana Immeuble Stanbic Bank Boulevard Valery Giscard d'Estaing 26 B.P. 701 Abidjan 26 Côte d'Ivoire 12 Avenue Mongala BP 16297 Kinshasa Democratic Republic of Congo Plot No 215 South Liberation Link Airport City Accra Ghana Chiromo Road Westland, Nairobi Kenya 1st Floor, LCCI Building, CNR Mabile and Orpen Road, Maseru Africa Unity Avenue City Centre Lilongwe Malawi Level 9 Tower A 1 CyberCity Ebene Mauritius Av. De Novembro No. 420, Maputo Erf 1378, 1 Chasie Street, Kleine Kuppe Windhoek Namibia Stanbic IBTC Place Walter Carrington Crescent Victoria Island Lagos Nigeria Corporate & Investment Banking 3 Simmonds Street Johannesburg 2001 South Africa Head Office: 5th Floors Corporate Place Building PO Box A294 Swazi Plaza Stanbic Centre 99A Kinondoni Road Corner A.H.Mwinyi Road Dar es Salaam Tanzania Crested Towers, Short Tower Plot 17 Hannington Road P.O. Box 7131 Kampala Uganda Stanbic House Head Office Plot 2375 Addis Ababa Drive Lusaka Zambia 59 Samora Machel Avenue Harare Zimbabwe Al Fattan Currency Tower 15th Floor Office 1501 Dubai International Financial Centre P.O. Box 482049 Dubai UAE Standard Bank House One Circular Road Douglas Isle of Man IM1 1SB Standard Bank House 47-49 La Motte Street St Helier Jersey JE2 4SX Channel Islands

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.firstrand.co.za/the-group/presence-in-african-region-and-other-markets/

presence in african region and other markets In South Africa, FirstRand offers a full suite of financial services products through a portfolio of market-leading brands. The groupâs strategy outside of its domestic market includes growing its presence and offerings in several markets in the rest of Africa where it believes it can organically build competitive advantage and scale over time. In the UK, FirstRand owns Aldermore, a UK specialist lender, which includes MotoNovo, a leading vehicle finance business. Click on infographic for more information. Footprint stats as at 30 June 2023. South Africa Integrated financial services group 614 Representation points 4 789 ATMs Botswana Subsidiary 25 Representation points 998 CashPlus agents 240 ATMs Namibia Subsidiary 41 Representation points 252 CashPlus agents 309 ATMs London FirstRand Bank Branch Guernsey FirstRand Bank Branch (trading as FNB Channel Islands) Zambia Subsidiary 24 Representation points 1634 CashPlus agents 142 ATMs Eswatini Subsidiary 9 Representation points 449 CashPlus agents 114 ATMs Lesotho Subsidiary 08 Representation points 139 CashPlus agents 56 ATMs Mozambique Subsidiary 15 Representation points 45 ATMs Kenya Representative office Angola Representative office Ghana Subsidiary 12 Representation points 109 CashPlus agents 32 ATMs Nigeria Subsidiary India FirstRand Bank Branch United Kingdom Specialist banking and vehicle asset finance Shanghai, China Representative office New York, USA Representative office - Full-service banking, Insurance and asset - Full-service - Investment banking - UK specialist - Branch - Representative

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.absa.africa/absaafrica/about-us/country-operations/

A leading pan-African bank We are a leading pan-African bank, inspired by the people we serve and determined to be a globally respected organisation of which Africa can be proud. As a financial institution, we empower and enable - from investing in our employees to uplifting our communities and enabling our clients' ambitions. Our heartbeat is African, and we are committed to a pan-African presence and contribution. Zambia In Zambia, we offer we offer business banking, corporate and investment banking, international banking, personal banking, premier banking as well as wealth and investment management. [Absa Group name change FAQs](https://www.absa.co.zm/faqs/) Namibia In Namibia, through Absa, we offer corporate and investment banking, international banking, personal banking as well as wealth and investment management. [Absa Group name change FAQs](/faqs) South Africa In South Africa, we offer business banking, corporate and investment banking, international banking, personal banking, insurance as well as wealth and investment management. [Absa Group name change FAQs](/faqs) Seychelles In the Seychelles, we offer business banking, corporate and investment banking, personal banking and premier banking. [Absa Group name change FAQs](https://www.absa.sc/faqs/) Mauritius In Mauritius, we offer business banking, corporate and investment banking, international banking, personal banking, premier banking as well as wealth and investment management. [Absa Group name change FAQs](https://www.absabank.mu/en/faqs/) Kenya In Kenya, we offer business banking, corporate and investment banking, international banking, personal banking, premier banking as well as wealth and investment management. [Absa Group name change FAQs](https://www.absabank.co.ke/faqs/) Tanzania In Tanzania, we offer business banking, corporate and investment banking and personal banking through both the Absa and National Bank of Commerce (NBC) operations. [Absa Group name change FAQs](https://www.absa.co.tz/faqs/) Mozambique In Mozambique, we offer business banking, corporate and investment banking, personal banking, premier banking and insurance. [Absa Group name change FAQs](https://www.absa.co.mz/pt/faqs/) Nigeria In Nigeria we offer trade finance, investment banking and market products through our various Nigerian registered subsidiaries namely Absa Representative Office Nigeria Limited, Absa Capital Markets Nigeria Limited, and Absa Securities Nigeria Limited. Telephone: +234-1 7000275 Email: [Absa Capital Markets Nigeria](mailto:[email protected]) [Absa Securities Nigeria](mailto:[email protected]) [Absa Group name change FAQs](/faqs) Uganda In Uganda, we offer business banking, corporate and investment banking, international banking, personal banking as well as wealth and investment banking. [Absa Group name change FAQs](https://www.absa.co.ug/faqs/) Our International Presence Beijing, China [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) Guanghua Ocean International Center 9th Floor, Tower AB Office Park, 10 Jintong West Road Chaoyang District Beijing, 100020

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v137/n3457/abs/137182a0.html

Abstract THE rapid development of South Africa was outlined by Lord Riverdale of Sheffield, speaking on January 23, under the auspices of the British Empire League, at the British Empire Club. His main subject was the Empire Exhibition which is to be opened in Johannesburg on September 15. Last year marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Union of South Africa; between 1910 and 1935 the European population increased by more than fifty per cent and the native population by more than forty per cent. These important years have seen a tremendous increase in agricultural products and mineral development. Conspicuous progress has been made in the fruit industry, the value of exports of fresh fruit having risen from an average of £15,000 a year in pre-War years to £2,270,000 in 1934. In recent years rapid industrial development has also taken place. As an export market for United Kingdom goods, South Africa ranks second only to British India, and in 1934 took goods to the value of some £32,000,000. The imports into the Union for the first six months of 1935 showed an increase of £5,600,000, and of this total the United Kingdom supplied forty-nine per cent. This will be the first Empire Exhibition which has been held outside Great Britain and is receiving the full support of the Union of South Africa Government and the Government of rsi.t' Britain. _A/fcetr enumerating many of the features of the forthcoming exhibition, Lord Riverdale said that, from a business point of view, he could thoroughly recommend it as being an opportunity of showing what British manufacturers can do for the South African market with a view to the expansion of our trade. In metals and manufactures, including machinery and vehicles, South Africa imported more than £24,000,000 in 1934, and Great Britain supplied only £12,000,000 in this item alone. If the market was studied and our goods shown in the right way, there lies a large field for further expansion. The same might be said for the item of fibres, yarns, textiles and apparel. In 1934 the Union's total imports for these were 15 millions, of which the United Kingdom's share was less than £10,000,000. Article PDF Rights and permissions About this article Cite this article Empire Exhibition at Johannesburg. Nature 137, 182 (1936). https://doi.org/10.1038/137182a0 Published: Issue Date: DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/137182a0

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.statecapture.org.za/

Home Hearings Summary of Dates Announcements Transcripts Statements and Documents Recent Hearings Audio Youtube Stats and Search Media Media Statements Media Briefings Accreditation Notices Practice Directions Prescribed Forms Judgments Decisions and Objections Court Judgments Final Reports About Us Our Mandate Executive Committee Legal Team Contact Us Toggle navigation Home Hearings Summary of Dates Announcements Transcripts Statements and Documents Recent Hearings Audio YouTube Stats and Search Media Media Statements Media Briefings Accreditation Notices Practice Directions Prescribed Forms Judgments Decisions and Objections Court Judgments Final Reports About Us Our Mandate Executive Committee Legal Team Contact Us The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State. ANNOUNCEMENT: Reports are under the Judgments menu All Reports Complete

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.ipp-projects.co.za/Home/About

Azishe The National Development Plan (NDP) identifies the need for South Africa to invest in a strong network of economic infrastructure designed to support the country's medium- and long-term economic, social and environmental goals. Energy infrastructure is a critical component that underpins economic activity and growth across the country, and it needs to be robust, extensive and affordable enough to meet industrial, commercial and household needs. In formulating its vision for the energy sector, the NDP took as a point of departure the Integrated Resource Plan for electricity (IRP) 2010 to 2030 as promulgated in March 2011. This was subsequently updated and the promulgated IRP 2019 replaced the IRP 2010 in October 2019 as the country's official electricity infrastructure plan to 2030. As with the IRP 2010, the IRP 2019 proposes a diverse energy mix with which to meet the country's electricity needs to 2030. Specifically, the IRP 2019 identifies 39 696 MW to be added to the national grid between 2019 and 2030. This includes 8 208 MW (20.7%) that has already been committed or contracted under IRP 2010 for grid connection between 2019 and 2022, as well as 31 488 MW (79.3%) of new additional capacity that has to be added between 2019 and 2030. To give effect to the procurement process and implementation of the relevant capacity allocations of the IRP, the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy (in consultation with the National Energy Regulator of South Africa) determines new electrical energy generation capacity requirements, as allowed by Section 34 of the Electricity Regulation Act No.4 of 2006. The determinations further specify whether the new generation capacity shall be established by Eskom, another organ of state or an independent power producer (IPP). Prior to the release of the promulgated IRP 2019, the procurement of electrical energy from IPPs was informed by Ministerial determinations made in alignment with the IRP 2010, however, the electrical capacity that has not already been contracted before the promulgation of the IRP 2019 has expired. New Ministerial determinations, with the concurrence of NERSA, will give effect to the capacity allocations stipulated in the IRP 2019. In that regard, two Ministerial determinations has been promulgated, following concurrence by NERSA. A total of 13 813 MW has been determined, which represents 43.9% of the total 31 488 MW target for new additional capacity that has to be added by 2030 as stipulated in the IRP 2019. The first determination, promulgated on 14 May 2020, calls for the procurement of 2 000 MW from a range of technologies, to fill the short-term capacity gap. A second determination, which was promulgated in September, allows for procurement from the following technologies, for the short and medium term: The Independent Power Producers Procurement Programme (IPPPP) Office and mandate The Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE), National Treasury (NT) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) established the IPP Office for the specific purpose of delivering on the IPPPP objectives. In November 2010 the DMRE and NT entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) with the DBSA to provide the necessary support to implement the IPPPP and establish the IPP Office. A new MoA was agreed upon by all parties in May 2016 for an additional 3-year period, then again in April 2019 for another year, and in March 2020 it was extended for an additional 3-year period to 2023. The programme's primary mandate is to secure electrical energy from the private sector for renewable and non-renewable energy sources. With regard to renewables, the programme is designed to reduce the country's reliance on fossil fuels, stimulate an indigenous renewable energy industry and contribute to socio-economic development and environmentally sustainable growth. The IPPPP has been designed not only to procure energy, but has also been structured to contribute to the broader national development objectives of job creation, social upliftment and broadening of economic ownership. The scale and scope of electricity infrastructure development under the IPPPP extend beyond the national footprint to the establishment of broader regional linkages and partnerships. Active engagement and collaboration has occurred with, amongst others, the South African Development Community (SADC), African Union (AU) and South African Power Pool (SAPP). Bilateral relations are also being pursued in support of cross-border project collaboration and capacity support, knowledge sharing and skills enhancement. The programme is contributing to the security of energy supply and ensuring a diversified energy mix through the procurement of significant additional renewable energy and non-renewable generation capacity from the private sector. The IPP Office provides the following services: The IPP Office has three interrelated focus areas: The IPPPP provides a flexible procurement service to the Department for a responsive and effective reply to the urgent power infrastructure development needs of the country, therefore our activities will continue to evolve in order to effectively respond to the planning and development needs in the current energy context.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.ipp-projects.co.za/Publications

Azishe This report provides an overview of the procurement activities of the IPPPP, including achievements as at the end of reporting Quarter 4 of the 2023/2024 Financial Year (1 January to 31 March 2024). The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and the Eastern Cape Province in particular. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and the Northern Cape Province in particular. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and the Western Cape Province in particular. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and all the other Provinces. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the contribution from wind power in particular.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.ipp-projects.co.za/Publications

Azishe This report provides an overview of the procurement activities of the IPPPP, including achievements as at the end of reporting Quarter 4 of the 2023/2024 Financial Year (1 January to 31 March 2024). The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and the Eastern Cape Province in particular. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and the Northern Cape Province in particular. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and the Western Cape Province in particular. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and all the other Provinces. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the contribution from wind power in particular.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.ipp-projects.co.za/Publications

Azishe This report provides an overview of the procurement activities of the IPPPP, including achievements as at the end of reporting Quarter 4 of the 2023/2024 Financial Year (1 January to 31 March 2024). The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and the Eastern Cape Province in particular. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and the Northern Cape Province in particular. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and the Western Cape Province in particular. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the renewable energy (RE) programme component (REIPPPP) and all the other Provinces. The purpose of this report is to provide a high level "at a glance" overview of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (IPPPP) with the focus on the contribution from wind power in particular.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.climatechangenews.com/2021/11/04/south-africa-8-5bn-finance-package-offers-model-ending-reliance-coal/

A financial package to speed South Africa's transition away from coal is creating a buzz at Cop26 climate talks, where campaigners hope it could provide a model for other emerging economies. The nation is at the heart of a string of announcements in Glasgow, UK to support developing countries in ditching the most polluting fossil fuel. After months of high-level political negotiations, France, Germany, the UK, the US and the EU announced [an $8.5 billion package](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_5768) of grants and concessional finance over 3-5 years to accelerate the retirement of coal plants and the deployment of renewable energy. Crucially, it also targets economic regeneration in coal mining regions, with electric vehicle manufacturing and green hydrogen among the potential alternative job opportunities. South African president Cyril Ramaphosa [described](http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-establishes-historic-international-partnership-support-just-transition) it as "a watershed moment". "South Africa has consistently argued that developed economies must support a just transition in developing economies. [This] represents a first-of-its kind partnership to turn these commitments into reality, and a model for similar forms of collaboration globally," he said. "We're witnessing the end of coal power in real-time," Leo Roberts, research manager for think tank E3G's coal transition team told Climate Home News. These announcements "point to a shift towards a world in which finance is available to help developing countries move away from coal". The partnership could be emulated by others amid a raft of commitments to ditch coal. Indonesia, Vietnam and Chile are among 18 new countries that [committed not to build or invest in new coal power and phase out coal plants in the 2040s ](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/end-of-coal-in-sight-as-uk-secures-ambitious-commitments-at-cop26-summit). Earlier this week, Indonesia's finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati [said](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-could-phase-out-coal-by-2040-with-financial-help-minister-2021-11-02/?taid=61823248cbd4050001d746cd&utm_campaign=trueAnthem:+Trending+Content&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=twitter) the country could phase out coal power by 2040, with financial support from the international community. That is a major shift from its [national climate submission](https://www.climatechangenews.com/2021/07/23/indonesia-plans-burn-coal-well-2050s-updated-climate-plan/) to the UN earlier this year, which sees coal meeting 38% of electricity demand in 2050. Like South Africa, Indonesia has communities dependent on coal mining, who could suffer from a transition to clean energy in the absence of economic regeneration. For the first time, financial instruments are being put together to address the issue. Part of the South African package includes $500 million from a $2bn [Accelerating Coal Transition (ACT) initiative](https://www.climatechangenews.com/2021/06/18/climate-fund-considers-india-south-africa-pilot-2bn-coal-transition-scheme/) launched by the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) in Glasgow on Wednesday. It is the first dedicated international fund to help developing countries exit coal, with funding from the US, the UK, Germany, Canada, and Denmark. [Caught between EU pressure and soaring demand, AIIB weighs end to gas finance] Indonesia, India, the Philippines and South Africa are the first beneficiaries of the scheme that aims to leverage private investments to support the transition from coal to clean energy. Together, they represent more than 15% of global coal-related emissions. Mafalda Duarte CEO of the Climate Investment Funds, told Climate Home News the fund aims to catalyse at least 10 times its core funding by bringing in private financiers and multilateral development banks. Duarte told Climate Home the fund aimed to address a gap in the financial architecture by providing support to reskill coal workers and social protection measures such as temporary income support to those losing their jobs. "If we don't provide this support, this coal phase out is probably not going to happen in time to meet our climate objectives," she said. The $8.5bn package is "groundbreaking" because it was "co-created" by South Africa and donor countries, rather than imposed by wealthy nations, Maesela Kekana, South Africa's climate change chief negotiator, told Climate Home News. Kekana said environment minister Barbara Creecy had been lobbying the CIFs for a coal transition programme to be established. "We were right at the forefront. We fought for that. That's how important the ACT programme is for us," he said. "There's nothing like this out there. It's never been done before. And now we're going to roll it out," he said. "We are determined to make this work because we believe that this is a good model." [Thunberg v Carney: tensions flare over net zero and carbon offsets at Cop26] South Africa pitched for the funds after debt-burdened state utility Eskom said it was [seeking $10bn in international finance](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-30/eskom-needs-10-billion-to-repurpose-most-coal-plants-by-2050) to help it shut most of its coal-fired power plants by 2050. The country uses coal for 87% of its electricity generation and 20% of its liquid fuels, drawing on significant domestic resources. UK climate envoy John Murton and a delegation from the US in September helped to seal the deal ahead of Cop26. "That was a turning point in our view because we started to realise how serious these countries were. Everyone was working non-stop at the technical and political level to make it happen," Kekana said. With Eskom accounting for around 41% of the country's emissions, decarbonising the electricity grid is a priority for South Africa to meet its climate goal. But the deal goes beyond cutting coal emissions to creating alternative, cleaner jobs and livelihoods. Jesse Burton, an energy policy researcher focusing on the South African coal sector, said the package could help address some of the technical challenges of the transition, which have been impeded by Eskom's huge debt. "But how the pot of money is going to be carved out need to be ironed out. It's can't just be about rolling out renewables, it has to be about the just transition," she said.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

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Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2022-state-nation-address-10-feb-2022-0000

State of the Nation Address (SoNA) by President Cyril Ramaphosa, Cape Town City Hall, Thursday, 10 February 2022 Speaker of the National Assembly, Ms Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, Mr Amos Masondo, Deputy President David Mabuza, Former President Thabo Mbeki, Former Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Former Deputy President Baleka Mbete, Former Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr Max Sisulu, Acting Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, Mayor of the City of Cape Town, Mr Geordin Hill-Lewis, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Mr Bene M'Poko, Members of the Judiciary, Heads of Institutions Supporting Democracy, Members of Parliament, Fellow South Africans, This year, for the first time since the dawn of our democracy, the SoNA is not being delivered in the Chamber of the National Assembly. As we entered this new year, a huge fire engulfed the seat of our democracy. We all watched in outrage and sadness as the flames devoured the buildings in which our democratic Constitution was born, in which laws of transformation and progress have been passed, in which the freely-chosen representatives of the people have shaped our young nation. For many, what happened in Parliament speaks to a broader devastation in our land. For many, the fire was symbolic of the devastation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, by rising unemployment and deepening poverty. It spoke to the devastation of a pandemic that over the past two years has taken the lives of tens of thousands of South Africans, put two million people out of work and brought misery to families. The fire in Parliament reminded us of the destruction, violence and looting that we witnessed in parts of the country in July last year, of the more than 300 lives lost and many more livelihoods ruined. As we reflect on the past year, we recall the words of President Thabo Mbeki who reminded us that: "Trying times need courage and resilience. Our strength as a people is not tested during the best of times". That we are gathered together in the Cape Town City Hall instead of the National Assembly Chamber reflects the extraordinary circumstances of this time. It reflects the determination of the Presiding Officers of Parliament and indeed all the members of our two houses that the work of this democratic institution should continue without interruption. There are moments in the life of a nation when old certainties are unsettled and new possibilities emerge. In these moments, there is both the prospect of great progress and the risk of reversal. Today, we are faced with such a moment. The path we choose now will determine the course for future generations. That is why we are taking steps to strengthen our democracy and reaffirm our commitment to a Constitution that protects us all. We are working together to revitalise our economy and end the inequality and injustice that impedes our progress. We are standing together against corruption and to ensure that those who are responsible for state capture are punished for their crimes. We are rebuilding the State and restoring trust and pride in public institutions. If there is one thing we all agree on, it is that the present situation – of deep poverty, unemployment and inequality – is unacceptable and unsustainable. There is agreement among a broad and diverse range of South Africans that fundamental reforms are needed to revive economic growth. There is a need both to address the immediate crisis and to create conditions for long-lasting stability and development. To achieve this, South Africa needs a new consensus. A consensus that is born out of a common understanding of our current challenging situation and a recognition of the need to address the challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality. This should be a new consensus which recognises that the State must create an environment in which the private sector can invest and unleash the dynamism of the economy. But equally, an environment in which South Africans can live a better life and unleash the energy of their capabilities. This should also be a new consensus which embraces our shared responsibility to one another, and acknowledges that we are all in this together. As the social partners – government, labour, business and communities – we are working to determine the actions we will take together to build such a consensus. We have begun discussions on what trade-offs are needed and what contribution we will each need to make. We have given ourselves 100 days to finalise a comprehensive social compact to grow our economy, create jobs and combat hunger. This work will build on the foundation of the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (ERRP), which remains our common programme to rebuild the economy, We remain focused on the priorities we identified in the SoNA last year: - overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic, - a massive rollout of infrastructure, - a substantial increase in local production, - an employment stimulus to create jobs and support livelihoods, - the rapid expansion of our energy generation capacity. To be effective, this social compact needs to include every South African and every part of our society. No one must be left behind. Fellow South Africans, When I last addressed the state of our nation, we were deep in the throes of the worst pandemic in more than a century. Since COVID-19 reached our shores, we have endured successive waves of infection, the emergence of new variants and the devastating cost of nearly 100 000 recorded COVID-19 deaths. South Africans have responded to this grave threat with courage and resilience, with compassion and restraint. Over the past two years, we have taken unprecedented actions to strengthen our health system, build laboratory capacity and prevent infections. The nation owes a great debt of gratitude to the dedicated healthcare workers and other frontline staff who put their health and their lives at risk to care for the ill and vulnerable during this pandemic. Within weeks of the first reported infection in our country, I announced the establishment of the Solidarity Fund, with the goal of uniting the country in the fight against the pandemic. In a wave of generosity that swept the country, the fund raised R3.4 billion from more than 300 000 individuals and 3 000 companies and foundations. More than 400 individuals and 100 companies volunteered their time and services. The fund has played a pivotal role in supporting the national health response and alleviating the humanitarian crisis. I would like to thank everyone who contributed to the Solidarity Fund and the great many who came together in countless other initiatives to support those affected by the pandemic. As the trajectory of the pandemic has continued to change, we have had to adapt and evolve. Our approach has been informed throughout by the best available scientific evidence, and we have stood out both for the quality of our scientists and for their involvement in every step of our response. During the past year, we have focused on accelerating our vaccine rollout. So far, we have administered 30 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines. Consequently, nearly 42% of all adults and 60% of everyone over 50 is fully vaccinated. We are now ready to enter a new phase in our management of the pandemic. It is our intention to end the national state of disaster as soon as we have finalised other measures under the National Health Act, 2003 (Act 61 0f 2003) and other legislation to contain the pandemic. Nearly all restrictions on economic and social activity have already been lifted. Vaccines have proven to be the best defence we have against illness and death from COVID-19. If we all get vaccinated, continue to observe basic health measures and remain ever vigilant, we will be able to get on with our lives even with the virus in our midst. The state of the nation is linked inextricably to the state of our economy. In addition to the divides of race, geography and education, COVID-19 has exacerbated the divide between those who are employed and unemployed. Last year, our unemployment rate reached its highest recorded level. Unemployment has been caused by low growth, which has in turn resulted from a long-term decline in investment. In the last year, we have benefited from a clear and stable macroeconomic framework, strong commodity prices and a better-than-expected recovery. However, we have been held back by an unreliable electricity supply, inefficient network industries and the high cost of doing business. We have been taking extraordinary measures to enable businesses to grow and create jobs alongside expanded public employment and social protection. We all know that government does not create jobs. Business creates jobs. Around 80% of all the people employed in South Africa are employed in the private sector. The key task of government is to create the conditions that will enable the private sector – both big and small – to emerge, to grow, to access new markets, to create new products, and to hire more employees. The problems in the South African economy are deep and they are structural. When electricity supply cannot be guaranteed, when railways and ports are inefficient, when innovation is held back by a scarcity of broadband spectrum, when water quality deteriorates, companies are reluctant to invest and the economy cannot function properly. With a view to addressing these challenges we are accelerating the implementation of far-reaching structural reforms to modernise and transform these industries, unlock investment, reduce costs and increase competitiveness and growth. The electricity crisis is one of the greatest threats to economic and social progress. In the last few days, we have once again been reminded of the fragility of our electricity system. Load shedding continues to have a huge impact on the lives of all South Africans, disrupting business activities, and placing additional strains on families and communities. Due to our aging power stations, poor maintenance, policy missteps and the ruinous effects of state capture, our country has a shortfall of around 4000 MW of electricity. During the past year, we have taken firm steps to bring additional generation capacity online as quickly as possible to close the shortfall. As a result, several new energy generation projects will be coming online over the next few years. This includes: - Over 500 MW from the remaining projects in Bid Window 4 of the renewable energy programme, which are at advanced stages of construction. - 2 600 MW from Bid Window 5 of the renewable energy programme, for which the preferred bidders were announced last year, - up to 800 MW from those risk mitigation power projects that are ready to proceed, - 2 600 MW from Bid Window 6 of the renewal energy programme, which will soon be opened, - 3,000 MW of gas power and 500 MW of battery storage, for which requests for proposals will be released later this year, - an estimated 4 000 MW from embedded generation projects in the mining sector, - approximately 1 400 MW currently in the process of being secured by various municipalities. In addition to closing the energy supply shortfall, we are implementing fundamental changes to the structure of the electricity sector. Eskom has established a separate transmission subsidiary, and is on track to complete its unbundling by December 2022. The utility has continued with its intensive maintenance programme, to reverse many years of neglected maintenance and underperformance of existing plants. To regulate all of these reforms, Cabinet yesterday approved amendments to the Electricity Regulation Act, 2006 (Act of 2006) for public comment. These far-reaching amendments will enable a competitive market for electricity generation and the establishment of an independent state-owned transmission company. Our economy cannot grow without efficient ports and railways. Over several years, the functioning of our ports has declined relative to ports in other parts of the world and on the African continent. This constrains economic activity. The agricultural sector, for example, relies heavily on efficient, well-run ports to export their produce to overseas markets. Fresh produce cannot wait for days and even weeks stuck in a terminal. This hurts businesses and compromises our country's reputation as an exporter of quality fresh produce. Transnet is addressing these challenges and is currently focused on improving operational efficiencies at the ports through procuring additional equipment and implementing new systems to reduce congestion. Transnet will ask for proposals from private partners for the Durban and Ngqura Container Terminals within the next few months, which will enable partnerships to be in place at both terminals by October 2022. Transnet will start the process of providing third-party access to its freight rail network from April 2022 by making slots available on the container corridor between Durban and City Deep in Gauteng. Transnet has developed partnerships with the private sector to address cable theft and vandalism on the freight rail network through advanced technologies and additional security personnel. This collaborative effort is already showing results in reduced disruptions to rail operations. The poor state of passenger rail in South Africa has a direct and detrimental impact on the lives of our people. We are therefore working hard to rehabilitate the passenger rail network in 10 priority corridors. The Southern Line in Cape Town and the Mabopane Line in Pretoria have been re-opened to be followed by the remaining lines in the next year. One of the greatest constraints on the technological development of our economy has been the unacceptable delay in the migration of broadcasting from analogue to digital. The switch-off of analogue transmission has been completed in a number of provinces. As I announced in the SoNA last year, the other provinces will move to digital signal by the end of March 2022. As part of this process, government will continue to subsidise low-income households so that they can access a set-top box and make the switch to digital TV. Our communications regulator, ICASA, will commence with the auctioning of the high frequency communications spectrum in about three weeks from now. This will unlock new spectrum for mobile telecommunications for the first time in over a decade. In addition, we will facilitate the rapid deployment of broadband infrastructure across all municipalities by establishing a standard model for the granting of municipal permissions. These reforms will revolutionise the country's technological development, making faster broadband accesible to more people and reducing the costs of digital communications. The world over, the ability to attract skilled immigrants is the hallmark of a modern, thriving economy. We are therefore streamlining and modernising the visa application process to make it easier to travel to South Africa for tourism, business and work. As we committed last year, the eVisa system has now been launched in 14 countries, including China, India, Kenya and Nigeria. The revised Critical Skills List has been published for the first time since 2014, following detailed technical work and extensive consultations with business and labour. The updated list reflects the skills that are in shortage today, to ensure that our immigration policy matches the demands of our economy. A comprehensive review of the work visa system is currently underway, led by a former Director-General of Home Affairs, Mr Mavuso Msimang. This review is exploring the possibility of new visa categories that could enable economic growth, such as a start-up Visa and a remote working visa. Water is the country's most precious natural resource. It is vital to life, to development and to economic growth. That is why we have prioritised institutional reforms in this area to ensure future water security, investment in water resources and maintenance of existing assets. We have embarked on the process of institutional reform in capacitating the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) and reviewing water boards in as far as their mandates are concerned and ensuring that they serve municipalities in terms of the District Development Model (DDM). These reforms are being championed by the Minister of Water and Sanitation, who has visited every water source in the country. A comprehensive turnaround plan is being implemented to streamline the process for water use license applications. The target is to clear the backlog of applications by June 2022 and to process 80% of all applications within 90 days during the next financial year. Legislation has been prepared for the establishment of the National Water Resources Infrastructure Agency, and will be published for public comment within the next month. The water quality monitoring system has been reinstated to improve enforcement of water standards at municipal level, and enable the DWS to intervene where water and sanitation services are failing. We will review the policy and regulatory framework for industrial hemp and cannabis to realise the huge potential for investment and job creation. While structural reforms are necessary for us to revive economic growth, they are not enough on their own. This year, we are undertaking far-reaching measures to unleash the potential of small businesses, micro businesses and informal businesses. These are the businesses that create the most jobs and provide the most opportunities for poor people to earn a living. We have started discussions with social partners as part of the social compact process to review labour market regulations for smaller businesses to enable them to hire more people, while continuing to protect workers' rights. A new, redesigned loan guarantee scheme is being introduced to enable small businesses to bounce back from the pandemic and civic unrest. This new bounce-back scheme incorporates the lessons from the previous loan guarantee scheme. It will involve development finance institutions and non-bank SME providers in offering finance, expand the types of financing available and adjust eligibility criteria to encourage greater uptake. The National Treasury is working with industry stakeholders to finalise the scheme and will provide details soon. We are reviewing the Business Act, 1991 (Act 71 of 1991) – alongside a broader review of legislation that affects small, medium and small-enterprises (SMMEs) – to reduce the regulatory burden on informal businesses. There are too many regulations in this country that are unduly complicated, costly and difficult to comply with. This prevents companies from growing and creating jobs. We are, therefore, working to improve the business environment for companies of all sizes through a dedicated capacity in The Presidency to reduce red tape. If we are to make progress in cutting unnecessary bureaucratic delays for businesses, we need dedicated capacity with the means to make changes. I have therefore appointed Mr Sipho Nkosi to head up a team in my office to cut red tape across government. Mr Nkosi has extensive experience in business, including as the CEO of Exxaro Resources, and is currently the chairperson of the Small Business Institute. The red tape team will identify priority reforms for the year ahead, including mechanisms to ensure government departments pay suppliers within the required 30 days. The team will also work with other departments and agencies to unblock specific obstacles to investment and business growth. It will support current initiatives to simplify processes relating to property registration, cross-border trade and construction permits. Infrastructure is central to our economic reconstruction and recovery. Through innovative funding and improved technical capabilities, we have prioritised infrastructure projects to support economic growth and better livelihoods, especially in energy, roads and water management. The Infrastructure Fund is at the centre of this effort, with a R100 billion allocation from the fiscus over 10 years. The fund is now working with state entities to prepare a pipeline of projects with an investment value of approximately R96 billion in student accommodation, social housing, telecommunications, water and sanitation and transport. Several catalytic projects to the value of R21 billion are expected to start construction this year. Of this, R2.6 billion is contributed by government and the balance from the private sector and developmental finance institutions. Government will make an initial investment of R1.8 billion in bulk infrastructure, which will unlock seven private sector projects to the value of R133 billion. For millions of South Africans in rural areas, roads and bridges provide access to markets, employment opportunities and social services. Yet, many children still have to brave overflowing rivers to reach schools and motorists have to battle impassable roads to reach the next town. We are therefore upscaling the Welisizwe Rural Bridges Programme to deliver 95 bridges a year from the current 14. Our South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is the implementing agent of the Welisizwe programme, and has demonstrated the expertise of SANDF engineers in bridge construction. Earlier this week, I was in Thakgalane village Limpopo to launch a new road that is going to make a huge difference in the lives of neighbouring communities. This road was constructed using block paving and other materials, which is a method that enables us to build durable roads faster and more cost-effectively. The rural roads programme will use labour intensive methods to construct or upgrade 685 kilometres of rural road over the next three years. This social enterprise programme includes access roads in Limpopo and Eastern Cape, gravel to surface upgrades in the Free State and North West, and capacity and connectivity improvements in the Western Cape. Government has initiated the process of delivering the uMzimvubu Water Project. The project is made of the Ntabelanga Dam and Lalini Dam, irrigation infrastructure and hydo-electric plant, Ntabelanga water treatment works and bulk distribution infrastructure to reticulate to the neighboring communities. The closing date for the first of the two-stage procurement process is scheduled to close later this month, with the preferred bidder likely to be announced in September 2022. Government is introducing an innovative social infrastructure delivery mechanism to address issues that afflict the delivery of school infrastructure. The mechanism will address the speed, financing and funding, quality of delivery, mass employment and maintenance. The new delivery mechanism will introduce a Special Purpose Vehicle, working with prominent Development Finance Institutions and the private sector, to deliver school education infrastructure. This approach is being piloted in schools in the Northern Cape and Eastern Cape. Over the past year, government has built on its successful Hydrogen SA strategy to make major strides in positioning South Africa as a global leader in this new market. This includes the development of a Hydrogen Society Roadmap for the next 10 years as well as a Green Hydrogen Strategy for the Northern Cape, supporting the development of a green hydrogen pipeline worth around R270 billion. The damage caused by the theft of scrap metal and cable on our infrastructure like electricity, trains and other vital services is enormous. We will take decisive steps this year both through improved law enforcement and by considering further measures to address the sale or export of such scrap metal. An important pillar of our ERRP is to revitalise our manufacturing base and create globally competitive export industries. In the past year, we launched new master plans in the steel industry, furniture and global business services. Through these plans, business, government and labour are working together to increase production and create more jobs in the sector. In the clothing industry, a number of retailers have announced ambitious localisation sourcing plans. One of these retailers, Foschini, kindly made the suit that I am wearing today at its new formal wear factory, Prestige Epping. Five years ago, more than 80% of all Foschini Group merchandise came from the East. Today, nearly half of the merchandise is locally made. The genuine leather shoes I am wearing were made by members of the National Union of Leather and Allied Workers from Bolton Footwear in Cape Town and Dick Whittington Shoes in Pietermaritzburg. Nearly four years ago, we set ourselves a target of mobilising R1.2 trillion in new investment over five years. By the time of the third South Africa Investment Conference in November 2020, we had reached R776 billion in investment commitments. Next month, on the 24th of March, we will be holding the fourth South Africa Investment Conference in Johannesburg. We will showcase the many investment opportunities available as South Africa continues its recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, and report back on the progress of previous commitments. Following the resolutions of the African Union Summit over the past weekend, trading can now begin under the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement South African companies are poised to play a key role in taking up the opportunities that this presents for preferential access to other African markets. The Free Trade agreement is about Africa taking charge of its destiny and growing its economies faster. We will continue to pursue Africa's health sovereignty, working with other African countries and international partners to support the strengthening of the continent's capacity to respond to pandemics. We will increase our efforts to develop Africa's ability to manufacture vaccines. We have made significant progress here in South Africa. We now have two South African companies – Aspen and Biovac – with contracts to produce COVID-19 vaccines. Two additional vaccine projects have also been announced. In addition, we have full local production capability for ventilators, hand sanitisers, medical-grade face masks and gloves and therapeutic drugs and anaesthetics. This production capability worth many billions of rand of production annually, has been put in place in less than two years. South African products have been exported to other African countries, securing them vital supplies and expanding jobs for young South Africans. While we help existing industries to grow, we are also nurturing new opportunities for growth and jobs. Government and the private sector have worked closely together to grow the global business services sector from a small group of companies to one of the world's leading players. The global business services sector is on track to create 500 000 new jobs over the next few years. The hemp and cannabis sector has the potential to create more than 130 000 new jobs. We are therefore streamlining the regulatory processes so that the hemp and cannabis sector can thrive like it is in other countries such as Lesotho. Our people in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and elsewhere are ready to farm with this age-old commodity and bring it to market in new and innovative forms. The social economy, including early childhood development, nursing, social work and community services, has significant potential not only to create jobs, but to provide vital services that communities need. Some of the country's mature industries also have a lot to offer in revamping the industrial and manufacturing potential of our country. The agriculture sector has significant potential for job creation in crops such as citrus, table and dried grapes, subtropical fruit, avocadoes, berries and nuts. Masterplans in the sugar and poultry industries are contributing significantly to increased investment, improved production and transformation. To attract investors into the mining minerals needed in the new global economy, we will soon be finalising our mining exploration strategy. We will continue to support the development of the upstream gas industry, as it holds huge potential for job creation and broader economic development. We will ensure that this is done in strict accordance with the environmental and other laws of our country, and that where there are differences, we work together to resolve them in the interest of our country and its people. We live in one of the regions of the world that is most affected by climate change. We frequently experience droughts, floods and other extreme weather events associated with global warming. Recently floods have affected a number of provinces, including KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Eastern Cape. These have already caused enormous damage to infrastructure and livelihoods. In the last year, we have made important strides in the fight against climate change, and, at the same time, securing our economic competitiveness. For the first time, our climate targets are compatible with limiting warming to 1.5°C. This is the goal that all countries agreed to as part of the Paris Climate Agreement, and is essential to prevent the worst effects of climate change. Since I established the Presidential Climate Commission a little more than a year ago, it has done much work to support a just transition to a sustainable, inclusive, resilient and low-carbon economy. At the international climate conference in Glasgow last November, South Africa struck a historic R131 billion deal with the European Union, France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States. This first-of-its-kind partnership will involve repurposing and repowering some of the coal plants that are reaching the end of their lives, and creating new livelihoods for workers and communities most impacted by this change. To ensure that South Africa is able to derive the full benefit of this and other partnerships, I have appointed Mr Daniel Mminele, a former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank, as Head of the Presidential Climate Finance Task Team to lead the mobilisation of funds for our just transition. Properly managed, the energy transition will benefit all. Renewable energy production will make electricity cheaper and more dependable, and will allow our industries to remain globally competitive. Investments in electric vehicles and hydrogen will equip South Africa to meet the global clean energy future. We will be able to expand our mining industry in strategic minerals that are crucial for clean energy, like platinum, vanadium, cobalt, copper, manganese and lithium. We also have a unique opportunity in green hydrogen, given our world-class solar and wind resources and local technology and expertise. All of these measures – from structural reforms to support for SMMEs, investments in infrastructure and the emergence of new sectors – will drive a turnaround in economic growth driven by the private sector growth over the coming years. We know, however, that even with the best business environment and much faster rates of economic growth, it will take time for the private sector to create enough jobs for the millions of South Africans who need them. Our intent is to leave no one behind. That is why we are expanding public and social employment. The first two phases of the Presidential Employment Stimulus programmes, which we launched in October 2020 have supported over 850 000 opportunities. More than 80 per cent of participants were young people, and over 60% were women. It has supported young women like Tracy Nkosi from Springs, who was employed as an education assistant at Welgedag Primary School, and who says this opportunity has motivated her to further her studies in the educational sphere. It has also supported Mama Nosipho Cekwana from Impendle in KwaZulu-Natal who used her farming input voucher to buy maize, manure and supplements for her livestock. The total number of direct beneficiaries will soon rise to over one million South Africans. This includes over half a million young people appointed as education assistants, making it the largest youth employment programme ever undertaken in our history. The employment stimulus will also enable the Department of Home Affairs to recruit 10 000 unemployed young people for the digitisation of paper records, enhancing their skills and contributing to the modernisation of citizen services. The Social Employment Fund will create a further 50 000 work opportunities using the capability of organisations beyond government, in areas such as urban agriculture, early childhood development, public art and tackling gender-based violence. In addition to expanding public employment, we are providing support to young people to prepare them for work and link them to opportunities. To encourage hiring by smaller businesses, we will be increasing the value and expanding the criteria for participation in the Employment Tax Incentive. For several years, this has been an effective way to encourage companies to hire new work seekers. The changes to the incentive will make it easier for small businesses in particular to hire young people. The Minister of Finance will announce the details of these changes in the budget. We call on companies to support this effort, take up the incentive and give young people a place in the world of work. The SAYouth.mobi platform for young work seekers to access opportunities and support now has more than 2.3 million young South Africans registered. Of these over 600 000 have been placed into employment opportunities. A revitalised National Youth Service will recruit its first cohort of 50 000 young people during the next year, creating opportunities for young people to contribute to their communities, develop their skills and grow their employability. The Department of Higher Education and Training will place 10,000 unemployed TVET graduates in workplaces from April 2022. In preparing this SoNA, I was assisted by two young South Africans who are working as interns in The Presidency, Ms Naledi Malatji and Ms Kearabetswe Mabatle. They told me about the pain felt by young people who find themselves with a qualification, but are unemployed because of lack of experience. This forces many into jobs that have little or nothing to do with what they studied. All of the measures I have outlined are essential to provide young people with the work experience that they need to take their first step into the labour market. We are calling on the private sector to support these measures – and, wherever possible, to drop experience as a hiring requirement – to give as many young people as possible their first job. As we work to grow the economy and create jobs, we will expand support to poor families to ensure that no person in this country has to endure the pain and indignity of hunger. Our social protection system is among the greatest achievements of the democratic government, reaching more than 18 million people every month. Without this support, millions more people would live in dire poverty. Since the onset of COVID-19, the Social Relief of Distress Grant has provided support to more than 10 million unemployed people who were most vulnerable to the impact of the pandemic. Some people used that money to start businesses. Mr Thando Makhubu from Soweto received the R350 grant for seven months last year, and saved it to open an ice-cream store that now employs four people. Mr Lindokuhle Msomi, an unemployed TV producer from KwaMashu Hostel, saved the R350 grant he received for nine months to start a fast food stall and to support his family. As much as it has had a substantial impact, we must recognise that we face extreme fiscal constraints. A fiscal crisis would hurt the poor worst of all through the deterioration of the basic services on which they rely. Mindful of the proven benefits of the grant, we will extend the R350 grant for one further year, to the end of March 2023. During this time, we will engage in broad consultations and detailed technical work to identify the best options to replace this grant. Any future support must pass the test of affordability, and must not come at the expense of basic services or at the risk of unsustainable spending. It remains our ambition to establish a minimum level of support for those in greatest need. Expanding access to land is vital for our efforts to reduce hunger and provide people with meaningful livelihoods. We are moving ahead with land reform in terms of the Constitution, and anticipate the approval of the Expropriation Bill during this year. The establishment of the Agriculture and Land Reform Development Agency will be finalised this year. The Department of Public Works and Infrastructure will finalise the transfer of 14 000 hectares of state land to the Housing Development Agency. We have enough arable land to support millions of thriving small-scale farmers in poultry, livestock, fruit and vegetables. Through the Presidential Employment Stimulus and the Solidarity Fund, over 100 000 farmers have already received input vouchers to expand their production. This scheme has proven to be effective and impactful. The agriculture sector has also recognised the importance of supporting small-scale farmers and integrating them into value chains. Through the sugar master plan, the industry has provided R225 million to over 12 000 small-scale sugar cane growers as part of a R1 billion commitment to support black farmers. We will be expanding the provision of input vouchers and calling on other sectors to join this effort, so that we can collectively reach up to 250 000 small-scale farmers this year. None of our efforts to revive our economy will succeed if we do not tackle the scourge of corruption once and for all. Since the beginning of the year, I have been provided with the first two parts of the report of the Commission of Inquiry into State Capture headed by Acting Chief Justice Raymond Zondo. While the definitive conclusion has yet to be delivered at the end of this month, the first two parts of the report make it plain that there was indeed 'state capture'. This means that public institutions and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were infiltrated by a criminal network intent on looting public money for private gain. The reports have detailed the devastating effects of this criminal activity on South African Airways, Transnet, Denel, South African Revenue Service (SARS) and Government Communications. State capture had a direct and very concrete negative impact on the lives of all South Africans, but especially the poorest and most vulnerable members of our society. It has weakened the ability of the State to deliver services and to meet the expectations and constitutional rights of people. We must now do everything in our power to ensure that it never happens again. My responsibility is to ensure that the commission report is properly and carefully considered and then acted upon. By no later than 30 June, I will present a plan of action in response to the commission's recommendations. We will, as the commission's first report recommends, strengthen the system to protect whistle-blowers, who are a vital safeguard in the fight against corruption and who take huge personal risk in reporting wrongdoing. We are doing a detailed review of all applicable legislation and a comparative study of other jurisdictions to strengthen whistle-blower protection. The relevant law enforcement agencies are taking the necessary steps to address the immediate concern about the safety of whistle blowers. Many individuals and companies that the commission has found were responsible for state capture must now be held to account. I have every confidence that the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) will carry out the further investigations that the commission has recommended, and that it will bring the members of the criminal network that infiltrated government and captured the State swiftly to justice. The Investigating Directorate in the NPA is now poised to deliver on its crucial mandate, and a dedicated team has been established to pursue these cases. We will be appointing a new head of the Investigating Directorate following the departure of Adv Hermione Cronje from that position. An amendment to the State Capture Commission regulations in June 2020, empowered the sharing of information between the Commission and law enforcement agencies. This amendment also permitted the employment of the State Capture Commission personnel by law enforcement agencies. These empowering provisions has geared the Investigating Directorate to more effectively pursue the investigations emanating from the commission. We have gratefully acknowledged the offer of support from the private sector to assist in providing those skills which we lack in government to enable investigation and prosecution of crime. To ensure that the prosecuting authority remains true to its constitutional obligation and to ensure transparency, we are developing a framework for private sector cooperation that will be managed through National Treasury. There are also discussions underway with the Judiciary for the creation of special court rolls for state capture and corruption cases. While we have taken decisive steps to end the era of state capture, we know that the fight against corruption is far from over. Even as the country was suffering the devastation of the COVID-19 pandemic, companies and individuals were conspiring with public officials to defraud the government of billions of rand in COVID-related contracts. As soon as evidence emerged of this corruption we acted. We withdrew certain emergency procurement regulations, set up a fusion centre that brought together various law enforcement agencies, published the details of all COVID-related contracts online and instituted the most extensive investigation that the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) has undertaken since its formation. In December, the SIU submitted its final report on its investigation into COVID-related contracts. As a result, 45 matters, with a combined value of R2.1 billion, have been enrolled with the Special Tribunal. The SIU has referred 224 government officials for disciplinary action and referred 386 cases for possible prosecution to the NPA. The Presidency has set up mechanisms to monitor implementation of the recommendations of the SIU and ensure that government departments and entities act against those who have violated regulations and broken the law. The fight against corruption will take on a new intensity thanks to the outcomes of the State Capture Commission, the strengthening of law enforcement agencies and the implementation of new anti-corruption practices in the public service. SOEs play a vital role in our economy. From water and roads, to energy and ports, to defence and aviation, these strategic assets are necessary to keep our country running. It is essential that we reverse their decline, and position them to contribute positively. We have therefore embarked on several immediate measures to restore these companies to health, at the same time as we undertake far-reaching reforms that will make our SOEs more efficient, competitive, accountable and sustainable. The Presidential SOE Council, which I appointed in 2020, has recommended that government adopt a centralised shareholder model for its key commercial state-owned companies. This would separate the State's ownership functions from its policy-making and regulatory functions, minimise the scope for political interference, introduce greater professionalism and manage state assets in a way that protects shareholder value. As part of this, preparatory work has begun for the establishment of a state-owned holding company to house strategic SOEs and to exercise coordinated shareholder oversight. To ensure that SOEs are effectively fulfilling their responsibilities, the Presidential SOE Council is preparing recommendations on SOEs to be retained, consolidated or disposed of. Any recommendations would be subject to extensive consultation with all stakeholders. We are taking steps to safeguard our democracy, protect our economic infrastructure and build safer communities for all. Earlier this week, we released the report of the expert panel into the civil unrest in July last year. The report paints a deeply disturbing picture of the capabilities of our security services and the structures that exist to coordinate their work. The report concludes that government's initial handling of the July 2021 events was inept, police operational planning was poor, there was poor coordination between the state security and intelligence services, and police are not always embedded in the communities they serve. The expert panel said that if the violence has exposed anything it was the poverty and inequality that is the root cause of the desperation of the people of South Africa. The expert panel found that Cabinet must take overall responsibility for the events of July 2021. This is a responsibility that we acknowledge and accept. We will, as recommended by the panel, develop and drive a national response plan to address the weaknesses that the panel has identified. We will begin immediately by filling critical vacancies and addressing positions affected by suspensions in the State Security Agency and Crime Intelligence. We will soon be announcing leadership changes in a number of security agencies to strengthen our security structures. The staffing of the public order policing unit of the South African Police Service will be brought to an appropriate level, with appropriate training courses in place. The ongoing damage to and theft of economic infrastructure has damaged confidence and severely constrained economic growth, investment and job creation. At the same time, we need to confront the criminal gangs that invade construction sites and other business places to extort money from companies. This requires a focused and coordinated response. Government has therefore established specialise multi-disciplinary units to address economic sabotage, extortion at construction sites and vandalism of infrastructure. We will make resources available to recruit and train an additional 12 000 new police personnel to ensure that the South African Police Service urgently gets the capacity it needs. Another area of immediate attention will be the re-establishment of community policing forums to improve relations and coordination between local police and residents of the areas they serve. It is clear from the observations of the expert panel that we need to take a more inclusive approach to assessing the threats to our country's security and determining the necessary responses. I am calling on all South Africans through their various formations to participate in developing our National Security Strategy. I will be approaching Parliament's presiding officers to request that Parliament plays a key role in facilitating inclusive processes of consultation. The security services have been tasked by the National Security Council to urgently develop implementation plans that address the range of recommendations made by the expert panel. These measures will go a long way to address the serious concerns about the breakdown of law and order in society. This year, we are intensifying the fight against gender-based violence and femicide through implementation of the National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide, and other measures to promote the empowerment of women. Earlier this month, I signed into law three new pieces of legislation, which has strengthened the criminal justice system, promoting accountability across the State and supporting survivors. The implementation of this legislation will go a long way to ensuring that cases are successfully prosecuted, that survivors are protected and that there are more effective deterrents in place. We have made significant progress in reducing the backlog in DNA processing, reducing it from 210 000 exhibits in April 2021 to around 58 000 at present. However, the fight against gender-based violence will never be won unless, as society, we mobilise all formations and all citizens behind a sustained programme of social action. As the COVID-19 pandemic has starkly demonstrated, a nation's health is inextricably linked with its economic progress and social development. We will therefore continue with the work underway to ensure universal health coverage for everyone in South Africa, regardless of their ability to pay. While public hearings on the National Health (NHI) Bill are continuing in Parliament, much progress is being made in preparing for the introduction of NHI. More than 59 million people are registered in the Health Patient Registration System. By September 2021, more than 56 000 additional health workers had been recruited and more than 46 000 community health workers integrated into the public health system. For the last two years, the education of our children and young people has been severely disrupted. As we return to normal educational activity, we will work harder to ensure that all learners and students get the quality education they need and deserve. Fellow South Africans, Government must work for the people. That is why our foremost priority is to build a capable, ethical and developmental state. We will soon be finalising a framework for the professionalisation of the public service. This will include tighter measures for recruitment of public servants, continuous professional development through the National School of Government and partnerships between state bodies, professional associations and universities. Lifestyle audits are already being implemented across the Public Service. This year, we will continue with the implementation of the DDM. This model brings all three spheres of government together with other social partners in every district to grow inclusive local economies and improve the lives of citizens. In particular, the DDM facilitates integrated planning and budgeting across spheres of government and improves integration of national projects at a district level. While there are many parts of the state that require much work, there are institutions that continue to serve the people of this country effectively and efficiently. One such institution is the SARS, which will be 25 years old this year. While SARS was badly damaged by state capture, it has made remarkable progress in restoring its integrity, credibility and performance. Since its formation, SARS has collected some R16 trillion for the country's social and economic development. This revenue has enabled government to improve the lives of millions through the provision of healthcare, education, social grants and other basic services. A capable state is not only about the quality of public servants and the efficiency of institutions. It is also, fundamentally, about how citizens are empowered to participate. We must work together to ensure that platforms like schools governing bodies and community policing forums are more active and inclusive. A vibrant civil society is crucial for a capable state and for development. We will therefore be working with social partners to convene the long-awaited social sector summit. This summit will seek to improve the interface between the state and civil society and address the challenges that non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations face. Our country has suffered several damaging blows in recent times. A confluence of forces, many of them outside of our control, has brought us to where we are now. We face steep and daunting challenges. Indeed, we are engaged in a battle for the soul of this country. But there can be no doubt that we will win. I ask every South African to rally together in our fight against corruption, in our fight to create jobs, in our fight to achieve a more just and equal society. We have faced many crises in our past, and we have overcome them. We have been confronted with difficult choices, and we have made them. In trying times, we have shown courage and resilience Time and time again, we have pulled ourselves back from the brink of despair and inspired hope, renewal and progress. Now, we must do so again. Let us forge a new consensus to confront a new reality, a consensus that unites us behind our shared determination to reform our economy and rebuild our institutions. Let us get to work. Let us rebuild our country. And let us leave no one behind. I thank you.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2022-state-nation-address-10-feb-2022-0000

State of the Nation Address (SoNA) by President Cyril Ramaphosa, Cape Town City Hall, Thursday, 10 February 2022 Speaker of the National Assembly, Ms Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, Mr Amos Masondo, Deputy President David Mabuza, Former President Thabo Mbeki, Former Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Former Deputy President Baleka Mbete, Former Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr Max Sisulu, Acting Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, Mayor of the City of Cape Town, Mr Geordin Hill-Lewis, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Mr Bene M'Poko, Members of the Judiciary, Heads of Institutions Supporting Democracy, Members of Parliament, Fellow South Africans, This year, for the first time since the dawn of our democracy, the SoNA is not being delivered in the Chamber of the National Assembly. As we entered this new year, a huge fire engulfed the seat of our democracy. We all watched in outrage and sadness as the flames devoured the buildings in which our democratic Constitution was born, in which laws of transformation and progress have been passed, in which the freely-chosen representatives of the people have shaped our young nation. For many, what happened in Parliament speaks to a broader devastation in our land. For many, the fire was symbolic of the devastation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, by rising unemployment and deepening poverty. It spoke to the devastation of a pandemic that over the past two years has taken the lives of tens of thousands of South Africans, put two million people out of work and brought misery to families. The fire in Parliament reminded us of the destruction, violence and looting that we witnessed in parts of the country in July last year, of the more than 300 lives lost and many more livelihoods ruined. As we reflect on the past year, we recall the words of President Thabo Mbeki who reminded us that: "Trying times need courage and resilience. Our strength as a people is not tested during the best of times". That we are gathered together in the Cape Town City Hall instead of the National Assembly Chamber reflects the extraordinary circumstances of this time. It reflects the determination of the Presiding Officers of Parliament and indeed all the members of our two houses that the work of this democratic institution should continue without interruption. There are moments in the life of a nation when old certainties are unsettled and new possibilities emerge. In these moments, there is both the prospect of great progress and the risk of reversal. Today, we are faced with such a moment. The path we choose now will determine the course for future generations. That is why we are taking steps to strengthen our democracy and reaffirm our commitment to a Constitution that protects us all. We are working together to revitalise our economy and end the inequality and injustice that impedes our progress. We are standing together against corruption and to ensure that those who are responsible for state capture are punished for their crimes. We are rebuilding the State and restoring trust and pride in public institutions. If there is one thing we all agree on, it is that the present situation – of deep poverty, unemployment and inequality – is unacceptable and unsustainable. There is agreement among a broad and diverse range of South Africans that fundamental reforms are needed to revive economic growth. There is a need both to address the immediate crisis and to create conditions for long-lasting stability and development. To achieve this, South Africa needs a new consensus. A consensus that is born out of a common understanding of our current challenging situation and a recognition of the need to address the challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality. This should be a new consensus which recognises that the State must create an environment in which the private sector can invest and unleash the dynamism of the economy. But equally, an environment in which South Africans can live a better life and unleash the energy of their capabilities. This should also be a new consensus which embraces our shared responsibility to one another, and acknowledges that we are all in this together. As the social partners – government, labour, business and communities – we are working to determine the actions we will take together to build such a consensus. We have begun discussions on what trade-offs are needed and what contribution we will each need to make. We have given ourselves 100 days to finalise a comprehensive social compact to grow our economy, create jobs and combat hunger. This work will build on the foundation of the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (ERRP), which remains our common programme to rebuild the economy, We remain focused on the priorities we identified in the SoNA last year: - overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic, - a massive rollout of infrastructure, - a substantial increase in local production, - an employment stimulus to create jobs and support livelihoods, - the rapid expansion of our energy generation capacity. To be effective, this social compact needs to include every South African and every part of our society. No one must be left behind. Fellow South Africans, When I last addressed the state of our nation, we were deep in the throes of the worst pandemic in more than a century. Since COVID-19 reached our shores, we have endured successive waves of infection, the emergence of new variants and the devastating cost of nearly 100 000 recorded COVID-19 deaths. South Africans have responded to this grave threat with courage and resilience, with compassion and restraint. Over the past two years, we have taken unprecedented actions to strengthen our health system, build laboratory capacity and prevent infections. The nation owes a great debt of gratitude to the dedicated healthcare workers and other frontline staff who put their health and their lives at risk to care for the ill and vulnerable during this pandemic. Within weeks of the first reported infection in our country, I announced the establishment of the Solidarity Fund, with the goal of uniting the country in the fight against the pandemic. In a wave of generosity that swept the country, the fund raised R3.4 billion from more than 300 000 individuals and 3 000 companies and foundations. More than 400 individuals and 100 companies volunteered their time and services. The fund has played a pivotal role in supporting the national health response and alleviating the humanitarian crisis. I would like to thank everyone who contributed to the Solidarity Fund and the great many who came together in countless other initiatives to support those affected by the pandemic. As the trajectory of the pandemic has continued to change, we have had to adapt and evolve. Our approach has been informed throughout by the best available scientific evidence, and we have stood out both for the quality of our scientists and for their involvement in every step of our response. During the past year, we have focused on accelerating our vaccine rollout. So far, we have administered 30 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines. Consequently, nearly 42% of all adults and 60% of everyone over 50 is fully vaccinated. We are now ready to enter a new phase in our management of the pandemic. It is our intention to end the national state of disaster as soon as we have finalised other measures under the National Health Act, 2003 (Act 61 0f 2003) and other legislation to contain the pandemic. Nearly all restrictions on economic and social activity have already been lifted. Vaccines have proven to be the best defence we have against illness and death from COVID-19. If we all get vaccinated, continue to observe basic health measures and remain ever vigilant, we will be able to get on with our lives even with the virus in our midst. The state of the nation is linked inextricably to the state of our economy. In addition to the divides of race, geography and education, COVID-19 has exacerbated the divide between those who are employed and unemployed. Last year, our unemployment rate reached its highest recorded level. Unemployment has been caused by low growth, which has in turn resulted from a long-term decline in investment. In the last year, we have benefited from a clear and stable macroeconomic framework, strong commodity prices and a better-than-expected recovery. However, we have been held back by an unreliable electricity supply, inefficient network industries and the high cost of doing business. We have been taking extraordinary measures to enable businesses to grow and create jobs alongside expanded public employment and social protection. We all know that government does not create jobs. Business creates jobs. Around 80% of all the people employed in South Africa are employed in the private sector. The key task of government is to create the conditions that will enable the private sector – both big and small – to emerge, to grow, to access new markets, to create new products, and to hire more employees. The problems in the South African economy are deep and they are structural. When electricity supply cannot be guaranteed, when railways and ports are inefficient, when innovation is held back by a scarcity of broadband spectrum, when water quality deteriorates, companies are reluctant to invest and the economy cannot function properly. With a view to addressing these challenges we are accelerating the implementation of far-reaching structural reforms to modernise and transform these industries, unlock investment, reduce costs and increase competitiveness and growth. The electricity crisis is one of the greatest threats to economic and social progress. In the last few days, we have once again been reminded of the fragility of our electricity system. Load shedding continues to have a huge impact on the lives of all South Africans, disrupting business activities, and placing additional strains on families and communities. Due to our aging power stations, poor maintenance, policy missteps and the ruinous effects of state capture, our country has a shortfall of around 4000 MW of electricity. During the past year, we have taken firm steps to bring additional generation capacity online as quickly as possible to close the shortfall. As a result, several new energy generation projects will be coming online over the next few years. This includes: - Over 500 MW from the remaining projects in Bid Window 4 of the renewable energy programme, which are at advanced stages of construction. - 2 600 MW from Bid Window 5 of the renewable energy programme, for which the preferred bidders were announced last year, - up to 800 MW from those risk mitigation power projects that are ready to proceed, - 2 600 MW from Bid Window 6 of the renewal energy programme, which will soon be opened, - 3,000 MW of gas power and 500 MW of battery storage, for which requests for proposals will be released later this year, - an estimated 4 000 MW from embedded generation projects in the mining sector, - approximately 1 400 MW currently in the process of being secured by various municipalities. In addition to closing the energy supply shortfall, we are implementing fundamental changes to the structure of the electricity sector. Eskom has established a separate transmission subsidiary, and is on track to complete its unbundling by December 2022. The utility has continued with its intensive maintenance programme, to reverse many years of neglected maintenance and underperformance of existing plants. To regulate all of these reforms, Cabinet yesterday approved amendments to the Electricity Regulation Act, 2006 (Act of 2006) for public comment. These far-reaching amendments will enable a competitive market for electricity generation and the establishment of an independent state-owned transmission company. Our economy cannot grow without efficient ports and railways. Over several years, the functioning of our ports has declined relative to ports in other parts of the world and on the African continent. This constrains economic activity. The agricultural sector, for example, relies heavily on efficient, well-run ports to export their produce to overseas markets. Fresh produce cannot wait for days and even weeks stuck in a terminal. This hurts businesses and compromises our country's reputation as an exporter of quality fresh produce. Transnet is addressing these challenges and is currently focused on improving operational efficiencies at the ports through procuring additional equipment and implementing new systems to reduce congestion. Transnet will ask for proposals from private partners for the Durban and Ngqura Container Terminals within the next few months, which will enable partnerships to be in place at both terminals by October 2022. Transnet will start the process of providing third-party access to its freight rail network from April 2022 by making slots available on the container corridor between Durban and City Deep in Gauteng. Transnet has developed partnerships with the private sector to address cable theft and vandalism on the freight rail network through advanced technologies and additional security personnel. This collaborative effort is already showing results in reduced disruptions to rail operations. The poor state of passenger rail in South Africa has a direct and detrimental impact on the lives of our people. We are therefore working hard to rehabilitate the passenger rail network in 10 priority corridors. The Southern Line in Cape Town and the Mabopane Line in Pretoria have been re-opened to be followed by the remaining lines in the next year. One of the greatest constraints on the technological development of our economy has been the unacceptable delay in the migration of broadcasting from analogue to digital. The switch-off of analogue transmission has been completed in a number of provinces. As I announced in the SoNA last year, the other provinces will move to digital signal by the end of March 2022. As part of this process, government will continue to subsidise low-income households so that they can access a set-top box and make the switch to digital TV. Our communications regulator, ICASA, will commence with the auctioning of the high frequency communications spectrum in about three weeks from now. This will unlock new spectrum for mobile telecommunications for the first time in over a decade. In addition, we will facilitate the rapid deployment of broadband infrastructure across all municipalities by establishing a standard model for the granting of municipal permissions. These reforms will revolutionise the country's technological development, making faster broadband accesible to more people and reducing the costs of digital communications. The world over, the ability to attract skilled immigrants is the hallmark of a modern, thriving economy. We are therefore streamlining and modernising the visa application process to make it easier to travel to South Africa for tourism, business and work. As we committed last year, the eVisa system has now been launched in 14 countries, including China, India, Kenya and Nigeria. The revised Critical Skills List has been published for the first time since 2014, following detailed technical work and extensive consultations with business and labour. The updated list reflects the skills that are in shortage today, to ensure that our immigration policy matches the demands of our economy. A comprehensive review of the work visa system is currently underway, led by a former Director-General of Home Affairs, Mr Mavuso Msimang. This review is exploring the possibility of new visa categories that could enable economic growth, such as a start-up Visa and a remote working visa. Water is the country's most precious natural resource. It is vital to life, to development and to economic growth. That is why we have prioritised institutional reforms in this area to ensure future water security, investment in water resources and maintenance of existing assets. We have embarked on the process of institutional reform in capacitating the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) and reviewing water boards in as far as their mandates are concerned and ensuring that they serve municipalities in terms of the District Development Model (DDM). These reforms are being championed by the Minister of Water and Sanitation, who has visited every water source in the country. A comprehensive turnaround plan is being implemented to streamline the process for water use license applications. The target is to clear the backlog of applications by June 2022 and to process 80% of all applications within 90 days during the next financial year. Legislation has been prepared for the establishment of the National Water Resources Infrastructure Agency, and will be published for public comment within the next month. The water quality monitoring system has been reinstated to improve enforcement of water standards at municipal level, and enable the DWS to intervene where water and sanitation services are failing. We will review the policy and regulatory framework for industrial hemp and cannabis to realise the huge potential for investment and job creation. While structural reforms are necessary for us to revive economic growth, they are not enough on their own. This year, we are undertaking far-reaching measures to unleash the potential of small businesses, micro businesses and informal businesses. These are the businesses that create the most jobs and provide the most opportunities for poor people to earn a living. We have started discussions with social partners as part of the social compact process to review labour market regulations for smaller businesses to enable them to hire more people, while continuing to protect workers' rights. A new, redesigned loan guarantee scheme is being introduced to enable small businesses to bounce back from the pandemic and civic unrest. This new bounce-back scheme incorporates the lessons from the previous loan guarantee scheme. It will involve development finance institutions and non-bank SME providers in offering finance, expand the types of financing available and adjust eligibility criteria to encourage greater uptake. The National Treasury is working with industry stakeholders to finalise the scheme and will provide details soon. We are reviewing the Business Act, 1991 (Act 71 of 1991) – alongside a broader review of legislation that affects small, medium and small-enterprises (SMMEs) – to reduce the regulatory burden on informal businesses. There are too many regulations in this country that are unduly complicated, costly and difficult to comply with. This prevents companies from growing and creating jobs. We are, therefore, working to improve the business environment for companies of all sizes through a dedicated capacity in The Presidency to reduce red tape. If we are to make progress in cutting unnecessary bureaucratic delays for businesses, we need dedicated capacity with the means to make changes. I have therefore appointed Mr Sipho Nkosi to head up a team in my office to cut red tape across government. Mr Nkosi has extensive experience in business, including as the CEO of Exxaro Resources, and is currently the chairperson of the Small Business Institute. The red tape team will identify priority reforms for the year ahead, including mechanisms to ensure government departments pay suppliers within the required 30 days. The team will also work with other departments and agencies to unblock specific obstacles to investment and business growth. It will support current initiatives to simplify processes relating to property registration, cross-border trade and construction permits. Infrastructure is central to our economic reconstruction and recovery. Through innovative funding and improved technical capabilities, we have prioritised infrastructure projects to support economic growth and better livelihoods, especially in energy, roads and water management. The Infrastructure Fund is at the centre of this effort, with a R100 billion allocation from the fiscus over 10 years. The fund is now working with state entities to prepare a pipeline of projects with an investment value of approximately R96 billion in student accommodation, social housing, telecommunications, water and sanitation and transport. Several catalytic projects to the value of R21 billion are expected to start construction this year. Of this, R2.6 billion is contributed by government and the balance from the private sector and developmental finance institutions. Government will make an initial investment of R1.8 billion in bulk infrastructure, which will unlock seven private sector projects to the value of R133 billion. For millions of South Africans in rural areas, roads and bridges provide access to markets, employment opportunities and social services. Yet, many children still have to brave overflowing rivers to reach schools and motorists have to battle impassable roads to reach the next town. We are therefore upscaling the Welisizwe Rural Bridges Programme to deliver 95 bridges a year from the current 14. Our South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is the implementing agent of the Welisizwe programme, and has demonstrated the expertise of SANDF engineers in bridge construction. Earlier this week, I was in Thakgalane village Limpopo to launch a new road that is going to make a huge difference in the lives of neighbouring communities. This road was constructed using block paving and other materials, which is a method that enables us to build durable roads faster and more cost-effectively. The rural roads programme will use labour intensive methods to construct or upgrade 685 kilometres of rural road over the next three years. This social enterprise programme includes access roads in Limpopo and Eastern Cape, gravel to surface upgrades in the Free State and North West, and capacity and connectivity improvements in the Western Cape. Government has initiated the process of delivering the uMzimvubu Water Project. The project is made of the Ntabelanga Dam and Lalini Dam, irrigation infrastructure and hydo-electric plant, Ntabelanga water treatment works and bulk distribution infrastructure to reticulate to the neighboring communities. The closing date for the first of the two-stage procurement process is scheduled to close later this month, with the preferred bidder likely to be announced in September 2022. Government is introducing an innovative social infrastructure delivery mechanism to address issues that afflict the delivery of school infrastructure. The mechanism will address the speed, financing and funding, quality of delivery, mass employment and maintenance. The new delivery mechanism will introduce a Special Purpose Vehicle, working with prominent Development Finance Institutions and the private sector, to deliver school education infrastructure. This approach is being piloted in schools in the Northern Cape and Eastern Cape. Over the past year, government has built on its successful Hydrogen SA strategy to make major strides in positioning South Africa as a global leader in this new market. This includes the development of a Hydrogen Society Roadmap for the next 10 years as well as a Green Hydrogen Strategy for the Northern Cape, supporting the development of a green hydrogen pipeline worth around R270 billion. The damage caused by the theft of scrap metal and cable on our infrastructure like electricity, trains and other vital services is enormous. We will take decisive steps this year both through improved law enforcement and by considering further measures to address the sale or export of such scrap metal. An important pillar of our ERRP is to revitalise our manufacturing base and create globally competitive export industries. In the past year, we launched new master plans in the steel industry, furniture and global business services. Through these plans, business, government and labour are working together to increase production and create more jobs in the sector. In the clothing industry, a number of retailers have announced ambitious localisation sourcing plans. One of these retailers, Foschini, kindly made the suit that I am wearing today at its new formal wear factory, Prestige Epping. Five years ago, more than 80% of all Foschini Group merchandise came from the East. Today, nearly half of the merchandise is locally made. The genuine leather shoes I am wearing were made by members of the National Union of Leather and Allied Workers from Bolton Footwear in Cape Town and Dick Whittington Shoes in Pietermaritzburg. Nearly four years ago, we set ourselves a target of mobilising R1.2 trillion in new investment over five years. By the time of the third South Africa Investment Conference in November 2020, we had reached R776 billion in investment commitments. Next month, on the 24th of March, we will be holding the fourth South Africa Investment Conference in Johannesburg. We will showcase the many investment opportunities available as South Africa continues its recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, and report back on the progress of previous commitments. Following the resolutions of the African Union Summit over the past weekend, trading can now begin under the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement South African companies are poised to play a key role in taking up the opportunities that this presents for preferential access to other African markets. The Free Trade agreement is about Africa taking charge of its destiny and growing its economies faster. We will continue to pursue Africa's health sovereignty, working with other African countries and international partners to support the strengthening of the continent's capacity to respond to pandemics. We will increase our efforts to develop Africa's ability to manufacture vaccines. We have made significant progress here in South Africa. We now have two South African companies – Aspen and Biovac – with contracts to produce COVID-19 vaccines. Two additional vaccine projects have also been announced. In addition, we have full local production capability for ventilators, hand sanitisers, medical-grade face masks and gloves and therapeutic drugs and anaesthetics. This production capability worth many billions of rand of production annually, has been put in place in less than two years. South African products have been exported to other African countries, securing them vital supplies and expanding jobs for young South Africans. While we help existing industries to grow, we are also nurturing new opportunities for growth and jobs. Government and the private sector have worked closely together to grow the global business services sector from a small group of companies to one of the world's leading players. The global business services sector is on track to create 500 000 new jobs over the next few years. The hemp and cannabis sector has the potential to create more than 130 000 new jobs. We are therefore streamlining the regulatory processes so that the hemp and cannabis sector can thrive like it is in other countries such as Lesotho. Our people in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and elsewhere are ready to farm with this age-old commodity and bring it to market in new and innovative forms. The social economy, including early childhood development, nursing, social work and community services, has significant potential not only to create jobs, but to provide vital services that communities need. Some of the country's mature industries also have a lot to offer in revamping the industrial and manufacturing potential of our country. The agriculture sector has significant potential for job creation in crops such as citrus, table and dried grapes, subtropical fruit, avocadoes, berries and nuts. Masterplans in the sugar and poultry industries are contributing significantly to increased investment, improved production and transformation. To attract investors into the mining minerals needed in the new global economy, we will soon be finalising our mining exploration strategy. We will continue to support the development of the upstream gas industry, as it holds huge potential for job creation and broader economic development. We will ensure that this is done in strict accordance with the environmental and other laws of our country, and that where there are differences, we work together to resolve them in the interest of our country and its people. We live in one of the regions of the world that is most affected by climate change. We frequently experience droughts, floods and other extreme weather events associated with global warming. Recently floods have affected a number of provinces, including KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Eastern Cape. These have already caused enormous damage to infrastructure and livelihoods. In the last year, we have made important strides in the fight against climate change, and, at the same time, securing our economic competitiveness. For the first time, our climate targets are compatible with limiting warming to 1.5°C. This is the goal that all countries agreed to as part of the Paris Climate Agreement, and is essential to prevent the worst effects of climate change. Since I established the Presidential Climate Commission a little more than a year ago, it has done much work to support a just transition to a sustainable, inclusive, resilient and low-carbon economy. At the international climate conference in Glasgow last November, South Africa struck a historic R131 billion deal with the European Union, France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States. This first-of-its-kind partnership will involve repurposing and repowering some of the coal plants that are reaching the end of their lives, and creating new livelihoods for workers and communities most impacted by this change. To ensure that South Africa is able to derive the full benefit of this and other partnerships, I have appointed Mr Daniel Mminele, a former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank, as Head of the Presidential Climate Finance Task Team to lead the mobilisation of funds for our just transition. Properly managed, the energy transition will benefit all. Renewable energy production will make electricity cheaper and more dependable, and will allow our industries to remain globally competitive. Investments in electric vehicles and hydrogen will equip South Africa to meet the global clean energy future. We will be able to expand our mining industry in strategic minerals that are crucial for clean energy, like platinum, vanadium, cobalt, copper, manganese and lithium. We also have a unique opportunity in green hydrogen, given our world-class solar and wind resources and local technology and expertise. All of these measures – from structural reforms to support for SMMEs, investments in infrastructure and the emergence of new sectors – will drive a turnaround in economic growth driven by the private sector growth over the coming years. We know, however, that even with the best business environment and much faster rates of economic growth, it will take time for the private sector to create enough jobs for the millions of South Africans who need them. Our intent is to leave no one behind. That is why we are expanding public and social employment. The first two phases of the Presidential Employment Stimulus programmes, which we launched in October 2020 have supported over 850 000 opportunities. More than 80 per cent of participants were young people, and over 60% were women. It has supported young women like Tracy Nkosi from Springs, who was employed as an education assistant at Welgedag Primary School, and who says this opportunity has motivated her to further her studies in the educational sphere. It has also supported Mama Nosipho Cekwana from Impendle in KwaZulu-Natal who used her farming input voucher to buy maize, manure and supplements for her livestock. The total number of direct beneficiaries will soon rise to over one million South Africans. This includes over half a million young people appointed as education assistants, making it the largest youth employment programme ever undertaken in our history. The employment stimulus will also enable the Department of Home Affairs to recruit 10 000 unemployed young people for the digitisation of paper records, enhancing their skills and contributing to the modernisation of citizen services. The Social Employment Fund will create a further 50 000 work opportunities using the capability of organisations beyond government, in areas such as urban agriculture, early childhood development, public art and tackling gender-based violence. In addition to expanding public employment, we are providing support to young people to prepare them for work and link them to opportunities. To encourage hiring by smaller businesses, we will be increasing the value and expanding the criteria for participation in the Employment Tax Incentive. For several years, this has been an effective way to encourage companies to hire new work seekers. The changes to the incentive will make it easier for small businesses in particular to hire young people. The Minister of Finance will announce the details of these changes in the budget. We call on companies to support this effort, take up the incentive and give young people a place in the world of work. The SAYouth.mobi platform for young work seekers to access opportunities and support now has more than 2.3 million young South Africans registered. Of these over 600 000 have been placed into employment opportunities. A revitalised National Youth Service will recruit its first cohort of 50 000 young people during the next year, creating opportunities for young people to contribute to their communities, develop their skills and grow their employability. The Department of Higher Education and Training will place 10,000 unemployed TVET graduates in workplaces from April 2022. In preparing this SoNA, I was assisted by two young South Africans who are working as interns in The Presidency, Ms Naledi Malatji and Ms Kearabetswe Mabatle. They told me about the pain felt by young people who find themselves with a qualification, but are unemployed because of lack of experience. This forces many into jobs that have little or nothing to do with what they studied. All of the measures I have outlined are essential to provide young people with the work experience that they need to take their first step into the labour market. We are calling on the private sector to support these measures – and, wherever possible, to drop experience as a hiring requirement – to give as many young people as possible their first job. As we work to grow the economy and create jobs, we will expand support to poor families to ensure that no person in this country has to endure the pain and indignity of hunger. Our social protection system is among the greatest achievements of the democratic government, reaching more than 18 million people every month. Without this support, millions more people would live in dire poverty. Since the onset of COVID-19, the Social Relief of Distress Grant has provided support to more than 10 million unemployed people who were most vulnerable to the impact of the pandemic. Some people used that money to start businesses. Mr Thando Makhubu from Soweto received the R350 grant for seven months last year, and saved it to open an ice-cream store that now employs four people. Mr Lindokuhle Msomi, an unemployed TV producer from KwaMashu Hostel, saved the R350 grant he received for nine months to start a fast food stall and to support his family. As much as it has had a substantial impact, we must recognise that we face extreme fiscal constraints. A fiscal crisis would hurt the poor worst of all through the deterioration of the basic services on which they rely. Mindful of the proven benefits of the grant, we will extend the R350 grant for one further year, to the end of March 2023. During this time, we will engage in broad consultations and detailed technical work to identify the best options to replace this grant. Any future support must pass the test of affordability, and must not come at the expense of basic services or at the risk of unsustainable spending. It remains our ambition to establish a minimum level of support for those in greatest need. Expanding access to land is vital for our efforts to reduce hunger and provide people with meaningful livelihoods. We are moving ahead with land reform in terms of the Constitution, and anticipate the approval of the Expropriation Bill during this year. The establishment of the Agriculture and Land Reform Development Agency will be finalised this year. The Department of Public Works and Infrastructure will finalise the transfer of 14 000 hectares of state land to the Housing Development Agency. We have enough arable land to support millions of thriving small-scale farmers in poultry, livestock, fruit and vegetables. Through the Presidential Employment Stimulus and the Solidarity Fund, over 100 000 farmers have already received input vouchers to expand their production. This scheme has proven to be effective and impactful. The agriculture sector has also recognised the importance of supporting small-scale farmers and integrating them into value chains. Through the sugar master plan, the industry has provided R225 million to over 12 000 small-scale sugar cane growers as part of a R1 billion commitment to support black farmers. We will be expanding the provision of input vouchers and calling on other sectors to join this effort, so that we can collectively reach up to 250 000 small-scale farmers this year. None of our efforts to revive our economy will succeed if we do not tackle the scourge of corruption once and for all. Since the beginning of the year, I have been provided with the first two parts of the report of the Commission of Inquiry into State Capture headed by Acting Chief Justice Raymond Zondo. While the definitive conclusion has yet to be delivered at the end of this month, the first two parts of the report make it plain that there was indeed 'state capture'. This means that public institutions and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were infiltrated by a criminal network intent on looting public money for private gain. The reports have detailed the devastating effects of this criminal activity on South African Airways, Transnet, Denel, South African Revenue Service (SARS) and Government Communications. State capture had a direct and very concrete negative impact on the lives of all South Africans, but especially the poorest and most vulnerable members of our society. It has weakened the ability of the State to deliver services and to meet the expectations and constitutional rights of people. We must now do everything in our power to ensure that it never happens again. My responsibility is to ensure that the commission report is properly and carefully considered and then acted upon. By no later than 30 June, I will present a plan of action in response to the commission's recommendations. We will, as the commission's first report recommends, strengthen the system to protect whistle-blowers, who are a vital safeguard in the fight against corruption and who take huge personal risk in reporting wrongdoing. We are doing a detailed review of all applicable legislation and a comparative study of other jurisdictions to strengthen whistle-blower protection. The relevant law enforcement agencies are taking the necessary steps to address the immediate concern about the safety of whistle blowers. Many individuals and companies that the commission has found were responsible for state capture must now be held to account. I have every confidence that the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) will carry out the further investigations that the commission has recommended, and that it will bring the members of the criminal network that infiltrated government and captured the State swiftly to justice. The Investigating Directorate in the NPA is now poised to deliver on its crucial mandate, and a dedicated team has been established to pursue these cases. We will be appointing a new head of the Investigating Directorate following the departure of Adv Hermione Cronje from that position. An amendment to the State Capture Commission regulations in June 2020, empowered the sharing of information between the Commission and law enforcement agencies. This amendment also permitted the employment of the State Capture Commission personnel by law enforcement agencies. These empowering provisions has geared the Investigating Directorate to more effectively pursue the investigations emanating from the commission. We have gratefully acknowledged the offer of support from the private sector to assist in providing those skills which we lack in government to enable investigation and prosecution of crime. To ensure that the prosecuting authority remains true to its constitutional obligation and to ensure transparency, we are developing a framework for private sector cooperation that will be managed through National Treasury. There are also discussions underway with the Judiciary for the creation of special court rolls for state capture and corruption cases. While we have taken decisive steps to end the era of state capture, we know that the fight against corruption is far from over. Even as the country was suffering the devastation of the COVID-19 pandemic, companies and individuals were conspiring with public officials to defraud the government of billions of rand in COVID-related contracts. As soon as evidence emerged of this corruption we acted. We withdrew certain emergency procurement regulations, set up a fusion centre that brought together various law enforcement agencies, published the details of all COVID-related contracts online and instituted the most extensive investigation that the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) has undertaken since its formation. In December, the SIU submitted its final report on its investigation into COVID-related contracts. As a result, 45 matters, with a combined value of R2.1 billion, have been enrolled with the Special Tribunal. The SIU has referred 224 government officials for disciplinary action and referred 386 cases for possible prosecution to the NPA. The Presidency has set up mechanisms to monitor implementation of the recommendations of the SIU and ensure that government departments and entities act against those who have violated regulations and broken the law. The fight against corruption will take on a new intensity thanks to the outcomes of the State Capture Commission, the strengthening of law enforcement agencies and the implementation of new anti-corruption practices in the public service. SOEs play a vital role in our economy. From water and roads, to energy and ports, to defence and aviation, these strategic assets are necessary to keep our country running. It is essential that we reverse their decline, and position them to contribute positively. We have therefore embarked on several immediate measures to restore these companies to health, at the same time as we undertake far-reaching reforms that will make our SOEs more efficient, competitive, accountable and sustainable. The Presidential SOE Council, which I appointed in 2020, has recommended that government adopt a centralised shareholder model for its key commercial state-owned companies. This would separate the State's ownership functions from its policy-making and regulatory functions, minimise the scope for political interference, introduce greater professionalism and manage state assets in a way that protects shareholder value. As part of this, preparatory work has begun for the establishment of a state-owned holding company to house strategic SOEs and to exercise coordinated shareholder oversight. To ensure that SOEs are effectively fulfilling their responsibilities, the Presidential SOE Council is preparing recommendations on SOEs to be retained, consolidated or disposed of. Any recommendations would be subject to extensive consultation with all stakeholders. We are taking steps to safeguard our democracy, protect our economic infrastructure and build safer communities for all. Earlier this week, we released the report of the expert panel into the civil unrest in July last year. The report paints a deeply disturbing picture of the capabilities of our security services and the structures that exist to coordinate their work. The report concludes that government's initial handling of the July 2021 events was inept, police operational planning was poor, there was poor coordination between the state security and intelligence services, and police are not always embedded in the communities they serve. The expert panel said that if the violence has exposed anything it was the poverty and inequality that is the root cause of the desperation of the people of South Africa. The expert panel found that Cabinet must take overall responsibility for the events of July 2021. This is a responsibility that we acknowledge and accept. We will, as recommended by the panel, develop and drive a national response plan to address the weaknesses that the panel has identified. We will begin immediately by filling critical vacancies and addressing positions affected by suspensions in the State Security Agency and Crime Intelligence. We will soon be announcing leadership changes in a number of security agencies to strengthen our security structures. The staffing of the public order policing unit of the South African Police Service will be brought to an appropriate level, with appropriate training courses in place. The ongoing damage to and theft of economic infrastructure has damaged confidence and severely constrained economic growth, investment and job creation. At the same time, we need to confront the criminal gangs that invade construction sites and other business places to extort money from companies. This requires a focused and coordinated response. Government has therefore established specialise multi-disciplinary units to address economic sabotage, extortion at construction sites and vandalism of infrastructure. We will make resources available to recruit and train an additional 12 000 new police personnel to ensure that the South African Police Service urgently gets the capacity it needs. Another area of immediate attention will be the re-establishment of community policing forums to improve relations and coordination between local police and residents of the areas they serve. It is clear from the observations of the expert panel that we need to take a more inclusive approach to assessing the threats to our country's security and determining the necessary responses. I am calling on all South Africans through their various formations to participate in developing our National Security Strategy. I will be approaching Parliament's presiding officers to request that Parliament plays a key role in facilitating inclusive processes of consultation. The security services have been tasked by the National Security Council to urgently develop implementation plans that address the range of recommendations made by the expert panel. These measures will go a long way to address the serious concerns about the breakdown of law and order in society. This year, we are intensifying the fight against gender-based violence and femicide through implementation of the National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide, and other measures to promote the empowerment of women. Earlier this month, I signed into law three new pieces of legislation, which has strengthened the criminal justice system, promoting accountability across the State and supporting survivors. The implementation of this legislation will go a long way to ensuring that cases are successfully prosecuted, that survivors are protected and that there are more effective deterrents in place. We have made significant progress in reducing the backlog in DNA processing, reducing it from 210 000 exhibits in April 2021 to around 58 000 at present. However, the fight against gender-based violence will never be won unless, as society, we mobilise all formations and all citizens behind a sustained programme of social action. As the COVID-19 pandemic has starkly demonstrated, a nation's health is inextricably linked with its economic progress and social development. We will therefore continue with the work underway to ensure universal health coverage for everyone in South Africa, regardless of their ability to pay. While public hearings on the National Health (NHI) Bill are continuing in Parliament, much progress is being made in preparing for the introduction of NHI. More than 59 million people are registered in the Health Patient Registration System. By September 2021, more than 56 000 additional health workers had been recruited and more than 46 000 community health workers integrated into the public health system. For the last two years, the education of our children and young people has been severely disrupted. As we return to normal educational activity, we will work harder to ensure that all learners and students get the quality education they need and deserve. Fellow South Africans, Government must work for the people. That is why our foremost priority is to build a capable, ethical and developmental state. We will soon be finalising a framework for the professionalisation of the public service. This will include tighter measures for recruitment of public servants, continuous professional development through the National School of Government and partnerships between state bodies, professional associations and universities. Lifestyle audits are already being implemented across the Public Service. This year, we will continue with the implementation of the DDM. This model brings all three spheres of government together with other social partners in every district to grow inclusive local economies and improve the lives of citizens. In particular, the DDM facilitates integrated planning and budgeting across spheres of government and improves integration of national projects at a district level. While there are many parts of the state that require much work, there are institutions that continue to serve the people of this country effectively and efficiently. One such institution is the SARS, which will be 25 years old this year. While SARS was badly damaged by state capture, it has made remarkable progress in restoring its integrity, credibility and performance. Since its formation, SARS has collected some R16 trillion for the country's social and economic development. This revenue has enabled government to improve the lives of millions through the provision of healthcare, education, social grants and other basic services. A capable state is not only about the quality of public servants and the efficiency of institutions. It is also, fundamentally, about how citizens are empowered to participate. We must work together to ensure that platforms like schools governing bodies and community policing forums are more active and inclusive. A vibrant civil society is crucial for a capable state and for development. We will therefore be working with social partners to convene the long-awaited social sector summit. This summit will seek to improve the interface between the state and civil society and address the challenges that non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations face. Our country has suffered several damaging blows in recent times. A confluence of forces, many of them outside of our control, has brought us to where we are now. We face steep and daunting challenges. Indeed, we are engaged in a battle for the soul of this country. But there can be no doubt that we will win. I ask every South African to rally together in our fight against corruption, in our fight to create jobs, in our fight to achieve a more just and equal society. We have faced many crises in our past, and we have overcome them. We have been confronted with difficult choices, and we have made them. In trying times, we have shown courage and resilience Time and time again, we have pulled ourselves back from the brink of despair and inspired hope, renewal and progress. Now, we must do so again. Let us forge a new consensus to confront a new reality, a consensus that unites us behind our shared determination to reform our economy and rebuild our institutions. Let us get to work. Let us rebuild our country. And let us leave no one behind. I thank you.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/understanding-water-issues-and-challenges-iii-water-boards-and-bulk-water-services

Introduction The Department of Water and Sanitation has nine state-owned water boards that provide bulk water services across the country. Rand Water in Gauteng, Umgeni Water in KwaZulu-Natal and Overberg Water in the Western Cape are the largest three water boards. Other water boards include Amatola Water, Bloem Water, Lepelle Northern Water, Magalies Water, Mhlathuze Water and Sedibeng Water. Government, represented by the Minister of Water and Sanitation, is the sole shareholder of each water board. While water boards are separate entities, the effect of poor governance at municipal and departmental level filters through to the management of water boards. They are unable to effectively and efficiently deal with ageing infrastructure, operational costs are hindered by outstanding debt owed to them, and their creditors are rightly demanding payment. Failing governance, financial mismanagement and unpaid debt pose the greatest challenge to water boards. Failing governance Governance in most water boards is failing. Two of South Africa's three largest water boards, Umgeni Water and Overberg Water, have been acting with little to no formally constituted board oversight for more than a year. Mid-2017 saw the dissolution of both boards by former Minister of Water and Sanitation Nomvula Mokonyane. An interim board was appointed in September 2017 at Umgeni, but the Water Services Act [[1]](#_ftn1) (WSA) which regulates water boards, makes no provision for the establishment of an interim board. Well over a year later, the current Minister is still in the process of concluding permanent appointments. In the meantime, Umgeni's interim board has appointed a permanent CEO, despite an instruction from the Minister that the appointment of a CEO must be placed on hold until a permanent board is appointed. Overberg Water, which provides bulk water services to areas of the Western Cape, does not have any oversight structure in place. After its leadership board and CEO were dismissed in June 2017, the former Minister appointed the CEO of Breede-Gouritz catchment management agency as acting CEO of Overberg. The utility continues to act without a formally constituted board. In addition, the term of office of Bloem Water's board ended in March 2018. However, Cabinet refused to approve the list of board members submitted by the Minister, citing an inadequate variety of skills as the primary reason for its rejection, particularly given the utility's current challenges. Essentially, the board continues to operate despite its members' terms having been expired. Sedibeng Water, which supplies bulk water services to about two million people across some of the driest areas of the Free State, North West and Northern Cape provinces, suspended its CEO after allegations of tender fraud. Poor financial and performance management in key areas In the Auditor-General's latest audit opinion on water boards, performance at four utilities remained unchanged while four water boards had regressed. Overberg Water failed to submit its financial statements and therefore the Auditor-General could not report any opinion on it. Only Bloem Water received a clean audit. Magalies, Amatola and Rand Water each received unqualified audit opinions with findings, while Sedibeng, Lepelle Northern and Mhlatuze Water received qualified audits respectively. The Auditor-General reported R8.4 million in fruitless and wasteful expenditure across all water boards in 2016/2017. [[2]](#_ftn2) This includes expenditure incurred that had no value for money and could have been avoided if reasonable steps had been taken. R298 million was reported as irregular expenditure incurred in contravention of key legislative provisions. The Auditor-General also identified and audited water boards on seven objectives linked to service delivery. These included bulk portable water quality compliance, managing debt, reliability of supply, increased access to services, bulk supply agreements, implementation of ministerial directives, and supporting rural development. Most water boards performed well in managing avoidable water losses and ensuring reliability of water supply. Generally, however, water boards did not achieve key outcomes for increasing access to services and implementing ministerial directives. This impacted negatively on national objectives of extending water services to areas with limited access. Municipal and departmental debt Water boards generate their own income primarily by providing water services to municipalities and other water service institutions. Additional revenue is sourced through secondary activities, like acting as implementing agents for project developments on behalf of the Department. While water boards also supply water to other consumers, the bulk of their revenue is generated from municipal and departmental accounts. If either is unable to pay, it automatically affects the functioning of water boards. Municipal debt is one of the foremost challenges confronting water boards. The systemic governance issues within municipalities continue to compromise the viability and sustainability of water boards. The Department recently reported that municipal debt owed to water boards currently stands at R8.6 billion and continues to rise. [[3]](#_ftn3) Bloem Water and Lepelle Northern Water are amongst the hardest hit water boards with high municipal debt levels. Sedibeng Water is the water board with the highest debt from a single municipality: Matjhabeng Local Municipality alone is indebted to Sedibeng for over R2 billion. [[4]](#_ftn4) An inter-ministerial task team was set up in 2017, chaired by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs and includes the Departments of Public Enterprises, Finance, Energy and Water and Sanitation, as well as the South African Local Government Association and Eskom, to find solutions for municipal debt arising from electricity and water services provided by water boards. The task team has not yet finalised its report. [[5]](#_ftn5) While the Department remains accountable for projects that are contracted out to water boards as implementing agents, its precarious financial position often results in non-payment to the respective water boards. At times, water boards are forced to effect payment for the projects from their pockets – placing them in financial distress. Concluding remarks Governance is a major issue at most water boards. Executive and board-level instability influences all other key areas of performance, as reflected in the Auditor-General's report. Without proper leadership structures within water boards, internal controls, financial structures, compliance, procurement and contract management are neglected. There is little accountability, strategic planning and effective implementation in such an environment. This is seen in the case of Overberg Water which, without a sitting board, failed to submit its 2016/2017 financial statements to the Auditor-General for auditing purposes. The Minister is responsible for appointing the boards, which in turn are responsible for appointing their respective CEOs. Without bringing stability to core leadership and oversight structures, governance issues in water boards are likely to persist. This brief forms part of a research project into water in South Africa, financed by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Michelle Toxopeüs Legal Researcher [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) [[2]](#_ftnref2) See AGSA report, accessed at [http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/180228AGSA.pdf](http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/180228AGSA.pdf). [[3]](#_ftnref3) See [https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/municipalities-unpaid-water-bills-increase-to-a-whopping-r131bn-20181114](https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/municipalities-unpaid-water-bills-increase-to-a-whopping-r131bn-20181114). [[4]](#_ftnref4) DWS press release of 14 November 2018, accessed at [https://www.gov.za/speeches/dws-update-municipal-debt-water-boards-14-nov-2018-0000](https://www.gov.za/speeches/dws-update-municipal-debt-water-boards-14-nov-2018-0000). [[5]](#_ftnref5) See SCOPA portfolio committee meeting of 14 June 2018, accessed at [https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26664/](https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26664/).

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/understanding-water-issues-and-challenges-iii-water-boards-and-bulk-water-services

Introduction The Department of Water and Sanitation has nine state-owned water boards that provide bulk water services across the country. Rand Water in Gauteng, Umgeni Water in KwaZulu-Natal and Overberg Water in the Western Cape are the largest three water boards. Other water boards include Amatola Water, Bloem Water, Lepelle Northern Water, Magalies Water, Mhlathuze Water and Sedibeng Water. Government, represented by the Minister of Water and Sanitation, is the sole shareholder of each water board. While water boards are separate entities, the effect of poor governance at municipal and departmental level filters through to the management of water boards. They are unable to effectively and efficiently deal with ageing infrastructure, operational costs are hindered by outstanding debt owed to them, and their creditors are rightly demanding payment. Failing governance, financial mismanagement and unpaid debt pose the greatest challenge to water boards. Failing governance Governance in most water boards is failing. Two of South Africa's three largest water boards, Umgeni Water and Overberg Water, have been acting with little to no formally constituted board oversight for more than a year. Mid-2017 saw the dissolution of both boards by former Minister of Water and Sanitation Nomvula Mokonyane. An interim board was appointed in September 2017 at Umgeni, but the Water Services Act [[1]](#_ftn1) (WSA) which regulates water boards, makes no provision for the establishment of an interim board. Well over a year later, the current Minister is still in the process of concluding permanent appointments. In the meantime, Umgeni's interim board has appointed a permanent CEO, despite an instruction from the Minister that the appointment of a CEO must be placed on hold until a permanent board is appointed. Overberg Water, which provides bulk water services to areas of the Western Cape, does not have any oversight structure in place. After its leadership board and CEO were dismissed in June 2017, the former Minister appointed the CEO of Breede-Gouritz catchment management agency as acting CEO of Overberg. The utility continues to act without a formally constituted board. In addition, the term of office of Bloem Water's board ended in March 2018. However, Cabinet refused to approve the list of board members submitted by the Minister, citing an inadequate variety of skills as the primary reason for its rejection, particularly given the utility's current challenges. Essentially, the board continues to operate despite its members' terms having been expired. Sedibeng Water, which supplies bulk water services to about two million people across some of the driest areas of the Free State, North West and Northern Cape provinces, suspended its CEO after allegations of tender fraud. Poor financial and performance management in key areas In the Auditor-General's latest audit opinion on water boards, performance at four utilities remained unchanged while four water boards had regressed. Overberg Water failed to submit its financial statements and therefore the Auditor-General could not report any opinion on it. Only Bloem Water received a clean audit. Magalies, Amatola and Rand Water each received unqualified audit opinions with findings, while Sedibeng, Lepelle Northern and Mhlatuze Water received qualified audits respectively. The Auditor-General reported R8.4 million in fruitless and wasteful expenditure across all water boards in 2016/2017. [[2]](#_ftn2) This includes expenditure incurred that had no value for money and could have been avoided if reasonable steps had been taken. R298 million was reported as irregular expenditure incurred in contravention of key legislative provisions. The Auditor-General also identified and audited water boards on seven objectives linked to service delivery. These included bulk portable water quality compliance, managing debt, reliability of supply, increased access to services, bulk supply agreements, implementation of ministerial directives, and supporting rural development. Most water boards performed well in managing avoidable water losses and ensuring reliability of water supply. Generally, however, water boards did not achieve key outcomes for increasing access to services and implementing ministerial directives. This impacted negatively on national objectives of extending water services to areas with limited access. Municipal and departmental debt Water boards generate their own income primarily by providing water services to municipalities and other water service institutions. Additional revenue is sourced through secondary activities, like acting as implementing agents for project developments on behalf of the Department. While water boards also supply water to other consumers, the bulk of their revenue is generated from municipal and departmental accounts. If either is unable to pay, it automatically affects the functioning of water boards. Municipal debt is one of the foremost challenges confronting water boards. The systemic governance issues within municipalities continue to compromise the viability and sustainability of water boards. The Department recently reported that municipal debt owed to water boards currently stands at R8.6 billion and continues to rise. [[3]](#_ftn3) Bloem Water and Lepelle Northern Water are amongst the hardest hit water boards with high municipal debt levels. Sedibeng Water is the water board with the highest debt from a single municipality: Matjhabeng Local Municipality alone is indebted to Sedibeng for over R2 billion. [[4]](#_ftn4) An inter-ministerial task team was set up in 2017, chaired by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs and includes the Departments of Public Enterprises, Finance, Energy and Water and Sanitation, as well as the South African Local Government Association and Eskom, to find solutions for municipal debt arising from electricity and water services provided by water boards. The task team has not yet finalised its report. [[5]](#_ftn5) While the Department remains accountable for projects that are contracted out to water boards as implementing agents, its precarious financial position often results in non-payment to the respective water boards. At times, water boards are forced to effect payment for the projects from their pockets – placing them in financial distress. Concluding remarks Governance is a major issue at most water boards. Executive and board-level instability influences all other key areas of performance, as reflected in the Auditor-General's report. Without proper leadership structures within water boards, internal controls, financial structures, compliance, procurement and contract management are neglected. There is little accountability, strategic planning and effective implementation in such an environment. This is seen in the case of Overberg Water which, without a sitting board, failed to submit its 2016/2017 financial statements to the Auditor-General for auditing purposes. The Minister is responsible for appointing the boards, which in turn are responsible for appointing their respective CEOs. Without bringing stability to core leadership and oversight structures, governance issues in water boards are likely to persist. This brief forms part of a research project into water in South Africa, financed by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Michelle Toxopeüs Legal Researcher [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) [[2]](#_ftnref2) See AGSA report, accessed at [http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/180228AGSA.pdf](http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/180228AGSA.pdf). [[3]](#_ftnref3) See [https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/municipalities-unpaid-water-bills-increase-to-a-whopping-r131bn-20181114](https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/municipalities-unpaid-water-bills-increase-to-a-whopping-r131bn-20181114). [[4]](#_ftnref4) DWS press release of 14 November 2018, accessed at [https://www.gov.za/speeches/dws-update-municipal-debt-water-boards-14-nov-2018-0000](https://www.gov.za/speeches/dws-update-municipal-debt-water-boards-14-nov-2018-0000). [[5]](#_ftnref5) See SCOPA portfolio committee meeting of 14 June 2018, accessed at [https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26664/](https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26664/).

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/understanding-water-issues-and-challenges-iii-water-boards-and-bulk-water-services

Introduction The Department of Water and Sanitation has nine state-owned water boards that provide bulk water services across the country. Rand Water in Gauteng, Umgeni Water in KwaZulu-Natal and Overberg Water in the Western Cape are the largest three water boards. Other water boards include Amatola Water, Bloem Water, Lepelle Northern Water, Magalies Water, Mhlathuze Water and Sedibeng Water. Government, represented by the Minister of Water and Sanitation, is the sole shareholder of each water board. While water boards are separate entities, the effect of poor governance at municipal and departmental level filters through to the management of water boards. They are unable to effectively and efficiently deal with ageing infrastructure, operational costs are hindered by outstanding debt owed to them, and their creditors are rightly demanding payment. Failing governance, financial mismanagement and unpaid debt pose the greatest challenge to water boards. Failing governance Governance in most water boards is failing. Two of South Africa's three largest water boards, Umgeni Water and Overberg Water, have been acting with little to no formally constituted board oversight for more than a year. Mid-2017 saw the dissolution of both boards by former Minister of Water and Sanitation Nomvula Mokonyane. An interim board was appointed in September 2017 at Umgeni, but the Water Services Act [[1]](#_ftn1) (WSA) which regulates water boards, makes no provision for the establishment of an interim board. Well over a year later, the current Minister is still in the process of concluding permanent appointments. In the meantime, Umgeni's interim board has appointed a permanent CEO, despite an instruction from the Minister that the appointment of a CEO must be placed on hold until a permanent board is appointed. Overberg Water, which provides bulk water services to areas of the Western Cape, does not have any oversight structure in place. After its leadership board and CEO were dismissed in June 2017, the former Minister appointed the CEO of Breede-Gouritz catchment management agency as acting CEO of Overberg. The utility continues to act without a formally constituted board. In addition, the term of office of Bloem Water's board ended in March 2018. However, Cabinet refused to approve the list of board members submitted by the Minister, citing an inadequate variety of skills as the primary reason for its rejection, particularly given the utility's current challenges. Essentially, the board continues to operate despite its members' terms having been expired. Sedibeng Water, which supplies bulk water services to about two million people across some of the driest areas of the Free State, North West and Northern Cape provinces, suspended its CEO after allegations of tender fraud. Poor financial and performance management in key areas In the Auditor-General's latest audit opinion on water boards, performance at four utilities remained unchanged while four water boards had regressed. Overberg Water failed to submit its financial statements and therefore the Auditor-General could not report any opinion on it. Only Bloem Water received a clean audit. Magalies, Amatola and Rand Water each received unqualified audit opinions with findings, while Sedibeng, Lepelle Northern and Mhlatuze Water received qualified audits respectively. The Auditor-General reported R8.4 million in fruitless and wasteful expenditure across all water boards in 2016/2017. [[2]](#_ftn2) This includes expenditure incurred that had no value for money and could have been avoided if reasonable steps had been taken. R298 million was reported as irregular expenditure incurred in contravention of key legislative provisions. The Auditor-General also identified and audited water boards on seven objectives linked to service delivery. These included bulk portable water quality compliance, managing debt, reliability of supply, increased access to services, bulk supply agreements, implementation of ministerial directives, and supporting rural development. Most water boards performed well in managing avoidable water losses and ensuring reliability of water supply. Generally, however, water boards did not achieve key outcomes for increasing access to services and implementing ministerial directives. This impacted negatively on national objectives of extending water services to areas with limited access. Municipal and departmental debt Water boards generate their own income primarily by providing water services to municipalities and other water service institutions. Additional revenue is sourced through secondary activities, like acting as implementing agents for project developments on behalf of the Department. While water boards also supply water to other consumers, the bulk of their revenue is generated from municipal and departmental accounts. If either is unable to pay, it automatically affects the functioning of water boards. Municipal debt is one of the foremost challenges confronting water boards. The systemic governance issues within municipalities continue to compromise the viability and sustainability of water boards. The Department recently reported that municipal debt owed to water boards currently stands at R8.6 billion and continues to rise. [[3]](#_ftn3) Bloem Water and Lepelle Northern Water are amongst the hardest hit water boards with high municipal debt levels. Sedibeng Water is the water board with the highest debt from a single municipality: Matjhabeng Local Municipality alone is indebted to Sedibeng for over R2 billion. [[4]](#_ftn4) An inter-ministerial task team was set up in 2017, chaired by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs and includes the Departments of Public Enterprises, Finance, Energy and Water and Sanitation, as well as the South African Local Government Association and Eskom, to find solutions for municipal debt arising from electricity and water services provided by water boards. The task team has not yet finalised its report. [[5]](#_ftn5) While the Department remains accountable for projects that are contracted out to water boards as implementing agents, its precarious financial position often results in non-payment to the respective water boards. At times, water boards are forced to effect payment for the projects from their pockets – placing them in financial distress. Concluding remarks Governance is a major issue at most water boards. Executive and board-level instability influences all other key areas of performance, as reflected in the Auditor-General's report. Without proper leadership structures within water boards, internal controls, financial structures, compliance, procurement and contract management are neglected. There is little accountability, strategic planning and effective implementation in such an environment. This is seen in the case of Overberg Water which, without a sitting board, failed to submit its 2016/2017 financial statements to the Auditor-General for auditing purposes. The Minister is responsible for appointing the boards, which in turn are responsible for appointing their respective CEOs. Without bringing stability to core leadership and oversight structures, governance issues in water boards are likely to persist. This brief forms part of a research project into water in South Africa, financed by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Michelle Toxopeüs Legal Researcher [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) [[2]](#_ftnref2) See AGSA report, accessed at [http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/180228AGSA.pdf](http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/180228AGSA.pdf). [[3]](#_ftnref3) See [https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/municipalities-unpaid-water-bills-increase-to-a-whopping-r131bn-20181114](https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/municipalities-unpaid-water-bills-increase-to-a-whopping-r131bn-20181114). [[4]](#_ftnref4) DWS press release of 14 November 2018, accessed at [https://www.gov.za/speeches/dws-update-municipal-debt-water-boards-14-nov-2018-0000](https://www.gov.za/speeches/dws-update-municipal-debt-water-boards-14-nov-2018-0000). [[5]](#_ftnref5) See SCOPA portfolio committee meeting of 14 June 2018, accessed at [https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26664/](https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26664/).

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.dws.gov.za/iwqs/nwa/tmp_Chapter_8.html

| | This Chapter deals with the establishment, powers and disestablishment of water user associations. Although water user associations are water management institutions their primary purpose, unlike catchment management agencies, is not water management. They operate at a restricted localised level, and are in effect co-operative associations of individual water users who wish to undertake water-related activities for their mutual benefit. A water user association may exercise management powers and duties only if and to the extent these have been assigned or delegated to it. The Minister establishes and disestablishes water user associations according to procedures set out in the Chapter. A water user association for a particular purpose would usually be established following a proposal to the Minister by an interested person, but such an association may also be established on the Minister's initiative. The functions of a water user association depend on its approved constitution, which can be expected to conform to a large extent to the model constitution in [Schedule 5. ](tmp_Schedule_5.html#Schedule_5)This Schedule also makes detailed provisions for the management and operation of water user associations. Although water user associations must operate within the framework of national policy and standards, particularly the national water resource strategy, the Minister may exercise control over them by giving them directives or by temporarily taking over their functions under particular circumstances. Existing irrigation boards, subterranean water control boards and water boards established for stock watering purposes will continue in operation until they are restructured as water user associations. 91.(1): A proposal to establish a water user association must contain at least - 91.(1)(a): the reasons for making the proposal; 91.(1)(b): a proposed name and area of operation for the association; 91.(1)(c): the proposed activities of the association; 91.(1)(d): a description of any existing or proposed waterwork within the proposed area of operation which is relevant to the proposed activities of the association; 91.(1)(e): a description of the water use licences or any other authorisations which the proposed members hold or intend applying for; 91.(1)(f): the proposed constitution of the association, together with an explanation for any provisions which differ from those of the model constitution contained in [Schedule 5; ](tmp_Schedule_5.html#Schedule_5) 91.(1)(g): a list of the proposed members or categories of members of the association; and 91.(1)(h): an indication whether there has been consultation in developing the proposal and the results of the consultation. 91.(2): The Director-General may assist a person to develop such a proposal. 92.(1): The Minister may on his or her own initiative or after receiving a proposal containing the information required in terms of section 91(1), by notice in the Gazette - 92.(1)(a): establish a water user association, give it a name, determine its area of operation and approve its constitution subject to [section 93(2); ](tmp_Chapter_8.html#93.(2))or 92.(1)(b): amend the name, area of operation or approve an amendment to the constitution of an established water user association. 92.(2): The Minister may - 92.(2)(a): require a person who has submitted a proposal in terms of subsection (1) to provide the Minister with additional information to that required by [section 91(1); ](tmp_Chapter_8.html#91.(1))and 92.(2)(b): instruct the Director-General to conduct an investigation regarding - 92.(2)(b)(i): the establishment of a water user association; or 92.(2)(b)(ii): a proposal submitted in terms of subsection (1). 92.(3): Before the establishment of a water user association the Minister must - 92.(3)(a): publish a notice in the Gazette - 92.(3)(a)(i): setting out the proposed establishment of the water user association, the proposed name and the proposed area of operation; and 92.(3)(a)(ii): inviting written comments to be submitted on the proposals, specifying an address to which and a date before which the comments are to be submitted, which date may not be earlier than 60 days after publication of the notice; 92.(3)(b): consider what further steps, if any, are appropriate to bring the contents of the notice to the attention of interested persons, and take those steps which the Minister considers to be appropriate; and 92.(3)(c): consider any comments received on or before the date specified in paragraph (a)(ii). 92.(4): The Minister need not fulfil all the requirements of subsection (3), if there has been sufficient consultation on a proposal submitted in terms of section 91. 92.(5): The Minister may - 92.(5)(a): recover the cost of complying with subsection (3) from the water user association once it has been established; or 92.(5)(b): require the person proposing the establishment of the water user association to pay the costs in advance. 93.(1): [Schedule 5 ](tmp_Schedule_5.html#Schedule_5)contains a model constitution which may be used as a basis for drawing up and proposing a constitution for a proposed water user association. 93.(2): The constitution of a water user association must contain at least - 93.(2)(a): details of the principal and ancillary functions of the association; 93.(2)(b): the procedures and requirements for admitting new members to the association; 93.(2)(c): the voting powers of members; 93.(2)(d): procedures for terminating membership; 93.(2)(e): procedures for electing the management committee of the association; 93.(2)(f): procedural requirements for appointment of employees of the association; 93.(2)(g): procedural requirements for obtaining loans; and 93.(2)(h): the financial obligations of members towards the association. 93.(3): A constitution must also incorporate such other provisions as the Minister may reasonably require and must be adopted by the members of the association and approved by the Minister before it can exercise any powers or perform any duties. 93.(4): A constitution adopted by a water user association is binding on all its members. 94.(1): A water user association is a body corporate and has the powers of a natural person of full capacity, except those powers which - 94.(1)(a): by nature can only attach to natural persons; or 94.(1)(b): are inconsistent with this Act. 94.(2): [Schedule 4 ](tmp_Schedule_4.html#Schedule_4)(excluding item 4(3) of Part 1 of that Schedule) applies to a water user association as if - 94.(2)(a): the water user association were an institution; and 94.(2)(b): a member of the management committee were a director, within the meaning of that Schedule, except to the extent that the Minister may otherwise direct. 95.(1): The Minister may, after consulting with a water user association, direct that a person be admitted as a member of the association on such conditions as are fair and equitable. 95.(2): A water user association must comply with a directive given under subsection (1). 95.(3): If a water user association - 95.(3)(a): is in financial difficulties or is being otherwise mismanaged; 95.(3)(b): has acted unfairly or in a discriminatory or inequitable way towards any member of the association; 95.(3)(c): has failed to admit persons to membership unfairly or on discriminatory grounds; 95.(3)(d): has failed to comply with any directive given by the Minister under this Act; 95.(3)(e): has obstructed the Minister or any other water management institution in exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of this Act; 95.(3)(f): is unable to exercise its powers or perform its duties effectively due to dissension among the management committee or its members; 95.(3)(g): has failed to comply with its constitution or this Act; or 95.(3)(h): has become redundant or ineffective, the Minister may - 95.(3)(h)(i): direct the association to take any action specified by the Minister; 95.(3)(h)(ii): withhold any financial assistance which might otherwise be available to the water user association until the association has complied with such directive; or 95.(3)(h)(iii): by notice addressed to the association and the member concerned, terminate the office of that member of the management committee and arrange for the resulting vacancy on the management committee to be filled. 95.(4): A directive contemplated in subsection (3)(i) must state - 95.(4)(a): the nature of the deficiency; 95.(4)(b): the steps which must be taken to remedy the situation; and 95.(4)(c): a reasonable period within which those steps must be taken. 95.(5): If the water user association fails to remedy the situation within the given period, the Minister may - 95.(5)(a): after having given that association a reasonable opportunity to be heard; and 95.(5)(b): after having afforded the association a hearing on any submissions received, take over the relevant function of the association, or appoint a suitable person to take over the power or duty. 95.(6): If the Minister, or a person appointed by the Minister, takes over a power or duty of a water user association - 95.(6)(a): the Minister or the appointee may do anything which the association might otherwise be empowered or required to do in terms of its constitution or by or under this Act, to the exclusion of the association; 95.(6)(b): the management committee of the association may not, while the Minister or the appointee is responsible for that power or duty, exercise any of its powers or perform any of its duties relating to that power or duty; 95.(6)(c): an employee or a contractor of the association must comply with a directive given by the Minister or the appointee; 95.(6)(d): as soon as the Minister is satisfied that the association is once more able to exercise its powers and perform its duties effectively, the Minister or the appointee, as the case may be, must cease exercising such powers and performing such duties; and 95.(6)(e): the Minister may recover from the association all reasonable costs incurred by the Minister or the appointee, including - 95.(6)(e)(i): the reasonable fees or disbursements of the appointee; and 95.(6)(e)(ii): any losses suffered as a result of lawful and reasonable action taken under this section, except to the extent that the loss is caused or contributed to by the negligence of the Minister or the appointee or any person under their control. 96.(1): The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, disestablish an association - 96.(1)(a): in circumstances provided for in the constitution of the association; 96.(1)(b): if the functions of the association are, by agreement with another water management institution, to be combined with, or taken over by that water management institution; 96.(1)(c): if it is in the best interests of the association or its members; 96.(1)(d): if an investigation of its affairs or financial position reveals that disestablishment is appropriate; 96.(1)(e): if the Minister has taken over a power or duty of the association as a result of dissensions among the management committee or its members; or 96.(1)(f): if the association is no longer active or effective. 96.(2): Before disestablishing a water user association the Minister must - 96.(2)(a): publish a notice in the Gazette - 96.(2)(a)(i): stating the intention to disestablish the water user association; 96.(2)(a)(ii): setting out the reasons for disestablishing the water user association; and 96.(2)(a)(iii): inviting written comments on the proposal, specifying an address to which and a date before which the comments are to be submitted, which date may not be earlier than 60 days after publication of the notice; 96.(2)(b): consider what further steps, if any, are appropriate to bring the contents of the notice to the attention of interested persons, and take those steps which the Minister considers to be appropriate; and 96.(2)(c): consider all comments received on or before the specified date. 97.(1): When a water user association is disestablished, its affairs must be wound up - 97.(1)(a): as provided for in its constitution; or 97.(1)(b): by a person appointed by the Minister in accordance with directives given by the Minister if the constitution does not provide for winding up. 97.(2): The costs of winding up a water user association are a cost against the estate of the association. 97.(3): Creditors of a water user association must be paid according to the order of preference established by the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936). 97.(4): If the affairs of a water user association are wound up, the Minister may direct that an amount equivalent to any financial contributions with interest made to the association from public funds be reimbursed, before assets are distributed among the members of the association. 97.(5): No transfer duty, other tax or duty is payable in respect of the transfer of any assets under subsection (4). 98.(1): This section applies to - 98.(1)(a): any irrigation board or subterranean water control board established by or deemed to be an irrigation board in terms of any law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act; 98.(1)(b): the Kalahari West Water Board, established by Government Notice No. 143 of 13 August 1982; 98.(1)(c): the Karos-Geelkoppan Water Board, established by Government Notice No. 145 of 7 October 1983; and 98.(1)(d): the Kalahari East Water Board, established by Government Notice No. 2233 of 4 November 1988. each of which is a board for the purposes of this section. 98.(2): A board continues to exist until it is declared to be a water user association in terms of subsection (6) or until it is disestablished in terms of the law by or under which it was established, which law must, for the purpose of such disestablishment, be regarded as not having been repealed by this Act. 98.(3): Subject to subsection (4) - 98.(3)(a): the name, area of operation, management, property, rights, liabilities, obligations, powers and duties of a board remain the same as immediately before the commencement of this Act; 98.(3)(b): this section does not affect the continuity, status, operation or effect of any act or omission of a board, or of any by-law made by a board, before the commencement of this Act; 98.(3)(c): any person holding office with a board when this Act commences continues in office for the term of that person's appointment; and 98.(3)(d): if a position becomes vacant prior to the declaration of the board as a water user association, the board may fill the vacancy according to the procedures laid down by or under the law which applied to that board immediately before the commencement of this Act. 98.(4): Within six months of the commencement of this Act, a board must prepare and submit to the Minister a proposal, prepared according to [section 91, ](tmp_Chapter_8.html#91.)to transform the board into a water user association. 98.(5): The Minister may accept the proposal contemplated in subsection (4), with or without amendments, or reject it. 98.(6): If the Minister accepts the proposal, the Minister must by notice in the Gazette - 98.(6)(a): declare the board to be a water user association; 98.(6)(b): give it a name; 98.(6)(c): determine its area of operation; and 98.(6)(d): approve its constitution. 98.(7): Upon the publication of a notice under subsection (6), every property, right and liability of the board becomes a property, right and liability of the relevant water user association. | |

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.dws.gov.za/iwqs/nwa/tmp_Chapter_8.html

| | This Chapter deals with the establishment, powers and disestablishment of water user associations. Although water user associations are water management institutions their primary purpose, unlike catchment management agencies, is not water management. They operate at a restricted localised level, and are in effect co-operative associations of individual water users who wish to undertake water-related activities for their mutual benefit. A water user association may exercise management powers and duties only if and to the extent these have been assigned or delegated to it. The Minister establishes and disestablishes water user associations according to procedures set out in the Chapter. A water user association for a particular purpose would usually be established following a proposal to the Minister by an interested person, but such an association may also be established on the Minister's initiative. The functions of a water user association depend on its approved constitution, which can be expected to conform to a large extent to the model constitution in [Schedule 5. ](tmp_Schedule_5.html#Schedule_5)This Schedule also makes detailed provisions for the management and operation of water user associations. Although water user associations must operate within the framework of national policy and standards, particularly the national water resource strategy, the Minister may exercise control over them by giving them directives or by temporarily taking over their functions under particular circumstances. Existing irrigation boards, subterranean water control boards and water boards established for stock watering purposes will continue in operation until they are restructured as water user associations. 91.(1): A proposal to establish a water user association must contain at least - 91.(1)(a): the reasons for making the proposal; 91.(1)(b): a proposed name and area of operation for the association; 91.(1)(c): the proposed activities of the association; 91.(1)(d): a description of any existing or proposed waterwork within the proposed area of operation which is relevant to the proposed activities of the association; 91.(1)(e): a description of the water use licences or any other authorisations which the proposed members hold or intend applying for; 91.(1)(f): the proposed constitution of the association, together with an explanation for any provisions which differ from those of the model constitution contained in [Schedule 5; ](tmp_Schedule_5.html#Schedule_5) 91.(1)(g): a list of the proposed members or categories of members of the association; and 91.(1)(h): an indication whether there has been consultation in developing the proposal and the results of the consultation. 91.(2): The Director-General may assist a person to develop such a proposal. 92.(1): The Minister may on his or her own initiative or after receiving a proposal containing the information required in terms of section 91(1), by notice in the Gazette - 92.(1)(a): establish a water user association, give it a name, determine its area of operation and approve its constitution subject to [section 93(2); ](tmp_Chapter_8.html#93.(2))or 92.(1)(b): amend the name, area of operation or approve an amendment to the constitution of an established water user association. 92.(2): The Minister may - 92.(2)(a): require a person who has submitted a proposal in terms of subsection (1) to provide the Minister with additional information to that required by [section 91(1); ](tmp_Chapter_8.html#91.(1))and 92.(2)(b): instruct the Director-General to conduct an investigation regarding - 92.(2)(b)(i): the establishment of a water user association; or 92.(2)(b)(ii): a proposal submitted in terms of subsection (1). 92.(3): Before the establishment of a water user association the Minister must - 92.(3)(a): publish a notice in the Gazette - 92.(3)(a)(i): setting out the proposed establishment of the water user association, the proposed name and the proposed area of operation; and 92.(3)(a)(ii): inviting written comments to be submitted on the proposals, specifying an address to which and a date before which the comments are to be submitted, which date may not be earlier than 60 days after publication of the notice; 92.(3)(b): consider what further steps, if any, are appropriate to bring the contents of the notice to the attention of interested persons, and take those steps which the Minister considers to be appropriate; and 92.(3)(c): consider any comments received on or before the date specified in paragraph (a)(ii). 92.(4): The Minister need not fulfil all the requirements of subsection (3), if there has been sufficient consultation on a proposal submitted in terms of section 91. 92.(5): The Minister may - 92.(5)(a): recover the cost of complying with subsection (3) from the water user association once it has been established; or 92.(5)(b): require the person proposing the establishment of the water user association to pay the costs in advance. 93.(1): [Schedule 5 ](tmp_Schedule_5.html#Schedule_5)contains a model constitution which may be used as a basis for drawing up and proposing a constitution for a proposed water user association. 93.(2): The constitution of a water user association must contain at least - 93.(2)(a): details of the principal and ancillary functions of the association; 93.(2)(b): the procedures and requirements for admitting new members to the association; 93.(2)(c): the voting powers of members; 93.(2)(d): procedures for terminating membership; 93.(2)(e): procedures for electing the management committee of the association; 93.(2)(f): procedural requirements for appointment of employees of the association; 93.(2)(g): procedural requirements for obtaining loans; and 93.(2)(h): the financial obligations of members towards the association. 93.(3): A constitution must also incorporate such other provisions as the Minister may reasonably require and must be adopted by the members of the association and approved by the Minister before it can exercise any powers or perform any duties. 93.(4): A constitution adopted by a water user association is binding on all its members. 94.(1): A water user association is a body corporate and has the powers of a natural person of full capacity, except those powers which - 94.(1)(a): by nature can only attach to natural persons; or 94.(1)(b): are inconsistent with this Act. 94.(2): [Schedule 4 ](tmp_Schedule_4.html#Schedule_4)(excluding item 4(3) of Part 1 of that Schedule) applies to a water user association as if - 94.(2)(a): the water user association were an institution; and 94.(2)(b): a member of the management committee were a director, within the meaning of that Schedule, except to the extent that the Minister may otherwise direct. 95.(1): The Minister may, after consulting with a water user association, direct that a person be admitted as a member of the association on such conditions as are fair and equitable. 95.(2): A water user association must comply with a directive given under subsection (1). 95.(3): If a water user association - 95.(3)(a): is in financial difficulties or is being otherwise mismanaged; 95.(3)(b): has acted unfairly or in a discriminatory or inequitable way towards any member of the association; 95.(3)(c): has failed to admit persons to membership unfairly or on discriminatory grounds; 95.(3)(d): has failed to comply with any directive given by the Minister under this Act; 95.(3)(e): has obstructed the Minister or any other water management institution in exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of this Act; 95.(3)(f): is unable to exercise its powers or perform its duties effectively due to dissension among the management committee or its members; 95.(3)(g): has failed to comply with its constitution or this Act; or 95.(3)(h): has become redundant or ineffective, the Minister may - 95.(3)(h)(i): direct the association to take any action specified by the Minister; 95.(3)(h)(ii): withhold any financial assistance which might otherwise be available to the water user association until the association has complied with such directive; or 95.(3)(h)(iii): by notice addressed to the association and the member concerned, terminate the office of that member of the management committee and arrange for the resulting vacancy on the management committee to be filled. 95.(4): A directive contemplated in subsection (3)(i) must state - 95.(4)(a): the nature of the deficiency; 95.(4)(b): the steps which must be taken to remedy the situation; and 95.(4)(c): a reasonable period within which those steps must be taken. 95.(5): If the water user association fails to remedy the situation within the given period, the Minister may - 95.(5)(a): after having given that association a reasonable opportunity to be heard; and 95.(5)(b): after having afforded the association a hearing on any submissions received, take over the relevant function of the association, or appoint a suitable person to take over the power or duty. 95.(6): If the Minister, or a person appointed by the Minister, takes over a power or duty of a water user association - 95.(6)(a): the Minister or the appointee may do anything which the association might otherwise be empowered or required to do in terms of its constitution or by or under this Act, to the exclusion of the association; 95.(6)(b): the management committee of the association may not, while the Minister or the appointee is responsible for that power or duty, exercise any of its powers or perform any of its duties relating to that power or duty; 95.(6)(c): an employee or a contractor of the association must comply with a directive given by the Minister or the appointee; 95.(6)(d): as soon as the Minister is satisfied that the association is once more able to exercise its powers and perform its duties effectively, the Minister or the appointee, as the case may be, must cease exercising such powers and performing such duties; and 95.(6)(e): the Minister may recover from the association all reasonable costs incurred by the Minister or the appointee, including - 95.(6)(e)(i): the reasonable fees or disbursements of the appointee; and 95.(6)(e)(ii): any losses suffered as a result of lawful and reasonable action taken under this section, except to the extent that the loss is caused or contributed to by the negligence of the Minister or the appointee or any person under their control. 96.(1): The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, disestablish an association - 96.(1)(a): in circumstances provided for in the constitution of the association; 96.(1)(b): if the functions of the association are, by agreement with another water management institution, to be combined with, or taken over by that water management institution; 96.(1)(c): if it is in the best interests of the association or its members; 96.(1)(d): if an investigation of its affairs or financial position reveals that disestablishment is appropriate; 96.(1)(e): if the Minister has taken over a power or duty of the association as a result of dissensions among the management committee or its members; or 96.(1)(f): if the association is no longer active or effective. 96.(2): Before disestablishing a water user association the Minister must - 96.(2)(a): publish a notice in the Gazette - 96.(2)(a)(i): stating the intention to disestablish the water user association; 96.(2)(a)(ii): setting out the reasons for disestablishing the water user association; and 96.(2)(a)(iii): inviting written comments on the proposal, specifying an address to which and a date before which the comments are to be submitted, which date may not be earlier than 60 days after publication of the notice; 96.(2)(b): consider what further steps, if any, are appropriate to bring the contents of the notice to the attention of interested persons, and take those steps which the Minister considers to be appropriate; and 96.(2)(c): consider all comments received on or before the specified date. 97.(1): When a water user association is disestablished, its affairs must be wound up - 97.(1)(a): as provided for in its constitution; or 97.(1)(b): by a person appointed by the Minister in accordance with directives given by the Minister if the constitution does not provide for winding up. 97.(2): The costs of winding up a water user association are a cost against the estate of the association. 97.(3): Creditors of a water user association must be paid according to the order of preference established by the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936). 97.(4): If the affairs of a water user association are wound up, the Minister may direct that an amount equivalent to any financial contributions with interest made to the association from public funds be reimbursed, before assets are distributed among the members of the association. 97.(5): No transfer duty, other tax or duty is payable in respect of the transfer of any assets under subsection (4). 98.(1): This section applies to - 98.(1)(a): any irrigation board or subterranean water control board established by or deemed to be an irrigation board in terms of any law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act; 98.(1)(b): the Kalahari West Water Board, established by Government Notice No. 143 of 13 August 1982; 98.(1)(c): the Karos-Geelkoppan Water Board, established by Government Notice No. 145 of 7 October 1983; and 98.(1)(d): the Kalahari East Water Board, established by Government Notice No. 2233 of 4 November 1988. each of which is a board for the purposes of this section. 98.(2): A board continues to exist until it is declared to be a water user association in terms of subsection (6) or until it is disestablished in terms of the law by or under which it was established, which law must, for the purpose of such disestablishment, be regarded as not having been repealed by this Act. 98.(3): Subject to subsection (4) - 98.(3)(a): the name, area of operation, management, property, rights, liabilities, obligations, powers and duties of a board remain the same as immediately before the commencement of this Act; 98.(3)(b): this section does not affect the continuity, status, operation or effect of any act or omission of a board, or of any by-law made by a board, before the commencement of this Act; 98.(3)(c): any person holding office with a board when this Act commences continues in office for the term of that person's appointment; and 98.(3)(d): if a position becomes vacant prior to the declaration of the board as a water user association, the board may fill the vacancy according to the procedures laid down by or under the law which applied to that board immediately before the commencement of this Act. 98.(4): Within six months of the commencement of this Act, a board must prepare and submit to the Minister a proposal, prepared according to [section 91, ](tmp_Chapter_8.html#91.)to transform the board into a water user association. 98.(5): The Minister may accept the proposal contemplated in subsection (4), with or without amendments, or reject it. 98.(6): If the Minister accepts the proposal, the Minister must by notice in the Gazette - 98.(6)(a): declare the board to be a water user association; 98.(6)(b): give it a name; 98.(6)(c): determine its area of operation; and 98.(6)(d): approve its constitution. 98.(7): Upon the publication of a notice under subsection (6), every property, right and liability of the board becomes a property, right and liability of the relevant water user association. | |

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.dws.gov.za/iwqs/nwa/tmp_Chapter_8.html

| | This Chapter deals with the establishment, powers and disestablishment of water user associations. Although water user associations are water management institutions their primary purpose, unlike catchment management agencies, is not water management. They operate at a restricted localised level, and are in effect co-operative associations of individual water users who wish to undertake water-related activities for their mutual benefit. A water user association may exercise management powers and duties only if and to the extent these have been assigned or delegated to it. The Minister establishes and disestablishes water user associations according to procedures set out in the Chapter. A water user association for a particular purpose would usually be established following a proposal to the Minister by an interested person, but such an association may also be established on the Minister's initiative. The functions of a water user association depend on its approved constitution, which can be expected to conform to a large extent to the model constitution in [Schedule 5. ](tmp_Schedule_5.html#Schedule_5)This Schedule also makes detailed provisions for the management and operation of water user associations. Although water user associations must operate within the framework of national policy and standards, particularly the national water resource strategy, the Minister may exercise control over them by giving them directives or by temporarily taking over their functions under particular circumstances. Existing irrigation boards, subterranean water control boards and water boards established for stock watering purposes will continue in operation until they are restructured as water user associations. 91.(1): A proposal to establish a water user association must contain at least - 91.(1)(a): the reasons for making the proposal; 91.(1)(b): a proposed name and area of operation for the association; 91.(1)(c): the proposed activities of the association; 91.(1)(d): a description of any existing or proposed waterwork within the proposed area of operation which is relevant to the proposed activities of the association; 91.(1)(e): a description of the water use licences or any other authorisations which the proposed members hold or intend applying for; 91.(1)(f): the proposed constitution of the association, together with an explanation for any provisions which differ from those of the model constitution contained in [Schedule 5; ](tmp_Schedule_5.html#Schedule_5) 91.(1)(g): a list of the proposed members or categories of members of the association; and 91.(1)(h): an indication whether there has been consultation in developing the proposal and the results of the consultation. 91.(2): The Director-General may assist a person to develop such a proposal. 92.(1): The Minister may on his or her own initiative or after receiving a proposal containing the information required in terms of section 91(1), by notice in the Gazette - 92.(1)(a): establish a water user association, give it a name, determine its area of operation and approve its constitution subject to [section 93(2); ](tmp_Chapter_8.html#93.(2))or 92.(1)(b): amend the name, area of operation or approve an amendment to the constitution of an established water user association. 92.(2): The Minister may - 92.(2)(a): require a person who has submitted a proposal in terms of subsection (1) to provide the Minister with additional information to that required by [section 91(1); ](tmp_Chapter_8.html#91.(1))and 92.(2)(b): instruct the Director-General to conduct an investigation regarding - 92.(2)(b)(i): the establishment of a water user association; or 92.(2)(b)(ii): a proposal submitted in terms of subsection (1). 92.(3): Before the establishment of a water user association the Minister must - 92.(3)(a): publish a notice in the Gazette - 92.(3)(a)(i): setting out the proposed establishment of the water user association, the proposed name and the proposed area of operation; and 92.(3)(a)(ii): inviting written comments to be submitted on the proposals, specifying an address to which and a date before which the comments are to be submitted, which date may not be earlier than 60 days after publication of the notice; 92.(3)(b): consider what further steps, if any, are appropriate to bring the contents of the notice to the attention of interested persons, and take those steps which the Minister considers to be appropriate; and 92.(3)(c): consider any comments received on or before the date specified in paragraph (a)(ii). 92.(4): The Minister need not fulfil all the requirements of subsection (3), if there has been sufficient consultation on a proposal submitted in terms of section 91. 92.(5): The Minister may - 92.(5)(a): recover the cost of complying with subsection (3) from the water user association once it has been established; or 92.(5)(b): require the person proposing the establishment of the water user association to pay the costs in advance. 93.(1): [Schedule 5 ](tmp_Schedule_5.html#Schedule_5)contains a model constitution which may be used as a basis for drawing up and proposing a constitution for a proposed water user association. 93.(2): The constitution of a water user association must contain at least - 93.(2)(a): details of the principal and ancillary functions of the association; 93.(2)(b): the procedures and requirements for admitting new members to the association; 93.(2)(c): the voting powers of members; 93.(2)(d): procedures for terminating membership; 93.(2)(e): procedures for electing the management committee of the association; 93.(2)(f): procedural requirements for appointment of employees of the association; 93.(2)(g): procedural requirements for obtaining loans; and 93.(2)(h): the financial obligations of members towards the association. 93.(3): A constitution must also incorporate such other provisions as the Minister may reasonably require and must be adopted by the members of the association and approved by the Minister before it can exercise any powers or perform any duties. 93.(4): A constitution adopted by a water user association is binding on all its members. 94.(1): A water user association is a body corporate and has the powers of a natural person of full capacity, except those powers which - 94.(1)(a): by nature can only attach to natural persons; or 94.(1)(b): are inconsistent with this Act. 94.(2): [Schedule 4 ](tmp_Schedule_4.html#Schedule_4)(excluding item 4(3) of Part 1 of that Schedule) applies to a water user association as if - 94.(2)(a): the water user association were an institution; and 94.(2)(b): a member of the management committee were a director, within the meaning of that Schedule, except to the extent that the Minister may otherwise direct. 95.(1): The Minister may, after consulting with a water user association, direct that a person be admitted as a member of the association on such conditions as are fair and equitable. 95.(2): A water user association must comply with a directive given under subsection (1). 95.(3): If a water user association - 95.(3)(a): is in financial difficulties or is being otherwise mismanaged; 95.(3)(b): has acted unfairly or in a discriminatory or inequitable way towards any member of the association; 95.(3)(c): has failed to admit persons to membership unfairly or on discriminatory grounds; 95.(3)(d): has failed to comply with any directive given by the Minister under this Act; 95.(3)(e): has obstructed the Minister or any other water management institution in exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of this Act; 95.(3)(f): is unable to exercise its powers or perform its duties effectively due to dissension among the management committee or its members; 95.(3)(g): has failed to comply with its constitution or this Act; or 95.(3)(h): has become redundant or ineffective, the Minister may - 95.(3)(h)(i): direct the association to take any action specified by the Minister; 95.(3)(h)(ii): withhold any financial assistance which might otherwise be available to the water user association until the association has complied with such directive; or 95.(3)(h)(iii): by notice addressed to the association and the member concerned, terminate the office of that member of the management committee and arrange for the resulting vacancy on the management committee to be filled. 95.(4): A directive contemplated in subsection (3)(i) must state - 95.(4)(a): the nature of the deficiency; 95.(4)(b): the steps which must be taken to remedy the situation; and 95.(4)(c): a reasonable period within which those steps must be taken. 95.(5): If the water user association fails to remedy the situation within the given period, the Minister may - 95.(5)(a): after having given that association a reasonable opportunity to be heard; and 95.(5)(b): after having afforded the association a hearing on any submissions received, take over the relevant function of the association, or appoint a suitable person to take over the power or duty. 95.(6): If the Minister, or a person appointed by the Minister, takes over a power or duty of a water user association - 95.(6)(a): the Minister or the appointee may do anything which the association might otherwise be empowered or required to do in terms of its constitution or by or under this Act, to the exclusion of the association; 95.(6)(b): the management committee of the association may not, while the Minister or the appointee is responsible for that power or duty, exercise any of its powers or perform any of its duties relating to that power or duty; 95.(6)(c): an employee or a contractor of the association must comply with a directive given by the Minister or the appointee; 95.(6)(d): as soon as the Minister is satisfied that the association is once more able to exercise its powers and perform its duties effectively, the Minister or the appointee, as the case may be, must cease exercising such powers and performing such duties; and 95.(6)(e): the Minister may recover from the association all reasonable costs incurred by the Minister or the appointee, including - 95.(6)(e)(i): the reasonable fees or disbursements of the appointee; and 95.(6)(e)(ii): any losses suffered as a result of lawful and reasonable action taken under this section, except to the extent that the loss is caused or contributed to by the negligence of the Minister or the appointee or any person under their control. 96.(1): The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, disestablish an association - 96.(1)(a): in circumstances provided for in the constitution of the association; 96.(1)(b): if the functions of the association are, by agreement with another water management institution, to be combined with, or taken over by that water management institution; 96.(1)(c): if it is in the best interests of the association or its members; 96.(1)(d): if an investigation of its affairs or financial position reveals that disestablishment is appropriate; 96.(1)(e): if the Minister has taken over a power or duty of the association as a result of dissensions among the management committee or its members; or 96.(1)(f): if the association is no longer active or effective. 96.(2): Before disestablishing a water user association the Minister must - 96.(2)(a): publish a notice in the Gazette - 96.(2)(a)(i): stating the intention to disestablish the water user association; 96.(2)(a)(ii): setting out the reasons for disestablishing the water user association; and 96.(2)(a)(iii): inviting written comments on the proposal, specifying an address to which and a date before which the comments are to be submitted, which date may not be earlier than 60 days after publication of the notice; 96.(2)(b): consider what further steps, if any, are appropriate to bring the contents of the notice to the attention of interested persons, and take those steps which the Minister considers to be appropriate; and 96.(2)(c): consider all comments received on or before the specified date. 97.(1): When a water user association is disestablished, its affairs must be wound up - 97.(1)(a): as provided for in its constitution; or 97.(1)(b): by a person appointed by the Minister in accordance with directives given by the Minister if the constitution does not provide for winding up. 97.(2): The costs of winding up a water user association are a cost against the estate of the association. 97.(3): Creditors of a water user association must be paid according to the order of preference established by the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936). 97.(4): If the affairs of a water user association are wound up, the Minister may direct that an amount equivalent to any financial contributions with interest made to the association from public funds be reimbursed, before assets are distributed among the members of the association. 97.(5): No transfer duty, other tax or duty is payable in respect of the transfer of any assets under subsection (4). 98.(1): This section applies to - 98.(1)(a): any irrigation board or subterranean water control board established by or deemed to be an irrigation board in terms of any law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act; 98.(1)(b): the Kalahari West Water Board, established by Government Notice No. 143 of 13 August 1982; 98.(1)(c): the Karos-Geelkoppan Water Board, established by Government Notice No. 145 of 7 October 1983; and 98.(1)(d): the Kalahari East Water Board, established by Government Notice No. 2233 of 4 November 1988. each of which is a board for the purposes of this section. 98.(2): A board continues to exist until it is declared to be a water user association in terms of subsection (6) or until it is disestablished in terms of the law by or under which it was established, which law must, for the purpose of such disestablishment, be regarded as not having been repealed by this Act. 98.(3): Subject to subsection (4) - 98.(3)(a): the name, area of operation, management, property, rights, liabilities, obligations, powers and duties of a board remain the same as immediately before the commencement of this Act; 98.(3)(b): this section does not affect the continuity, status, operation or effect of any act or omission of a board, or of any by-law made by a board, before the commencement of this Act; 98.(3)(c): any person holding office with a board when this Act commences continues in office for the term of that person's appointment; and 98.(3)(d): if a position becomes vacant prior to the declaration of the board as a water user association, the board may fill the vacancy according to the procedures laid down by or under the law which applied to that board immediately before the commencement of this Act. 98.(4): Within six months of the commencement of this Act, a board must prepare and submit to the Minister a proposal, prepared according to [section 91, ](tmp_Chapter_8.html#91.)to transform the board into a water user association. 98.(5): The Minister may accept the proposal contemplated in subsection (4), with or without amendments, or reject it. 98.(6): If the Minister accepts the proposal, the Minister must by notice in the Gazette - 98.(6)(a): declare the board to be a water user association; 98.(6)(b): give it a name; 98.(6)(c): determine its area of operation; and 98.(6)(d): approve its constitution. 98.(7): Upon the publication of a notice under subsection (6), every property, right and liability of the board becomes a property, right and liability of the relevant water user association. | |

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.tcta.co.za/about-tcta/

Who are we? Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) is a state-owned entity charged with financing and implementing bulk raw water infrastructure projects. It is an agency of the National Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), which is responsible for the country's water resources in respect of usage, equitable allocation and distribution. TCTA assists the government in its pursuit of water security for South Africa and in realising its constitutional obligation of ensuring universal access to this essential resource for all citizens. South Africa is a water-scarce country, requiring a dedicated focus on ensuring adequate water storage and transfer capacity. To this end, TCTA designs bankable projects, raises funding in capital markets, manages debt and implements infrastructure rollouts. It is a specialised liability management body the government uses to finance and build dams and transfer schemes off budget while within an acceptable risk framework and in the most cost-effective manner. This financing mechanism reduces the borrowing requirements of the government and allows it to pass the cost of infrastructure onto the consumer in line with the "user-pay principle". The government of South Africa founded TCTA in terms of a Notice of Establishment published on 12 December 1986. The initial mandate was to finance and build the South African part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which delivers water to the Vaal River System in South Africa. It was meant to be a special purpose vehicle for South Africa to use to fulfil its treaty obligations to Lesotho in respect of this project. However, in 2000, the Notice of Establishment was amended resulting in the TCTA being able to undertake other projects. The amended notice, issued in terms of the National Water Act of 1998, replaced the old one when DWS published it in the Government Gazette on 24 March 2000. It articulates TCTA's mandate and allows periodic directives on new deliverables from the Executive Authority. Each project is ring-fenced with its own bank account, income agreement and funding programme. Now, in addition to LHWP, TCTA is engaged in other water security projects. These include Olifants River Water Resources Development, Mokolo-Crocodile Water Augmentation, Acid Mine Drainage, Berg River-Voëlvlei Augmentation, uMzibuvubu River Water and Kriel Off-take projects.In executing its mandate, TCTA strives for professionalism, integrity and diligence. The organisation recognises its obligations and expectations of stakeholders – including capital markets, various spheres of government and the public at large – hence its endeavours to maintain transparent and consultative relationships with them. It upholds the principles of accountability and sound corporate governance. TCTA's vision, mission and values are an indispensable guide in navigating the dynamic environment the organisation operates in, and in striving for and maintaining world-class service, managerial and technical excellence standards. Our Vision World-class enabler of sustainable infrastructure for a water-secure South Africa. Our Mission To plan, finance and implement sustainable and accessible water resource infrastructure. Values Growth We willingly share knowledge and information with each other, we are innovative and proactive in thought and in action, and we support, encourage and provide opportunities for individuals and collective growth.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.tcta.co.za/about-tcta/

Who are we? Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) is a state-owned entity charged with financing and implementing bulk raw water infrastructure projects. It is an agency of the National Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), which is responsible for the country's water resources in respect of usage, equitable allocation and distribution. TCTA assists the government in its pursuit of water security for South Africa and in realising its constitutional obligation of ensuring universal access to this essential resource for all citizens. South Africa is a water-scarce country, requiring a dedicated focus on ensuring adequate water storage and transfer capacity. To this end, TCTA designs bankable projects, raises funding in capital markets, manages debt and implements infrastructure rollouts. It is a specialised liability management body the government uses to finance and build dams and transfer schemes off budget while within an acceptable risk framework and in the most cost-effective manner. This financing mechanism reduces the borrowing requirements of the government and allows it to pass the cost of infrastructure onto the consumer in line with the "user-pay principle". The government of South Africa founded TCTA in terms of a Notice of Establishment published on 12 December 1986. The initial mandate was to finance and build the South African part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which delivers water to the Vaal River System in South Africa. It was meant to be a special purpose vehicle for South Africa to use to fulfil its treaty obligations to Lesotho in respect of this project. However, in 2000, the Notice of Establishment was amended resulting in the TCTA being able to undertake other projects. The amended notice, issued in terms of the National Water Act of 1998, replaced the old one when DWS published it in the Government Gazette on 24 March 2000. It articulates TCTA's mandate and allows periodic directives on new deliverables from the Executive Authority. Each project is ring-fenced with its own bank account, income agreement and funding programme. Now, in addition to LHWP, TCTA is engaged in other water security projects. These include Olifants River Water Resources Development, Mokolo-Crocodile Water Augmentation, Acid Mine Drainage, Berg River-Voëlvlei Augmentation, uMzibuvubu River Water and Kriel Off-take projects.In executing its mandate, TCTA strives for professionalism, integrity and diligence. The organisation recognises its obligations and expectations of stakeholders – including capital markets, various spheres of government and the public at large – hence its endeavours to maintain transparent and consultative relationships with them. It upholds the principles of accountability and sound corporate governance. TCTA's vision, mission and values are an indispensable guide in navigating the dynamic environment the organisation operates in, and in striving for and maintaining world-class service, managerial and technical excellence standards. Our Vision World-class enabler of sustainable infrastructure for a water-secure South Africa. Our Mission To plan, finance and implement sustainable and accessible water resource infrastructure. Values Growth We willingly share knowledge and information with each other, we are innovative and proactive in thought and in action, and we support, encourage and provide opportunities for individuals and collective growth.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.tcta.co.za/about-tcta/

Who are we? Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) is a state-owned entity charged with financing and implementing bulk raw water infrastructure projects. It is an agency of the National Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), which is responsible for the country's water resources in respect of usage, equitable allocation and distribution. TCTA assists the government in its pursuit of water security for South Africa and in realising its constitutional obligation of ensuring universal access to this essential resource for all citizens. South Africa is a water-scarce country, requiring a dedicated focus on ensuring adequate water storage and transfer capacity. To this end, TCTA designs bankable projects, raises funding in capital markets, manages debt and implements infrastructure rollouts. It is a specialised liability management body the government uses to finance and build dams and transfer schemes off budget while within an acceptable risk framework and in the most cost-effective manner. This financing mechanism reduces the borrowing requirements of the government and allows it to pass the cost of infrastructure onto the consumer in line with the "user-pay principle". The government of South Africa founded TCTA in terms of a Notice of Establishment published on 12 December 1986. The initial mandate was to finance and build the South African part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which delivers water to the Vaal River System in South Africa. It was meant to be a special purpose vehicle for South Africa to use to fulfil its treaty obligations to Lesotho in respect of this project. However, in 2000, the Notice of Establishment was amended resulting in the TCTA being able to undertake other projects. The amended notice, issued in terms of the National Water Act of 1998, replaced the old one when DWS published it in the Government Gazette on 24 March 2000. It articulates TCTA's mandate and allows periodic directives on new deliverables from the Executive Authority. Each project is ring-fenced with its own bank account, income agreement and funding programme. Now, in addition to LHWP, TCTA is engaged in other water security projects. These include Olifants River Water Resources Development, Mokolo-Crocodile Water Augmentation, Acid Mine Drainage, Berg River-Voëlvlei Augmentation, uMzibuvubu River Water and Kriel Off-take projects.In executing its mandate, TCTA strives for professionalism, integrity and diligence. The organisation recognises its obligations and expectations of stakeholders – including capital markets, various spheres of government and the public at large – hence its endeavours to maintain transparent and consultative relationships with them. It upholds the principles of accountability and sound corporate governance. TCTA's vision, mission and values are an indispensable guide in navigating the dynamic environment the organisation operates in, and in striving for and maintaining world-class service, managerial and technical excellence standards. Our Vision World-class enabler of sustainable infrastructure for a water-secure South Africa. Our Mission To plan, finance and implement sustainable and accessible water resource infrastructure. Values Growth We willingly share knowledge and information with each other, we are innovative and proactive in thought and in action, and we support, encourage and provide opportunities for individuals and collective growth.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.tcta.co.za/about-tcta/

Who are we? Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) is a state-owned entity charged with financing and implementing bulk raw water infrastructure projects. It is an agency of the National Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), which is responsible for the country's water resources in respect of usage, equitable allocation and distribution. TCTA assists the government in its pursuit of water security for South Africa and in realising its constitutional obligation of ensuring universal access to this essential resource for all citizens. South Africa is a water-scarce country, requiring a dedicated focus on ensuring adequate water storage and transfer capacity. To this end, TCTA designs bankable projects, raises funding in capital markets, manages debt and implements infrastructure rollouts. It is a specialised liability management body the government uses to finance and build dams and transfer schemes off budget while within an acceptable risk framework and in the most cost-effective manner. This financing mechanism reduces the borrowing requirements of the government and allows it to pass the cost of infrastructure onto the consumer in line with the "user-pay principle". The government of South Africa founded TCTA in terms of a Notice of Establishment published on 12 December 1986. The initial mandate was to finance and build the South African part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which delivers water to the Vaal River System in South Africa. It was meant to be a special purpose vehicle for South Africa to use to fulfil its treaty obligations to Lesotho in respect of this project. However, in 2000, the Notice of Establishment was amended resulting in the TCTA being able to undertake other projects. The amended notice, issued in terms of the National Water Act of 1998, replaced the old one when DWS published it in the Government Gazette on 24 March 2000. It articulates TCTA's mandate and allows periodic directives on new deliverables from the Executive Authority. Each project is ring-fenced with its own bank account, income agreement and funding programme. Now, in addition to LHWP, TCTA is engaged in other water security projects. These include Olifants River Water Resources Development, Mokolo-Crocodile Water Augmentation, Acid Mine Drainage, Berg River-Voëlvlei Augmentation, uMzibuvubu River Water and Kriel Off-take projects.In executing its mandate, TCTA strives for professionalism, integrity and diligence. The organisation recognises its obligations and expectations of stakeholders – including capital markets, various spheres of government and the public at large – hence its endeavours to maintain transparent and consultative relationships with them. It upholds the principles of accountability and sound corporate governance. TCTA's vision, mission and values are an indispensable guide in navigating the dynamic environment the organisation operates in, and in striving for and maintaining world-class service, managerial and technical excellence standards. Our Vision World-class enabler of sustainable infrastructure for a water-secure South Africa. Our Mission To plan, finance and implement sustainable and accessible water resource infrastructure. Values Growth We willingly share knowledge and information with each other, we are innovative and proactive in thought and in action, and we support, encourage and provide opportunities for individuals and collective growth.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.tcta.co.za/about-tcta/

Who are we? Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) is a state-owned entity charged with financing and implementing bulk raw water infrastructure projects. It is an agency of the National Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), which is responsible for the country's water resources in respect of usage, equitable allocation and distribution. TCTA assists the government in its pursuit of water security for South Africa and in realising its constitutional obligation of ensuring universal access to this essential resource for all citizens. South Africa is a water-scarce country, requiring a dedicated focus on ensuring adequate water storage and transfer capacity. To this end, TCTA designs bankable projects, raises funding in capital markets, manages debt and implements infrastructure rollouts. It is a specialised liability management body the government uses to finance and build dams and transfer schemes off budget while within an acceptable risk framework and in the most cost-effective manner. This financing mechanism reduces the borrowing requirements of the government and allows it to pass the cost of infrastructure onto the consumer in line with the "user-pay principle". The government of South Africa founded TCTA in terms of a Notice of Establishment published on 12 December 1986. The initial mandate was to finance and build the South African part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which delivers water to the Vaal River System in South Africa. It was meant to be a special purpose vehicle for South Africa to use to fulfil its treaty obligations to Lesotho in respect of this project. However, in 2000, the Notice of Establishment was amended resulting in the TCTA being able to undertake other projects. The amended notice, issued in terms of the National Water Act of 1998, replaced the old one when DWS published it in the Government Gazette on 24 March 2000. It articulates TCTA's mandate and allows periodic directives on new deliverables from the Executive Authority. Each project is ring-fenced with its own bank account, income agreement and funding programme. Now, in addition to LHWP, TCTA is engaged in other water security projects. These include Olifants River Water Resources Development, Mokolo-Crocodile Water Augmentation, Acid Mine Drainage, Berg River-Voëlvlei Augmentation, uMzibuvubu River Water and Kriel Off-take projects.In executing its mandate, TCTA strives for professionalism, integrity and diligence. The organisation recognises its obligations and expectations of stakeholders – including capital markets, various spheres of government and the public at large – hence its endeavours to maintain transparent and consultative relationships with them. It upholds the principles of accountability and sound corporate governance. TCTA's vision, mission and values are an indispensable guide in navigating the dynamic environment the organisation operates in, and in striving for and maintaining world-class service, managerial and technical excellence standards. Our Vision World-class enabler of sustainable infrastructure for a water-secure South Africa. Our Mission To plan, finance and implement sustainable and accessible water resource infrastructure. Values Growth We willingly share knowledge and information with each other, we are innovative and proactive in thought and in action, and we support, encourage and provide opportunities for individuals and collective growth.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2006/06120615151003.htm

Skip to main content Services Residents Business Foreign Nationals Online Services About Contact Directory South Africa Government FAQs Links Documents What's new Constitution Acts All documents News What's new Cabinet statements Statements Speeches Events All news Jobs Search gov.za Search Breadcrumb Home > Node Social grants - Relief of Distress - Old age pension - Child support grant more> Driving - Driving licence - Learner's licence - Register motor vehicle more> Education - Rewrite Matric - Check matric results - NSFAS more> Citizens and Travel - Identity document (ID) - Passport - Police clearance cert. more> World of work - UIF, Tax - Maternity benefits - Register business more> Family - Register a birth - Getting married - Death certificate more> Documents - Notices - Constitution - Acts more> About Country - School calendar - Public holidays - History more> Government - Contact directories - Jobs - National departments more> In Focus Fellow South Africans, Just over a month ago, on the 29th of May, the people of South Africa voted… 0 Latest News Speeches and Statements President Cyril Ramaphosa offers Proteas message of support 30 June 2024 President Cyril Ramaphosa: Appointment of members of the National Executive 30 June 2024 Treasury hosts successful Operation Vulindlela conference 28 June 2024 Events President Cyril Ramaphosa announces new National Executive @ 21:00, 30 Jun 30 June 2024 President Cyril Ramaphosa calls Joint Sitting of Parliament, 18 Jul 28 June 2024 Lieutenant General Godfrey Lebeya briefs media on Hawks 2023/2024 achievements, 28 Jun 27 June 2024 Documents South African Schools Act: Regulations: Minimum uniform norms and standards for public school infrastructure 27 June 2024 Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Amendment Act 4 of 2024 (English / isiZulu) 11 June 2024 National Land Transport Amendment Act 23 of 2023 (English / isiZulu) 11 June 2024 Documents for public comment Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill: Draft 21 May 2024 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Bill: Draft 24 May 2024 Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill and Local Government: General Laws Amendment Bill: Extension: Comm… 26 Jun 2024 Multimedia Video President Cyril Ramaphosa delivers Memorial Lecture on life and times of Elijah Barayi YouTube Photo Gallery Presidential Inauguration 2024 Flickr

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

http://www.bdi.eu/Suedafrika.htm

[ EU-Klimapolitik 2023: Von Energiekrisenmaßnahmen zu strukturellen Reformen Energie war für die Europäische Union (EU) das beherrschende Thema im Krisenjahr 2022: Acht Mal tagte der Energieministerrat, drei Energienotfallpaketen verabschiedete er. Für 2023 stehen in der EU grundsätzliche strukturelle Reformen an, von der Finalisierung der Fit-for-55 Gesetzgebungspakete,… - Artikel ](/artikel/news/eu-klimapolitik-in-2023-von-energiekrisenmassnahmen-zu-strukturellen-reformen) [ Inflation Reduction Act: Europa im Wettbewerb um die Grüne Transformation Mit dem Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) legt die Biden-Administration ein Klimainvestitionsprogramm auf, das in beispielhafter Weise klima-, handels- und industriepolitische Aspekte unbürokratisch, konsistent und zukunftsorientiert zusammenführt. Der IRA ist ein Beispiel dafür, wie eine Verzahnung von… - Publikation ](/artikel/news/inflation-reduction-act-europa-im-wettbewerb-um-die-gruene-transformation) [ Carbon Contracts for Difference: Was sind Klimaschutzverträge? - Artikel ](/artikel/news/carbon-contracts-for-difference-was-sind-klimaschutzvertraege) Deutschland hat sich das Ziel gesetzt, bis 2045 klimaneutral zu sein. Klimaschutzverträge, sogenannte Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfD), sind ein Instrument, um die Industrie bei dieser Transformation zu unterstützen. Aber was genau sind Klimaschutzverträge, warum sind sie wichtig und für… [ Steuerpolitik in Krisenzeiten - Publikation ](/artikel/news/steuerpolitik-in-krisenzeiten-investitionen-wettbewerb) Inflation, hohe Energiepreise und Lieferkettenschwierigkeiten setzen deutsche Unternehmen massiv unter Druck. Die Bundesregierung sollte jetzt Anreize schaffen für Investitionen zur Stärkung und Erholung des Wirtschaftsstandorts. Gezielte Maßnahmen in der Steuerpolitik sind zentrale Hebel für die… [ Tanja Gönner: die neue BDI-Hauptgeschäftsführerin im Porträt - Artikel ](/artikel/news/tanja-goenner-die-neue-bdi-hauptgeschaeftsfuehrerin-im-portraet) Zehn Jahre Entwicklungszusammenarbeit bei der GIZ, zuvor Sozial-, Umwelt- und Verkehrsministerin in Baden-Württemberg und Bundestagsabgeordnete: Tanja Gönner hat sich in ihrer Karriere schon in viele Themen eingefuchst. Wir haben nachgefragt: Was hat sie als Hauptgeschäftsführerin des BDI vor? Wie… [ Die G20: Zentrales Forum für internationale wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit In einer immer stärker vernetzten Welt greifen nationale Alleingänge zu kurz. Die Kommuniqués der G20 sind völkerrechtlich nicht bindend. Nichtsdestotrotz hat die G20 als wichtiger Agenda-Setter gedient und dazu beigetragen, Vertrauen und Verständnis in der internationalen Gemeinschaft zu schaffen.… - Artikel ](/artikel/news/die-g20-zentrales-forum-fuer-internationale-wirtschaftliche-zusammenarbeit) [ Chinas Wirtschaftspolitik als Herausforderung für die europäische Wirtschaft - Artikel ](/artikel/news/chinas-wirtschaftspolitik-als-herausforderung-fuer-die-europaeische-wirtschaft) Aus Chinas 14. Fünfjahresplan (2021–2025) und den langfristigen Plänen bis 2035 geht deutlich hervor, dass technologische Selbstständigkeit und globale Führung bei Zukunftstechnologien für Chinas Machthaber eine zentrale Rolle einnehmen. Auch ausländischen Beobachtern ist spätestens seit der 2015… [ Deutsch-Australische Wasserstoffbrücke noch vor 2030 realisierbar - Artikel ](/artikel/news/deutsch-australische-wasserstoffbruecke-noch-vor-2030-realisierbar) Die Untersuchungen von HySupply zeigen, dass der Import von erneuerbarem Wasserstoff aus Australien mittels verschiedener Optionen machbar ist. Dennoch gibt es einigen Hürden, die eine zeitnahe Realisierung der Lieferkette im notwendigen Maßstab erschweren. Der "Demand Side Action Plan" zeigt, was… [ Europa im Krisenmodus: Wie bewältigen wir Energiekrise und den Klimawandel? - Artikel ](/artikel/news/europa-im-krisenmodus-wie-bewaeltigen-wir-energiekrise-und-den-klimawandel) Aufgrund der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine läuft Europa im Krisenmodus. Im ungewissen Jetzt müssen die richtigen Weichenstellungen für Generationen getroffen werden. Maßnahmen zur Bewältigung der Energiekrise und einer Intensivierung der Investitionen in den Klimaschutz müssen dabei Hand in…

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/Maerkte/suche,t=suedafrika-buhlt-um-investitionen,did=1925098.html

Sie sind ein ausländisches Unternehmen, das in Deutschland investieren möchte? Die von Ihnen gewählte Seite kann nicht angezeigt werden. Versuchen Sie stattdessen die folgenden Seiten: Sie wollen Ihre Produkte exportieren oder ins Ausland expandieren? Wir informieren Sie über Chancen und Risiken. Bitte benutzen Sie die Suchfunktion, um die gewünschten Informationen zu finden. Wenn Sie weitere Hilfe benötigen oder Fragen haben, stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung. © 2024 Germany Trade & Invest Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck – auch teilweise – nur mit vorheriger ausdrücklicher Genehmigung. Trotz größtmöglicher Sorgfalt keine Haftung für den Inhalt. Gefördert vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz aufgrund eines Beschlusses des Deutschen Bundestages.

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/south-africa.aspx</nowiki>

JOIN US SHOP MEMBERS LOGIN NUCLEAR INFORMATION Information Library A library of resources related to the Nuclear industry. Reactor Database Information on nuclear reactors from around the globe. Essentials Nuclear technology, radiation,and uranium. Climate Change Nuclear Energy, Climate Change and COP27. Publications Reports, guides and books from the World Nuclear Association. Ukraine Ukraine conflict and nuclear energy. Subscribe to receive our enewsletter and updates Please select the mailing you wish to subscribe to: WNN Daily WNN Weekly Events Press News and Media ABOUT US Our Mission Information on the leadership, organisation and secretariat of the World Nuclear Association. Leadership World Nuclear Association Members appoint the Director General and elect a Board of Management. Membership Which companies are members of the World Nuclear Association, and what could you gain from membership. At Work At Work is an annual report of World Nuclear Association's activities. Subscribe to receive our enewsletter and updates Please select the mailing you wish to subscribe to: WNN Daily WNN Weekly Events Press Working Groups EVENTS SHOP MEMBERS LOGIN HOME / 404 PAGE NOT FOUND 404 Page not found We can't seem to find the page you're looking for

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/south-africa.aspx</nowiki>

JOIN US SHOP MEMBERS LOGIN NUCLEAR INFORMATION Information Library A library of resources related to the Nuclear industry. Reactor Database Information on nuclear reactors from around the globe. Essentials Nuclear technology, radiation,and uranium. Climate Change Nuclear Energy, Climate Change and COP27. Publications Reports, guides and books from the World Nuclear Association. Ukraine Ukraine conflict and nuclear energy. Subscribe to receive our enewsletter and updates Please select the mailing you wish to subscribe to: WNN Daily WNN Weekly Events Press News and Media ABOUT US Our Mission Information on the leadership, organisation and secretariat of the World Nuclear Association. Leadership World Nuclear Association Members appoint the Director General and elect a Board of Management. Membership Which companies are members of the World Nuclear Association, and what could you gain from membership. At Work At Work is an annual report of World Nuclear Association's activities. Subscribe to receive our enewsletter and updates Please select the mailing you wish to subscribe to: WNN Daily WNN Weekly Events Press Working Groups EVENTS SHOP MEMBERS LOGIN HOME / 404 PAGE NOT FOUND 404 Page not found We can't seem to find the page you're looking for

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://www.miningweekly.com/article/south-africa-has-22-operating-manganese-mines-amaranthcx--2020-09-28

South Africa has 22 operating manganese mines – AmaranthCX Mamatwan manganese mine in South Africa's Northern Cape. As a magazine-and-online subscriber to Creamer Media's Engineering News & Mining Weekly, you are entitled to one free research report of your choice. You would have received a promotional code at the time of your subscription. Have this code ready and click [here](https://store.creamermedia.co.za/products/). At the time of check-out, please enter your promotional code to download your free report. Email [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) if you have forgotten your promotional code. If you have previously accessed your free report, you can purchase additional Research Reports by clicking on the "Buy Report" button on this page. 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The most cost-effective way to access all our Research Reports is by subscribing to Creamer Media's Research Channel Africa - you can upgrade your subscription now at this [link](https://store.creamermedia.co.za/products/research-channel-africa-1-user-1). JOHANNESBURG (miningweekly.com) – South Africa has 22 operating manganese mines, with only four of them owned in part by Johannesburg Stock Exchange- (JSE-) listed companies, AmaranthCX director Paul Miller has calculated. All are in the Northern Cape, except for four small mines well outside the Northern Cape in the North West, Mpumalanga and Western Cape provinces. Secondary-listed JSE companies South32, with 44%, and Anglo American, with 29%, own the Hotazel Manganese Mines, Wessels and Mamatwan, served by a 500 000 t/y sintering plant at Mamatwan. These same two companies, South32, with 60%, and Anglo American, with 40%, own the manganese alloys company, Metalloys, near Meyerton, in Gauteng, which is on care and maintenance. Assmang, held 50% by African Rainbow Minerals, owns the Nçhwaning and Gloria manganese mines. "So, there are four mines owned in part at least by JSE-listed companies – not four listed companies that own manganese mines – and these are the four original still operating manganese mines," Miller stated in an emailed response to Mining Weekly. Sydney-listed Jupiter, which does not have a secondary listing on the JSE, owns the Tshipi Borwa mine. "If ever you needed evidence of the decoupling of the South African resource sector from the South African public capital markets then there you have it. We have had 18 new manganese mines of various sizes (mostly, to be fair, quite small - except Tshipi Borwa, UMK, Kalagadi and Kudumane), come into production since about 2006 and none is listed on the JSE," Miller pointed out. "It's a travesty that we have to figure out this stuff ourselves - the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy seemingly no longer produces any usable knowledge. "Their listing of Operating Mines of SA on their website was last updated in 2016 and they have not published any sector/commodity reports for about a decade. Yet they probably employ more people in their Mineral Promotion Directorate than they did back in 2010. You would think they would be crowing the growth in the number of participants in manganese from the rooftops," said Miller. Besides the traditional export port of Port Elizabeth and now the Saldanha multi-purpose terminal, there are also extensive skip-to-ship exports at Maydon Wharf in Durban, after being road hauled a thousand kilometres. "We have mapped it all - for use by non-GIS specialists in Google Maps/Google Earth on a smart phone, PC or tablet. We hope it is of interest to transporters, traders and mine suppliers," said Miller. South Africa is the global leader in manganese reserves - with a growing export market. Manganese ore was traditionally railed from the Northern Cape to the manganese terminal in Port Elizabeth. This export channel soon reached full capacity as new producers entered the market to join the four original mines - new export channels were needed. Practical innovations were necessary absent further capital investment by Transnet: road hauling with empty backhaul shipping containers being stuffed at Lohatla, Kimberley and Bloemfontein; skip-to-ship operations at out-of-season privately operated fresh produce terminals in Port Elizabeth and general purpose terminals at Maydon Wharf in Durban; repurposing of the coal handling facilities at the old Swartkops power station; and using straddle backactors to unload rail wagons in Saldanha and Port Elizabeth. Of the seven domestic beneficiation plants (sintering, silicon and ferromanganese alloys plants), two have been shuttered owing to Eskom. The 22 operating mines are exporting via seven terminals. There are also 12 exploration projects. ECNOMIC TRANSFORMATION DOCUMENT Reaction has been positive to the discussion document of the economic transformation committee (ETC) of the African National Congress (ANC), which states that the listing of mining companies on the JSE should be encouraged and mining exploration incentivised, as is the case in other mining jurisdictions. The 30-page discussion document puts forward an economic framework for reconstruction, growth and transformation, with the objective of building a new, inclusive South African economy, at a time when the Covid-19 pandemic is continuing to impact negatively on economic activity. In its comment on the mining sector, the ANC's ETC document states: "Listings of mining companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange should be encouraged and South African retail investors willing to invest in mining exploration should be incentivised, as is the case in other mining jurisdictions." Minerals Council South Africa has acknowledged the release of the ANC's reconstruction, growth and transformation document and said it was pleased to note the approaches proposed to reinvigorate the county's mining industry. In his response to the ANC document earlier this year, Miller, as director of AmaranthCX, a consultancy to the minerals industry, stated: "I'm very pleased to see that the penny has dropped that the development of public markets, like the JSE, and the junior exploration sector should be firmly linked – two sides of the same coin basically – and that any effective policy must do both, simultaneously. Previously initiatives like Section 12J have failed when it came to mining exploration, in part because they did not both develop the market for raising the capital and the junior minerals sector itself." Miller led the JSE-listed coal exploration and development company Keaton Energy and advised many others in his former capacities as Nedbank CIB mining finance principal and as MD of the CCP 12J startup, which specialised in the financing of secondary and ancillary projects on existing mines. "I am concerned, however, that the South African mining sector has for all intents and purposes decoupled from our public markets – remembering that the JSE was born to serve the primary capital requirements of the mining industry. Forty years ago, half of global mining industry market capitalisation traded on the JSE; we are now down to some 26 companies of which quite a number have no operations in South Africa. However, South Africa still has close to 400 operating mines (more than the rest of Africa, collectively) across a diversity of commodities, ranging from small limeworks to global Tier One assets, and yet almost no primary capital raising for new projects takes place in local public markets. It seems that our market regulators think that secondary trade in exchange traded funds based on foreign indices or just the 80 largest most liquid local companies is enough. Perhaps we need to relook the value of a stock exchange to a society, which in my view should be the raising primary capital for the real economy. "If the ANC wants to encourage listings on the JSE, then the national chairperson of the ANC [Gwede Mantashe] could start the process by simply phoning the respective chairpersons of Bushveld Minerals, Ivanhoe Mines, Jupiter Mines, Magnum Mining & Exploration, Platinum Group Metals, Bluerock Diamonds, Diamcor, Taung Gold and any other foreign listed mining company with operations in South Africa and ask them to please apply for a low-cost, fast-tracked, secondary listing on a local market as part of their contribution to post-Covid recovery. This would create some interest and excitement in the short term and get some positive momentum going. Moral suasion should probably be enough to do it," said Miller. "A really quick way of encouraging retail participation on the local markets already exists, without incurring the cost to the fiscus of new incentives - this would be to allow individual investors to manage their own tax-free savings accounts, or perhaps a capped portion of their own retirement annuity, in a ring-fenced stock broking account. In a similar way to which Australians can self-manage a portion of their Superannuation Funds (a retirement annuity equivalent). Rent seeking big business members of ASISA wouldn't like this - as they benefit from high fees and will lobby National Treasury against investors being able to do their own thing at low cost. But small companies, like junior miners, need a diversity of small investors and our concentrated financial services sector needs to open up space for smaller growth companies and less risk averse investors. We can follow that up by cloning the flow through share schemes of Canada or Australia, however, that would probably take a full legislative process, which is a longer term solution," Miller said. South Africa's rich Kalahari basin, in the Northern Cape, is home to 80% of the world's manganese orebody. Comments Latest Multimedia sponsored by Press Office Announcements What's On Subscribe to improve your user experience... 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Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://irr.org.za/media/cranes-are-disappearing-from-sa-skyline-2013-and-jse-2013-as-construction-sector-struggles-biznews

Sara Gon The state of South Africa's construction industry is a sign of the state of the economy as managed by the African National Congress (ANC): it's in terminal decline. For decades, big construction companies were seen everywhere – Group Five, Murray & Roberts, After 45 years of trading on the JSE, Group Five filed for business rescue in March 2019. In June, Probuild Construction Group applied to be placed in business rescue as it was financially distressed and unable to pay all of its debts. Basil Read, Liviero Group and Esor Construction have all been placed in business rescue. LBC Lenco Construction applied for debt-freezing agreements, but has since been liquidated. The construction industry is notoriously cyclical, but there is a current mix of a depressed economy, high levels of national debt, uncertainty and low infrastructure-spending, and contracts are drying up. Thousands of jobs have been lost, 8,000 at Group Five alone. The past nine years have proved to be ruinous. Construction companies that are South Africa-orientated were badly affected from mid-June 2018 to mid-June this year. Says Marc Ter Mors, the head of equity research at Johannesburg-based SBG Securities: 'In South Africa, volumes are low, pricing is under pressure and companies are taking on more risk to win contracts, so margins are thin and that hits cash flow. There are no real segments to hide in.' Murray & Roberts anticipated the crash and sold its building and infrastructure units in 2016 to move into international businesses focused on projects like underground mining, and oil and gas. Although M&R's market valuation is a fraction of what it once was, the stock has gained 44% in the past year amid takeover interest from 40% shareholder, Aton GmbH. The industry was on a high in the build-up to the FIFA Soccer World Cup in South Africa in 2010, which required major national infrastructure spend, particularly on new stadiums. However, the Competition Commission had already started to investigate collusion in the industry. The Commission settled with 15 firms in 2013, while Group Five was granted immunity for co-operating. President Cyril Ramaphosa recently said that although government's infrastructure spending had slowed, the State would contribute R100bn into a fund over 10 years. The plan is to use this to get financing from both private and state-owned companies to reboot the industry. Meanwhile the FTSE/JSE Africa Construction & Materials Index is down 27% in the past 12 months, compared to a 6% drop in the FTSE/JSE Africa All Shares Index. There is also a risk that if South Africa's local construction industry is wrecked, future building projects will become more expensive, Ter Mors said. 'As South Africa depletes its capacity to build its own infrastructure, when the cycle turns again, it will be forced to rely on international companies and their pricing,' the analyst said. By way of example, Aveng was among the top 40 largest companies by market value on the JSE in 2010, but now has a market value of R582m from a peak of R28bn in 2008. Then, as the Zuma presidency took hold and the money that was meant for infrastructure was stolen, the big construction industry went into freefall. But in recent years another problem has been putting a nail in the coffin of many of the smaller companies that subcontract to the large construction groups: unpaid debts. Recent business failures and job losses in the sector have been blamed on the non-payment or late payment of contractors. As at September 2019, the government owed construction and building industry contractors about R5.5bn. This is according to an article in Moneyweb "Government owes construction contractors R5.5bn" (19 September). The article quotes Roy Mnisi, executive director of Master Builders South Africa (MBSA), as saying that late payment or non-payment by government is the single greatest challenge facing the industry. Despite government ministers and President Ramaphosa's talking about the issue, nothing has been done to ensure that contractors are paid within 30 days after invoicing, as required by National Treasury regulations. In most cases, the work has been completed but the government doesn't pay. MBSA has already postponed a class-action claim for work done for municipalities, provincial and national departments, and state-owned entities. The postponement was intended to allow Treasury time to resolve the problem. The reasons Treasury has given for this situation will not come as a surprise to anybody: Bad budgeting; A lack of proper financial management; Corruption; No 'consequence' management for invoices that are over 30 days overdue. Many of MBSA's members have gone into business rescue and liquidation. Suppliers apply for liquidation of construction companies to recover some of the losses. The president of the Black Business Council says that contractors are scared to exercise their legal rights against big companies because no further contracts will be forthcoming. The economic situation ensures that things can only get worse for all those in the industry. * * * Another sector that is likely to meet with the same problem, only more so, is healthcare, should the government press on with the National Health Insurance (NHI). We have no confidence that an ANC government can afford, develop or manage a project as huge and unaffordable as the NHI. The provision of chronic medication is just one example; it's almost certain that government facilities will run out of the medication so many desperately need. The risk of this happening is one of many reasons why the NHI must be opposed. You will cease to exercise control over your own life. Sara Gon is a Policy Fellow at the Institute of Race Relations. If you like what you have just read, become a Friend of the IRR if you aren't already one by SMSing your name to 32823 or clicking here. Each SMS costs R1.' Terms & Conditions Apply. [https://www.biznews.com/asset-management/2019/11/19/construction-crisis-jse?](https://www.biznews.com/asset-management/2019/11/19/construction-crisis-jse?utm_source=Biznews.com+Main&utm_campaign=058908f6f9-dailyinsider&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b56abc3f25-058908f6f9-101603781)

Ekonomie van Suid-Afrika

https://irr.org.za/media/cranes-are-disappearing-from-sa-skyline-2013-and-jse-2013-as-construction-sector-struggles-biznews

Sara Gon The state of South Africa's construction industry is a sign of the state of the economy as managed by the African National Congress (ANC): it's in terminal decline. For decades, big construction companies were seen everywhere – Group Five, Murray & Roberts, After 45 years of trading on the JSE, Group Five filed for business rescue in March 2019. In June, Probuild Construction Group applied to be placed in business rescue as it was financially distressed and unable to pay all of its debts. Basil Read, Liviero Group and Esor Construction have all been placed in business rescue. LBC Lenco Construction applied for debt-freezing agreements, but has since been liquidated. The construction industry is notoriously cyclical, but there is a current mix of a depressed economy, high levels of national debt, uncertainty and low infrastructure-spending, and contracts are drying up. Thousands of jobs have been lost, 8,000 at Group Five alone. The past nine years have proved to be ruinous. Construction companies that are South Africa-orientated were badly affected from mid-June 2018 to mid-June this year. Says Marc Ter Mors, the head of equity research at Johannesburg-based SBG Securities: 'In South Africa, volumes are low, pricing is under pressure and companies are taking on more risk to win contracts, so margins are thin and that hits cash flow. There are no real segments to hide in.' Murray & Roberts anticipated the crash and sold its building and infrastructure units in 2016 to move into international businesses focused on projects like underground mining, and oil and gas. Although M&R's market valuation is a fraction of what it once was, the stock has gained 44% in the past year amid takeover interest from 40% shareholder, Aton GmbH. The industry was on a high in the build-up to the FIFA Soccer World Cup in South Africa in 2010, which required major national infrastructure spend, particularly on new stadiums. However, the Competition Commission had already started to investigate collusion in the industry. The Commission settled with 15 firms in 2013, while Group Five was granted immunity for co-operating. President Cyril Ramaphosa recently said that although government's infrastructure spending had slowed, the State would contribute R100bn into a fund over 10 years. The plan is to use this to get financing from both private and state-owned companies to reboot the industry. Meanwhile the FTSE/JSE Africa Construction & Materials Index is down 27% in the past 12 months, compared to a 6% drop in the FTSE/JSE Africa All Shares Index. There is also a risk that if South Africa's local construction industry is wrecked, future building projects will become more expensive, Ter Mors said. 'As South Africa depletes its capacity to build its own infrastructure, when the cycle turns again, it will be forced to rely on international companies and their pricing,' the analyst said. By way of example, Aveng was among the top 40 largest companies by market value on the JSE in 2010, but now has a market value of R582m from a peak of R28bn in 2008. Then, as the Zuma presidency took hold and the money that was meant for infrastructure was stolen, the big construction industry went into freefall. But in recent years another problem has been putting a nail in the coffin of many of the smaller companies that subcontract to the large construction groups: unpaid debts. Recent business failures and job losses in the sector have been blamed on the non-payment or late payment of contractors. As at September 2019, the government owed construction and building industry contractors about R5.5bn. This is according to an article in Moneyweb "Government owes construction contractors R5.5bn" (19 September). The article quotes Roy Mnisi, executive director of Master Builders South Africa (MBSA), as saying that late payment or non-payment by government is the single greatest challenge facing the industry. Despite government ministers and President Ramaphosa's talking about the issue, nothing has been done to ensure that contractors are paid within 30 days after invoicing, as required by National Treasury regulations. In most cases, the work has been completed but the government doesn't pay. MBSA has already postponed a class-action claim for work done for municipalities, provincial and national departments, and state-owned entities. The postponement was intended to allow Treasury time to resolve the problem. The reasons Treasury has given for this situation will not come as a surprise to anybody: Bad budgeting; A lack of proper financial management; Corruption; No 'consequence' management for invoices that are over 30 days overdue. Many of MBSA's members have gone into business rescue and liquidation. Suppliers apply for liquidation of construction companies to recover some of the losses. The president of the Black Business Council says that contractors are scared to exercise their legal rights against big companies because no further contracts will be forthcoming. The economic situation ensures that things can only get worse for all those in the industry. * * * Another sector that is likely to meet with the same problem, only more so, is healthcare, should the government press on with the National Health Insurance (NHI). We have no confidence that an ANC government can afford, develop or manage a project as huge and unaffordable as the NHI. The provision of chronic medication is just one example; it's almost certain that government facilities will run out of the medication so many desperately need. The risk of this happening is one of many reasons why the NHI must be opposed. You will cease to exercise control over your own life. Sara Gon is a Policy Fellow at the Institute of Race Relations. If you like what you have just read, become a Friend of the IRR if you aren't already one by SMSing your name to 32823 or clicking here. Each SMS costs R1.' Terms & Conditions Apply. [https://www.biznews.com/asset-management/2019/11/19/construction-crisis-jse?](https://www.biznews.com/asset-management/2019/11/19/construction-crisis-jse?utm_source=Biznews.com+Main&utm_campaign=058908f6f9-dailyinsider&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b56abc3f25-058908f6f9-101603781)

Libië

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/09/libyan-parliament-refuge-greek-car-ferry

A Greek car ferry has been hired as last-minute accommodation for Libya's embattled parliament, which has fled the country's civil war to the small eastern town of Tobruk. The 17,000-ton Elyros liner has been deployed, complete with its Greek crew, as a floating hotel for a legislature clinging to power in the Libyan city that is last stop before the Egyptian border. Tobruk is no stranger to last stands. In the second world war, British and Commonwealth forces endured months of attacks from Erwin Rommel's [Africa](https://www.theguardian.com/world/africa) Corps. Now the siege mentality is back. Islamists and their allies have captured the capital, Tripoli, and most of Benghazi, the country's second city. Derna, the next town up the coast, has been declared an Islamic caliphate and the front line begins at Tobruk airport, where pickup trucks mounting anti-aircraft guns face out into the shimmering empty desert. The small port is home to what remains of Libya's sovereign power. On one side of the bay, sitting on sandy bluffs, a hotel conference hall acts as chamber to the house of representatives, ringed by troops in sandy-coloured US-made Humvee troop carriers. On the other, moored to a quay, is the white gleaming bulk of the Elyros, which usually plies it trade carrying cars and passengers between Greece and Italy, looming over a collection of grey naval patrol boasts. "We had only three days to prepare everything in Tobruk, to find spaces for meetings, places to stay, internet, everything," said Dr Muftah Othman, head of the town's election commission. "If there is no ship, where will you stay?" The mood on board is sombre. An escalator, switched on only for important guests, heads up above the car deck to restaurants and bars with bright lights and almost no people. Children of the parliamentarians who have fled with them play in the corridors while clusters of officials and women in shawls cluster around the tables, where they are served Pepsi and orange juice by the bemused crew in immaculate white uniforms. "It is unusual, yes," says one steward. "The Libyans are very polite. We are here one week, maybe we stay months, we don't know." Nor do Libya's parliamentarians. The small Libyan army is reeling from hammer blows from its foes. "We need time to build up our army and security and to develop our skills to run the country," says deputy speaker Mohammed Ali Shuhaib. In one way, time is on the government's side. Weeks of fighting have seen it lose major cities but it still has control of Libya's vast foreign reserves abroad and oil fields at home. Hold the line, the theory goes, and parliament can build its army while Islamist forces diminish. But in another way, time is running out, with Libya's conflict already shaping up as a regional war. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, the big Gulf players, have each taken a side, Qatar for the Islamists, the Emiratis for the nationalists. Pentagon sources say the UAE and Egypt have launched air strikes against Libya Dawn, while Sudan is flying in weapons for the Islamists, making parliament's job of finding middle ground all the harder. In Tobruk, cohesion is parliament's problem. The Islamists are not the biggest faction in Libya – they captured Tripoli after suffering catastrophic defeats in June's elections – but they are the most cohesive. The tribes ranged against them are fractured along ancient fault lines, some dating back centuries. Uniting those tribes, then persuading at least some Islamists to end their boycott of the chamber, is likely to determine whether Libya's three-year experiment with democracy succeeds or fails. Publicly, politicians are upbeat. "They should know, the people who are not coming, that we accept them," says Amal Bayou, a microbiologist and one of 32 female MPs. "If they [Islamists] are against the parliament, they can say it here, they should know there is a place for them." But MP numbers are falling. It is supposed to have 200 members, but some seats are unfilled, some boycotted, and a mixture of intimidation and logistical problems have seen attendance dwindle to 115, dangerously close to the point where credibility will drain away. UN envoy Bernard Leon, arriving on Monday for his first visit, insisted he was optimistic. "This is a country, a society, that is fed up with conflict," he said. "We are going to spend the week developing contacts with the stakeholders." Meanwhile, across Libya those stakeholders continue pummelling each other. Tripoli, occupied by Islamist-led Libya Dawn, is suffering power and water cuts. Human Rights Watch reported this week on house-burnings and attacks on ethnic minorities and journalists across the capital. Without the means to counterattack, or much sign of international support, Libya's parliament clings on in Tobruk, its eyes on the Elyros, wondering if it will end up being less a floating hotel than a lifeboat.

Libië

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/libyan-politicians-sign-un-peace-deal-unify-rival-governments

A group of Libyan politicians have signed a UN-sponsored peace deal that nominally unifies the country's two rival governments, despite being denounced as illegitimate by some of the groups the agreement is meant to unite. Members of Libya's two competing parliaments met in Morocco to sign the deal which supporters say will hasten the end of an 18-month civil war, as well as five years of political violence that followed [the uprising against the former dictator, Muammar Gaddafi](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/20/muammar-gaddafi-dies-city-birth). Western powers hope a united Libya will allow the country's warring militias to instead focus on eradicating an Islamic State franchise that has seized power on parts of the country's coast. But the sustainability of the deal has been thrown into doubt after key players not present at the signing ceremony said it was an agreement forced on Libya by external powers. Britain hopes the unity government, to be run by a nine-strong presidency, will invite western powers to mount airstrikes against Isis positions, allowing David Cameron to avoid [another Commons vote](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2015/dec/02/syria-airstrikes-mps-debate-vote-cameron-action-against-isis-live) before dispatching RAF jets. The deal was accepted on Thursday by some members of Libya Dawn, [the rebel coalition that seized power in Tripoli in July 2014](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/31/tripoli-residents-libya-dawn-islamist-militias) and forced the internationally recognised government to retreat to the eastern city of Tobruk. But Jamal Zubia, the rebel government spokesman, claimed those who signed the unity deal did not speak for the Tripoli faction and were merely puppets for the international community. "People who are signing this UN draft – none of them have any authority. When you send unauthorised people to sign, it's a fake document," Zubia said. He added: "If they want a democratic country, they must do it in a democratic way – they can't force us to accept it. If they want to make it a colony, then call it a colony, but don't pass it to us as a gift from the UN." Other factions were more supportive. Hatem al-Oraibi, the spokesman for the Tobruk government, said: "We support all the efforts that are being done for the sake of reunifying Libya during this critical phase." Analysts warn the unity government will face many of the same problems that the previous internationally recognised government faced. Without a cohesive state-run police force and army under its control, the new government may not be able to meet in Tripoli without the support of sympathetic militias. This could perpetuate the involvement of militias in political affairs, an unstable arrangement that goes against the long-term goals of the peace deal. [Frederic Wehrey](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=709), a Libya specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "The danger is that it becomes yet another third body that has to meet outside the capital or even worse outside the country. There is a plan for [local] armed actors to help secure the new government. But the problem is that the actual army and police are quite weak so we would be relying on militias again. "And that's the larger issue – how do you create a security force under the control of the authorities, while at the same time demobilising the militias?"

Libië

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/libyan-politicians-sign-un-peace-deal-unify-rival-governments

A group of Libyan politicians have signed a UN-sponsored peace deal that nominally unifies the country's two rival governments, despite being denounced as illegitimate by some of the groups the agreement is meant to unite. Members of Libya's two competing parliaments met in Morocco to sign the deal which supporters say will hasten the end of an 18-month civil war, as well as five years of political violence that followed [the uprising against the former dictator, Muammar Gaddafi](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/20/muammar-gaddafi-dies-city-birth). Western powers hope a united Libya will allow the country's warring militias to instead focus on eradicating an Islamic State franchise that has seized power on parts of the country's coast. But the sustainability of the deal has been thrown into doubt after key players not present at the signing ceremony said it was an agreement forced on Libya by external powers. Britain hopes the unity government, to be run by a nine-strong presidency, will invite western powers to mount airstrikes against Isis positions, allowing David Cameron to avoid [another Commons vote](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2015/dec/02/syria-airstrikes-mps-debate-vote-cameron-action-against-isis-live) before dispatching RAF jets. The deal was accepted on Thursday by some members of Libya Dawn, [the rebel coalition that seized power in Tripoli in July 2014](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/31/tripoli-residents-libya-dawn-islamist-militias) and forced the internationally recognised government to retreat to the eastern city of Tobruk. But Jamal Zubia, the rebel government spokesman, claimed those who signed the unity deal did not speak for the Tripoli faction and were merely puppets for the international community. "People who are signing this UN draft – none of them have any authority. When you send unauthorised people to sign, it's a fake document," Zubia said. He added: "If they want a democratic country, they must do it in a democratic way – they can't force us to accept it. If they want to make it a colony, then call it a colony, but don't pass it to us as a gift from the UN." Other factions were more supportive. Hatem al-Oraibi, the spokesman for the Tobruk government, said: "We support all the efforts that are being done for the sake of reunifying Libya during this critical phase." Analysts warn the unity government will face many of the same problems that the previous internationally recognised government faced. Without a cohesive state-run police force and army under its control, the new government may not be able to meet in Tripoli without the support of sympathetic militias. This could perpetuate the involvement of militias in political affairs, an unstable arrangement that goes against the long-term goals of the peace deal. [Frederic Wehrey](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=709), a Libya specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "The danger is that it becomes yet another third body that has to meet outside the capital or even worse outside the country. There is a plan for [local] armed actors to help secure the new government. But the problem is that the actual army and police are quite weak so we would be relying on militias again. "And that's the larger issue – how do you create a security force under the control of the authorities, while at the same time demobilising the militias?"

Libië

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/25/draft-statement-says-libya-rivals-have-agreed-ceasefire-election/

Leaders of the two main factions in war-torn Libya have agreed to implement a ceasefire and to hold elections next year after French-brokered talks which Emmanuel Macron hailed as "historic". Fayez al-Sarraj, the head of Libya's UN-backed government in western Libya, and General Khalifa Haftar, a military strongman in the country's east, shook hands and pledged to try to work together after talks outside Paris. Mr Macron, who has made peace in Libya a foreign policy priority, said the two men had shown "historic courage" during the talks. "The cause of peace has made a lot of progress today," the French president said in the suburb of La Celle-Saint-Cloud. "The Mediterranean needs this peace." Behind the smiles and diplomatic handshakes, there is still much work to do to try to reunite Libya, which remains in a state of political chaos six years after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. The UN-backed government in Tripoli and General Haftar's army in the east are the biggest factions in the country's power struggle, but they are also competing with a myriad of militias, tribal groups and the weakened but not defeated Libyan branch of the Islamic State (Isil). The two leaders signed off on a joint 10-point plan in which they committed to not fighting against each other and to hold national elections "as soon as possible". Mr Macron said the goal was for a vote to be held in spring 2018. "The solution to the Libya crisis can only be a political one and requires a national reconciliation process involving all Libyans," the joint document said. The two sides said they would only use force for counter-terrorism and to defend Libya's borders. They also committed to "building the rule of law" and working towards the "disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration" of militia groups in the country. France's former president, Nicolas Sarkozy, was one of the main drivers of western intervention in Libya and since taking off Mr Macron has said he is eager to try to help broker a deal. Libya has been the main departure point for migrants and refugees from Africa crossing the Mediterranean towards Europe and the EU is keen to see a unified government that could stem their numbers. The US and European countries also fear that Isil, facing defeat on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, may try to regroup in chaotic Libya or use the country as a launching point for attacks. A united government could help counter the terror threat. Tarek Megerisi, a Libyan politican analyst, said he was sceptical the deal was the beginning of a breakthrough. "As a step towards a genuine solution to the situation in Libya, I'm not very optimistic," he said. One potential stumbling block, he said, was defining what military actions would be considered counter-terrorism and therefore allowed under the deal. Gen Haftar, like his backers in Egypt's government, considers the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups to be terrorists. "Haftar's use of violence so far has always been under the aegis of counter-terrorism, so when you have a wide definition of counter-terrorism you have a lot of scope to use force," Mr Megerisi said. Another issue is the weakness of the UN-backed government, which has widespread international backing but little control over the militias which are nominally loyal to it. It is not clear that Mr Sarraj can actually enforce an agreement made on their behalf. Mr Macron spoke to the leaders of Egypt and the UAE, which both back Gen Haftar, before the meeting to seek their support for an agreement. While Gen Haftar has been able to assert his control over much of eastern Libya, as well as recently taking empty desert in the centre of the country, he is not strong enough to take over the whole country by force. He and his foreign backers may see an election as a possible pathway towards him becoming president of all of Libya through the ballot box.

Libië

https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/libyen-fluechtlinge-in-tripolis-leben-in-angst-vor-den-milizen-a-1276853.html

Flüchtlinge in Libyen: Trostlos in Tripolis Libyen Ein Leben in Angst vor den Milizen [Fritz Schaap](https://www.spiegel.de/impressum/autor-991dd67a-0001-0003-0000-000000023666) Die Milizionäre kamen in der Nacht, um zwei Uhr, als die Hitze für ein paar Stunden aus Tripolis gewichen war. Von der Front im Süden der Stadt wehte dumpf das Donnern der Explosionen herauf. Suleiman Hadi und die meisten anderen waren bereits auf den dünnen Matratzen in der zum Lager umfunktionierten Bin-Shitwan-Schule im Zentrum der Stadt in den Schlaf gesunken. Hadi, ein junger Mann, das Gesicht faltig wie zerknülltes Papier, steht am nächsten Nachmittag in schwarzer Trainingsjacke vor dem Haus des International Medical Corps (IMC) im Stadtteil Gurji. "Sie haben einen Iraker und seinen Sohn geschlagen und entführt", sagt Hadi, und er muss fast schreien, um das Dröhnen der Straße zu übertönen. Dann seien sie alle aus der Schule geschmissen worden. Nun wollen sie hier protestieren, vor dem Haus des IMC, das sie fälschlicherweise für ein Büro des Uno-Flüchtlingshilfswerks UNHCR halten. "Aber die Mitarbeiter sind alle verschwunden als wir kamen", sagt er. Ein letzter IMC-Mann sagt im Gehen, dass man leider nicht die Kapazitäten habe, sich um all die Menschen hier zu kümmern. Nun kauern 28 Familien im Schatten der Mauer unter den Akazien. Eine Mitarbeiterin des Roten Halbmonds rief die Miliz Vor zehn Monaten kam Hadi mit seiner Familie aus dem [Sudan](https://www.spiegel.de/thema/sudan/), wo er für seine Familie keine Zukunft mehr sah. Er wollte nach Norden, über das Meer, nach [Europa](https://www.spiegel.de/thema/europa/), wurde aber im Süden Libyens verschleppt und misshandelt. Mit seinem letzten Geld konnte er sich und seine Familie freikaufen. Dann strandeten sie in Tripolis. Er arbeitete als Tagelöhner, mietete für sich und seine Familie ein Zimmer im Vorort Aswani. Bis im April der Krieg kam, sie fliehen mussten und einen Platz in der vom Roten Halbmond betriebenen Schule bekamen. Sie hatten mehr Glück als andere. Flüchtlinge in Libyen: Trostlos in Tripolis Tausende Migranten werden in [Libyen](https://www.spiegel.de/thema/libyen/) in staatlich betriebenen Gefangenenlagern festgehalten. Oft [unter unmenschlichen Bedingungen](https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/libyen-die-wueste-ist-fuer-fluechtlinge-gefaehrlicher-als-das-mittelmeer-a-1275816.html). Und immer öfter geraten die Lager ins Kreuzfeuer der um Tripolis kämpfenden Milizenverbände. Da sind auf der einen Seite die Truppen aus dem Westen des Landes, die auf Seiten der Einheitsregierung des Premierministers Fayez al-Sarraj kämpfen. Und da sind auf der anderen Seite die Verbände von General Khalifa Haftar, der mittlerweile den Osten und den Süden des zweigeteilten Landes kontrolliert. In der vergangenen Woche [wurden mindestens 40 Flüchtlinge](https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/tripolis-in-libyen-angriff-auf-fluechtlingslager-dutzende-tote-a-1275498.html) bei einem Luftangriff auf ein Lager im östlichen Vorort Tajoura getötet. Das Camp befand sich nur wenige Meter vom Waffenlager einer Miliz entfernt. Die Gewalt gegen Migranten hat System "Wir werden hier campieren, und hoffen, dass das UNHCR uns helfen wird", sagt Hadi während einige Frauen neben den dreckigen Mülltonnen Decken und Tücher spannen, um der Sonne zu entkommen. Die Leiterin des Camps hatte die Milizen selbst geholt, um die Migranten zu bestrafen, so bestätigt es auch ein Mitarbeiter des Roten Halbmondes. Der Iraker hatte sein Auto falsch geparkt, also verschleppten ihn die Milizen. Außerdem war kürzlich bekanntgeworden, dass die Campchefin die Spenden, die für die [Flüchtlinge](https://www.spiegel.de/thema/fluechtlinge/) abgegeben wurden, zum Großteil für sich behielt. Ein Einzelfall beim Roten Halbmond, so der Leiter der Organisation in Tripolis. Doch die Gewalt der Milizen gegenüber den Migranten hat System. Sie ist Teil des großen Geschäfts, das die bewaffneten Gruppen mit den Migranten machen. "Seit ich im Land bin habe ich Probleme mit Milizen", sagt Hadi. "Im Süden und hier in Tripolis. Sie kommen in unsere Wohnungen, nehmen unser Geld, nehmen unsere Handys, vergewaltigen unseren Frauen", er zeigt auf eine Gruppe müder Frauen, die mit ihren Kindern unter einer Plane im Staub sitzen, "eine von uns ist schwanger deswegen." Ein Milizionär droht den Vertriebenen Hadi schaut müde auf das Lager. Schuhe liegen herum, kleine Kinder rennen durch den Dreck. "Wir wollen auch in keine andere Schule, kein Camp. Wir haben Angst, dass sie uns etwas antun." Dann geht ein Ruck durch die Gruppe, die Blicke werden starr, richten sich auf einen stämmigen Mann, der 20 Meter entfernt aus einem Auto gestiegen ist. "Das ist einer von Ihnen", sagt Hadi leise. "Verschwindet hier", schreit der Mann die Frauen an, die neben den Mülltonnen kauern. Sonst kommen wir wieder." Die Gruppe der Männer, die um Hadi herumstanden, löst sich auf. Sie bitten die Journalisten zu gehen. "Letztes Mal, als wir hier vor einem Monat protestierten, kamen sie und schossen in die Luft." Und in der Nacht sind sie wiedergekommen, erzählt Hadi am nächsten Tag. "Sie haben gedroht, wenn wir hier bleiben, kommen sie und werden uns wehtun." Er schaut auf die Autobahn, auf der Lastwagen vorbeiziehen. Die Luft ist schwer von Abgasen. "Aber wir werden nicht gehen", sagt er. "Wo sollen wir denn auch hin?"

Libië

https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/sklavenhandel-in-libyen-gott-allein-weiss-was-wir.1773.de.html?dram:article_id=401628

Wo in dieser Woche rund 8o Staats- und Regierungschef aus Afrika und Europa ankommen und in Limousinen zu ihrem Gipfeltreffen chauffiert werden, da standen vor wenigen Tagen noch Busse und Krankenwagen für Heimkehrer aus Libyen. Auf dem Flughafen der ivorischen Hauptstadt Abidjan berichteten sie Reportern von ihren Erfahrungen – wenn sie denn überhaupt dafür noch Worte fanden. So wie die 34-jährige Sonia: "Es ist ihr Geschäft, Menschen zu verkaufen", sagt Sonia über ihre libyschen Peiniger. "Man kann das nicht beschreiben, es ist zu schlimm. Sie kommen und schlagen Dich, es gibt oft nichts zu essen. Man sitzt da fest. Sie vergewaltigen die Frauen. Nur mit Gottes Hilfe bin ich hier angekommen." Bittere Armut als Fluchtfaktor Mit Hilfe ihrer Regierung und der Internationalen Organisation für Migration, IOM sind Sonia und mehr als 300 weitere ivorische Migranten aus Libyen ausgeflogen worden. Was sie und ihre Leidensgenossen erzählen, können die Journalisten nicht überprüfen, aber es deckt sich mit Berichten, die Amnesty International und die IOM schon vor Monaten veröffentlichten. Bei ihr zu Hause, auf dem Land, herrsche bittere Armut, sagt Félicité, eine weitere Heimkehrerin, deswegen habe sie sich von der Elfenbeinküste auf den Weg nach Europa gemacht. Jetzt sei sie froh, noch mit dem Leben davongekommen zu sein: "Man muss sagen, dass Libyen die Hölle auf Erden ist. Ich konnte mir nicht vorstellen, dass man Menschen so behandelt, wie wir dort behandelt wurden. Es war die Hölle, weil wir geschlagen wurden, wir wurden misshandelt, und viele von haben ihr Leben verloren. Man wird vergewaltigt. Auch ich selbst wurde vergewaltigt, ich war ein Opfer, ich wurde geschlagen. Man bekam nichts zu essen, sie haben uns Reis gegeben, der war nicht gekocht." Ein Reporter fragt die 24-Jährige, ob sie die Täter erkannt habe, ob sie wisse, von wem sie vergewaltigt worden sei: "Jeden Tag kamen andere vorbei, um Dich zu vergewaltigen. Wenn Du weinst, hilft das nicht. Sie richten eine Waffe auf Dich und machen mit Dir, was sie wollen." Zwischen 1500 und 3000 Euro habe sie die Reise an die südliche Grenze des Mittelmeers gekostet, geben die Überlebenden an. Unter ihnen Yaya, ein gebrochen wirkender 40-Jähriger, der Brandwunden aufweist: Ein Essenspaket und 30 Euro Startkapital für die Heimkehrer "Ja", sagt er auf Nachfrage, auch er sei als Sklave verkauft worden, zusammen mit einigen jungen Frauen, die gestorben seien. Jetzt stünde er vor dem Nichts, sagt er und wird anschließend in eine Klinik gefahren. Was wird aus ihm? Die Internationale Organisation für Migration und die Regierung in Abidjan haben die Heimkehrer mit Essenspaketen ausgestattet. Jeder bekommt außerdem 300 Euro Startkapital und wird dann zurück in sein Dorf geschickt. Ob ihr Schicksal Nachahmer abschreckt? Drissa Soulama, der Koordinator des West African Civil Society Forum, ist das skeptisch: "Die Leute kennen die Risiken, man muss deshalb sagen, dass die Aufklärung über die Gefahren der Migration nicht effektiv ist. Man muss den Leuten sagen: Die jungen Menschen in der Elfenbeinküste können hier bleiben und sich entwickeln." Die Bundesregierung geht davon aus, dass möglicherweise Hunderttausende Menschen in Libyen festsitzen, darunter nicht nur Westafrikaner, sondern auch Eritreer, Sudanesen und Migranten aus Bangladesch Mehrere Regierungschefs Afrikas wollten das Thema Sklaverei in Libyen jetzt in Abidjan auf die Tagesordnung des EU-Afrika-Gipfels setzen. Ruanda hat bereits konkrete Maßnahmen ergriffen. Der Kleinstaat in Ostafrika will bis zu 30.000 afrikanische Migranten aus Libyen aufnehmen.

Libië

https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article161611324/Auswaertiges-Amt-kritisiert-KZ-aehnliche-Verhaeltnisse.html

Angesichts eines möglichen Migrationspakts mit Libyen hat das Auswärtige Amt die Lage in den Flüchtlingslagern des Landes ungewöhnlich scharf kritisiert. Die deutsche Botschaft in Nigers Hauptstadt Niamey berichtet in einer sogenannten Diplomatischen Korrespondenz (intern: "Drahtbericht") an das Bundeskanzleramt und mehrere Ministerien von "allerschwersten, systematischen Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Libyen". Das berichtet die "Welt am Sonntag" mit Bezug auf das Schreiben, das der Zeitung vorliegt. Wörtlich heißt es demnach: "Authentische Handy-Fotos und -videos belegen die KZ-ähnlichen Verhältnisse in den sogenannten Privatgefängnissen." In solchen "Privatgefängnissen" würden Schlepper ausreisewillige Migranten häufig gefangen halten. "Exekutionen nicht zahlungsfähiger Migranten, Folter, Vergewaltigungen, Erpressungen sowie Aussetzungen in der Wüste sind dort an der Tagesordnung", heißt es in dem Bericht. "Augenzeugen sprachen von exakt fünf Erschießungen wöchentlich in einem Gefängnis - mit Ankündigung und jeweils freitags, um Raum für Neuankömmlinge zu schaffen, d.h. den menschlichen ,Durchsatz' und damit den Profit der Betreiber zu erhöhen", heißt es laut "Welt am Sonntag" in dem Bericht der Botschaft in Niamey weiter. [>>Lesen Sie hier den vollständigen Artikel bei "Welt Plus".](/politik/ausland/article161608446/Wir-sind-weniger-wert-als-Hunde.html) Die Fraktionschefin der Grünen im EU-Parlament, Ska Keller, forderte Konsequenzen. "Wenn die Bundesregierung davon Kenntnis hat, dass es in [Libyen](/themen/libyen-krise/) zu schwersten und anhaltenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen gegen Flüchtlinge kommt, dann muss sie mit aller Macht dafür eintreten, dass ein neues Abkommen mit Libyen nicht zustande kommt", sagte Keller der "Welt am Sonntag". Ein solches Abkommen würde vielmehr dazu führen, "dass Menschen in eine katastrophale und menschenunwürdige Lage zurückgeschickt werden." Die EU-Staats- und Regierungschefs wollen am kommenden Freitag bei ihrem Treffen in Malta darüber beraten, wie sich der [Flüchtlingsstrom](/themen/fluechtlinge/) aus Libyen und anderen nordafrikanischen Staaten eindämmen lässt. Die maltesische EU-Ratspräsidentschaft hatte in den vergangenen Tagen Vorschläge für eine "Schutzlinie" in libyschen Hoheitsgewässern präsentiert, um Migranten von der Flucht abzuhalten. De Maizière: "Geschäftsmodell der Schlepper beenden" [Bundesinnenminister Thomas de Maizière](/themen/thomas-de-maiziere/) (CDU) sagte der "Welt am Sonntag": "In der jetzigen Lage ist es so, dass die Schlepper entscheiden, wer nach Europa kommt – das muss beendet werden, denn das Geschäftsmodell der Schlepper ist so einfach wie grausam. Flüchtlinge erkaufen sich für viel Geld einen Platz in einem kaum seefähigen Boot". Es gebe in der UN-Flüchtlingskonvention einen Anspruch von Schutzsuchenden gegenüber der Völkergemeinschaft, so der Minister. "Aber es gibt darin keinen Anspruch, hinzugehen, wo man will." De Maizière verwies darauf, dass die UN-Flüchtlingskonvention auch die Idee enthalte, "dass schutzsuchende Menschen in der Region bleiben".

Libië

http://www.geographic.org/geographic_names/name.php?uni=9093369&fid=3769&c=libya

This page presents the geographical name data for Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Libya, as supplied by the US military intelligence in electronic format, including the geographic coordinates and place name in various forms, latin, roman and native characters, and its location in its respective country's administrative division Full Name ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#FULL_NAME)): Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Non-Roman Name: [ اَلْجَمَاهِيرِيَّة اَلْعَرَبِيَّة اَللِّيبِيَّة اَلشَّعْبِيَّة اَلإِشْتِرَاكِيَّة ](name.php?uni=6485614&fid=3784&c=libya ) Primary Country Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#CC1)): LY ( [Libya](https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/libya/index.html)) First-order administrative division code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#ADM1)): 00 (Libya (general) ) Region Font Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#RC)): 3 (Africa/Middle East) Unique Feature Identifier ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#UFI)): -3169384 Unique Name Identifier ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#UNI)): 9093369 Latitude in decimal degrees ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#LAT)): 25 Longitude in decimal degrees ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#LONG)): 17 Latitude in degrees, minutes, and seconds ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#DMS_LAT)): 25° 00' 00" N Longitude in degrees, minutes, and seconds ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#DMS_LONG)): 17° 00' 00" E Military Grid Reference System coordinates ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#MGRS)): 33RYH0184666437 Joint Operations Graphic reference ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#JOG)): NG33-12 Feature Classification ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#FC)): A (Administrative region type feature) Feature Designation Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#DSG)): PCLI (independent political entity) Populated Place Classification ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#PC)): No data Second-order administrative division code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#ADM2)): No data Population Figures ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#POP)): No data Elevations ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#ELEV)): No data Secondary Country Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#CC2)): No data Name Type ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#NT)): C (Conventional name) Language Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#LC)): eng (English) Substitute for full name ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#SHORT_FORM)): Libya Descriptive part of the full name ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#GENERIC)): No data A form of the full name that allows for alphabetical sorting of the file into gazetteer sequence ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#SORT_NAME)): GREATSOCIALISTPEOPLESLIBYANARABJAMAHIRIYA Full Name with QWERTY characters ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#FULL_NAME_ND)): Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Modify Date ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#MODIFY_DATE)): 2007-02-28 NOTE: The information regarding Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Libya on this page is published from the data supplied by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a member of the Intelligence community of the United States of America, and a Department of Defense (DoD) Combat Support Agency. No claims are made regarding the accuracy of Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya information contained here. All suggestions for corrections of any errors about Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya should be addressed to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Libië

http://www.geographic.org/geographic_names/name.php?uni=9093369&fid=3769&c=libya

This page presents the geographical name data for Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Libya, as supplied by the US military intelligence in electronic format, including the geographic coordinates and place name in various forms, latin, roman and native characters, and its location in its respective country's administrative division Full Name ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#FULL_NAME)): Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Non-Roman Name: [ اَلْجَمَاهِيرِيَّة اَلْعَرَبِيَّة اَللِّيبِيَّة اَلشَّعْبِيَّة اَلإِشْتِرَاكِيَّة ](name.php?uni=6485614&fid=3784&c=libya ) Primary Country Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#CC1)): LY ( [Libya](https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/libya/index.html)) First-order administrative division code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#ADM1)): 00 (Libya (general) ) Region Font Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#RC)): 3 (Africa/Middle East) Unique Feature Identifier ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#UFI)): -3169384 Unique Name Identifier ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#UNI)): 9093369 Latitude in decimal degrees ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#LAT)): 25 Longitude in decimal degrees ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#LONG)): 17 Latitude in degrees, minutes, and seconds ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#DMS_LAT)): 25° 00' 00" N Longitude in degrees, minutes, and seconds ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#DMS_LONG)): 17° 00' 00" E Military Grid Reference System coordinates ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#MGRS)): 33RYH0184666437 Joint Operations Graphic reference ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#JOG)): NG33-12 Feature Classification ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#FC)): A (Administrative region type feature) Feature Designation Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#DSG)): PCLI (independent political entity) Populated Place Classification ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#PC)): No data Second-order administrative division code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#ADM2)): No data Population Figures ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#POP)): No data Elevations ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#ELEV)): No data Secondary Country Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#CC2)): No data Name Type ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#NT)): C (Conventional name) Language Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#LC)): eng (English) Substitute for full name ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#SHORT_FORM)): Libya Descriptive part of the full name ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#GENERIC)): No data A form of the full name that allows for alphabetical sorting of the file into gazetteer sequence ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#SORT_NAME)): GREATSOCIALISTPEOPLESLIBYANARABJAMAHIRIYA Full Name with QWERTY characters ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#FULL_NAME_ND)): Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Modify Date ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#MODIFY_DATE)): 2007-02-28 NOTE: The information regarding Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Libya on this page is published from the data supplied by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a member of the Intelligence community of the United States of America, and a Department of Defense (DoD) Combat Support Agency. No claims are made regarding the accuracy of Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya information contained here. All suggestions for corrections of any errors about Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya should be addressed to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Libië

http://www.geographic.org/geographic_names/name.php?uni=6485614&fid=3784&c=libya

This page presents the geographical name data for اَلْجَمَاهِيرِيَّة اَلْعَرَبِيَّة اَللِّيبِيَّة اَلشَّعْبِيَّة اَلإِشْتِرَاكِيَّة in Libya, as supplied by the US military intelligence in electronic format, including the geographic coordinates and place name in various forms, latin, roman and native characters, and its location in its respective country's administrative division Full Name ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#FULL_NAME)): اَلْجَمَاهِيرِيَّة اَلْعَرَبِيَّة اَللِّيبِيَّة اَلشَّعْبِيَّة اَلإِشْتِرَاكِيَّة Roman Name: [ Libyan Jamahiriyah ](name.php?uni=-4474980&fid=3750&c=libya ) Primary Country Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#CC1)): LY ( [Libya](https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/libya/index.html)) First-order administrative division code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#ADM1)): 00 (Libya (general) ) Region Font Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#RC)): 3 (Africa/Middle East) Unique Feature Identifier ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#UFI)): -3169384 Unique Name Identifier ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#UNI)): 6485614 Latitude in decimal degrees ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#LAT)): 25 Longitude in decimal degrees ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#LONG)): 17 Latitude in degrees, minutes, and seconds ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#DMS_LAT)): 25° 00' 00" N Longitude in degrees, minutes, and seconds ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#DMS_LONG)): 17° 00' 00" E Military Grid Reference System coordinates ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#MGRS)): 33RYH0184666437 Joint Operations Graphic reference ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#JOG)): NG33-12 Feature Classification ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#FC)): A (Administrative region type feature) Feature Designation Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#DSG)): PCLI (independent political entity) Populated Place Classification ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#PC)): No data Second-order administrative division code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#ADM2)): No data Population Figures ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#POP)): No data Elevations ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#ELEV)): No data Secondary Country Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#CC2)): No data Name Type ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#NT)): NS (BGN Standard name in non-Roman script ) Language Code ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#LC)): ara (Arabic) Substitute for full name ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#SHORT_FORM)): No data Descriptive part of the full name ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#GENERIC)): No data A form of the full name that allows for alphabetical sorting of the file into gazetteer sequence ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#SORT_NAME)): الجماهيريةالعربيةالليبيةالشعبيةالإشتراكية Full Name with QWERTY characters ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#FULL_NAME_ND)): الجماهيرية العربية الليبية الشعبية الإشتراكية Modify Date ( [see definition](https://geographic.org/geographic_names/definitions.html#MODIFY_DATE)): 2007-02-28 NOTE: The information regarding اَلْجَمَاهِيرِيَّة اَلْعَرَبِيَّة اَللِّيبِيَّة اَلشَّعْبِيَّة اَلإِشْتِرَاكِيَّة in Libya on this page is published from the data supplied by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a member of the Intelligence community of the United States of America, and a Department of Defense (DoD) Combat Support Agency. No claims are made regarding the accuracy of اَلْجَمَاهِيرِيَّة اَلْعَرَبِيَّة اَللِّيبِيَّة اَلشَّعْبِيَّة اَلإِشْتِرَاكِيَّة information contained here. All suggestions for corrections of any errors about اَلْجَمَاهِيرِيَّة اَلْعَرَبِيَّة اَللِّيبِيَّة اَلشَّعْبِيَّة اَلإِشْتِرَاكِيَّة should be addressed to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Libië

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/herod-libya1.html

In the accounts here, Herodotus describes thepeoples and geography of North Africa west of Egypt - much further west than the current boundaries of modern Libya. These texts aslo form part of a larger file on [North Africa/Mauretania](anc-nafrica.asp) in ancient sources. Book IV.42-43 For my part I am astonished that men should ever have divided Libya, Asia, and Europe as they have, for they are exceedingly unequal. Europe extends the entire length of the other two, and for breadth will not even (as I think) bear to be compared to them. As for Libya, we know it to be washed on all sides by the sea, except where it is attached to Asia. This discovery was first made by Necos, the Egyptian king, who on desisting from the canal which he had begun between the Nile and the Arabian gulf [i.e., the Red Sea], sent to sea a number of ships manned by Phoenicians, with orders to make for the Pillars of Hercules, and return to Egypt through them, and by the Mediterranean. The Phoenicians took their departure from Egypt by way of the Erythraean sea, and so sailed into the southern ocean. When autumn came, they went ashore, wherever they might happen to be, and having sown a tract of land with corn, waited until the grain was fit to cut. Having reaped it, they again set sail; and thus it came to pass that two whole years went by, and it was not till the third year that they doubled the Pillars of Hercules, and made good their voyage home. On their return, they declared - I for my part do not believe them, but perhaps others may - that in sailing round Libya they had the sun upon their right hand. In this way was the extent of Libya first discovered. Next to these Phoenicians the Carthaginians, according to their own accounts, made the voyage. For Sataspes, son of Teaspes the Achaemenian, did not circumnavigate Libya, though he was sent to do so; but, fearing the length and desolateness of the journey, he turned back and left unaccomplished the task which had been set him by his mother. This man had used violence towards a maiden, the daughter of Zopyrus, son of Megabyzus, and King Xerxes was about to impale him for the offence, when his mother, who was a sister of Darius, begged him off, undertaking to punish his crime more heavily than the king himself had designed. She would force him, she said, to sail round Libya and return to Egypt by the Arabian gulf. Xerxes gave his consent; and Sataspes went down to Egypt, and there got a ship and crew, with which he set sail for the Pillars of Hercules. Having passed the Straits, he doubled the Libyan headland, known as Cape Soloeis, and proceeded southward. Following this course for many months over a vast stretch of sea, and finding that more water than he had crossed still lay ever before him, he put about, and came back to Egypt. Thence proceeding to the court, he made report to Xerxes, that at the farthest point to which he had reached, the coast was occupied by a dwarfish race, who wore a dress made from the palm tree. These people, whenever he landed, left their towns and fled away to the mountains; his men, however, did them no wrong, only entering into their cities and taking some of their cattle. The reason why he had not sailed quite round Libya was, he said, because the ship stopped, and would no go any further. Xerxes, however, did not accept this account for true; and so Sataspes, as he had failed to accomplish the task set him, was impaled by the king's orders in accordance with the former sentence. Book IV.168-198 The Libyans dwell in the order which I will now describe. Beginning on the side of Egypt, the first Libyans are the Adyrmachidae. These people have, in most points, the same customs as the Egyptians, but use the costume of the Libyans. Their women wear on each leg a ring made of bronze; they let their hair grow long, and when they catch any vermin on their persons, bite it and throw it away. In this they differ from all the other Libyans. They are also the only tribe with whom the custom obtains of bringing all women about to become brides before the king, that he may choose such as are agreeable to him. The Adyrmachidae extend from the borders of Egypt to the harbor called Port Plynus. Next to the Adyrmachidae are the Gilligammae, who inhabit the country westward as far as the island of Aphrodisias. Off this tract is the island of Platea, which the Cyrenaeans colonized. Here too, upon the mainland, are Port Menelaus, and Aziris, where the Cyrenaeans once lived. The Silphium begins to grow in this region, extending from the island of Platea on the one side to the mouth of the Syrtis on the other. The customs of the Gilligammae are like those of the rest of their countrymen. The Asbystae adjoin the Gilligammae upon the west. They inhabit the regions above Cyrene, but do not reach to the coast, which belongs to the Cyrenaeans. Four-horse chariots are in more common use among them than among any other Libyans. In most of their customs they ape the manners of the Cyrenaeans. Westward of the Asbystae dwell the Auschisae, who possess the country above Barca, reaching, however, to the sea at the place called Euesperides. In the middle of their territory is the little tribe of the Cabalians, which touches the coast near Tauchira, a city of the Barcaeans. Their customs are like those of the Libyans above Cyrene. The Nasamonians, a numerous people, are the western neighbors of the Auschisae. In summer they leave their flocks and herds upon the sea-shore, and go up the country to a place called Augila, where they gather the dates from the palms, which in those parts grow thickly, and are of great size, all of them being of the fruit-bearing kind. They also chase the locusts, and, when caught, dry them in the sun, after which they grind them to powder, and, sprinkling this upon their milk, so drink it. Each man among them has several wives, in their intercourse with whom they resemble the Massagetae. The following are their customs in the swearing of oaths and the practice of augury. The man, as he swears, lays his hand upon the tomb of some one considered to have been pre-eminently just and good, and so doing swears by his name. For divination they betake themselves to the sepulchers of their own ancestors, and, after praying, lie down to sleep upon their graves; by the dreams which then come to them they guide their conduct. When they pledge their faith to one another, each gives the other to drink out of his hand; if there be no liquid to be had, they take up dust from the ground, and put their tongues to it. On the country of the Nasamonians borders that of the Psylli, who were swept away under the following circumstances. The south-wind had blown for a long time and dried up all the tanks in which their water was stored. Now the whole region within the Syrtis is utterly devoid of springs. Accordingly the Psylli took counsel among themselves, and by common consent made war upon the southwind---so at least the Libyans say, I do but repeat their words---they went forth and reached the desert; but there the south-wind rose and buried them under heaps of sand: whereupon, the Psylli being destroyed, their lands passed to the Nasamonians. Above the Nasamonians, towards the south, in the district where the wild beasts abound, dwell the Garamantians, who avoid all society or intercourse with their fellow-men, have no weapon of war, and do not know how to defend themselves. These border the Nasamonians on the south: westward along the sea-shore their neighbors are the Macea, who, by letting the locks about the crown of their head grow long, while they clip them close everywhere else, make their hair resemble a crest. In war these people use the skins of ostriches for shields. The river Cinyps rises among them from the height called "the Hill of the Graces," and runs from thence through their country to the sea. The Hill of the Graces is thickly covered with wood, and is thus very unlike the rest of Libya, which is bare. It is distant two hundred furlongs from the sea. Adjoining the Macae are the Gindanes, whose women wear on their legs anklets of leather. Each lover that a woman has gives her one; and she who can show the most is the best esteemed, as she appears to have been loved by the greatest number of men. A promontory jutting out into the sea from the country of the Gindanes is inhabited by the Lotophagi, who live entirely on the fruit of the lotus-tree. The lotus fruit is about the size of the lentisk berry, and in sweetness resembles the date. The Lotophagi even succeed in obtaining from it a sort of wine. The sea-coast beyond the Lotophagi is occupied by the Machlyans, who use the lotus to some extent, though not so much as the people of whom we last spoke. The Machlyans reach as far as the great river called the Triton, which empties itself into the great lake Tritonis. Here, in this lake, is an island called Phla, which it is said the Lacedaemonians were to have colonized, according to an oracle. The following is the story as it is commonly told. When Jason had finished building the Argo at the foot of Mount Pelion, he took on board the usual hecatomb, and moreover a brazen tripod. Thus equipped, he set sail, intending to coast round the Peloponnese, and so to reach Delphi. The voyage was prosperous as far as Malea; but at that point a gale of wind from the north came on suddenly, and carried him out of his course to the coast of Libya; where, before he discovered the land, he got among the shallows of Lake Tritonis. As he was turning it in his mind how he should find his way out, Triton (they say) appeared to him, and offered to show him the channel, and secure him a safe retreat, if he would give him the tripod. Jason complying, was shown by Triton the passage through the shallows; after which the god took the tripod, and, carrying it to his own temple, seated himself upon it, and, filled with prophetic fury, delivered to Jason and his companions a long prediction. "When a descendant," he said, "of one of the Argo's crew should seize and carry off the brazen tripod, then by inevitable fate would a hundred Grecian cities be built around Lake Tritonis." The Libyans of that region, when they heard the words of this prophecy, took away the tripod and hid it. The next tribe beyond the Machlyans is the tribe of the Auseans. Both these nations inhabit the borders of Lake Tritonis, being separated from one another by the river Triton. Both also wear their hair long, but the Machlyans let it grow at the back of the head, while the Auseans have it long in front. The Ausean maidens keep year by year a feast in honor of Minerva, whereat their custom is to draw up in two bodies, and fight with stones and clubs. They say that these are rites which have come down to them from their fathers, and that they honor with them their native goddess, who is the same as the Minerva (Athena) of the Grecians. If any of the maidens die of the wounds they receive, the Auseans declare that such are false maidens. Before the fight is suffered to begin, they have another ceremony. One of the virgins, the loveliest of the number, is selected from the rest; a Corinthian helmet and a complete suit of Greek armor are publicly put upon her; and, thus adorned, she is made to mount into a chariot, and led around the whole lake in a procession. What arms they used for the adornment of their damsels before the Greeks came to live in their country, I cannot say. I imagine they dressed them in Egyptian armor, for I maintain that both the shield and the helmet came into Greece from Egypt. The Auseans declare that Minerva is the daughter of Neptune and the Lake Tritonis---they say she quarreled with her father, and applied to Jupiter, who consented to let her be his child; and so she became his adopted daughter. These people do not marry or live in families, but dwell together like the gregarious beasts. When their children are full-grown, they are brought before the assembly of the men, which is held every third month, and assigned to those whom they most resemble. Such are the tribes of wandering Libyans dwelling upon the sea-coast. Above them inland is the wild-beast tract: and beyond that, a ridge of sand, reaching from Egyptian Thebes to the Pillars of Hercules. Throughout this ridge, at the distance of about ten days' journey from one another, heaps of salt in large lumps lie upon hills. At the top of every hill there gushes forth from the middle of the salt a stream of water, which is both cold and sweet. Around dwell men who are the last inhabitants of Libya on the side of the desert, living, as they do, more inland than the wild-beast district. Of these nations the first is that of the Ammonians, who dwell at a distance of ten days' from Thebes [Waset], and have a temple derived from that of the Theban Jupiter. For at Thebes likewise, as I mentioned above, the image of Jupiter has a face like that of a ram. The Ammonians have another spring besides that which rises from the salt. The water of this stream is lukewarm at early dawn; at the time when the market fills it is much cooler; by noon it has grown quite cold; at this time, therefore, they water their gardens. As the afternoon advances the coldness goes off, till, about sunset, the water is once more lukewarm; still the heat increases, and at midnight it boils furiously. After this time it again begins to cool, and grows less and less hot till morning comes. This spring is called "the Fountain of the Sun." Next to the Ammonians, at the distance of ten days' journey along the ridge of sand, there is a second salt-hill like the Ammonian, and a second spring. The country round is inhabited, and the place bears the name of Augila. Hither it is that the Nasamonians come to gather in the dates. Ten days' journey from Augila there is again a salt-hill and a spring; palms of the fruitful kind grow here abundantly, as they do also at the other salt-hills. This region is inhabited by a nation called the Garamantians, a very powerful people, who cover the salt with mold, and then sow their crops. From thence is the shortest road to the Lutophagi, a journey of thirty days. In the Garamantian country are found the oxen which, as they graze, walk backwards. This they do because their horns curve outwards in front of their heads, so that it is not possible for them when grazing to move forwards, since in that case their horns would become fixed in the ground. Only herein do they differ from other oxen, and further in the thickness and hardness of their hides. The Garamantians have four-horse chariots, in which they chase the Troglodyte Ethiopians, who of all the nations whereof any account has reached our ears are by far the swiftest of foot. The Troglodytes feed on serpents, lizards, and other similar reptiles. Their language is unlike that of any other people; it sounds like the screeching of bats. At the distance of ten days' journey from the Garamantians there is again another salt-hill and spring of water; around which dwell a people, called the Atarantians, who alone of all known nations are destitute of names. The title of Atarantians is borne by the whole race in common; but the men have no particular names of their own. The Atarantians, when the sun rises high in the heaven, curse him, and load him with reproaches, because (they say) he burns and wastes both their country and themselves. Once more at the distance of ten days' there is a salt-hill, a spring, and an inhabited tract. Near the salt is a mountain called Atlas, very taper and round; so lofty, moreover, that the top (it is said) cannot be seen, the clouds never quitting it either summer or winter. The natives call this mountain "the Pillar of Heaven"; and they themselves take their name from it, being called Atlantes. They are reported not to eat any living thing, and never to have any dreams. As far as the Atlantes the names of the nations inhabiting the sandy ridge are known to me; but beyond them my knowledge fails. The ridge itself extends as far as the Pillars of Hercules, and even further than these; and throughout the whole distance, at the end of every ten days' there is a salt-mine, with people dwelling round it who all of them build their houses with blocks of the salt. No rain falls in these parts of Libya; if it were otherwise, the walls of these houses could not stand. The salt quarried is of two colors, white and purple. Beyond the ridge, southwards, in the direction of the interior, the country is a desert, with no springs, no beasts, no rain, no wood, and altogether destitute of moisture. Thus from Egypt as far as Lake Tritonis Libya is inhabited by wandering tribes, whose drink is milk and their food the flesh of animals. Cow's flesh, however, none of these tribes ever taste, but abstain from it for the same reason as the Egyptians, neither do they any of them breed swine. Even at Cyrene, the women think it wrong to eat the flesh of the cow, honoring in this Isis, the Egyptian goddess, whom they worship both with fasts and festivals. The Barcaean women abstain, not from cow's flesh only, but also from the flesh of swine. West of Lake Tritonis the Libyans are no longer wanderers, nor do they practice the same customs as the wandering people, or treat their children in the same way. For the wandering Libyans, many of them at any rate, if not all---concerning which I cannot speak with certainty---when their children come to the age of four years, burn the veins at the top of their heads with a flock from the fleece of a sheep: others burn the veins about the temples. This they do to prevent them from being plagued in their after lives by a flow of rheum from the head; and such they declare is the reason why they are so much more healthy than other men. Certainly the Libyans are the healthiest men that I know; but whether this is what makes them so, or not, I cannot positively say---the healthiest certainly they are. If when the children are being burnt convulsions come on, there is a remedy of which they have made discovery. It is to sprinkle goat's water upon the child, who thus treated, is sure to recover. In all this I only repeat what is said by the Libyans. The rites which the wandering Libyans use in sacrificing are the following. They begin with the ear of the victim, which they cut off and throw over their house: this done, they kill the animal by twisting the neck. They sacrifice to the Sun and Moon, but not to any other god. This worship is common to all the Libyans. The inhabitants of the parts about Lake Tritonis worship in addition Triton, Neptune, and Minerva, the last especially. The dress wherewith Minerva's statues are adorned, and her Aegis, were derived by the Greeks from the women of Libya. For, except that the garments of the Libyan women are of leather, and their fringes made of leathern thongs instead of serpents, in all else the dress of both is exactly alike. The name too itself shows that the mode of dressing the Pallas-statues came from Libya. For the Libyan women wear over their dress stripped of the hair, fringed at their edges, and colored with vermilion; and from these goat-skins the Greeks get their word Aegis (goat-harness). I think for my part that the loud cries uttered in our sacred rites came also from thence; for the Libyan women are greatly given to such cries and utter them very sweetly. Likewise the Greeks learnt from the Libyans to yoke four horses to a chariot. All the wandering tribes bury their dead according to the fashion of the Greeks, except the Nasamonians. They bury them sitting, and are right careful when the sick man is at the point of giving up the ghost, to make him sit and not let him die lying down. The dwellings of these people are made of the stems of the asphodel, and of rushes wattled together. They can be carried from place to place. Such are the customs of the afore-mentioned tribes. Westward of the river Triton and adjoining upon the Auseans, are other Libyans who till the ground, and live in houses: these people are named the Maxyans. They let the hair grow long on the right side of their heads, and shave it close on the left; they besmear their bodies with red paint; and they say that they are descended from the men of Troy. Their country and the remainder of Libya towards the west is far fuller of wild beasts and of wood than the country of the wandering people. For the eastern side of Libya, where the wanderers dwell, is low and sandy, as far as the river Triton; but westward of that the land of the husbandmen is very hilly, and abounds with forests and wild beasts. For this is the tract in which the huge serpents are found, and the lions, the elephants, the bears, the aspics, and the horned asses. Here too are the dog-faced creatures, and the creatures without heads, whom the Libyans declare to have their eyes in their breasts; and also the wild men, and wild women, and many other far less fabulous beasts. Among the wanderers are none of these, but quite other animals; as antelopes, gazelles, buffaloes, and asses, not of the horned sort, but of a kind which does not need to drink; also oryxes, whose horns are used for the curved sides of citherns, and whose size is about that of the ox; foxes, hyaenas porcupines, wild rams, dictyes, jackals, panthers, boryes, land-crocodiles about three cubits in length, very like lizards, ostriches, and little snakes, each with a single horn. All these animals are found here, and likewise those belonging to other countries, except the stag and the wild boar; but neither stag nor wild-boar are found in any part of Libya. There are, however, three sorts of mice in these parts; the first are called two-footed; the next, zegeries, which is a Libyan word meaning "hills"; and the third, urchins. Weasels also are found in the Silphium region, much like the Tartessian. So many, therefore, are the animals belonging to the land of the wandering Libyans, in so far at least as my researches have been able to reach. Next to the Maxyan Libyans are the Zavecians, whose wives drive their chariots to battle. On them border the Gyzantians; in whose country a vast deal of honey is made by bees; very much more, however, by the skill of men. The people all paint themselves red, and eat monkeys, whereof there is inexhaustible store in the hills. Off their coast, as the Carthaginians report, lies an island, by name Cyraunis, the length of which is two hundred furlongs, its breadth not great, and which is soon reached from the mainland. Vines and olive trees cover the whole of it, and there is in the island a lake, from which the young maidens of the country draw up gold-dust, by dipping into the mud birds' feathers smeared with pitch. If this be true, I know not; I but write what is said. It may be even so, however; since I myself have seen pitch drawn up out of the water from a lake in Zacynthus. At the place I speak of there are a number of lakes; but one is larger than the rest, being seventy feet every way, and two fathoms in depth. Here they let down a pole into the water, with a bunch of myrtle tied to one end, and when they raise it again, there is pitch sticking to the myrtle, which in smell is like to bitumen, but in all else is better than the pitch of Pieria. This they pour into a trench dug by the lake's side; and when a good deal has thus been got together, they draw it off and put it up in jars. Whatever falls into the lake passes underground, and comes up in the sea, which is no less than four furlongs distant. So then what is said of the island off the Libyan coast is not without likelihood. The Carthaginians also relate the following: There is a country in Libya, and a nation, beyond the Pillars of Hercules, which they are wont to visit, where they no sooner arrive but forthwith they unlade their wares, and, having disposed them after an orderly fashion along the beach, leave them, and, returning aboard their ships, raise a great smoke. The natives, when they see the smoke, come down to the shore, and, laying out to view so much gold as they think the worth of the wares, withdraw to a distance. The Carthaginians upon this come ashore and look. If they think the gold enough, they take it and go their way; but if it does not seem to them sufficient, they go aboard ship once more, and wait patiently. Then the others approach and add to their gold, till the Carthaginians are content. Neither party deals unfairly by the other: for they themselves never touch the gold till it comes up to the worth of their goods, nor do the natives ever carry off the goods till the gold is taken away. These be the Libyan tribes whereof I am able to give the names; and most of these cared little then, and indeed care little now, for the king of the Medes. One thing more also I can add concerning this region, namely, that, so far as our knowledge reaches, four nations, and no more, inhabit it; and two of these nations are indigenous, while two are not. The two indigenous are the Libyans and Ethiopians, who dwell respectively in the north and the south of Libya. The Phoenicians and the Greek are in-comers. It seems to me that Libya is not to compare for goodness of soil with either Asia or Europe, except the Cinyps region, which is named after the river that waters it. This piece of land is equal to any country in the world for cereal crops, and is in nothing like the rest of Libya. For the soil here is black, and springs of water abound; so that there is nothing to fear from drought; nor do heavy rains (and it rains in that part of Libya) do any harm when they soak the ground. The returns of the harvest come up to the measure which prevails in Babylonia. The soil is likewise good in the country of the Euesperites; for there the land brings forth in the best years a hundred-fold. But the Cinyps region yields three hundred-fold. The country of the Cyrenaeans, which is the highest tract within the part of Libya inhabited by the wandering tribes, has three seasons that deserve remark. First the crops along the sea-coast begin to ripen, and are ready for the harvest and the vintage; after they have been gathered in, the crops of the middle tract above the coast region (the hill-country, as they call it) need harvesting; while about the time when this middle crop is housed, the fruits ripen and are fit for cutting in the highest tract of all. So that the produce of the first tract has been all eaten and drunk by the time that the last harvest comes in. And the harvest-time of the Cyrenaeans continues thus for eight full months. So much concerning these matters.

Libië

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1398437.stm

Libya profile - Timeline - Published A chronology of key events: 7th century BC - Phoenicians settle in Tripolitania in western Libya, which was hitherto populated by Berbers. 6th century BC - Carthage conquers Tripolitania. 4th century BC - Greeks colonise Cyrenaica in the east of the country, which they call Libya. 74 BC - Romans conquer Libya. AD 643 - Arabs under Amr Ibn al-As conquer Libya and spread Islam. 16th century - Libya becomes part of the Ottoman Empire, which joins the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan into one regency in Tripoli. Italian rule 1911-12 - Italy seizes Libya from the Ottomans. Omar al-Mukhtar begins 20-year insurgency against Italian rule. 1920s - Libyan resistance grows as Senussi dynasty joins in alongside the Mukhtar campaign. 1931 - Italy breaks resistance through combination of major armed operations and concentration camps for rebel population. Al-Mukhtar is captured and executed. 1934 - Italy unites the provinces as the colony of Libya and steps up Italian migration as part of an eventual plan for the incorporation of Libya into a Greater Italy. 1942 - Allies oust Italians from Libya, which is then divided between the French, who administer Fezzan, and the British, who control Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. 1951 - Libya becomes independent under King Idris al-Sanusi. 1956 - Libya grants two American oil companies a concession of some 14 million acres. 1961 - King Idris opens a 104-mile pipeline, which links important oil fields in the interior to the Mediterranean Sea and makes it possible to export Libyan oil for the first time. The Gaddafi era 1969 - King Idris deposed in military coup led by Col Muammar Gaddafi, who pursues a pan-Arab agenda by attempting to form mergers with several Arab countries, and introduces state socialism by nationalising most economic activity, including the oil industry. 1970 - Libya orders the closure of a British airbase in Tobruk and the giant US Wheelus air force base in Tripoli; property belonging to Italian settlers nationalised. 1971 - National referendum approves proposed Federation of Arab Republics (FAR) comprising Libya, Egypt and Syria. However, the FAR never takes off. 1973 - Col Gaddafi declares a "cultural revolution", which includes the formation of "people's committees" in schools, hospitals, universities, workplaces and administrative districts; Libyan forces occupy Aozou Strip in northern Chad. 1977 - Col Gaddafi declares a "people's revolution", changing the country's official name from the Libyan Arab Republic to the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah and setting up "revolutionary committees" - heralding the start of institutionalised chaos, economic decline and general arbitrariness. 1980 - Libyan troops intervene in civil war in northern Chad. Confrontation with the US 1981 - US shoots down two Libyan aircraft which challenged its warplanes over the Gulf of Sirte, claimed by Libya as its territorial water. 1984 - UK breaks off diplomatic relations with Libya after a British policewoman is shot dead outside the Libyan embassy in London while anti-Gaddafi protests were taking place. 1986 - US bombs Libyan military facilities, residential areas of Tripoli and Benghazi, killing 101 people, and Gaddafi's house, killing his adopted daughter. US says raids were in response to alleged Libyan involvement in bombing of Berlin disco frequented by US military personnel. Lockerbie plane bombing 1988 December - Lockerbie bombing - an airliner is blown up over the Scottish town of Lockerbie, allegedly by Libyan agents. 1989 - Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia form the Arab Maghreb Union. 1992 - UN imposes sanctions on Libya in an effort to force it to hand over for trial two of its citizens suspected of involvement in the Lockerbie bombing. 1994 - Libya returns the Aozou Strip to Chad. 1995 - Gaddafi expels some 30,000 Palestinians in protest at the Oslo accords between the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Israel. 1999 - Lockerbie suspects handed over for trial in the Netherlands under Scottish law; UN sanctions suspended; diplomatic relations with UK restored. 2000 September - Dozens of African immigrants are killed by Libyan mobs in the west of Libya who were said to be angry at the large number of African labourers coming into the country. Lockerbie sentence 2001 31 January- Special Scottish court in the Netherlands finds one of the two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing, Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi, guilty and sentences him to life imprisonment. Megrahi's co-accused, Al-Amin Khalifa Fahimah, is found not guilty and freed. 2001 May - Libyan troops help to quell a coup attempt against President Ange-Felix Patasse of the Central African Republic. 2002 January - Libya and the US say they have held talks to mend relations after years of hostility over what the Americans termed Libya's sponsorship of terrorism. 2002 14 March - The Libyan man found guilty of the Lockerbie bombing, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, loses his appeal against the conviction and begins a life sentence of at least 20 years. Compensation 2003 January - Libya is elected chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission despite opposition from the US and human rights groups. 2003 August - Libya signs a deal worth $2.7bn to compensate families of the Lockerbie bombing victims. Libya takes responsibility for the bombing in a letter to the UN Security Council. 2003 September - UN Security Council votes to lift sanctions. 2003 December - Libya says will abandon programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction. 2004 January - Libya agrees to compensate families of victims of 1989 bombing of French passenger aircraft over Sahara. 2004 March - British Prime Minister Tony Blair visits, the first such visit since 1943. Return to respectability 2004 May - Five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor are sentenced to death having been accused of deliberately infecting some 400 children with HIV. They are eventually freed under a deal with the EU. 2004 August - Libya agrees to pay $35m to compensate victims of the bombing of a Berlin nightclub in 1986. 2005 January - Libya's first auction of oil and gas exploration licences heralds the return of US energy companies for the first time in more than 20 years. 2006 February - At least 10 people are killed in clashes with police in Benghazi, part of a wave of international protests by Muslims who are angered by a Danish newspaper's cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad. 2006 May - The US says it is restoring full diplomatic ties with Libya. 2008 January - Libya takes over one-month rotating presidency of the UN Security Council in a step back to respectability after decades as a pariah of the West. 2008 August - Libya and US sign agreement committing each side to compensate all victims of bombing attacks on the other's citizens. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi apologises to Libya for damage inflicted by Italy during the colonial era and signs a five billion dollar investment deal by way of compensation. 2008 September - US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice makes historic visit - the highest-level US visit to Libya since 1953. Ms Rice says relations between the US and Libya have entered a "new phase". 2009 February - Gaddafi elected chairman of the African Union by leaders meeting in Ethiopia. Sets out ambition of "United States of Africa" even embracing the Caribbean. 2009 June - Gaddafi pays first state visit to Italy, Libya's former colonial ruler and now its main trading partner. Al-Megrahi released 2009 August - Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi is freed from gaol in Scotland on compassionate grounds and returned to Libya. His release and return to a hero's welcome causes a storm of controversy. 2010 January - Russia agrees to sell Libya weapons in a deal worth $1.8bn. The deal is thought to include fighter jets, tanks and air defence systems. 2010 June - UN refugee agency UNHCR expelled. BP confirms it is about to begin drilling off Libyan coast. 2010 October - European Union and Libya sign agreement designed to slow illegal migration. Anti-Gaddafi uprising 2011 February - Inspired by revolts in other Arab countries, especially neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia, violent protests break out in Benghazi, spread to other cities, leading to escalating clashes between security forces and anti-Gaddafi rebels. 2011 March - UN Security Council authorises a no-fly zone over Libya and air strikes to protect civilians, over which NATO assumes command. Libyan rebels initially capture territory but are then forced back by better-armed pro-Gaddafi forces. 2011 July - The international Contact Group on Libya formally recognises the main opposition group, the National Transitional Council (NTC), as the legitimate government of Libya. 2011 August - Col Gaddafi goes into hiding after rebels swarm into his fortress compound in Tripoli. 2011 August-September - African Union joins 60 countries which have recognised the NTC as the new Libyan authority. 2011 20 October - Col Gaddafi is captured and killed as rebel fighters take his hometown Sirte. Three days later, the NTC declares Libya to be officially "liberated" and announces plans to hold elections within eight months. 2011 November - Saif al-Islam, the fugitive son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, is captured, becoming the last key Gaddafi family member to be seized or killed. 2012 January-March - Clashes erupt between former rebel forces in Benghazi in sign of discontent with the NTC. Benghazi-based NTC officials campaign to re-establish autonomy for the region, further increasing tension with the NTC in Tripoli. 2012 August - Transitional government hands power to the General National Congress, which was elected in July. Benghazi attack 2012 September - US ambassador and three other Americans are killed when Islamist militants, including Ansar al-Sharia, storm the consulate in Benghazi. 2013 August - Petroleum Facilities Guard militia begins blockade of oil export terminals. Civil war 2014 February - Protests erupt in response to the General National Congress refusal to disband after mandate expires. 2014 April - Petroleum Facilities Guard militia lifts closure of two oil terminals. 2014 May - "Libyan National Army" renegade general Khalifa Haftar launches military assault including airstrikes against militant Islamist groups in Benghazi; tries to seize parliament building, accusing Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteg of being in thrall to Islamist groups. 2014 June - Prime Minister Maiteg resigns after supreme court rules his appointment illegal. New parliament chosen in elections marred by a low turn-out attributed to security fears and boycotts; Islamists suffer heavy defeat. Fighting breaks out between forces loyal to outgoing GNC and new parliament. 2014 July - UN staff pull out, embassies shut, foreigners evacuated as security situation deteriorates. Tripoli international airport is largely destroyed by fighting. Ansar al-Sharia seizes control of most of Benghazi. Islamic State intervenes 2014 October - UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits to continue UN-brokered talks between the new parliament and government based in Tobruk and Islamist Libya Dawn militias holding Tripoli. UN says 100,000s displaced by clashes. Islamic State extremist militia seizes control of port of Derna in eastern Libya. 2015 January - Libyan army and Tripoli-based militia alliance declare partial ceasefire after UN-sponsored talks in Geneva. 2015 February - Egyptian jets bomb Islamic State targets in Derna, a day after the group there released a video showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians. Libyan Army offensive to retake Derna in March fails to dislodge the group. IS establishes control over port-city of Sirte, halfway along coast between Tripoli and Benghazi. 2015 July - A Tripoli court sentences Gaddafi's sons Saif al-Islam and eight other former officials to death for crimes committed during the 2011 uprising against his father. He is later freed by an armed group. 2016 January - UN announces new, Tunisia-based interim government, but neither Tobruk nor Tripoli parliaments agree to recognise its authority. Islamic State group attacks Ras Lanuf oil terminal, threatens to move on to Brega and Tobruk. Rise of General Haftar 2016 March - New UN-backed Government of National Accord arrives in Tripoli by boat after opposing forces block airspace. 2016 April - UN staff return to Tripoli after absence of nearly two years. 2016 September - Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar seizes key oil export terminals in the east. 2016 December - Pro-government forces oust Islamic State militants from coastal town of Sirte, which they had seized 18 months previously. 2017 July - Islamic State group ejected from Benghazi after three years of fighting. 2018 July - Khalifa Haftar claims that his forces are fully in control of Derna, the last Islamist stronghold in the east and the only city in the region hitherto outside his control. 2019 April - The Haftar Libyan National Army advances on Tripoli, sparking clashes with the forces of the internationally-recognised Government of National Accord. 2020 June - UN-backed government drives Haftar forces out of Tarhouna, their last stronghold in the west of the country near Tripoli. 2021 March - Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh takes over as prime minister of the UN-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli.

Libië

http://www.bartleby.com/65/qa/Qaddafi.html

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Get your first week for just 4.99!* [Try Bartleby Learn](/account/registration) Millions of textbooks solutions FIND STEP-BY-STEP EXPLANATIONS TO YOUR COURSEWORK Chapter 14.1, Problem 1cT: Suppose that a single change were made to the apparatus (keeping the distance between the mask and the screen fixed), resulting in the new pattern shown. 1. Are the angles to the interference maxima in the new pattern greater than, less than, or equal to those in the original pattern? Explain how you can tell from the photographs. 2. If the wavelength of light () was the only quantity changed, determine (i) whether was increased or decreased, and (iii) whether it was changed by a factor that was greater than, less than, or equal to 2. Explain how you can use your results from parts A and B to justify your answer. 3. If the slit separation (d) was the only quantity changed, determine (i) whether d was increased or decreased, and (ii) whether it was changed by a factor that was greater than, less than, or equal to 2. Explain how you can use your results from parts A and B to justify your answer. Chapter 12.1, Problem 4cT: A syringe is used to remove some water from the left side of the U-tube. The water level on the left side is seen to be lowered, butthe water level on the right does not change. Consider the following student dialogue: Student 1: "The pressure at point F must now be higher than atmospheric pressure because the water there is being pushed up against the stopper." Student 2: "I think that the pressure at point E must be the same as at point A because they are at the same level. These points are both at atmospheric pressure. So the pressure at point F is lower than atmospheric pressure because know that pressure gets less as you go up." Student 3: "But water is more dense than air so the pressure at F cannot be less than atmospheric pressure." With which student(s), if any, do you agree? Chapter 1.2, Problem 1jT: Description of Motion: Initially move away from the detector; maintain a constant negative acceleration. Chapter 1.2, Problem 1hT: Description of Motion: Move toward the detector with decreasing speed, then just as you have come to rest, move away, from the detector with increasing speed. Chapter 23.2, Problem 4TH: The figure at right has several errors. How many can you find? Explain briefly. Chapter 3, Problem 3.37P: Determine the magnitude and location of the resultant for the load system shown. Chapter 5, Problem 5.1P: through 5.7 Calculate the forces in all members of the trusses shown, using the method of joints. Chapter 5, Problem 5.6P: Calculate the forces in all members of the trusses shown, using the method of joints. Chapter 7, Problem 7.1P: A cylindrical cast-iron casting has an axial bole extending partway through the casting, as shown. Locate the center of gravity of the casting. Chapter 9, Problem 9.6P: Determine the stresses in the two segments of the bar shown. Segment A has a diameter of 114 in. and segment B has a cross section 2 in. by 2 in. Chapter 9, Problem 1E: Decode information from each of the following station models: Sea-level pressure ___________ Temperature ___________ Dew-point temperature ___________ Sky coverage ___________ Current weather ___________ Sea-level pressure ___________ Temperature ___________ Dew-point temperature ___________ Sky coverage ___________ Wind speed ___________ Wind direction ___________ Pressure change during last three hours ___________ Pressure tendency ___________ Sea-level pressure ___________ Temperature ___________ Dew-point temperature ___________ Sky coverage ___________ Chapter 8, Problem 1E: Using Figure 8-2: a. Circle the area with the greatest pressure gradient. b. Use arrows to show the direction of pressure gradient force at a few locations. (These are typically drawn perpendicular to isobars.) c. Label a region where you would expect the lightest winds. Chapter 2, Problem 1E: The EarthSun orientation will change throughout the year as Earth revolves around the Sun. Using Figures 2-3 and 2-4 as models, sketch two similar diagrams for each date given to the right and below. First draw Earths axis and equator on the globe. Then, on the sunny side of the globe, draw a short line representing a flat surface at 66.5 N, 30 N, 0, and 23.5 S, a stick figure at each site with the Suns rays striking the flat surface at the feet of the stick figure. On the profile view, draw the Suns rays striking the flat surface transcribing the angles that you drew on the globe. Suns rays striking Earth on March 21. Profile view at Earths surface: solar noon on March 21. Suns rays striking Earth on June 21. Profile view at Earths surface: solar noon on June 21. Chapter 3, Problem 1E: a. The Sun has an average surface temperature of 6000 K. How much radiation is emitted from this surface? b. How much radiation is emitted from Earths surface at 300 K? Chapter 9, Problem 9E: Using Figure 9-13 below: a. Draw isobars at 4-mb intervals (e.g., 1004 mb, 1008 mb, 1012 mb). b. Label the low pressure center with an L. c. Draw the warm and cold fronts. d. Label a maritime tropical (mT) and continental polar air mass (cP). e. Outline the area where cloud cover exceeds 75%. f. Shade the areas receiving precipitation. Figure 9-13 Chapter 6.4, Problem 8P: A Laundry Problem: You need 34 cup of laundry detergent to wash 1 full load of laundry. How many loads of laundry can you wash with 5 cups of laundry detergent? (Assume that you can wash fractional loads of laundry.) Solve the laundry problem with the aid of a math drawing, a table, or a double number line. Explain your reasoning. 6 2/3 loads. Chapter 1.1, Problem 2P: If you give a child in kindergarten or first grade a bunch of beads or other small objects and ask the child to show you what the 3 in 35 stands for, the child might show you 3 of the beads. You might be tempted to respond that the 3 really stands for "thirty" and not 3. Of course it's true that the 3 does stand for thirty, but is there a better way you could respond, so as to draw attention to the base-ten system? How could you organize the beads to make your point? Chapter 1.3, Problem 10P: For each of the following pairs of numbers, find a decimal between the two numbers, and plot all three numbers visibly and distinctly on a number line like the one in Figure 1.54. Label all the longer tick marks. Your labeling of the tick marks should fit with the structure of the base-ten system. The numbers 2.981 and 2.982 The numbers 13 and 12.9999 The numbers 13 and 13.0001 Chapter 12.2, Problem 7P: Use the moving and additivity principles to determine the area, in square inches, of the shaded flower design in Figure 12.18 El. In determining the area of the shape, use no formulas other than the one for areas of rectangles. Explain your reasoning clearly. Figure12.18 A flower design Chapter 7.3, Problem 2P: A company mixes different amounts of grape and peach juice, but always in the ratio 3 to 5. a. Explain how to reason with a value of the ratio to determine how much peach juice the company should mix with the following amounts of grape juice: 100 liters; 140 liters; G liters. b. Explain how to reason with a value of the ratio in another way to determine how much peach juice the company should mix with the amounts of grape juice in part (a). c. Explain how to reason with a value of the ratio to determine how much grape juice the company should mix with the following amounts of peach juice: 72 liters; 84 liters; P liters. d. Explain how to reason with a value of the ratio in another way to determine how much grape juice the company should mix with the amounts of peach juice in part (c). Chapter 10, Problem 2PE: Car Class Write a class named Car that has the following data attributes: _ _year_model (for the car's year model) _ _ make (for the make of the car) _ _speed (for the car's current speed) The Car class should have an _ _init_ _ method that accepts the car's year model and make as arguments. These values should be assigned to the object's _ _year_model and _ _make data attributes. It should also assign 0 to the _ _speed data attribute. The class should also have the following methods: accelerate The accelerate method should add 5 to the speed data attribute each time it is called. brake The brake method should subtract 5 from the speed data attribute each time it is called. get_speed The get_speed method should return the current speed. Next, design a program that creates a Car object then calls the accelerate method five times. After each call to the accelerate method. get the current speed of the car and display it. Than call the brake method five times. After each call to the brake method, get the current speed of the car and display it. Chapter 6, Problem 11PE: Personal Web Page Generator Write a program that asks the user for his or her name, then asks the user to enter a sentence that describes himself or herself. Here is an example of the programs screen: Enter your name: Julie Taylor Describe yourself: I am a computer science major, a member of the Jazz club, and I hope to work as a mobile app developer after I graduate. Once the user has entered the requested input, the program should create an HTML file, containing the input, for a simple Web page. Here is an example of the HTML content, using the sample input previously shown: html head /head body center hlJulie Taylor/hl /center hr / I am a computer science major, a member of the Jazz club, and I hope to work as a mobile app developer after I graduate. hr / /body /html Chapter 6, Problem 12PE: Average Steps Taken A Personal Fitness Tracker is a wearable device that tracks your physical activity, calories burned, heart rate, sleeping patterns, and so on. One common physical activity that most of these devices track is the number of steps you take each day. If you have downloaded this books source code from the Computer Science Portal, you will find a file named steps.txt in the Chapter 06 folder. (The Computer Science Portal can be found at www.pearsonhlghered.com/gaddls.) The steps.txt file contains the number of steps a person has taken each day for a year. There are 365 lines in the file, and each line contains the number of steps taken during a day. (The first line is the number of steps taken on January 1st, the second line is the number of steps taken on January 2nd, and so forth.) Write a program that reads the file, then displays the average number of steps taken for each month (The data is from a year that was not a leap year, so February has 28 days.) Chapter 10, Problem 1PE: Pet Class The Pet class Write a class named Pet, which should have the following data attributes: _ _ name (for the name of a pet) _ _ animal_type (for the type of animal that a pet is. Example values are 'Dog', 'Cat', and 'Bird) _ _ age (for the pets age) The Pet class should have an _ _init_ _ method that creates these attributes. It should also have the following methods: set_name This method assigns a value to the _ _name field. set_animal_type This method assigns a value to the _ _animal_type field. set_age This method assigns a value to the _ _age field. get_name This method returns the value of the _ _name field. get_animal_type This method returns the value of the _ _animal_type field. get_age This method returns the value of the _ _age field. Once you have written the class, write a program that creates an object of the class and prompts the user to enter the name, type, and age of his or her pet. This data should be stored as the objects attributes. Use the object's accessor methods to retrieve the pets name, type, and age and display this data on the screen. Chapter 4, Problem 4PE: Distance Traveled The distance a vehicle travels can be calculated as follows: distance = speed x time For example, if a train travels 40 miles per hour for three hours, the distance traveled is 120 miles. Write a program that asks the user for the speed of a vehicle (in miles per hour) and the number of hours it has traveled. It should then use a loop to display the distance the vehicle has traveled for each hour of that time period. Here is an example of the desired output: What is the speed of the vehicle in mph? 40 Enter How many hours has it travelled? 3 Enter Hour Distance Traveled 1 40 2 80 3 120 Chapter 3.7C, Problem 1A: Using Figure 3.2, measure the distance from Point A located off the Carolina coast to Point B off the African coast. Determine the distance in kilometers and then convert that distance into centimeters. Distance: ______km Distance: ______cm Chapter 2.7, Problem 1A: Use Figure 2.16 to identify the environments A- L where the sediment for the following sedimentary rocks could have been deposited. Rock gypsum Conglomerate Sandstone Shale Bituminous coal Travertine Chapter 8.6, Problem 1A: Calculate the elevation of the water table at each well location and write the approximate elevation on the line next to each well. Next, use a colored pencil to draw smooth 10-foot contours that show the shape of the water table. Start with the 1160-foot contour. Use a pencil of a different color to draw arrows on the map to indicate the direction of the slope of the water table. a. Toward which direction downward does the water table slope? b. Referring to the site of the proposed water well, at approximately what depth below the surface should the proposed well intersect the water table? Chapter 10.3, Problem 5A: What evidence supports the conclusion that the igneous intrusion labeled sill B is more recent than the rock layers on either side A and C? Chapter 5.2, Problem 3A: What are the small "hills' covered in vegetation in the foreground of this image? Hint See Figure 5.5 Chapter 1, Problem 1.5TE: Determine the number of vectors (x1,...,xn), such that each x1 is either 0 or 1 andi=1nxiK Chapter 1, Problem 1.1P: a. How many different 7-place license plates are possible if the first 2 places are for letters and the other 5 for numbers? b. Repeat part (a) under the assumption that no letter or number can be repeated in a single license plate. Chapter 4, Problem 4.16P: A deck of n cards numbered 1 through n are to be turned over one a time. Before each card is shown you are to guess which card it will be. After making your guess, you are told whether or not your guess is correct but not which card was turned over. It turns out that the strategy that maximizes the expected number of correct guesses fixes a permutation of the n cards, say 1, 2,. . ., n, and then continually guesses 1 until it is correct, then continually guesses 2 until either it is correct or all cards have been turned over, and then continuality guesses 3, and so on. Let G denote the number of correct guesses yielded by this strategy. Determine P(G=k) Hint: In order for C to be at least k what must be the order of cards 1,…,k. Chapter 3, Problem 3.83P: In a certain contest, the players are of equal skill and the probability is 12 that a specified one of the two contestants will be the victor, in a group of 2n players, the players are paired off against each other at random. The 2n1 winners are again paired off randomly, and so on, until a single winner remains. Consider two specified contestant, A and B, and define the events Ai,in,E by Ai: A plays in exactly i contests E: A and B never play each other Find P(Ai),i=1,...,n. Find P(E). Let Pn=P(E). Show that Pn=12n1+2n+22n1(12)2Pn1 are use this formula to check the answer you obtained in part (b). Hint: Find P(E) by conditioning on which of the events P(Ai),i=1,...,n occur. In simplifying your answer, use the algebraic identity i=1n1ixi1=1nxn1+(n1)xn(1x)2 For another approach to solving this problem, note that there are a total of 2n1 games played. Explain why 2n1 games are played. Number these games, and let Bi denote event that A and B play each other in game i,i=1,...,2n1. What is P(Bi). Use part (e) to find P(E). Chapter 2, Problem 2.5TE: For any sequence of events E1,E2,..., define a new sequence F1,F2,... of disjoint events (that is. events such that FiFj= whenever ij ) such that for all n1, 1nFi=1nEi Chapter 6, Problem 12PC: SavingsAccount Class Design a SavingsAccount class that stores a savings accounts annual interest rate and balance. The class constructor should accept the amount of the savings accounts starting balance. The class should also have methods for subtracting the amount of a withdrawal, adding the amount of a deposit, and adding the amount of monthly interest to the balance. The monthly interest rate is the annual interest rate divided by twelve. To add the monthly interest to the balance, multiply the monthly interest rate by the balance, and add the result to the balance. Test the class in a program that calculates the balance of a savings account at the end of a period of time. It should ask the user for the annual interest rate, the starting balance, and the number of months that have passed since the account was established. A loop should then iterate once for every month, performing the following: a. Ask the user for the amount deposited into the account during the month. Use the class method to add this amount to the account balance. b. Ask the user for the amount withdrawn from the account during the month. Use the class method to subtract this amount from the account balance. c. Use the class method to calculate the monthly interest. After the last iteration, the program should display the ending balance, the total amount of deposits, the total amount of withdrawals, and the total interest earned. Chapter 6, Problem 13PC: Deposit and Withdrawal Files Use Notepad or another text editor to create a text file named Deposits.txt. The file should contain the following numbers, one per line: 100.00 124.00 78.92 37.55 Next, create a text file named Withdrawals.txt. The file should contain the following numbers, one per line: 29.88 110.00 27.52 50.00 12.90 The numbers in the Deposits.txt file are the amounts of deposits that were made to a savings account during the month, and the numbers in the Withdrawals.txt file are the amounts of withdrawals that were made during the month. Write a program that creates an instance of the SavingsAccount class that you wrote in Programming Challenge 12. The starting balance for the object is 500.00. The program should read the values from the Deposits.txt file and use the objects method to add them to the account balance. The program should read the values from the Withdrawals.txt file and use the objects method to subtract them from the account balance. The program should call the class method to calculate the monthly interest, and then display the ending balance and the total interest earned. Chapter 5, Problem 2PC: Retail Price Calculator Write a program that asks the user to enter an items wholesale cost and its markup percentage. It should then display the items retail price. For example: If an items wholesale cost is 5.00 and its markup percentage is 100 percent, then the items retail price is 10.00. If an items wholesale cost is 5.00 and its markup percentage is 50 percent, then the items retail price is 7.50. The program should have a method named calculateRetail that receives the wholesale cost and the markup percentage as arguments, and returns the retail price of the item. Chapter 5, Problem 3PC: Rectangle AreaComplete the Program If you have downloaded the books source code from www.pearsonhighered.com/gaddis, you will find a partially written program named AreaRectangle.java in this chapters source code folder. Your job is to complete the program. When it is complete, the program will ask the user to enter the width and length of a rectangle, and then display the rectangles area. The program calls the following methods, which have not been written: getLengthThis method should ask the user to enter the rectangles length, and then return that value as a double. getWidthThis method should ask the user to enter the rectangles width, and then return that value as a double. getAreaThis method should accept the rectangles length and width as arguments, and return the rectangles area. The area is calculated by multiplying the length by the width. displayDataThis method should accept the rectangles length, width, and area as arguments, and display them in an appropriate message on the screen. Chapter 3, Problem 17PC: Wi-Fi Diagnostic Tree Figure 3-23 shows a simplified flowchart for troubleshooting a bad Wi-Fi connection. Use the flowchart to create a program that leads a person through the steps of fixing a bad Wi-Fi connection. Here is an example of the programs output; Reboot the computer and try to connect. Did that fix the problem? no [Enter] Reboot the router and try to connect. Did that fix the problem? yes [Enter] Notice that the program ends as soon as a solution is found to the problem. Here is another example of the programs output: Reboot the computer and try to connect. Did that fix the problem? no [Enter] Reboot the router and try to connect. Did that fix the problem? no [Enter] Make sure the cables between the router modem are plugged in firmly. Did that fix the problem? no [Enter] Move the router to a new location. Did that fix the problem? no [Enter] Get a new router. Figure 3-23 Troubleshooting a bad Wi-Fi connection Chapter 1, Problem 14P: The acceleration of the linear trajectory of problem P1-13 is shown in Fig. P1.14. Determine the equation of a (t ) for 0t1s1t3s3t4s Chapter 1, Problem 23P: The output voltage, v0, of the Op-Amp circuit shown in Fig. P1.23 satisfies the relationship vo=(1+100R)(vin2)(100R)vb, where R is the unknown resistance in k and vb is the unknown voltage in volts. Fig. P1.23 gives the values of the output voltage for two different values of the input voltage. (a) Determine the equation of the line for vo, as a function of vin, and find the values of R and vb. (b) Plot the output voltage vo as a function of the input voltage vin. On the plot, clearly indicate the value of the output voltage when the input voltage is zero (y-intercept) and the value of the input voltage when the output voltage is zero (x-intercept). Chapter 6, Problem 1P: The tip of a one-link robot is located at =0 at time t=0 s as shown in Fig. P6.1.It takes 1 for the robot to move from =0 ,to =2rad If l=5 in., plot the x and y components as a function of the. Also find the amplitude, frequency, period, phase angle, and time shift. FIGURE P6.1 Rotating one-link robot starting at =0. Chapter 7, Problem 1P: Consider the two-loop circuit shown in Fig P7.1. The currents l1 and l2 (in A) satisfy the following system of equations: 16l19l2=110 (7.84) 20l29l1+110=0 (7.85) (a) Find l1 and l2 using the substitutions method. (b) Write the system of equations (7.84) and (7.85) in the matrix form AI=b, where I=[ I1I2 ]. (c) Find l1 and l2 using the matrix algebra method. Perform all computations by hand and show all steps. (d) Find l1 and l2 using the Cramer's rule. Chapter 2, Problem 6P: In the purely resistive circuit shown in Fig. P2.6, the total resistance R of the circuit is given by R=R1+R1R2R1+R2 (2.58) If the total resistance of the circuit is R=100 and R2=2R1+100. find R2 and R1 as follows: (a) Substitute the values of R and R2 into equation (2.58), and simplify the resulting expression to obtain a single quadrate equation for R1. (b) Using the method of your choice, solve the quadratic equation for R1 and compute the corresponding value of R2. Chapter 10, Problem 16PB: At Stardust Gems, a faux gem and jewelry company, the setting department is a bottleneck. The company is considering hiring an extra worker, whose salary will be $67,000 per year, to ease the problem. Using the extra worker, the company will be able to produce and sell 9,000 more units per year. The selling price per unit is $20. The cost per unit currently is $15.85 as shown: What is the annual financial impact of hiring the extra worker for the bottleneck process? Chapter 2, Problem 2TP: This list contains costs that various organizations incur; they fall into three categories: direct materials (DM), direct labor (DL), or overhead (OH).t Classify each of these items as direct materials, direct labor, or overhead. Glue used to attach labels to bottles containing a patented medicine. Compressed air used in operating paint sprayers for Student Painters, a company that paints houses and apartments. Insurance on a factory building and equipment. A production department supervisors salary. Rent on factory machinery. Iron ore in a steel mill. Oil, gasoline, and grease for forklift trucks in a manufacturing companys warehouse. Services of painters in building construction. Cutting oils used in machining operations. Cost of paper towels in a factory employees washroom. Payroll taxes and fringe benefits related to direct labor. The plant electricians salaries. Crude oil to an oil refinery. Copy editors salary in a book publishing company. Assume your classifications could be challenged in a court case. Indicate to your attorneys which of your answers for part a might be successfully disputed by the opposing attorneys and why. In which answers are you completely confident? Chapter 4, Problem 10MC: Assigning indirect costs to specific jobs is completed by which of the following? applying the costs to manufacturing overhead using the predetermined overhead rate using the manufacturing costs incurred applying the indirect labor to the work in process inventory Chapter 11, Problem 6MC: You want to invest $8,000 at an annual Interest rate of 8% that compounds annually for 12 years. Which table will help you determine the value of your account at the end of 12 years? A. future value of one dollar ($1) B. present value of one dollar ($1) C. future value of an ordinary annuity D. present value of an ordinary annuity Chapter 2, Problem 1MC: Which of the following is the primary source of revenue for a service business? A. the production of products from raw materials B. the purchase and resale of finished products C. providing intangible goods and services D. the sale of raw materials to manufacturing firms A smarter way to study The perfect combo of study and writing tools to get you through the school year. With bartleby+ you'll get our learn and write tools for one low price. Get your first week for just 6.99!** [Try Bartleby+](/plus) *After trial, subscription auto-renews monthly at $9.99 USD or then current monthly fee. Cancel any time. **After trial, subscription auto-renews monthly at $14.99 USD or then current monthly fee. Cancel any time. **After trial, subscription auto-renews monthly at $14.99 USD or then current monthly fee. 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| | | | Sunday, March 21, 1999 Published at 04:51 GMT World Blair thanks Mandela Lockerbie effort The two world leaders spoke by telephone on Saturday UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has thanked Nelson Mandela for his help in persuading Libya to hand over two suspects wanted in connection with the Lockerbie bombing. Downing Street added that Mr Mandela had confirmed that Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had agreed to hand over the suspects by 6 April. "The prime minister welcomed it and said he was very grateful for his work towards this," said a spokeswoman. The April date had earlier been confirmed in a letter delivered to Mr Annan by Libya's UN Ambassador, Abuzed Dorda. Shortly after receiving the letter, the UN head said: "It looks as if we're there". The US and UK Governments first demanded back in 1991 that the two Libyan intellligence agents face trial over the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, in which 270 people died. Colonel Gaddafi told the meeting he had received enough assurances from Saudi Arabian and South African mediators to allow the handover of the two men for trial in the Netherlands. UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said he was encouraged by the news but warned : "I am not going to start taking anything for granted just yet." British relatives of the Lockerbie bombing victims have praised the decision, although spokesman Dr Jim Swire called for the exact date of the handover to be kept secret to ensure the suspects' safety. "These two are entitled to the presumption of innocence like anyone else," he said. Sanctions must be lifted The Libyan letter to the UN insists that the sanctions imposed in 1992 to try to secure the handover, be lifted within 90 days of confirmation that Libya has met with UN Security Council requirements. The two Western allies said if Libya failed to meet the deadline, they would seek tougher UN sanctions against the country. Mr Mandela said the deal on the handover had been worked out with the help of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah. Both South Africa and Saudi Arabia have been playing a leading role in diplomatic efforts to resolve the deadlock over the proposed trial of the two Libyan intelligence agents. | |

Libië

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/libya/indxirlb.htm

The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Libya in 1992 to press Tripoli to hand over two suspects wanted for the 1988 bombing of a US Pan American Airways airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland. The Council suspended (but did not lift) the sanctions against Libya in April 1999 after the Libyan government handed over the suspects for trial in a special court. Eventually the court found one of the two suspects guilty. In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility for the bombing and agreed to a $2.7 billion settlement. In return, London and Washington immediately began to push the Security Council to lift all UN sanctions against Tripoli. As a permanent member with veto power, France agreed in principle to lift the sanctions, but urged a delay so that it could negotiate increased Libyan indemnity payments to its own citizens in connection with the 1989 bombing of a French UTA airliner over Niger. The Security Council lifted sanctions in September 2003, and at the end of the year, Libya agreed to end efforts to produce nuclear weapons. Libya also began to offer contracts to big Western oil companies. Relations between Tripoli and the US and Europe have gradually normalized. In January 2008, Libya gained a non-permanent seat on the Security Council â a position the country will hold for two years. This section looks at the original Council action to impose the sanctions and the debate that followed, later erosion of support for the sanctions, negotiations between Libya and the US-UK over the organization of the trial, aspects of the trial proceedings, and subsequent issues about lifting of the sanctions. [UN Resolutions](http://www.un.org/News/ossg/libya.htm)| [Sanctions Against Libya](indxirlb.htm#sanction) | [The Trial](indxirlb.htm#trial) | [The Handover](indxirlb.htm#handover) | [Documents](indxirlb.htm#documents) Articles [2012](indxirlb.htm#a2012) | [2011](indxirlb.htm#2011) [ ](indxirlb.htm#2011)| [2003](indxirlb.htm#2003) | [2002](indxirlb.htm#2002) | [2001](indxirlb.htm#2001) | [1993-2000](indxirlb.htm#1993-2000)  2012 Libya has the highest per capita GDP in Africa due to profits from its oil industry. The nationâs relative wealth in the region attracts migrants from Somalia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Sudan, and Mali. But migrants have no status in Libya, and national turmoil allows detention centers to hold migrants and exploit them as forced labor. Detention centers are not under state control and often deal with organized crime syndicates who run human trafficking operations. The going rate for a migrant in Libya is between 210 and 645 US dollars. The UN has pushed for the issuance of temporary documentation to migrants in order to legally protect them. (NY Times) In this Foreign Policy in Focus article, Professor David Gibbs explores the long-term consequences of NATOâs intervention in Libya. Gibbs argues that the NATO intervention is erroneously heralded as a military âsuccessâ when in reality it has set a dangerous precedent of future military interventions in Iran, Syria, and other targets. Moreover, Gibbs warns that the NATO intervention must be seen within a larger global framework where western nations interfere with the internal politics of other countries for their own strategic or economic benefits. Libya is no exception.  (Foreign Policy in Focus) 2011 A New York Times on-the-ground investigation of airstrike sites across Libya has revealed scores of civilian casualties in the wake of UN-sanctioned military intervention. Issuing self-congratulatory statements deeming the campaign a success, NATO has repeatedly refused to acknowledge or accept responsibility for these deaths. The argument that âpreciseâ airstrike campaigns do not harm, maim, or kill innocent people rings false. NATO killed Libyan civilians, mistakenly pummeling a secret rebel armored convoy, bombing residences of sleeping families due to errant ordnance, and specifically targeting homes presumed to be used by loyalist forces. (New York Times) Before the UN Security Council voted to approve military intervention in Libya, a worked-out non-violent proposal was put forward. It addressed the need to protect civilians by seeking a rapid ceasefire and setting out key elements of an orderly, stable transition to a more legitimate form of government. International Crisis Group published a statement arguing for such an approach, echoed by the African Union and consistent with the views of the BRIC states. It was deliberately rejected. London, Paris, and Washington licensed themselves to undertake regime change in Resolution 1973 with the phrase âall necessary measures.â They did so with full knowledge that as permanent veto-wielding members of the Council, they would not be held accountable. (London Review of Books) On the surface, a Security Council resolution calling for an investigation into the fate of missiles used to overthrow Gadaffi indicates a commitment to combat the spread of deadly weapons and raise public concern about proliferation. However, according to UN correspondent Colum Lynch, a technical provision in the resolution provides Council members with greater scope to influence the findings of the panel of experts on Libya. The UN sanctions committee will decide what is reported, not the independent arms expert that typically investigates illicit weapons transfers, and each Council member will have authority to block any disagreeable finding that comes to light. This sets a dangerous precedent. (Foreign Policy) The Western military alliance has declared victory after NATOâs eight-month operation in Libya, with serious implications for the future of UN mandates on the use of force. NATO reports on conducting 26, 320 sorties and attacking over 5,000 targets, but provides no casualty figures. Among the many problems with the policy of military intervention is the casual attitude towards its victims. Today, rebel militias refuse to disarm, and there have been many reprisals against civilians identified as Gaddafi supporters. Meanwhile, it is abundantly clear that the âhumanitarianâ campaign in Libya will prove lucrative for western arms manufacturers and oil companies. (Open Democracy) As profit-making opportunities diminish in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western companies and security contractors have turned their focus toward Libya. Recognizing the potential for enormous revenues from a country with large infrastructure needs and the oil to finance them, entrepreneurs hope to cash in on Libyan gratitude toward the US and NATO. Libya has Africaâs largest oil reserves, which could translate to a steady supply of cash and resources for the West. Eighty French companies met with the TNC one week before Gadaffiâs death, and the British defense minister has advised British corporations to âpack their suitcasesâ and go to Tripoli. This scramble to secure contracts for Libyan oil reinforces the perception that the intervention was motivated by the UK and Franceâs quest for access to these resources. (New York Times) Since Gaddafiâs regime collapse, rebel military councils have emerged all around the country. They are responsible of arresting Gaddafiâs supporters, looking for smuggled weapons and organizing their own justice system. However, tensions and rivalry between the different groups remain ripe. This article points out that rebels are mostly motivated by vengeance and are acting violently against civilians they suspect of being Gaddafiâs supporters with no legal restraint.(Guardian) Military intervention in Libya ultimately revealed itself to be based on the premise that R2P and regime change could be one and the same. Whether or not NATO targeted Gaddafi directly, Western countries certainly had a vested interest in his death. Had he been handed over to The Hague, Gaddafi would have almost certainly revealed the extent of his close ties with Western government officials, details of his collaboration with Western intelligence services in counterterrorism, with the EU in limiting migration from Libyan shores, and in the granting of major contracts to Western oil firms. (Foreign Policy) During his forty-year rule, Gaddafi has frequently promoted pan-Africanism and African multiculturalism. Libya counts a high number of black people â Indigenous Libyans and African migrants. But Gaddafiâs overthrow has shown the limits of Libyaâs image as an African country. Gaddafiâs army has recruited the indigenous Black population, thus stirring resentment among the other Libyans. African migrants have been hunted down and killed by the rebels. Libya is now affirming its Arab roots and its affiliation to North Africa. But Libyaâs future remains closely linked to the African continent as a whole. The National Transitional Council, Libyaâs new government needs Africaâs recognition and assistance, not only to gain political legitimacy but also to cooperate on issues, such as immigration and regional security. It remains to be seen if Libya realizes this transition. (Guardian) The Qaddafi regime was in power for more than 40 years, partly due to the quiet friendships forged with the same Western governments now responsible for its downfall. The Italians had strong ties to the Colonel, based on oil and gas, as did the UK. London sold to Libya almost £40 million worth of military equipment in the year ending September 2010. Similarly, the Bush administration approved military shipments of $8.3 million in 2006-2007. Germany, Malta and France also have significant business ties to Libya. (Project Syndicate) Following NATOâs military intervention into Libya, Human Rights Watch discovered secret intelligence documents drafted during the Bush administration containing evidence of US, UK, and Libyan cooperation in the transfer, detention, and interrogation of terrorism suspects during Gadaffi's rule. Research by HRW, as well as the US State Departmentâs own documentation at the time, confirmed Libyaâs record of torture and abuse of detainees. In the face of overwhelming evidence of senior level US government involvement in torture, and of US and UK complicity in torture in third countries, these governments should conduct criminal investigations into the alleged abuses. (Human Rights Watch) Western powers that actively supported Libyan rebelsâ insurrection appear poised to gain from Gaddafiâs fall. Libya is a major oil producer, and it is becoming increasingly clear that petroleum companies from the US, Britain, and France will benefit from NATOâs military intervention and subsequent regime change in the country. (Guardian) This article calls into question the assertion that the war in Libya is over. Gaddafi still retains significant military power and strategic strongholds, while the rebels may not be able to form a coherent government. Western doctrine of soft military power and the implementation of a âno-fly zoneâ have not met their ultimate goals â the fall of Gaddafi and the protection of civilians. (Stratfor) Events in Libya threaten the UNâs credibility as a trustworthy, impartial arbiter of international and civil conflicts. Resolution 1973 authorized member countries to protect civilians and was not intended to allow foreign forces to take sides in the revolution or actively working toward the overthrow of a UN member state. What kind of credibility will future Security Council resolutions have if their terms can be so thoroughly exceeded or violated by those entrusted with the task of enforcing them? (Al Jazeera) Diplomatic cables revealed by WikiLeaks show the close relationship between the Gaddafi regime and the US. The two countries developed an important military and security cooperation as part of the âwar against terrorismâ, while US companies hoped to gain high profits from Libyaâs oil. But now that the Gaddafi regime has been toppled, the US is changing sides and turning against its former ally.(Global Research) According to this article, the Gaddafi regime and Britain have been involved in secret talks and struck clandestine deals in the past few years. These discussions, in which Gaddafiâs son Saif took part, focused mostly on the Libyan nuclear program. Gaddafiâs strategy consisted in preventing western intervention in Libya, in the wake of the attack on Iraq. Now that the Gaddafi regime is falling apart, the MI6, Britainâs secret service, is tracking down its former âfriend.â (The Independent) The author of this article compares Tony Blairâs misguided actions in the 2003 invasion of Iraq to the current UK Prime Ministerâs military involvement in Libya. The rebels in Libya, who have been put forward as alternatives to Gadaffiâs rule, may be just as unsavory as the dictator himself. The author suggests that previous wars and occupations should provide lessons for the future â military intervention does not help protect civilians. (Independent) Germany has announced that it will lend â¬100m to Libyan rebels. The loan to the national transitional council was secured against frozen Libyan government funds. Five months into the war, the humanitarian situation is acute. In Misrata, Libya's third largest and normally affluent city, basic food and clothing supplies are in need, along with the cash to pay for them. Nato remains outwardly confident stating that Gaddafi is losing his hold on Libya. Gaddafiâs government is open to a ceasefire and a negotiated solution to the war, but the rebel forces, UK, US, France and Russia will likely insist that Gaddafi steps down as a precondition to talks. This has, thus far, impeded African Union and UN informal peace proposals. (Guardian) The author of this article contends that the NATO intervention in Libya exhibits âthe dangers of political fantasy in the service of âhumanitarian interventionismâ, appalling intelligence work, illusions about bombing and air power and some of the worst press coverage in living memoryâ. Three and a half months after US, UK and French forces started bombing Libya and supplying arms supply to various rebel factions, NATO's failure in its efforts to promote âregime changeâ in Libya is now glaring. (Pambazuka News) US President Barack Obama has stated that the US is a country founded on justice and the rule of law. However, he has failed to obtain Congressional authorization (as required under the War Powers Resolution of 1973) for the intervention in Libya. The Act requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of introducing the US to hostilities and to end operations within 60 to 90 days unless he receives Congressional authority to continue. In the Libya case, the 90-day period will end Sunday. As such, the US President has failed to comply with legislation that is an important check on the use of force. (IPS) The author, Obi Nwakanma of Pambazuka News, suggests that real the motivation behind the NATO alliance war in Libya is the quest to control the oil fields of Libya, guaranteeing Western access to energy sources. While the South African President and the African Union attempt to negotiate a settlement, NATO countries are setting up new embassies and arranging oil deals with the Libyan rebels against the long-term interest of the Libyan people. Germany has recognized the rebel force as the legitimate government of Libya, making it easier to do business in Libya. The author calls for a stronger and more cohesive regional response to interventions by industrialized countries in the domestic affairs of African countries. (Pambazuka News) Muammar Gaddafi's regime, offered a truce in return for an immediate NATO ceasefire in Libya, a day before the International Criminal Court (ICC) considered arrest warrants for rights abuses in Libya. The Office of the Prosecutor for the ICC has since filed arrest warrants for Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam, and intelligence chief Abdullah Senussi. (Mail and Guardian ) Some European Union (EU) member states are considering supplying arms to anti-Gaddafi rebels in Libya. This, however, has the potential to actively prolong the crisis. Further, intervention in Libya is likely motivated by EU and US economic and strategic interests in the region. Chinaâs commercial contracts in Libya, totaling 18 billion dollars, have declined by nearly 53 percent since the unrest in North Africa began. Thus, the aim of US Africa Commandâs (AFRICOMâs) strategic policy may be to minimize Chinaâs economic interest in Africa whilst enhancing the USâ. (Inter Press Service ) The legality of international intervention in Libya is already uncertain. Now another controversial legal question has arisen; the legality of arming the rebels. The possibility of such action was initially rejected by British Prime Minister David Cameron. Since then, however, Cameron has back flipped and US President Barack Obama has said he will not rule out giving military aid to the rebels. This article examines the legal debate, which stems from competing clauses in Security Council Resolution 1970 â which implemented an arms embargo against Libya â and Resolution 1973, which authorizes coalition forces to âtake all necessary measuresâ to protect civilians. However, legality may be a moot point; with politics, and not law, once again likely to be the deciding factor. (Turtle Bay, Foreign Policy) Much of the debate regarding international intervention in Libya has focused on politics, ignoring the legality of the action under international law. Curtis Doebbler, a US human rights lawyer, argues that the use of force against Libya is illegal. Doebbler argues that Security Council resolution 1973, which authorizes the use of force, contravenes the UN Charter requirement that force must be a measure of last resort. The Security Council had not determined that non-forceful measures had been exhausted at the time the resolution was adopted. Further, after the resolution was adopted, the Libyan government indicated it would comply with its terms â yet Western forces still launched their offensive, disregarding the governmentâs assertion. (Al-Ahram) The International Peace Bureau (IPB) has vehemently condemned the "no-fly zone" in Libya. Comparing the UN-approved intervention to the Iraq crisis of 2003, The IPB argues that the sanctions process should be continued before further military strikes occur. This article maintains that the UN should engage in negotiations between Gaddafi and the rebels and respect the ceasefire agreement, rather than adhering to a policy of armed intervention stemming from their "responsibility to protect". Overall, the IPB appeals for disarmament as a prerequisite for development. (International Peace Bureau) Humanitarian concerns in Libya undoubtedly require the involvement of the international community. However, a no fly zone and other forms of "coercive external intervention" will not necessarily serve the interests of Libyan civilians. This article argues that foreign powers should allow the Libyan population to manage its democratic uprising on its own terms, without the imposition of external interests. The authors argue alternative forms of intervention would better assist Libyan civilians: humanitarian aid and the establishment of evacuation routes for refugees. Indirect support could also be provided to the rebels through means such as intelligence sharing. (Al Jazeera) This Talk of the Nation broadcast on NPR focuses on the conditions in Libya prior to the conflictâs beginning. It addresses the underlying tensions that had been existent in the country, as well as the role that Libyan oil has played domestically and internationally. (NPR) 2003 Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has granted permission to UN weapons inspectors to conduct checks for weapons of mass destruction. The move may lead to the end of US unilateral sanctions against the country. (Scotsman) Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi has announced the privatization of the Libyan oil sector. Big oil firms ponder a small Scottish firm's claim that its annual turnover would reach £30 billion in open trade with Libya, the world's sixth largest oil producer. (Vanguard ) Prior to the sanctions regime, Libya provided arms to rebel groups in Western Sahara and the Philippines. Several countries seek to resume trade with Libya, but some commodities for sale, including fast patrol boats and night-vision technology, raise eyebrows. (Inter Press Service) The Security Council ended its sanctions regime against Libya, although unilateral US sanctions will continue. Amnesty International welcomed the symbolic return of Libya to the international community, but urged the government to improve the human rights situation. (Associated Press) Major US oil companies pressure the Bush administration to lift unilateral sanctions against Libya. The New York Times reports that the oil-rich country may revoke concessions to these companies if sanctions continue. France may use its veto in the Security Council to prevent the end of sanctions against Libya. The French foreign ministry expressed concern about reparations for Libyan-backed bombing of a French airliner in 1989. (Reuters) The Libyan government has formally acknowledged responsibility for the bombing of a 1988 Pan Am flight and will pay reparations to the families of the 270 victims. While the UK pushes for the end of UN sanctions, the future of unilateral US-imposed sanctions remains in doubt. (Guardian) Libya has accepted responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, a condition set by Washington for lifting UN and US sanctions. Simultaneously, Libyan officials have said they would give priority to negotiations with the four US oil companies. (New York Times) In its approach to Iraq, the Bush administration should learn from Libya that violence only leads to retaliation, perpetuating an ongoing cycle of undesirable consequences. The US bombed Libya in April 1986 for its alleged involvement in terrorism, and the country responded with more murders, kidnappings and terrorist attacks. (Foreing Policy In Focus) A German oil company, Wintershall, is eager to drill Libyan oil fields formerly held by the US company Oasis before imposition of sanctions in 1986. The US threatens to impose sanctions on Wintershall if it goes ahead. (Washington Post) The US and the United Kingdom pressed Libya to comply with UN resolutions to allow the formal lifting of UN sanctions and an end to unilateral US sanctions. However, Washington remains more skeptical than London towards normalizing relations with Tripoli. (The Guardian) Mohamed Ali El Huwej, Qaddafi's money manager, tells Bloomberg News he has developed a system for making global investments -- using minority stakes, shell companies and interlocking share holdings -- that won't attract the attention of U.S. authorities. He calls it ``financial engineering.'' Foreign ministers of the European Union appealed to the US not to extend its Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). The ILSA gives the US government permission to impose sanctions against third-country firms doing business in Iran or Libya. (Reuters) The US is revising its sanction regime not only on Iraq, but also on Iran and Libya in order to meet energy needs in the country. (Washington Post) After a second round of talks with Libya, the US and the UK have not changed their standpoint, but the meeting help to establish a dialogue and clarify everyone's position. (Associated Press) After a meeting with the US and UK, the Libyan ambassador says he is optimistic that an agreement could be reached soon. (BBC) Because "Libya in 2001 is a very different place from Libya in 1988," according to a UK official, Britain will support a new UN resolution to lift the embargo, as long as Tripoli accepts a set of conditions including renouncement to terrorism. (Independent) Various Security Council members want to see the inactive sanctions against Libya formally put to rest, but the US and UK say that they will oppose an end to sanctions until the Lockerbie trial is over. (Reuters) Following the lead of the UN, Switzerland suspended sanctions against Libya after the surrender two suspects in the lockerbie bombing case. Libya handed the suspects in this case over to Scottish authorities. This article looks at what may be next while recapping a little of the history of this situation. Testimony by Jeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. Several Council members criticise the ongoing sanctions against Libya but the United States and Britain manage to gain another renewal, with the support of France. A critical view by a distinguished international lawyer from Canada. The Trial 2009 Before Libyan citizen Ali al-Megrahi was charged for the bombing of PanAm 103 over Lockerbie, the official scenario endorsed by the US, the UK and Scotland implicated Iran, Syria and the Palestinian group PFLP-GC. It was only in 1990, two years after the bombing, that Megrahi and Libya became the prime suspects. By promoting this new official version, the US was hoping to secure the support of Iran and Syria during the Gulf War. (Global Research) 2001 Hans Koeschler, an expert on international law appointed by Kofi Annan to observe the Lockerbie trial says that the court's decision has been influenced by political considerations. (Associated Press) After eighty-four days of trial, the Scottish court unanimously convicted one of the two accused, while the other was acquitted. Speculation about Gaddafiââ¬â¢s involvement in the bombing remains. And Libya may have to wait a while before sanctions are lifted.(BBC) The credibility of US intelligence agencies suffered as CIA cables were released in the Lockerbie trial - accompanied by a series of evasive answers from an FBI investigator and a poor showing by the witness, Abdul Majid Giaka, who spent three years on the CIA payroll. (New York Times) The testimony of the double agent Mr. Abdul Majid against the two defendents seemed a little unsure and was attacked for its credibility. One mystery question is that as a double US agent - working at the airport and knowing of the bombing, why did he not tip anybody off about the bomb? (New York Times) The UN sanction against Libya was imposed to blame suspects of the Lockerbie bombings. However, the prosecution against Libya is weakening as feeble testimonies and lack of cooperation from the witnesses hides the case in a thick fog. (New York Times) Following a report by Kofi Annan on Libya's decision to renounce terrorism and respect UN resolutions, EU Ministers unanimously decided to lift sanctions against Libya imposed in 1992 in connection with the Lockerbie bombing. (Pan African News Agency) The Lockerbie suspects are in custody in Holland and the Security Council has resolved to lift all sanctions on Libya. (BBC News) Britain announced it would resume diplomatic relations with Libya after a 15-year freeze. The move comes after Libya handed over the two Lockerbie bombing suspects and agreed to cooperate in an investigation of the fatal shooting of a London police officer in 1984. (New York Times) Washington Post article on the qualifications the US is placing on the lifting of sanctions against Libya, including their cooperation with the trial of two Libyan intelligence agents suspected in the bombing of Flight 103. While a number of Security Council members, including the three African states, Gabon, Gambia and Namibia, advocate the lifting of sanctions against Libya, the US shows no willingness of compromise on the issue. (Inter Press Service) The US has made it clear that it considers lifting sanctions on Libya "premature" at this point. (CNN Online) Breaking a 18-year long freeze in diplomatic relations, Libya and the US held talks concerning the lifting of UN sanctions. But Libya has yet to fulfill a number of conditions before the US is ready to make concessions, according to this BBC Online article. In an important step toward normalizing diplomatic relations, ambassadors of the US, the United Kingdom and Libya will hold talks hosted by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to discuss how to proceed on the issue of lifting sanctions against Libya.  The Handover Once the men are in the Netherlands, Secretary-General is to write a letter to the Security Council that would automatically suspend sanctions imposed on Libya in 1992 and tightened in 1993. If the suspects are found guilty, they would be detained in a prison affiliated to the UN in Scotland. State prosecutors were told to make haste in arresting nine Americans wanted in connection with the 1986 bombings of Tripoli and the Libyan port of Benghazi. Libya had agreed that the two suspects would be available to the Secretary-General on or before April 6, 1999. Mandela plans to address Libya's General People's Congress which will decide whether to send the two suspects to the Netherlands. Secretary General denied that Security Council offered the ultimatum but he said he did discuss with the Council about "reasonable" time period for handover. Libya wants a guarantee of justice before they let the two suspects appear in court. The United States and Britain threatened increased sanctions against Libya unless it hands over the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing case within 30 days. Kofi Annan responded with support. Libya is looking for assurances that the sanctions will be lifted if it complies. Follow-up of the talks regarding the trial of the Lockerbie suspects. Two salient issues are the place of incarceration of the suspects if found guilty, and Libya's insistence that UN sanctions should be lifted rather than simply suspended as the UN Security Council proposed. This article examines the question of the erosion of hostility against Libya by looking at the proposal of a UN designation to prevent interrogation of the Lockerbie suspects. Contrasting opinions about the progress of Lockerbie case after the meeting of Colonel Qaddafi and Secretary General Annan. The continuing problems of agreeing arrangements for a trial of the suspected Lockerbie bombers.  Documents Text of P.L. 104-172 (H.R. 3107). Enacted August 5, 1996. Posted by the Department of State.  Much of the debate regarding international intervention in Libya has focused on politics, ignoring the legality of the action under international law. Curtis Doebbler, a US human rights lawyer, argues that the use of force against Libya is illegal. Doebbler argues that Security Council resolution 1973, which authorizes the use of force, contravenes the UN Charter requirement that force must be a measure of last resort. The Security Council had not determined that non-forceful measures had been exhausted at the time the resolution was adopted. Further, after the resolution was adopted, the Libyan government indicated it would comply with its terms â yet Western forces still launched their offensive, disregarding the governmentâs assertion. (Al-Ahram)

Libië

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4774305.stm

| | By Jonathan Marcus BBC diplomatic correspondent If diplomats wrote fairy stories, this would probably be one. | | Libya's ending of weapons programmes led to the breakthrough Once seen in Washington as a typical "rogue state", Libya has now definitively come in from the cold. By anyone's standards it is a diplomatic happy ending. The big breakthrough came at the end of 2003 when the US and British governments announced that the Libyan authorities - after months of secret negotiations - had agreed to disclose and dismantle their nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes. During the preceding months, the Libyan authorities had gradually agreed to take some responsibility for the bombing of a Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie in 1988; a compensation agreement was reached with the families of the victims; and a similar deal was agreed with the families of those killed in the bombing of a French UTA airliner in 1989. All this prompted the lifting of United Nations sanctions. But the normalisation of ties with Washington has proceeded at a slower, step-by-step pace. Direct Libya-US diplomatic ties were restored in June 2004 with the opening of an American liaison office in Tripoli. But it has taken almost two more years for the Bush administration to be satisfied - as one official put it - that Libya "is out of the terrorism business". Indeed the Americans now praise the Libyans for their co-operation in the counter-terrorism field. | || | LIBYA-US RELATIONS 1980: US ends diplomatic ties with Libya 1986: Libya blamed for killing US troops in Berlin disco bomb 1986: US jets bomb Libyan capital and military bases 1988: Pan Am jet explodes over Lockerbie; Libya blamed 1999: Libya hands over Lockerbie bomb suspects 2003: Libya says it will give up WMDs and long-range missiles 2006: US says it will restore full diplomatic ties with Libya So a country once condemned for its involvement in international terrorism and for having clandestine weapons programmes has been cajoled and encouraged back into the international fold. The question now is whether the Libyan experience has any broader lessons. The US Assistant Secretary of State, David Welch, certainly thinks so. He explicitly cited Libya as an important model as Washington pushes for change in the policy of other countries, notably Iran and North Korea. Every situation is of course different. But the Libyan experience shows what can be done through negotiation when there is goodwill on both sides. Iranian balance This news will only bolster those in Washington - in the think-tanks and on Capitol Hill - who argue that the Bush administration should be more willing to explore whether direct talks with Tehran are possible. Iran put out feelers concerning potential talks back in 2003 That was at a time when US forces had occupied much of both Afghanistan and Iraq and the Iranians felt under huge pressure. Their overture was rebuffed. Today Iran feels that the regional strategic balance has to some extent shifted in its favour. The Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's curious letter to President Bush notwithstanding, there seems little sign at the moment of a desire in Tehran for a wide-ranging dialogue with Washington. Equally, the Bush administration too seems to have set itself against pursuing such contacts. Nonetheless the experience with Libya shows that seemingly intractable problems can be grappled with by diplomatic means. But bear in mind one distinctive feature of the 2003 Libya talks, in which British officials played a prominent role. They went on for months in total secrecy. If you want diplomatic happy endings, then megaphone diplomacy and the glare of the media spotlight probably have to take a back seat.

Libië

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3566545.stm

Tony Blair says Libya's Muammar Gaddafi is willing to join Britain in the fight against terrorism. | | The pair met in a Bedouin tent outside Tripoli After shaking hands with Colonel Gaddafi at the start of the historic talks, the prime minister said there was real hope for a "new relationship". People should not forget the past, they should move beyond it, Mr Blair said. Thursday's Tripoli meeting follows Libya's renunciation of weapons of mass destruction in December. Mr Blair said such changes were "extraordinary". After the talks took place Mr Blair headed to an EU summit in Brussels set to be dominated by the issue of security in the wake of the Madrid terror attack. As Mr Blair met Mr Gaddafi, it was announced Anglo-Dutch oil giant Shell had signed a deal worth up to £550m for gas exploration rights off the Libyan coast. It was also announced that British police officers would travel to Libya on 3 April to continue investigations into the murder of Pc Yvonne Fletcher. The police officer is thought to have been shot dead by a gunman inside the Libyan embassy as she helped police a demonstration outside it in 1984. Mr Blair 's Tripoli visit has been criticised by some politicians and received a mixed response from relatives of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing. Asked if he had felt queasy about meeting Colonel Gaddafi, Mr Blair said: "It was strange given the history to come here and do this and of course I am conscious of the pain that people have suffered as a result of terrorist actions in the past. "But the world is changing and we have got to do everything we possibly can to tackle the security threat that faces us." That meant pursuing terror groups but also offering partnership to states renouncing terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Mr Blair said he had been struck by how Colonel Gaddafi wanted to make "common cause with us against al-Qaeda, extremists and terrorism". He insisted he was aware of potential pitfalls. "Trust on both sides will take time to establish," he argued. "But the signs are better than they have been for many years. And the future prize in terms of security not just of this region but the wider world - indeed our own country - is great." Greetings Earlier, Mr Blair greeted the Libyan leader in a Bedouin tent on the outskirts of Tripoli, saying: "It's good to be here at last after so many months." Colonel Gaddafi spoke first in Arabic before switching to English to tell the prime minister: "You did a lot of fighting on this issue and seem exhausted." Mr Blair replied: "There's been a lot to do." The Libyan leader added: "You look good, you are still young." It is the first visit by a British prime minister since 1943 and comes after US Assistant Secretary of State William Burns this week became the most senior American to visit since the 1969 coup which brought Colonel Gaddafi to power. BBC News political editor Andrew Marr said: "This is an absolutely pivotal moment in the history of the region, possibly even in the history of the war against terrorism." In addition to Shell, other British firms have already begun tapping the opportunities in Libya. Among them is defence contractor BAE Systems, which says it is in talks over aviation projects. | || | UK-LIBYA KEY DATES World War II: Winston Churchill visits Libya 1984: Wpc Fletcher shot outside Libyan Embassy 1988: Lockerbie bombing kills 270 people April 1999: Libya hands over Lockerbie suspects to UN July 1999: Britain restores diplomatic relations after Libya accepts "general responsibility" for Wpc Fletcher murder 2002: Foreign Office Minister Mike O'Brien meets Gaddafi in first visit by British minister since 1969 coup August 2003: Libya accepts responsibility for Lockerbie and agrees to pay compensation December 2003: Gaddafi renounces weapons of mass destruction programmes February 2004: Libyan foreign minister visits London, plans for Tony Blair's visit announced Tony Blair's visit to Libya has divided families of those killed at Lockerbie. American Kathleen Flynn, whose son John Patrick died, said she found the trip was "insulting". But Jim Swire, of the UK Families Flight 103 campaign group, said the visit would "greatly diminish the chances of a backsliding of support for terrorism". UK opposition leader Michael Howard said it was very odd timing for Mr Blair to visit Libya straight from a memorial service for those killed by terrorists in Madrid. Mr Howard said he did not oppose contact with Libya but thought it should have been at a less senior level. Liberal Democrat foreign affairs spokesman Sir Menzies Campbell said the potential prize of helping Libya "in from the cold" made Mr Blair's risk worth taking.

Libië

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7047627.stm

Five countries have secured terms as non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. | | The council can authorise sanctions and the use of force in conflicts Libya, Vietnam, Burkina Faso were elected to the UN's top body unopposed, in a UN general assembly secret ballot. Croatia and Costa Rica won seats after their respective rivals, Czech Republic and Dominican Republic, withdrew. Nations compete keenly for council membership. The five permanent members - France, Britain, China, the US and Russia - can veto any candidate. The 10 non-permanent seats on the 15-member council are allocated according to regional groupings. Five members are replaced every year, with each serving a two-year term. Regional balance Libya and Burkina Faso were endorsed by the African group and faced no opposition. Vietnam ran unopposed, with endorsement from the Asian grouping. Croatia and Costa Rica failed to secure a two-thirds majority of votes in the first two rounds of voting. They won their posts after their rivals pulled out in the third round. | || | NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS Belgium - until end of 2008 Indonesia - until end of 2008 Italy - until end of 2008 Panama - until end of 2008 South Africa - until end of 2008 Burkina Faso - until end of 2009 Libya - until end of 2009 Vietnam - until end of 2009 Costa Rica - until end of 2009 Croatia - until end of 2009 Libya's ambassador to the UN, Giadalla Ettalhi, hailed the result as a special moment for his country: "I think for us it has a very important meaning, being elected to the Security Council by a very high score," Mr Ettalhi said. "It means, I can say, we are back to the international community, that all the problems we have faced in the past are now behind us." The aim is to achieve a regional balance, with five Asian or African members, two from Latin America, one eastern European and two members from western Europe or other regions. Last year's Latin America ballot lasted for more than three weeks, after an epic 47 rounds of voting failed to choose a winner between Venezuela and US-backed Guatemala. Panama was eventually selected as a compromise candidate. Some countries announce their candidacy many years in advance and actively lobby for votes. The council has the power to introduce sanctions regimes and authorise the use of force in conflicts.

Libië

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6903336.stm

| | | | The imprisonment of the medics has caused an international outcry Death sentences on six foreign medics convicted of infecting Libyan children with HIV have been commuted to life in prison by Libya's top legal body. The High Judicial Council ruling came after the families of the 438 children agreed a compensation deal reportedly worth $1m (£500,000) per child. Talks are expected to open on Wednesday on the transfer of the six to Bulgaria. The five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor, who were convicted in 2004, maintain their innocence. Libya's foreign minister said Tripoli was willing to consider the medics' transfer to Bulgaria but that it would take place in "the legal framework and political context" between the two countries. "There is a legal co-operation agreement between Libya and Bulgaria, and we don't mind that the Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor benefit from it," Abdel-Rahman Shalqam told the Associated Press news agency. | || | TRIAL IN DATES 1999: 19 Bulgarian medics and a Palestinian doctor are arrested at a Benghazi hospital after an outbreak of HIV/Aids among children. 13 are later freed May 2004: Libya convicts and sentences five Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor for infecting children with HIV. A Bulgarian doctor is freed Dec 2005: Libyan Supreme Court overturns the convictions and orders a retrial Dec 2006: Medics sentenced to death a second time Feb 2007: Medics appeal to the Libyan Supreme Court June 2007: Top EU officials hold talks in Libya to try to secure medics' release 11 July 2007: Libya's Supreme Court upholds death sentences He added that the conditions of the infected children and their families should be a consideration in the transfer deal. Bulgaria's Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin said negotiations on the transfer of the six prisoners to Sofia would begin on Wednesday. "This decision is a big step in the right direction... For us the case will end once they come back to Bulgaria," he said. The Palestinian doctor has been granted Bulgarian citizenship to allow him to benefit from any transfer deal. Libya's Supreme Court last week upheld their 2004 death sentences, placing the medics' fate with the High Judicial Council. The council, a semi-political body, has the power to commute sentences or issue pardons. 'Deflecting criticism' At the weekend the medics signed a letter of request for pardon and mercy, as well as a document ruling out any further legal action against the Libyan state over the prison time they have so far served. A spokesman for the relatives, Idriss Lagha, said that all the families had now received compensation. The payout is reportedly coming from an international fund which the Libyan government, the European Union and other organisations are contributing to. The medics were convicted of deliberately injecting 438 children with HIV-tainted blood. Fifty-six children have since died. The six, who have been in prison since 1999, say they were tortured to confess. Foreign experts say the infections started before the medics arrived at the hospital, and are more likely to have been a result of poor hygiene. Bulgaria, its allies in the European Union, and the United States say Libya has used the case to deflect criticism from its run-down health service. They have also suggested that not freeing the nurses could carry a diplomatic price for Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who is seeking to emerge from more than three decades of diplomatic isolation.

Libië

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6912965.stm

| | | | The medics were greeted by tearful relatives and well-wishers Six Bulgarian medical workers who were imprisoned in Libya for deliberately infecting children with HIV have arrived in Bulgaria after being freed. The five nurses and a Palestinian-born doctor, who served eight years of the life sentences they received, had always maintained they were innocent. All six were pardoned on their arrival by Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov. The release was made possible by a deal struck in Tripoli on improving Libya-EU ties, following years of negotiations. The EU's External Affairs Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, made many trips to Libya, meeting the prisoners and working to improve conditions for children infected with HIV/Aids. French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his wife, Cecilia, were also involved in the final negotiations. Mr Sarkozy is now scheduled to visit Libya on Wednesday and meet the country's leader, Muammar Gaddafi, to discuss Tripoli's re-integration into the international community. 'We kept hoping' On their arrival aboard a French government plane at Sofia airport, the medics were greeted on the tarmac by tearful relatives and well-wishers. One of the nurses, Snezhana Dimitrova, declared: "I lived for this moment. "It's as if this had never been... as if I had never been guilty of anything. I am happy now." Another nurse, Kristiana Valcheva, said the six were informed of their impending release shortly before dawn. "They told us at four in the morning. They woke me up. At a quarter to six we passed through the big gate of the prison and we were taken to the VIP area of the airport and to the French plane." Despite years in prison, Ms Valcheva said the group had always kept hoping they would be freed. "You know that hope dies last. We always had hope, although we were quite sceptical and were afraid to say it," she said. At least one other Bulgarian, Zdravko Georgiev, the husband of one of the nurses who was held under house arrest in Libya, also returned home with the group. Compensation confusion European politicians hailed the release of the medics. Ms Ferrero-Waldner said it marked "a new page in the history of relations between the EU and Libya". Mr Sarkozy and the EU denied making any financial payment to secure the medics' release. However, the families of the 438 infected children reportedly agreed last week to a compensation deal worth $1m (£500,000) per child, channelled through Gaddafi Foundation, a charity run by Seif al-Islam, the Libyan leader's son. Libya's foreign minister said both the EU and France had contributed to the fund, AFP reported. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said the EU could now begin to normalise trade and political ties with Libya. The European market could now be opened to Libyan farm and fishery produce, and there could be co-operation in archaeology, education, and healthcare for the Libyan children infected with HIV. Citizenship President Parvanov said he was satisfied with the release of the medics. "The dramatic case with the sentenced innocent Bulgarian citizens is at its end. We are still sympathetic with the other tragedy - the one of the infected Libyan children and their families," he said. | | The deal follows years of efforts by Ms Ferrero-Waldner The Palestinian doctor, Ashraf Alhajouj, was granted Bulgarian citizenship last month to allow him to benefit from any transfer deal. He is now expected to travel to the Netherlands to visit his family. The medics were convicted of deliberately injecting the 438 children with HIV-tainted blood. Fifty-six of the children have since died. The six, who had been in prison since 1999, say they were tortured to confess. Foreign experts say the infections started before the medics arrived at the hospital, and are more likely to have been a result of poor hygiene. Bulgaria, its allies in the EU and the US say Libya has used the case to deflect criticism from its run-down health service.

Libië

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/feb/19/libya-against-itself/

Gentle Islamism? Mahdi al-Herati is sipping his lemon tea in the open-air café beneath the grand Italian porticos of Algiers Square in Tripoli. He seems a little too casual to be either an international jihadi or the elected mayor of the capital city of a country supposedly rescued from Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and sliding into civil war. Still, Herati is both, although he prefers to call himself a Libyan revolutionary. Since becoming mayor last year, he tells me, he has invited his counterparts in Dublin and Rome to "twin" with Tripoli under its new rulers, the group called Libya Dawn. He has taken other steps to counter Libya Dawn's reputation for Islamism. He speaks of his efforts to drum up support from local writers and actors for an arts festival he has planned promoting Tripoli as a cosmopolitan Mediterranean capital of culture. Herati plans to reopen the movie houses that Qaddafi closed in an earlier revolution. His men protect the national museum, he says, which is crammed full of ancient pagan statues. A new spa for women is opening. And yes, he tells me, his festival will include female as well as male performers and spectators. The capital, he says with only an occasional look over his shoulder and at his two security guards, is safe. The Libya Dawn coalition Herati belongs to overran the capital after six weeks of bombardment last summer. Many of its leaders are former militiamen from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the jihadi movement that after fighting the unbelievers in alliance with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan turned their guns on Qaddafi and his army. But allied with them are such unlikely bedfellows as merchants from Misrata, a Mediterranean port dependent on trade with Europe, and the Imazighen, or Berber revivalists, whose leaders are either secularists or adherents of a small reformist sect, Ibadiyya, dating back to the first decades of Islam, that opposed the supremacy of the Prophet Muhammad's Arabian tribe and elected its own leaders. As in the time of Qaddafi, words and reality in postrevolutionary Libya often seem to inhabit separate spheres. Twenty minutes before landing in Tripoli, women returning from Egypt drape their highlighted hair and designer jeans in black cloth. The women at passport control have gone, and the man in charge of immigration is the one with the bushiest beard. Inside the city, Muslim iconoclasts are purging the capital of its colonial-era images. Soon after capturing the capital in August, they fired a shell through the belly of the Bride of the Sea, a sculpture of a bare-breasted mermaid entwined with a tender gazelle, which since Italian times had served as a backdrop for wedding photos. And last month they stole the sculpture itself. Herati only got it back because the thieves could be traced by the cameras Qaddafi hid in the capital's roadside trees. For now, though, he says, it is safer for it to remain under wraps. Other monuments in the capital are disappearing too. The three tombs of Ottoman mystics that graced the entrance of the eighteenth-century Ahmed Pasha Qaramanli mosque at the entrance of the souk have been smashed, and replaced with an already overgrown patch of grass. Islamists have snapped off the antique Koranic inscriptions in the souk's other old mosques, lest believers be led astray into polytheism by venerating the ornaments instead of God alone. Libya Dawn's officials blame the attacks on the local followers of a Saudi scholar, Rabi' al-Mudkhali. He works, says an official, with Saudi intelligence, seeking to tarnish the name of Islamist groups that do not follow Saudi's puritanical doctrines or more importantly their politics. Others suggest that acolytes of Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's Islamic State, or ISIS, are finding a foothold thanks to Libya Dawn's relaxed approach to Islamic extremists. I failed to find evidence of the Islamic State cadres that had been reported in Tripoli, but cafés frequented by couples have been torched and embassies car-bombed. A couple of days after I left Tripoli, a gunman shot dead an unveiled woman driving home near the city center. Lest anyone be tempted to investigate, in mid-November Libya Dawn raided the National Commission for Human Rights, seized its database, and padlocked its doors. Tripoli's distraught population might have welcomed anyone bringing a semblance of order, including the ghost of Qaddafi. But three months into its rule, Libya Dawn's honeymoon is fading. My first night in the capital was blissfully free of explosions. Libya Dawn had sent text messages to residents' mobile phones banning not just gunfire but fireworks. But the following night, Tripoli's gunpowder orchestra began its familiar crescendo. The criminal gangs who had largely gone underground after Libya Dawn took over again began trying their luck. Advertisement Driving back into town after a meeting in Café di Roma, a popular rendezvous in an upmarket suburb, I was caught in the crossfire after a local Islamist militia—connected with Libya Dawn—clashed with local drug barons. The young men in a neighboring open-air café went on watching televised soccer, so common were such shootings. Husbands continued their shopping, and drivers waited at traffic lights with almost exaggerated decorum. Libyans feel even more isolated than when the UN imposed sanctions on Qaddafi. The civil society that briefly emerged after the colonel's downfall has all but disappeared. Each activist can reel off the names of colleagues shot dead or kidnapped, often by Islamists. "My husband hates guns, and vowed he would never get one," says my friend from the Café di Roma, who is an economist. "Last week for the first time he brought one home." Exiles who jubilantly if naively returned to build a new post-Qaddafi order have almost all left. Many more would have gone with them had Europe's consulates not all withdrawn and with them any hope of a visa. Libya's neighbors periodically close their borders. And flights out of Libya are in jeopardy too after rival armed groups began targeting the country's airports. Libya should be one of the world's richer states but many facilities and power stations have been set aflame as Libya Dawn battles for control of the oil terminals along the Gulf of Sirte coast. "The Revolution's leaders promised we would be like Dubai," says a civil servant who doubles as a taxi driver to make ends meet. "But private hotels that had opened in the last years of Qaddafi have shut down. There's no business. And where before we had one family who stole, now we have hundreds." Just like Qaddafi, Libya's rulers win power by seizing it. Although Herati himself was elected in local elections, his movement, Libya Dawn, is made up of the factions that fared badly in the June general election for Libya's parliament, the House of Representatives, and then took Tripoli by force. Libya Dawn vs. Dignity After they were displaced, the winners of the election fled to Libya's far east. A short distance shy of the border with Egypt, they seemed to be preparing for a last stand. From their seat of government in the hilltop city of Beida, ministers sit behind empty desks while a central bank governor with empty coffers signs ornate declarations for their Potemkin state. At one point, the parliamentarians took refuge in a ferry anchored off Tobruk, the coastal town nearest the border with Egypt. But by presenting their cause as a struggle for survival against jihadi Islam, they have found allies at home and abroad. They made an alliance with the remnants of the armed forces, which fought Islamists in the east under Qaddafi, and they launched a counter-attack they called Operation Karama, or Dignity. "There are two rival programs jostling for power in Libya," Mohammed Bazaza, the young spokesman of the Dignity security forces in Beida, tells me. "The Islamic state and the civil state. If we don't react now, [Libya's] terrorists are going to come across the Mediterranean to a place near you." Last year, he says, Ansar al-Sharia, the same group whose members killed the US ambassador, Christopher Stevens, on the eleventh anniversary of al-Qaeda's attacks in America, killed his father, a security chief in Benghazi, the east's provincial capital and birthplace of the 2011 revolution. The group planted a bomb in his car, and then for good measure set off another bomb at his funeral. Islamists are carrying out similar attacks all along Libya's Mediterranean coast, he insists, lumping together all groups from the Muslim Brotherhood to al-Qaeda. In Derna, an old Ottoman garrison town on the coast below Beida, some militiamen have declared allegiance to al-Baghdadi's Islamic State and are carrying out his signature beheadings. (In fact this is only a fraction of those killed by a staunch Western ally, Saudi Arabia, which reportedly has decapitated three score people this year alone.) Leading the Dignity counterattack is Khalifa Haftar, who as a young army officer helped Qaddafi launch his coup in 1969, and after commanding Libya's forces in a disastrous war on Chad fled to the United States. Some twenty-five years later, he seized on the 2011 revolution as an opportunity for staging a comeback. Though himself from a relatively small Bedouin Arab tribe, he wooed larger ones to his side, and last year he commandeered what remained of Qaddafi's army and turned to the region's anti-Islamist powers for support. Advertisement The Egyptian general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who overthrew Egypt's elected Islamists and made himself president, offered to supply Haftar's forces with both arms and training. The United Arab Emirates, a Gulf state, paid them. And both drummed up international support. On his first visit to Europe as president, Sisi warned of the "extremely dangerous jihadist bases" in Libya and called on Western powers to give supplies to Dignity's General Haftar as part of their war on terror, despite the UN arms embargo. "Aid, equipment, training," he said, "must be sent to [Dignity's anti-Dawn army]." Haftar launched Dignity's first operation in May in Benghazi, Libya's unruly second city, where Islamist jihadis, tribesmen, and student revolutionaries all jostled for control. The results were initially meager. He dealt with snipers by shelling the apartment blocks from which they were shooting. The tactic was counterproductive, creating more opponents than it killed. But when he acquired spare parts for the army's aging fighter jets, the battle lines began to shift. Air strikes helped him capture much of Benghazi and project his strength deep into the west of the country. He intermittently cut off Libya Dawn's exits by bombing the land crossing to Tunis and bombing Tripoli's airport as passengers were preparing to board planes. Piqued and irate, the head of Libya Dawn's government in Tripoli, Omar al-Hasi, who before the war was a geography professor, rallied to the side of Haftar's foes in the east, Ansar al-Sharia, the killers of Christopher Stevens, calling them "amiable revolutionaries." In the lobby of the Tripoli hotel where al-Hasi has set up his Dawn government, his ministers and commanders congregate, encouraging militiamen to plant more car bombs. Indeed hundreds of miles to the east, glass litters the parking lot of the former royal palace in Beida that now serves as the seat of the constitutional assembly. Convoked by Dignity, its defiant chairman, Ali Tarhouni, says he has survived fourteen attempted assassinations. A short drive away, Dignity's deputy prime minister looks out of his window disconcertedly at the upturned breeze blocks placed every ten yards or so beneath his office. These are security measures taken since a car bomb exploded a week before we met. "Terrorists will always find a way through," he says glumly. At the same time, Libya Dawn's forces have been advancing east toward their beleagured allies, besieged by Haftar's forces in Benghazi while setting on fire the country's main oil terminals along the Mediterranean Gulf of Sirte. Black plumes of burning oil from the country's largest terminal at Sidra waft toward Europe over more than seventy miles. As the stakes rise, the efforts of the UN envoy, Bernardino León, to mediate a compromise repeatedly falter. According to Libya Body Count, which uses press reports to keep a tally of all deaths since January 2014, 2,500 people were killed just in the past six months of fighting. The scale of the terror and destruction on both sides far surpasses that of Qaddafi's last years. One wonders how many of the Westerners who cheered on the war against him recognize this. An Ethnic Divide? It was always unrealistic to expect Libyans to emerge overnight from four decades of whimsical dictatorship into a state of democratic institutions. Western powers provided the military support to oust the colonel, but myopically not the civilian support to put a workable administration in his place. When civilians tried to erect a modern state themselves, warlords from the different parts of Libya easily bypassed the elections that had been held and seized power in the name of whatever cause they hoped might attract support. Some militia leaders justify their recourse to arms as a battle against jihadi Islamists or the remnants of the Qaddafi regime. Others claim to defend whatever tribal, religious, or ethnic group might win them local constituencies. They have tried to revive traditional myths in order to cultivate fresh loyalties. In the process a once relatively homogeneous society has splintered into multiple bickering armed groups. The irrepressible rise of Libya's many contending forces is one of the enigmas of the 2011 revolution. When Libyans first revolted, they counted among their blessings that they had few of the cleavages of sect and ethnicity that divided other Arab states. Through intermarriage, relocation for work, and Qaddafi's deliberate jumbling of ethnic groups, many Libyans had multiple associations spanning the country's vast terrain. Yet The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath, a compilation edited by Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn, British analysts of Libya, is a timely acknowledgment that Libya's chemistry is older than the laboratory Qaddafi fashioned. The book traces not only the colonel's demise, as many others have done, but the appearance of a lesser-known new cast. Written almost entirely by foreign experts, some of whom know the different factions intimately, it is the most detailed account I have read of the old forces shaping new Libya. Chapter by chapter, it analyzes each of the "sub-national identities" jostling for influence, and the communal narratives their representatives use to promote their claims. They include Libya's Islamists, the merchants of Misrata, the Arab Bedouin tribes concentrated in the Green Mountains of the east, the indigenous Imazighen (i.e., Berbers) in the west, and the two ethnic groups of Libya's slice of the Sahara—the Tuareg and Tubu. Libya in its current shape is a recent, fragile construct, originating in Italy's invasion of 1911, exactly a century before the Arab Spring. It has been fracturing and reuniting ever since. Unable to overcome the Arab Bedouin tribes in the east, Italy's first wave of colonizers sanctioned the creation of an autonomous Emirate of Cyrenaica. In 1929 Benito Mussolini tried again, and succeeded by imprisoning tens of thousands of Bedouins in concentration camps, where half of them died. After World War II, the British backed the revival of the Cyrenaican emirate replete with a king, Idris I. But the discovery of oil, whose fields and pipelines straddled boundaries, drew Libya's disparate provinces into ever closer union. In 1951, Cyrenaica established a federation with the Fezzan region in the south, hitherto under French hegemony, and Tripolitania in the northwest, also under the British. King Idris added a green and a red band below and above his black flag with a white crescent. And in 1963, under King Idris, Libya abolished the federation and declared itself a single unified state. For forty-two years, Qaddafi, who called himself Il Duce with overtones of Mussolini, suppressed these separate identities. But once he had fallen, vulnerable Libyans floundering for some means of protection turned to their closest kin. In Tripoli each district of the city assembled its armed wing. Islamists organized anti-vice squads, and the Imazighen established "rapid deployment forces" to support neighborhoods with high concentrations of Berbers. Libya's new power brokers revived and inflamed ancient grievances to consolidate their hold. In a hollow beneath the crest of the Green Mountains lies Cyrene, a Hellenistic city about 130 miles east of Benghazi. In ruins since the seventh century, it was once dubbed the Athens of Africa because of its many ancient philosophers. In Cyrene it is possible briefly to forget the encroaching war. Families displaced by the fighting find relief sharing a picnic amid the city's lost grandeur. Boys dive into Apollo's pools where Caesar once wooed Cleopatra. Lovers, with the young women sometimes fully veiled, slip into the shadows between the columns of Mithra's temple to hold hands. And professors from the nearby highland town of Beida regale each other with Bedouin verse, a pre-Islamic tradition reviled by Islamists, while swigging home-brewed grappa, one of colonial Italy's more enduring legacies. "I've tried to bandage the pain of my love, but the wound just grows deeper," sings Salah, a lecturer on urban planning who helps Haftar's generals draw their battle maps. On our way back to Beida, the lecturer, with alcohol-induced clarity, questions the notion that the conflict is a battle between Libya Dawn's Islamists and Dignity's old security apparatchiks. "No one here believes it. We have our Islamists, they have theirs. Ours were the first to officially adopt sharia law, after Qaddafi was killed." At Beida's Turkish restaurant, he introduces me to his friends—bank managers, delegates to Dignity's constitutional assembly, and more university professors, who despite their disparate professions all recite proud verses about their Bedouin past. The current conflict, they insist, is primarily an epic struggle as old as Islam, between, on the one hand, Bedouin Arab nomadic tribes of the hinterland, and on the other, Libyans living on the coast. While they celebrate the troubadours and swordsmen of their Bedouin forebears, they disparage their coastal rivals who have rallied to the side of Libya Dawn. A lawyer who took up arms curses them for having been bastardized by mingling with indigenous Berbers inhabiting the west and with the waves of colonizers who have washed up on Libya's shores, and reduced them to effete, urbanized taxpayers. Reciting from al-Sirah al-Hilaliyya, an Arab bard's answer to the Song of Roland, they tell of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym, who surged out of Arabia in the eleventh century and swept aside the bourgeoisie in Cyrenaica and beyond. The Banu Hilal Arabs settled in the east; the Banu Sulaym Arabs in the west. When Libya's Revolution erupted in 2011, the Bedouin Arabs saw their chance for a second coming. The bank manager joined his Bedouin Arab tribesmen from the Green Mountains. With arms in the trunk of his SUV he raced toward Benghazi, while the Bedouin Arabs' counterparts in Zintan, a Bedouin town in the Nafusa Mountains, established their hold over the capital Tripoli, eighty-five miles north on the coast. But others besides the Bedouin Arabs sought their share, too. Last July the disparate militias from the coastal cities, the Berber towns, and Islamist movements concentrated in the west joined forces, creating the coalition of Libya Dawn, and forced the Bedouin tribes to retrench. Back in Beida, Salah the urban-planning expert and his Arab kinsmen dream of reviving the dominance they enjoyed when Cyrenaica was an emirate under the king and the Arab tribes ran his army. They hope to reconstitute such a force under Haftar, and look to him to crush the revolt of non-Arab settlers on the coast below. It oversimplifies, of course, to reduce Libya's conflict into a battle between Bedouin Arab tribes and Libyans of other ethnic groups Arabized over centuries. Some Bedouins hold senior positions in Libya Dawn, and Berbers can be found fighting for Dignity. But increasingly, the rank-and-file on both sides paint the conflict in stark ethnic colors. The Bedouin professor Salah and many like him dismiss their opponents in the east as settlers from the west brought by colonizers over the centuries to weaken the Arab tribes. The family of Wissam ben Hamid, a militia leader fighting Haftar's Dignity forces in Benghazi, he notes derisively, comes from Misrata. Surrounded by Berber towns, the 40,000 Arabs of Zintan increasingly see themselves as a Bedouin fringe left out on a limb in the Nafusa mountains of the west. They have rapidly shed the alliance they formed with their Berber neighbors to unseat Qaddafi in the heady months of 2011, and allied themselves with the Arab Bedouin and their armed forces in the east. With the help of the United Arab Emirates, the Zintani Arabs repulsed a two-month offensive by Libya Dawn's militias drawn from western cities ten times its size. We feel we are waging an existential battle, a young Zintani man tells me. The Berbers, he says, have never forgiven the Arabs for killing their Berber Jewish queen, Kahina, when the first generation of Muslims spilled out of Arabia in the seventh century. Berber revivalists, too, paint their struggle as a similarly ancient tug of war against 1,400 years of Arabization. They have turned to Berbers in neighboring Algeria as well as large diaspora communities in Europe to combat pan-Arabism. "While we look to the Maghreb [west North Africa], the Arabs look to the Mashreq [the Middle East]," says Wael, a Berber activist in Tripoli, who reprimands me severely when I speak of the Arab Spring. "North Africa's spring," he corrects me. The recourse to politics pitting different ethnic and religious groups against one another is sowing schisms across Libya's vast terrain. The World Amazigh (or Berber) Congress demands minority rights and autonomy in the west. Meanwhile officials in Beida, who furtively whispered support for federalism a year ago, now openly broach the prospect of partition. With only a third of Libya's population, but two thirds of its oil fields, most of its aquifers, and the country's gold mines bordering Egypt, Cyrenaican separatists dream of the untold riches that lie ahead if they separate from the west. An alliance with the Jibarna, another Arab tribal federation hugging the Gulf of Sidra, would ensure control over the country's main oil terminals. One of the Dignity representatives in Beida who is drafting the new constitution says that Cyrenaica "is part of the Middle East. Tripoli is part of the Maghreb [i.e., North Africa]. Historically, there's no such thing as Libya." Reconciliation? No doubt the next time I visit Libya, the country's constellation of alliances will have shifted again. Bedouin tribes who rose up against Qaddafi in the east might have tired of producing a new crop of colonels to rule them. The UN's decision to blacklist Libya's more radical Islamist movements might prompt Berbers and people from Misrata to withdraw from their alliance with Libya Dawn. Communal conflicts that seem so unsolvable when one listens to the invective on their rival satellite televisions have an odd way of melting away once dialogue starts. Bernardino León, the UN's special envoy to Libya, recalls how careful he was to separate the negotiating parties before the start of the discussions he organized on the Algerian border last September, only to be taken aback when they bumped into each other in the hotel lobby and hugged and kissed. He points to the commitment he has received from the various Libyan spokesmen that they will pay for up to six thousand UN peacekeepers should they succeed in agreeing on local cease-fires and on a constitutional system of government for a new Libya. Sadly, it seems likely that the toll on Libya's wealth and human life will rise further before the rivals tire of demonizing each other's ethnic and religious identities, and resorting to external support for a confrontation with militant Islam that only radicalizes the factions and deepens Libya's civil war. —January 22, 2015

Libië

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/libyan-politicians-sign-un-peace-deal-unify-rival-governments

A group of Libyan politicians have signed a UN-sponsored peace deal that nominally unifies the country's two rival governments, despite being denounced as illegitimate by some of the groups the agreement is meant to unite. Members of Libya's two competing parliaments met in Morocco to sign the deal which supporters say will hasten the end of an 18-month civil war, as well as five years of political violence that followed [the uprising against the former dictator, Muammar Gaddafi](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/20/muammar-gaddafi-dies-city-birth). Western powers hope a united Libya will allow the country's warring militias to instead focus on eradicating an Islamic State franchise that has seized power on parts of the country's coast. But the sustainability of the deal has been thrown into doubt after key players not present at the signing ceremony said it was an agreement forced on Libya by external powers. Britain hopes the unity government, to be run by a nine-strong presidency, will invite western powers to mount airstrikes against Isis positions, allowing David Cameron to avoid [another Commons vote](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2015/dec/02/syria-airstrikes-mps-debate-vote-cameron-action-against-isis-live) before dispatching RAF jets. The deal was accepted on Thursday by some members of Libya Dawn, [the rebel coalition that seized power in Tripoli in July 2014](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/31/tripoli-residents-libya-dawn-islamist-militias) and forced the internationally recognised government to retreat to the eastern city of Tobruk. But Jamal Zubia, the rebel government spokesman, claimed those who signed the unity deal did not speak for the Tripoli faction and were merely puppets for the international community. "People who are signing this UN draft – none of them have any authority. When you send unauthorised people to sign, it's a fake document," Zubia said. He added: "If they want a democratic country, they must do it in a democratic way – they can't force us to accept it. If they want to make it a colony, then call it a colony, but don't pass it to us as a gift from the UN." Other factions were more supportive. Hatem al-Oraibi, the spokesman for the Tobruk government, said: "We support all the efforts that are being done for the sake of reunifying Libya during this critical phase." Analysts warn the unity government will face many of the same problems that the previous internationally recognised government faced. Without a cohesive state-run police force and army under its control, the new government may not be able to meet in Tripoli without the support of sympathetic militias. This could perpetuate the involvement of militias in political affairs, an unstable arrangement that goes against the long-term goals of the peace deal. [Frederic Wehrey](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=709), a Libya specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "The danger is that it becomes yet another third body that has to meet outside the capital or even worse outside the country. There is a plan for [local] armed actors to help secure the new government. But the problem is that the actual army and police are quite weak so we would be relying on militias again. "And that's the larger issue – how do you create a security force under the control of the authorities, while at the same time demobilising the militias?"

Libië

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/libyan-politicians-sign-un-peace-deal-unify-rival-governments

A group of Libyan politicians have signed a UN-sponsored peace deal that nominally unifies the country's two rival governments, despite being denounced as illegitimate by some of the groups the agreement is meant to unite. Members of Libya's two competing parliaments met in Morocco to sign the deal which supporters say will hasten the end of an 18-month civil war, as well as five years of political violence that followed [the uprising against the former dictator, Muammar Gaddafi](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/20/muammar-gaddafi-dies-city-birth). Western powers hope a united Libya will allow the country's warring militias to instead focus on eradicating an Islamic State franchise that has seized power on parts of the country's coast. But the sustainability of the deal has been thrown into doubt after key players not present at the signing ceremony said it was an agreement forced on Libya by external powers. Britain hopes the unity government, to be run by a nine-strong presidency, will invite western powers to mount airstrikes against Isis positions, allowing David Cameron to avoid [another Commons vote](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2015/dec/02/syria-airstrikes-mps-debate-vote-cameron-action-against-isis-live) before dispatching RAF jets. The deal was accepted on Thursday by some members of Libya Dawn, [the rebel coalition that seized power in Tripoli in July 2014](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/31/tripoli-residents-libya-dawn-islamist-militias) and forced the internationally recognised government to retreat to the eastern city of Tobruk. But Jamal Zubia, the rebel government spokesman, claimed those who signed the unity deal did not speak for the Tripoli faction and were merely puppets for the international community. "People who are signing this UN draft – none of them have any authority. When you send unauthorised people to sign, it's a fake document," Zubia said. He added: "If they want a democratic country, they must do it in a democratic way – they can't force us to accept it. If they want to make it a colony, then call it a colony, but don't pass it to us as a gift from the UN." Other factions were more supportive. Hatem al-Oraibi, the spokesman for the Tobruk government, said: "We support all the efforts that are being done for the sake of reunifying Libya during this critical phase." Analysts warn the unity government will face many of the same problems that the previous internationally recognised government faced. Without a cohesive state-run police force and army under its control, the new government may not be able to meet in Tripoli without the support of sympathetic militias. This could perpetuate the involvement of militias in political affairs, an unstable arrangement that goes against the long-term goals of the peace deal. [Frederic Wehrey](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=709), a Libya specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "The danger is that it becomes yet another third body that has to meet outside the capital or even worse outside the country. There is a plan for [local] armed actors to help secure the new government. But the problem is that the actual army and police are quite weak so we would be relying on militias again. "And that's the larger issue – how do you create a security force under the control of the authorities, while at the same time demobilising the militias?"

Libië

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/23/why-libya-election-got-postponed

Why Libya's election got postponed: A quick guide A look at the factors that have forced Libya to postpone a vote seen as crucial to end its 10-year-long crisis. Libyans were scheduled to head to the polls on Friday for a presidential election that had long been marred by mounting challenges and disputes over rules and regulations. After months of uncertainty, [Libya](/where/libya/)'s electoral commission on Wednesday [suggested](/news/2021/12/22/libya-tensions-rise-as-election-all-but-set-to-be-delayed) the polls be pushed back by a month, as a parliamentary committee tasked with overseeing the process said it was impossible to hold the vote as originally planned. Keep readinglist of 3 items [Has the political process in Libya failed?](/program/inside-story/2021/12/21/has-political-process-in-libya-failed?traffic_source=KeepReading) [Libya electoral commission dissolves poll committees](/news/2021/12/21/libya-electoral-commission-dissolves-poll-committees?traffic_source=KeepReading) Below, we take a look at some of the obstacles that have prevented the long-waited vote from happening and the challenges that lie ahead. Why did the election get postponed? The divided political class that emerged in the wake of the 2011 NATO-backed uprising against longtime ruler [Muammar Gaddafi ](/tag/muammar-gaddafi/)could not agree on the rules overseeing the election. Furthermore, they failed to reach a consensus on what powers a new president or parliament would have and who could run in the vote. Parliament speaker Aguila Saleh, who is a presidential candidate, issued a law setting a first round of the presidential election for December 24, followed by a runoff vote – if needed – and parliamentary polls. Putting the presidential vote first meant the election would come down to a winner-take-all contest between candidates from virulently opposing factions. Other political institutions rejected the law, accusing Saleh of passing the law without any proper parliamentary process. However, Saleh's law formed the basis of the electoral process and disputes over it grew even more as a number of divisive candidates entered the contest. Who are the main candidates? Some 98 candidates registered for the presidential race – including some who were seen as unacceptable by many in the country, including powerful armed factions. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of former leader Muammar Gaddafi, registered despite a 2015 conviction in absentia by a court in the capital, Tripoli, of war crimes during the rebellion that overthrew his father 10 years ago. Khalifa Haftar, a renegade military commander whose eastern-based forces waged a destructive 14-month offensive on Tripoli that ended last year, is rejected as a possible president by various armed factions and many people in western Libya. Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, the interim prime minister, had promised not to stand for election as a condition to taking on a caretaker role earlier this year. Other candidates say his presence on the ballot is unfair. For him to be eligible, Dbeibah would have needed to have suspended himself from governmental duties at least three months before the polling date, which he did not do. Without clear agreement on the rules, let alone on who would enforce them or adjudicate disputes, the electoral commission, the parliament's election committee and the fragmented judiciary were unable to agree on a final list of eligible candidates. What other challenges stand in the way of a vote? Most of Libya is controlled by armed forces that back rival candidates. Without extensive independent monitoring, there would likely be claims of fraud or voter intimidation. Two incidents last month showed the risks: Fighters closed a court to stop Gaddafi's lawyers lodging an appeal against his disqualification, while the electoral commission said fighters had raided several of its offices, stealing voting cards. A disputed result could rapidly unravel the peace process, replicating the aftermath of a 2014 election when warring factions backed rival administrations. What next? The electoral commission has proposed a one-month delay but the parliament may seek a longer one. Negotiations are continuing among the candidates, political institutions and foreign powers. On Thursday, the parliament ordered the formation of a committee to create a roadmap and submit their proposal within one week. A short delay may not be enough to resolve the arguments that derailed Friday's vote. However, fixing those problems could require more time, raising questions about whether the interim government could stay in place until a new election is held. The future of Dbeibah and his government during the coming period has rapidly become one of the main topics of dispute among rival camps. "We were expecting that the elections weren't going to happen on December 24, but now setting a new date will also be a contentious issue," Adel Karmous, a member of parliament, told Al Jazeera. "From a legal standpoint, the parliament must agree with the High Council of State on a new date. The question now is how long will the postponement be for? And will they come to an agreement on a constitutional framework?" Another conflict on the horizon? If the peace process falls apart there is a risk that eastern factions could again form a breakaway government at war with Dbeibah's administration in the capital, Tripoli. However, analysts think that is unlikely for now. The more immediate risk is that a political crisis could add fuel to local disputes between rival armed groups that have mobilised in western Libya in recent weeks, leading to a new round of fighting inside the capital.

Libië

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/libya

Amid tenuous United Nations-led peace talks, Libya's political and security crisis deepened as two rival governments competed for legitimacy, control of vital institutions, and international support. Despite some factions signing a political deal in December, there was no end in sight to the crisis. As armed clashes continued, the country edged towards a humanitarian crisis, with almost 400,000 people internally displaced and increasing disruption to basic services, such as power and fuel supplies. Forces engaged in the conflict continued with impunity to arbitrarily detain, torture, unlawfully kill, indiscriminately attack, abduct and disappear, and forcefully displace people from their homes. The domestic criminal justice system collapsed in most parts of the country, exacerbating the human rights crisis. Armed groups that pledged allegiance to the extremist group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) continued to commit serious human rights abuses, including unlawful killings and summary executions, and succeeded in expanding and gaining control over towns in the center of the country, including Sirte. The widescale breakdown in law and order enabled tens of thousands of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers to transit through Libya as they made their way towards Europe. In Libya, they faced violence, ill-treatment, and forced labor, while at least 3,100 died attempting to cross the Mediterranean in flimsy boats provided by networks of criminal people smugglers. Over 143,500 people arrived in Italy by boat from North Africa, the vast majority from Libya, between January 1 and end of November 2015. Armed Conflicts and War Crimes Armed conflicts continued to rage in the east, west, and south. In Benghazi, forces loyal to the internationally recognized government battled against a coalition of Islamist militias, including ISIS and Ansar al-Sharia. Some civilians remained trapped in the areas of fighting. In the west, forces allied with the self-declared government in Tripoli continued to clash with opposing groups based in western coastal areas. In the south, Tebu and Tuareg militias clashed intermittently. Warring factions indiscriminately shelled civilian areas, arbitrarily seized people, tortured and looted, burned, and otherwise destroyed civilian property in attacks that in some cases amounted to war crimes. Some forces also used cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines, which are internationally prohibited weapons. Political Process An UN-sponsored dialogue that spanned a year sought to achieve agreement on the formation of a government of national unity and an end to fighting. In December, some factions signed a political agreement in Skheirat, Morocco, designating a prime minister and a presidential council with a view to establishing a national unity government, and the UN Security Council passed a resolution recognizing this new entity as the sole legitimate Libyan government. However, by December the new entiy was operating from Tunisia due to key factions in Libya opposing the deal. In November, Martin Kobler took over as chief UN negotiator and special representative of the secretary-general in Libya. Those engaged in the dialogue included in the east, members of the internationally recognized government, the House of Representatives (HoR), Libyan National Army, and affiliated militias, and in the west, members of the rival Tripoli-based Government of National Unity, as well as the rump General National Congress (GNC) and a host of armed militias affiliated with the Libya Dawn alliance. The talks centered on a power-sharing agreement that would see the HoR remain as the main legislative authority, alongside a consultative State Council formed from GNC members. In practice, the rival authorities continued to operate parallel institutions from al-Bayda and Tripoli, effectively creating two separate administrations, with the former also creating its own national oil company, investment authority, and national bank. In May, Abdullah al-Thinni, head of the internationally recognized government, said he survived an assassination attempt in eastern Libya. In October, the HoR, the legislature of the internationally recognized government, voted to extend its term of office, which legally expired on October 21, without conducting new elections, leaving a possible constitutional vacuum. Constitution and Legislation Libya remains without a permanent constitution. The Constitution Drafting Assembly, elected in February 2014 to draft a new constitution, hampered by political infighting and a boycott by Amazigh groups, published a first draft in September 2015. Some political groups called for readopting the 1951 Constitution of the Libyan monarchy. The HoR failed to amend the counterterrorism law that it adopted in September 2014, although several provisions could be used to curtail free speech and rights to peaceful assembly and movement. The law prescribes harsh punishments for vaguely defined acts "that harm national unity," includes an overly broad definition of "terrorist acts," and stipulates life imprisonment for establishing or leading a "terrorist organization" and 10 years with hard labor for joining a "terrorist organization," without requiring any evidence of violence. In July, the HoR passed a General Amnesty Law. It stipulates that those who commit crimes of terrorism, rape, torture, corruption, and murder by race or ethnicity may not receive an amnesty. However, it fails to rule out amnesties for other serious human rights crimes, such as forced displacement, enforced disappearances, and unlawful killings. Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Deaths in Custody In what may amount to a crime against humanity, prison authorities and militias continued to arbitrarily detain thousands of Libyans and foreigners—including some held since 2011—without charges, trial, or due process rights, and ill-treat them in detention. Human Rights Watch gained rare access in April to detainees in facilities controlled by the military and Interior and Justice ministries in eastern Libya and in September interviewed detainees in prisons run by the Justice Ministry of the self-proclaimed government in Tripoli and Misrata. Although conditions varied, in most facilities, detainees reported torture and other ill-treatment, and in some, deaths in custody caused by abuse. In August, an online news site leaked video tapes in which officials and guards at al-Hadba Prison in Tripoli seemed to ill-treat several detainees, including al-Saadi Gaddafi, one of the sons of former leader Muammar Gaddafi. The General Prosecutor's Office announced an investigation into the incident. Criminal Justice System The criminal justice system collapsed or was dysfunctional: in the east, there were no prosecutions or trials, and in Tripoli, the Supreme Court's ability to exert judicial oversight and afford impartial remedy was threatened by the effective division between two rival authorities and deteriorating security conditions. ISIS-affiliated groups suspended the criminal justice system in the coastal city of Sirte and installed their own Islamic Court based on Sharia law. International Justice and the International Criminal Court Authorities failed to surrender Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court (ICC); he is wanted there for crimes against humanity related to the 2011 uprising that overthrew his father, Muammar. The ICC prosecutor failed to open a new investigation into the grave and ongoing crimes within the court's jurisdiction being committed in Libya. Death Penalty More than 30 articles of the penal code still provide for the death penalty. Since Gaddafi's overthrow in 2011, civil and military courts around the country continued to impose death sentences. At time of writing, however, authorities had not carried out any judicial executions. The total number of people sentenced to death is unknown. On July 28, Tripoli's Court of Assize convicted 32 former Gaddafi officials on charges of alleged crimes committed during the 2011 uprising. The court sentenced Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in absentia and eight other defendants to death, including former intelligence chief Abdullah Sanussi, and former Gaddafi-era prime ministers, al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and Abuzaid Dorda. Serious due process violations, including denial of access to legal counsel for defendants, undermined the trial. In September, Human Rights Watch gained rare access to al-Hadba detention facility in Tripoli and met with Sanussi, Dorda, al-Mahmoudi and another son of Gaddafi, al-Saadi. Women's Rights The HoR failed to amend penal code provisions that deem sexual violence a crime against a woman's "honor" rather than the woman herself. The code continues to permit a reduced sentence for a man who kills his wife or another female relative because he suspects her of extramarital sexual relations. Libyan law inadequately prohibits domestic violence. Abductions and Enforced Disappearances Militias and criminal groups throughout Libya continued to abduct and forcibly disappear hundreds of civilians, including civil society activists, politicians, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers with impunity. According to the Libyan Red Crescent, at least 600 people went missing in such circumstances between February 2014 and April 2015. Those still missing in November 2015 included four Italian oil company workers abducted in western Libya in July 2015, Suliman Zubi, a former GNC member abducted by Zintan groups in July 2014, and Abdelmoez Banoon, a Tripoli-based activist who disappeared in July 2014. Freedom of Speech and Expression Armed groups continued to harass, attack, and kill journalists. Victims included Muftah Al-Qatrani, who worked for a media production company prior to his murder on April 21 in Benghazi. Some international journalists reported harassment by Tripoli authorities, including questioning over contents of reports and threats of expulsion. The fate of Sofiane Chourabi and Nadhir Ktari, two Tunisian journalists who went missing in September 2014 while on assignment in Libya, remains unclear. Groups affiliated with ISIS claimed in April that they had killed both men. In November, the NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) said there were 31 individual attacks against journalists in Libya in 2015. The NGO also said that Libya ranked 154 out of 180 countries on the 2015 press freedom index. ISIS and Other Extremist Groups ISIS-affiliated groups continued to commit serious rights abuses while extending their presence and control of territory within Libya. They remained present around Derna and in Benghazi in the east, in the Tripoli area in the west, and in the south, and took total control of Sirte and its environs. In January, ISIS militants attacked a Tripoli hotel, killing at least 12 people, mostly civilians, including foreign nationals. They also claimed responsibility for attacks on the Iranian ambassador's residence and the embassies of Algeria, Morocco, and South Korea. In September, ISIS-affiliated groups attacked a militia-run prison within the Mitiga airbase in Tripoli, which resulted in the reported deaths of at least three prison guards. In Derna, ISIS militants maintained a reign of terror from January until June marked by public lashings and summary, extrajudicial executions of residents who opposed them, as well as at least four LGBT men. On February 20, ISIS said it carried out car bomb attacks in al-Qubba, a town near Derna, which killed at least 45 people, mostly civilians. In June, the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC), an Al-Qaeda affiliated militia, forced ISIS militants to withdraw from Derna's center, but in November armed clashes continued. In October, ISIS militants killed one man after forcing him to dig his own grave, and killed another by dragging him through streets. ISIS militants took control of Sirte and the nearby villages of Harawa and Nawfaliyah, and in February 2015, issued a video showing them beheading 21 mostly Egyptian Copts in Sirte. Another ISIS video issued in April appeared to show the killing of at least 30 Ethiopian Christians in separate incidents in Sirte and southern Libya. In August, ISIS militants established a public administration and an Islamic Court in Sirte. Armed clashes between local residents and ISIS-affiliated groups resulted in at least 29 reported deaths, mostly fighters but also some civilians. In October, masked members of ISIS publicly beheaded two men accused of sorcery, and crucified an elderly Sufi Sheikh. Internally Displaced People The local council of Misrata and affiliated militias continued to prevent 40,000 residents of Tawergha and residents of Tomina and Karareem from returning to their homes in what amounts to a crime against humanity, and collective punishment for crimes they say were committed by some Tawergha residents during the 2011 revolution. Those displaced remained scattered in makeshift camps and private housing around the country, but continued to face harassment and arbitrary detention. Libyan authorities failed to end this ongoing crime, while perpetrators continued to benefit from impunity since 2011. According to the United Nations, around 400,000 people remained internally displaced due to the ongoing armed hostilities in all parts of the country, which forced them to leave their homes. Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers Significant numbers of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants reached Europe from Libya by sea in 2015. Over 143,500 arrived in Italy from North Africa, the vast majority from Libya, by the end of November. However, at least 3,100 others perished at sea during the same period. In May, the European Union significantly increased search and rescue missions in the central Mediterranean. Libya's remaining active coast guard provided only limited search and rescue operations, citing a lack of resources. The Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration continued to detain asylum seekers and migrants found without official residence documents and hold them in inhumane conditions, where prison guards abused and ill-treated them with impunity and they lacked access to medical care. Criminal smuggler networks also abused migrants and asylum seekers and subjected them to forced labor. Key International Actors The UN, the United States, EU states, and Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), all played significant roles in the Libya conflict. The US, United Kingdom, and France issued several statements supporting the UN-led peace initiative. In February, Egyptian warplanes carried out air strikes against purported ISIS targets in the eastern city of Derna, in retaliation for the alleged killings of 21 mostly Egyptian Coptic Christians by ISIS militants, killing at least seven civilians. In June, the US conducted airstrikes in the eastern city of Ajdabiya in an attempt to kill Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Al-Qaeda operative. At time of writing, Belmokhtar's death remained unconfirmed. In March, the UN Human Rights Council agreed to begin an investigation by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) into ongoing rights abuses in Libya since January 1, 2014 (OIOL). The first OIOL oral update in September said violations included attacks on civilians and civilian objects, reprisals in the form of destruction of homes, shelling of hospitals, unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, torture, and other ill-treatment, in some cases leading to death. The report also mentioned abductions based on origin and abduction of activists and journalists. It said refugees and asylum seekers remained vulnerable to abuses. The UN Security Council renewed the mandates of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Panel of Experts on Libya in March, and reaffirmed the international arms embargo on Libya, despite efforts by Libya and Egypt to overturn it. In July, Russia and China vetoed a council resolution that would have imposed sanctions on two individuals for obstructing the UN peace talks. In May, the EU approved the establishment of EU NAVFOR MED, an air and sea operation empowered to use force against people smuggling networks in Libya. In October, the EU announced that the renamed "Operation Sophia" entered its second phase where it would "conduct boarding, search, seizure and diversion, on the high seas, of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking." In November, leaked communication alleged the UAE had violated the existing arms

Libië

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/13/here-are-the-10-countries-where-homosexuality-may-be-punished-by-death-2/

In the wake of America's deadliest mass shooting ever — at a gay nightclub in Orlando on Sunday — we have updated our map of LGBT rights around the world. Here are the 10 countries where homosexuality may be punishable by death: Yemen: According to the 1994 penal code, married men can be sentenced to death by stoning for homosexual intercourse. Unmarried men face whipping or one year in prison. Women face up to seven years in prison. Iran: In accordance with sharia law, homosexual intercourse between men can be punished by death, and men can be flogged for lesser acts such as kissing. Women may be flogged. Mauritania: Muslim men engaging in homosexual sex can be stoned to death, according to a 1984 law, though none have been executed so far. Women face prison. Nigeria: Federal law classifies homosexual behavior as a felony punishable by imprisonment, but several states have adopted sharia law and imposed a death penalty for men. A law signed in early January makes it illegal for gay people countrywide to hold a meeting or form clubs. Qatar: Sharia law in Qatar applies only to Muslims, who can be put to death for extramarital sex, regardless of sexual orientation. GET CAUGHT UP Stories to keep you informed Saudi Arabia: Under the country's interpretation of sharia law, a married man engaging in sodomy or any non-Muslim who commits sodomy with a Muslim can be stoned to death. All sex outside of marriage is illegal. Afghanistan: The Afghan Penal Code does not refer to homosexual acts, but Article 130 of the Constitution allows recourse to be made to sharia law, which prohibits same-sex sexual activity in general. Afghanistan's sharia law criminalizes same-sex sexual acts with a maximum of the death penalty. No known cases of death sentences have been meted out since the end of Taliban rule in 2001. Somalia: The penal code stipulates prison, but in some southern regions, Islamic courts have imposed sharia law and the death penalty. Sudan: Three-time offenders under the sodomy law can be put to death; first and second convictions result in flogging and imprisonment. Southern parts of the country have adopted more lenient laws. United Arab Emirates: Lawyers in the country and other experts disagree on whether federal law prescribes the death penalty for consensual homosexual sex or only for rape. In a recent Amnesty International report, the organization said it was not aware of any death sentences for homosexual acts. All sexual acts outside of marriage are banned. Read More:

Libië

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/qa-libya-180909072236031.html

Q&A: What's next for Libya? Middle East scholar Jalel Harchaoui discusses the challenges hampering efforts to achieve political transition in Libya. On March 30, 2016, members of Libya's UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) sailed into Tripoli in an effort to unite rival factions and bring stability to the war-torn country. In order to establish its authority, the GNA sought the support of a handful of militias already active in the city. The gradual rise of these Tripoli-based armed groups, which kept their autonomy as they began dominating the formal security institutions, including the interior ministry, angered powerful militias outside the capital who felt marginalised and at risk of losing access to state funds. Last week, [fierce clashes broke out](/news/2018/08/clashes-shatter-illusion-security-libyan-capital-180829164603848.html) between groups from outside the capital and Tripoli-based militias, killing dozens of people and wounding many more. The renewed fighting not only laid bare Tripoli's fragile security situation and GNA's powerlessness but also pushed major international powers – already at odds over how to resolve the long-running conflict – to change their tone. In a speech at the Security Council on Wednesday, Ghassane Salame, the UN envoy to Libya, [warned](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/srsg-salame-briefing-security-council-5-september-2018) of the threat "predatory" armed groups pose to the country's transition process. "Indeed, members of some armed groups nominally acting under the Ministry of Interior have kidnapped, tortured and murdered employees of sovereign institutions, including the National Oil Corporation and the Libyan Investment Authority," said Salame. "Our public criticism of the predatory behaviour of armed groups in the capital was warmly welcomed by Libyans, who are fed up with living on the poverty line whilst their national resources are looted by gunmen-turned-millionaires." Salame also cautioned against opportunistic politicians in the country's two rival administrations – the Tripoli-based GNA and the House of Representatives in the eastern city of Tobruk – who seek to prolong the country's chaotic status quo for their own personal gain. The violence also cast doubt at the prospect of holding nationwide presidential and parliamentary elections by December, agreed by rival Libyan leaders who met in May in Paris at the behest of French President [Emmanuel Macron](/topics/people/emmanuel-macron.html). [Italy](/topics/country/italy.html) has called for the launch of peace talks between rival groups, which it hopes can take place in November as a prelude to the planned December polls. But Giuseppe Conte, Italy's prime minister, acknowledged last month that Rome was in no rush to see elections happen. "Italy's primary interest is to stabilise Libya and to hold the presidential and political elections with appropriate guarantees," Conte told reporters last month. Meanwhile, renegade General [Khalifa Haftar](/topics/people/khalifa-haftar.html), whose self-declared Libyan National Army controls much of eastern Libya, denounced Italy's approach as counterproductive. Al Jazeera spoke to Jalel Harchaoui, a political analyst and scholar, to get a sense of where [Libya](/topics/country/libya.html) stands and what it needs to do to bridge political differences and move the legislative process forward. Al Jazeera: Do recent clashes in Tripoli present the international community with a new reality of the situation in Libya? Jalel Harchaoui: I think it's more about the optics rather than a reality that would have been completely novel. A lot of what happened had been almost predicted by several political scientists. What the international community was engaged in was a very strong and tenacious desire to believe that the equilibrium in Tripoli was tenable, viable and stable – that wasn't the reality. People detached from governments and the UN had enough information to conclude that, yes, there was an equilibrium in Tripoli but that it wasn't tenable. Foreign states are now forced to see what they were not willing to see: the fact that downtown Tripoli, the centre of the capital where all the embassies are, as well as other vital institutions, cannot be separated from the rest of Libya. What we have seen over the last 10 days was that armed groups outside Tripoli, in the periphery, were not going to stand by idly while those in the capital take advantage of the opportunities for embezzlement. Al Jazeera: Can militia violence and their disproportionate influence over civilian authorities be reined in? Harchaoui: No one – neither the Libyans in the Tripolitania region nor the foreign states nor the UN – has undertaken any real effort to build a state. On the contrary, what we have seen is a temptation, or even an interest, in working with militias. These militias were smart enough to know that in order to receive support and please some of the actors, they were expected to conduct a political war against groups like the Islamist figures and groups whom they expelled from the capital city. It is difficult to see how these convenient groups can be dismantled. They are useful to some outside parties with foreign agenda. At the same time, one must keep in mind that accepting a militia is not a good start to state-building efforts. A militia will continue torturing people, being opaque and corrupt, regardless of what it says. In sum, we don't know whether they can be reined in until we actually try. If you don't question a militia, you cannot diffuse its power and incorporate it into state structures effectively. Foreign states are not the only culprits but it is important to highlight their role. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and France, in particular, were all too happy to court the militias. These three countries happily accepted the militias as legitimate actors to work with. They were deeply interested in co-opting them because they thought these militias did not belong to the Muslim Brotherhood. The militias in Tripoli did improve the security situation but they were also expected to wage a different kind of war, a political battle against Islamists and revolutionary militias in the capital. The reason why I single out those three is because nobody seems to mention them. They were not denounced by the UN, civil society groups or NGOs. Al Jazeera: Do the latest developments give reason to Italy's approach, as opposed to France's, to the Libyan crisis which has emphasised national reconciliation before nationwide polls can be held? Harchaoui: In terms of Italy and France, no single approach is best. Italy has a lot to do with the collapse that just happened and engaged in a strategy that it thought would be very productive but which in the end proved futile. Rome tried to cultivate the status quo by talking to as many actors as possible, both inside and outside Tripoli. They adopted a horizontal approach and they genuinely thought that they'd be able to control the whole thing and stitch everything [militias] together into a functioning state. France doesn't know Libya nearly as well as Italy. They have no contacts in the cities of Sabratha or Misrata. They were not even able to invite Misratans to the May 29 summit in Paris. But the French government's approach is quite similar to Italy's in Tripoli, where both celebrated the capital's newfound stability and the four big militias that upheld it. The difference has to do with the periphery but the Italians – by virtue of historical circumstances – have a much wider reach. The French looked at the developments in eastern Libya, where Haftar restored a semblance of normality, and at how central Tripoli also seemed to have been stabilised and thought why not organise elections overlooking the simmering tensions in the capital's outskirts. Stability for Italy, on the other hand, is far more important. It imports some 300,000 barrels of oil per day from Libya and the impact of instability, especially in terms of refugee flows, would be unbearable. They didn't want anybody to rock the boat, as it were, and elections were a risky endeavour. Al Jazeera: What can the international community do to move the legislative process forward? Harchaoui: France doesn't just want elections. It is interested in creating the role of a president, knowing fully well that Libya has a parliamentary system at the moment. France is therefore extraordinarily ambitious and it's asking for a lot. This stands in contrast with the Italian, British and the United States' approach, which is a lot more prudent and pragmatic: there is talk of parliamentary elections but not before June 2019. To move the legislative process forward, one step that the UN can take, and the international community more broadly, is to break the taboo about the Emiratis and Saudis bypassing international efforts and interfering by supporting the militias that most suit their agenda. The international community should be able to ask these two states to back off. Many people talk about the run-ins and war of words between France and Italy but this isn't that major of an issue. It's good to criticise Qatar and Turkey but the other two are never mentioned simply because they happen to be anti-Muslim Brotherhood which in my view is problematic. Of course, there are other issues in Libya that have nothing to do with Islamism. They have to do with state construction and can be addressed once foreign meddling stops. This interview was edited for clarity and brevity.

Libië

https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21572243-country-still-struggling-move-ahead-party-and-hangover

[Middle East and Africa](/middle-east-and-africa/)| Libya The party and the hangover The country is still struggling to move ahead AFTER a brief bout of euphoria to mark the second anniversary of the rebellion against Muammar Qaddafi on February 17th, Libyans soon sank back into the less joyful realisation that political, economic and security reforms are proceeding at a snail's pace at best. Days before the anniversary, the national congress, a proto-parliament elected last July to supervise the writing of a new constitution, decided instead to call a fresh election to a new 60-strong commission. It would then be asked to take on the job. This may add a year to the original timetable, which envisaged an election in the next few months to a full-blown parliament enshrined in a new constitution. The recent arrest of four foreign Christian missionaries in Benghazi, Libya's biggest eastern city, on charges of proselytising, still a crime under a law inherited from the Qaddafi era, is a reminder of how much Libya needs a constitution to clarify what the new order permits. Other laws from the past are further deterring investment. The congress has failed to revoke a law enacted by the previous administration, known as the "national transitional council", which limits foreign ownership in a Libyan company to 49%. Jocularly known as "the oligarchs' law", since it favours rich Libyans who did well under Qaddafi, it has put off many foreign businessmen from investing in companies they are not allowed to control. Meanwhile, violence persists, especially on the country's periphery. Jihadist militias have reappeared in the east, running checkpoints in Benghazi and in Derna, further east along the coast, which has long had a reputation for hosting extreme Islamists. Five months after such people stormed the American consulate in Benghazi and killed the ambassador there, no one has been charged with the crime. In the west and south, smugglers and bandits are battling each other to control the flow of petrol, arms, drugs and people across the border. Elsewhere, militias refuse to be integrated into a central security force. The most powerful outfits, in the cities of Misrata and Zintan, which led the revolt against Qaddafi, answer only to the city authorities. These militias in turn help make up the so-called Libyan Shield, a parallel national force, which operates at the request, rather than at the order, of the defence ministry. Many of these militias are disciplined, but they reinforce a growing impression of a country of city-states. The civil service is emerging as a particular obstacle to reform. Demonstrators gathered recently to back a proposed law to remove all Qaddafi-era officials from positions of power. "It is necessary to remove them if we want to move forward," said Idris Nouraddin, a Misrata lawyer. "They may not be bad people, but it is like someone who has been smoking for 40 years. You tell them that this is a new regime, a new way, where nobody smokes, but they have got used to smoking." Yet if all civil servants who held senior jobs under the previous regime are ousted, the economy may grind even more rapidly to a halt. The central government's impotence is illustrated by a visit to Tripoli's national congress, which has lost physical control of the chamber where it is supposed to sit. Instead, the building is occupied by a group of wounded veterans of the rebellion, who are protesting against the failure of the defence ministry to pay them pensions. Rather than have them thrown out, the lawmakers opted to hold sessions in a tent on the grounds of a local hotel. This article appeared in the Middle East & Africa section of the print edition under the headline "The party and the hangover" [More from Middle East and Africa](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/) [Iran's supreme leader is terrified of people power](/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/29/irans-supreme-leader-is-terrified-of-people-power) A zealot and a reformer will contest a second-round poll on July 5th [Mauritania is a beacon of stability in the coup-prone Sahel](/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/27/mauritania-is-a-beacon-of-stability-in-the-coup-prone-sahel) But disorder is knocking at its door [A new breed of protest has left Kenya's president tottering](/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/27/a-new-breed-of-protest-has-left-kenyas-president-tottering) President Ruto has capitulated to people power and cancelled hated tax increases

Libië

https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21572243-country-still-struggling-move-ahead-party-and-hangover

[Middle East and Africa](/middle-east-and-africa/)| Libya The party and the hangover The country is still struggling to move ahead AFTER a brief bout of euphoria to mark the second anniversary of the rebellion against Muammar Qaddafi on February 17th, Libyans soon sank back into the less joyful realisation that political, economic and security reforms are proceeding at a snail's pace at best. Days before the anniversary, the national congress, a proto-parliament elected last July to supervise the writing of a new constitution, decided instead to call a fresh election to a new 60-strong commission. It would then be asked to take on the job. This may add a year to the original timetable, which envisaged an election in the next few months to a full-blown parliament enshrined in a new constitution. The recent arrest of four foreign Christian missionaries in Benghazi, Libya's biggest eastern city, on charges of proselytising, still a crime under a law inherited from the Qaddafi era, is a reminder of how much Libya needs a constitution to clarify what the new order permits. Other laws from the past are further deterring investment. The congress has failed to revoke a law enacted by the previous administration, known as the "national transitional council", which limits foreign ownership in a Libyan company to 49%. Jocularly known as "the oligarchs' law", since it favours rich Libyans who did well under Qaddafi, it has put off many foreign businessmen from investing in companies they are not allowed to control. Meanwhile, violence persists, especially on the country's periphery. Jihadist militias have reappeared in the east, running checkpoints in Benghazi and in Derna, further east along the coast, which has long had a reputation for hosting extreme Islamists. Five months after such people stormed the American consulate in Benghazi and killed the ambassador there, no one has been charged with the crime. In the west and south, smugglers and bandits are battling each other to control the flow of petrol, arms, drugs and people across the border. Elsewhere, militias refuse to be integrated into a central security force. The most powerful outfits, in the cities of Misrata and Zintan, which led the revolt against Qaddafi, answer only to the city authorities. These militias in turn help make up the so-called Libyan Shield, a parallel national force, which operates at the request, rather than at the order, of the defence ministry. Many of these militias are disciplined, but they reinforce a growing impression of a country of city-states. The civil service is emerging as a particular obstacle to reform. Demonstrators gathered recently to back a proposed law to remove all Qaddafi-era officials from positions of power. "It is necessary to remove them if we want to move forward," said Idris Nouraddin, a Misrata lawyer. "They may not be bad people, but it is like someone who has been smoking for 40 years. You tell them that this is a new regime, a new way, where nobody smokes, but they have got used to smoking." Yet if all civil servants who held senior jobs under the previous regime are ousted, the economy may grind even more rapidly to a halt. The central government's impotence is illustrated by a visit to Tripoli's national congress, which has lost physical control of the chamber where it is supposed to sit. Instead, the building is occupied by a group of wounded veterans of the rebellion, who are protesting against the failure of the defence ministry to pay them pensions. Rather than have them thrown out, the lawmakers opted to hold sessions in a tent on the grounds of a local hotel. This article appeared in the Middle East & Africa section of the print edition under the headline "The party and the hangover" [More from Middle East and Africa](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/) [Iran's supreme leader is terrified of people power](/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/29/irans-supreme-leader-is-terrified-of-people-power) A zealot and a reformer will contest a second-round poll on July 5th [Mauritania is a beacon of stability in the coup-prone Sahel](/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/27/mauritania-is-a-beacon-of-stability-in-the-coup-prone-sahel) But disorder is knocking at its door [A new breed of protest has left Kenya's president tottering](/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/27/a-new-breed-of-protest-has-left-kenyas-president-tottering) President Ruto has capitulated to people power and cancelled hated tax increases

Libië

https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21572243-country-still-struggling-move-ahead-party-and-hangover

[Middle East and Africa](/middle-east-and-africa/)| Libya The party and the hangover The country is still struggling to move ahead AFTER a brief bout of euphoria to mark the second anniversary of the rebellion against Muammar Qaddafi on February 17th, Libyans soon sank back into the less joyful realisation that political, economic and security reforms are proceeding at a snail's pace at best. Days before the anniversary, the national congress, a proto-parliament elected last July to supervise the writing of a new constitution, decided instead to call a fresh election to a new 60-strong commission. It would then be asked to take on the job. This may add a year to the original timetable, which envisaged an election in the next few months to a full-blown parliament enshrined in a new constitution. The recent arrest of four foreign Christian missionaries in Benghazi, Libya's biggest eastern city, on charges of proselytising, still a crime under a law inherited from the Qaddafi era, is a reminder of how much Libya needs a constitution to clarify what the new order permits. Other laws from the past are further deterring investment. The congress has failed to revoke a law enacted by the previous administration, known as the "national transitional council", which limits foreign ownership in a Libyan company to 49%. Jocularly known as "the oligarchs' law", since it favours rich Libyans who did well under Qaddafi, it has put off many foreign businessmen from investing in companies they are not allowed to control. Meanwhile, violence persists, especially on the country's periphery. Jihadist militias have reappeared in the east, running checkpoints in Benghazi and in Derna, further east along the coast, which has long had a reputation for hosting extreme Islamists. Five months after such people stormed the American consulate in Benghazi and killed the ambassador there, no one has been charged with the crime. In the west and south, smugglers and bandits are battling each other to control the flow of petrol, arms, drugs and people across the border. Elsewhere, militias refuse to be integrated into a central security force. The most powerful outfits, in the cities of Misrata and Zintan, which led the revolt against Qaddafi, answer only to the city authorities. These militias in turn help make up the so-called Libyan Shield, a parallel national force, which operates at the request, rather than at the order, of the defence ministry. Many of these militias are disciplined, but they reinforce a growing impression of a country of city-states. The civil service is emerging as a particular obstacle to reform. Demonstrators gathered recently to back a proposed law to remove all Qaddafi-era officials from positions of power. "It is necessary to remove them if we want to move forward," said Idris Nouraddin, a Misrata lawyer. "They may not be bad people, but it is like someone who has been smoking for 40 years. You tell them that this is a new regime, a new way, where nobody smokes, but they have got used to smoking." Yet if all civil servants who held senior jobs under the previous regime are ousted, the economy may grind even more rapidly to a halt. The central government's impotence is illustrated by a visit to Tripoli's national congress, which has lost physical control of the chamber where it is supposed to sit. Instead, the building is occupied by a group of wounded veterans of the rebellion, who are protesting against the failure of the defence ministry to pay them pensions. Rather than have them thrown out, the lawmakers opted to hold sessions in a tent on the grounds of a local hotel. This article appeared in the Middle East & Africa section of the print edition under the headline "The party and the hangover" [More from Middle East and Africa](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/) [Iran's supreme leader is terrified of people power](/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/29/irans-supreme-leader-is-terrified-of-people-power) A zealot and a reformer will contest a second-round poll on July 5th [Mauritania is a beacon of stability in the coup-prone Sahel](/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/27/mauritania-is-a-beacon-of-stability-in-the-coup-prone-sahel) But disorder is knocking at its door [A new breed of protest has left Kenya's president tottering](/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/27/a-new-breed-of-protest-has-left-kenyas-president-tottering) President Ruto has capitulated to people power and cancelled hated tax increases

Libië

http://www.extremescience.com/hottest.htm

| | | | Hottest Temperature - Lut Desert, Iran How Hot is Hot? NASA has been capturing earth surface temperature data using the Landsat 7 satellite and the stunning results are now in....the hottest surface temperature ever recorded keeps happening in the same area of the Lut Desert in Iran. Five of the seven years of temperature data (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009) have shown the hottest surface temperatures there. The single highest land surface temperature (LST) recorded in any year, in any region, occurred there in 2005, when MODIS recorded a temperature of 70.7°C (159.3°F) - more than 12°C (22°F) warmer than the official air temperature record from Libya. Hot enough to fry an egg! Desert Lands As big as the earth is, over two thirds of its surface is covered in water from the oceans. The remaining one-third of the earth's surface is exposed as dry land for us to live on, but a third of that dry land is really dry. In fact, it's inhospitable desert. Much of the deserts in the world are clustered between 5 to 30 degrees north and south of the equator, in what are called subtropical zones. Scientists have theorized that these desert belts are due to two things: Duh? Anybody who's ever been outside on a hot summer day, all day, knows that. Just about every continent on earth that is inhabited by humans experiences seasonal weather changes, with a distinct winter and summer. Just because there's hot, dry weather during the summer, doesn't mean that where you live is going to turn into a desert. What makes the desert so hot and dry is the climactic conditions that are sustained almost continually, year round. Any part of the world that's hot and dry for long enough periods throughout the year won't be able to support much plant or animal life. Living things need water to survive. Why is it so Dry All the Time? First, the air in the earth's atmosphere is warmest around the equator (because the sun reaches the earth at a direct 90° angle) so that warmer air rises and flows north and south of the equator. As the air "piles" up in the northern and southern latitudes, these zones of "piled-high" warm air become permanent high pressure zones. As the air at the "bottom of the pile" descends toward the earth it gets warmed up even more. Because this descending warm air has no clouds (i.e., condensing water vapor), that allows the burning sun to go right through the air and heat the land mass below even more. Hence, extreme heat. Warm air can hold a lot more moisture (water vapor) than colder air. Unless this really warm air contacts some much cooler air (or cooler land mass), there's nothing to coax the moisture out of the air in the form of precipitation (rain, fog). Hence, lack of moisture. What Goes Around, Comes Around This hot air moves northward and southward of the equator, almost continuously in the form of reliable winds called the Trade Winds. As these warm winds circulate back around towards the equator they rise into the upper atmosphere again, cooling. The water vapor in the cooling air mass condenses and rains, and rains and rains all over the equator in the Tropical zones. All this rain makes the land mass around the equator the lushest, wettest, most densely forested in the world (plants love water!). It's ironic that the wettest and hottest places in the world occur within just a few thousand miles of each other. Though the hottest place in the world is a desert, not all deserts are hot. Antarctica, for example, is the | | Get Your Degree! Find schools and get information on the program that's right for you. Powered by | | Copyright © 1998-2015. Extreme Science is a registered trademark. All rights reserved.

Libië

http://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/image_feature_562.html

In the 1950s, oil exploration in Libya turned up another valuable resource: water. Huge aquifers, underground deposits of sand and rock that also contain water, lurked underneath the scorching sands. The Libyan government weighed the costs of bringing water up from the aquifers against transporting water from Europe and desalination of salt water, and chose the aquifers as the most cost-effective option. The Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) on NASA's Terra satellite captured this image on April 10, 2006. This image is of Libya's massive water project, known as the Grand Omar Mukhtar, near the city of Suluq. Plans are afoot to make the Grand Omar Mukhtar the country's largest man-made reservoir. Water residing in reservoirs appears at the bottom of this image in dark blue. In this false-color image, vegetation appears red, and the brighter the red, the more robust the vegetation. In this arid place, the vegetation results from irrigated agriculture, so the areas of red appear in the crisp geometric shapes of carefully planned fields. The circular spots of red almost certainly result from center-pivot irrigation. Cityscape structures such as pavement and buildings appear in gray. Bare ground appears tan or beige. Water hiding in aquifers can actually be cleaner than water resting in above-ground reservoirs because the process of percolating through soil and rock can remove impurities. Water can rest underground in aquifers for thousands or even millions of years. When geologic changes seal the aquifer off from further "recharging," the water inside is sometimes called "fossil water." Radiocarbon dating has revealed that some Libya's aquifer water has been there for 40,000 years, since before the end of the last ice age.Image Credit: NASA/GSFC/METI/ERSDAC/JAROS, and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team 2 min read "Fossil Water" in Libya In the 1950s, oil exploration in Libya turned up another valuable resource: water. Huge aquifers, underground deposits of sand and rock that also contain water, lurked underneath the scorching sands. The Libyan government weighed the costs of bringing water up from the aquifers against transporting water from Europe and desalination of salt water, and chose the aquifers as the most cost-effective option.

Libië

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2016-09-06/coming-fall-libyas-gna

[](/ukraine/how-russian-elites-made-peace-war) How Russian Elites Made Peace With the War Moscow's Victories Have Dampened Opposition to the Kremlin Among Libya's many challenges is the fact that it has several governments. Not counting local armed groups, of which there are dozens, or the Libyan branch of the Islamic State (ISIS), at least three different groups can make credible claims to legitimate governance. Only one of those, the Government of National Accord (GNA), is recognized outside the country and in the West. In fact, Western nations and the United Nations don't just recognize the GNA—they created it. Setting aside [problems with how the GNA was conjured](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/04/un-libya-envoy-accepts-1000-a-day-job-from-backer-of-one-side-in-civil-war), many Libyans supported it or muted their criticisms because some path out of the violence—even a bad one—was preferable to none. But now that the GNA government has moved into Tripoli, it is on the brink of collapse. The GNA's failure is not a political matter or a military one. Rather, it has failed on the most basic issues of politics and governance. For example, the number of deputy presidents allowed under its formation mysteriously shifted from three to nine—an increase outside any legal authority or explanation and based purely on ethnic and geographical considerations. Because of the increase, the council now looks more like a tribal council than a modern Western-backed government.But then, in July, four GNA Still, the GNA could have survived its political and legal shortcomings had it tried to alleviate the many problems facing Libya, including chronic power and water shortages, inflation, a liquidity crisis, and a lack of security. Yet it has not. Despite many international pledges of assistance, the government has solved not one of these challenges. Before the GNA, power outages in the capital typically lasted an average of eight to ten hours a day. Under the GNA, Tripoli was without power for up to 20 hours a day in June and is now back to the eight to ten hours of blackout a day. Likewise, water outages had been infrequent, but throughout the summer, Tripoli has been without steady water for weeks. In turn, riots have broken out in protest of the deteriorating conditions and Libyans regularly gather in front of banks waiting to withdraw some of their cash just so that they can buy the necessities.Conditions in Libya are so bad that even UN envoy Martin Kobler, the final architect of the GNA government deal, has taken to Twitter to shame his GNA government into action. "Worried about the continued power cuts in large parts of tripoli. Urge #Gna to tackle energy supply for the population," For its part, the GNA has blamed " [previous governments](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-libya-s-prime-minister-a-1108565.html)" for its inability to quickly tackle the well-known and most pressing problems. The GNA has been eager to point out, though, that it has made good progress against the Islamic State. Yet the success against the group in its former stronghold of Sirte was a broad Libyan endeavor, not the sole work of the GNA. At the time the GNA was created, fighters from across the region representing various factions and militias were already in battle there. Meanwhile, the GNA has struggled to do the basics in the fight against the terrorist group; hundreds of wounded fighters have been unable to receive medical care. Kobler, taking to Twitter again, [posted](https://twitter.com/KoblerSRSG/status/744179336022982657), "Thinking about the many dead and injured in fight against #ISIL in Sirt. Urge international community to help with medicine and evacuation." If nothing else, the GNA government in Libya is the international community. And it is deeply ominous that a Libyan government created and sustained and promoted by the West cannot execute the most basic tasks of governance. And so the GNA's days are numbered. Very soon, Libyans might have to find yet another path. Familiar Patterns, Fresh Consequences

Libië

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-serraj-experiment-of-libya

On March 30, 2016, Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj and a few other members of Libya's Presidency Council (PC) and Government of National Accord (GNA), the two government bodies that the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) established, arrived to Tripoli's Abu Sita navy base after having operated in Tunisia for three months. While the international media and diplomats cheered the move as a major step toward stabilizing Libya, it was actually the beginning of the end the GNA and PC. The move to Tripoli, which UN Special Representative Martin Kobler had encouraged, handed al-Serraj over to the mercy of the powerful militias in the capital. The Prime Minister is an upright person from Tripoli's upscale Hay Andalus district, with no familiarity with dealing with armed groups. While the United Nations and some European countries organized "feel-good" meetings and signed agreements with al-Serraj, the situation in the country deteriorated, particularly in the capital. Libya's elected and internationally recognized parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR) refused to endorse the GNA, dismissing its core purpose and ensuring that a political battle would parallel the military one. The HoR relocated to Tobruk in East Libya after Islamist militias forced it out of Tripoli. Fast forward to the present. A few weeks ago, fighting intensified as the Sirte basin and Tripoli have become major battlefields again. The Libyan National Army, which Field Marshal Haftar commands, is battling the Islamist-leaning Benghazi Defend Brigade (BDB, in Arabic: Suraya Difaa Benghazi) for control of Libya's most important oil terminals, Ras Lanuf and al-Sider. The picture in Tripoli is more complicated. In theory, there are two sides: a pro-GNA militia block, supporting the internationally recognized GNA, and a pro-NSG block, siding with the Islamist National Salvation Government (NSG) of 'prime minister' Khalifa al-Ghwell. But the reality on the ground is very different. All the individual militias are first and foremost interested in maintaining their own power and influence. Most of the pro-GNA militias support al-Serraj only in as much as they consider him a useful tool. All the important militia leaders siding with the GNA, rejected a ceasefire brokered mid-March by some members of the PC and shows how quickly militias can change colors. In fact, al-Serraj and his GNA are helpless between the mighty militia blocks, with no real possibility of influencing developments on the ground. As things stand, they are doomed to failure, and with them the UN-brokered LPA. Although Libya's most important economic organizations, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), the National Oil Corporation (NOC), and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) recognize the GNA, al-Serraj has not been able to solve the country's economic difficulties. The cash crisis—a combination of inflation, black market currency exchanges, and general lack of funds—continues to worsen and power outages are frequent. High subsidies on fuel and basic foodstuff are a strain for the budget and smuggling is an endemic problem costing the state several hundred million dollars a year. The CBL is still financing competing administrations in the east and the west and paying former "thuwwar" (revolutionary fighters who are eligible for payments from the state). Corruption is out of control. The combination of problems is melting away the country's cash reserves. On the security side, al-Serraj lacks influence on the jihadists in Benghazi and Derna, on the Misrata militias, and the BDB. The refugee deal recently signed by Italian Prime Minister Gentiloni and Libyan Prime Minister Serraj is just words on paper because the GNA has no means to enforce it. After the recent heavy fighting in Tripoli, the hostile protests against Misrata, and violent attacks against its Misrata citizens in Tripoli, the Misrata local government suspended its contacts with the PC, feeling that its citizens and institutions were being targeted because of fighting with Misrata militias. Before this, Misrata had been among the strongest and most powerful supporters of the GNA, even providing security details for the GNA, but now the city council is debating whether to continue supporting the GNA. Although it is easy to blame the HoR for not endorsing the GNA, it has no real reason to do so. The HoR is not willing to accept a government that cannot act independent of the armed gangs in Tripoli. At this point, whether the HoR endorses the GNA and Haftar or the GNA support al-Serraj is irrelevant—he is focused on his own survival among the militias in the capital, a struggle in which neither the HoR nor Haftar can be of much help. Martin Kobler's experiment with the PC-GNA-Serraj is about to fail, and with it the reputation of countries that backed these groups. To stabilize Libya and restore international credibility, a powerful nation needs to take the lead in organizing stakeholders to implement future agreed upon plans. The United States is the only one capable of doing this. An immediate and comprehensive ceasefire—except for the fight against terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State—needs to be brokered and supervised. Libya's neighbors have an important role in this process, wielding their influence on proxies to make them cooperate. The United States does not need to put boots on the ground, but it does need to bring together stakeholders to create a neutral observer force that can enforce the ceasefire from the ground and sky. Otherwise hostilities will break out again. With a ceasefire in place, Libya can move into a transitional phase. It is too early, and the mechanisms are not in place for a country-wide reconciliation. The transitional period should focus on bringing peace to Libya in parts (its three historic provinces). An amended form of the Libya's 1963 constitution, which Gaddafi abandoned in 1969, can be used in the interim period. Legally, it can be argued the constitution is still in place. The constitution will need to be amended to ensure the distribution of the oil wealth between the regions. Some provisions of the 1951 constitution, such as article 36 about central government powers and article 39 about provincial powers, can also be used. For the head of state to have respect and authority, he must either be a well-respected person or the Libyan crown prince. The location of the interim government cannot be Tripoli. Though it is the capital, residing there puts the government at the mercy of the militias. An international protection force could secure a safe zone until the new government has sufficient forces of its own. Stability also requires economic recovery. For Libya, this means unhindered production and export of Libya's hydrocarbon resources and that Libyans see economic progress. There are already small scale international development programs that support local government and civil society development, and with a ceasefire in place these programs can be scaled up. The current programs have had limited success accessing the central government and large cities due to the presence of militias. Programs that worked on elections and constitution development have largely been a failure, and will continue to be so until a certain level of stability is achieved. Libya is currently in a downward spiral, and no political agreement will work unless the international community enforces it. But the international community will not take those steps unless the United States takes the steps up to the leadership plate. Wolfgang Pusztai is a freelance Security & Policy Analyst.

Libië

https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/wfp-libya-country-brief-january-2020

In Numbers 78,000 people assisted in January 2020 (estimate) 593MT of food assistance distributed in January USD 7.4 m six month (March-August 2020) net funding requirement Operational Updates - In January 2020, WFP reached approximately 78,000 people in need through its programmes in Libya: general food distributions, emergency food distributions as packages for migrants in urban settings, emergency food distributions through the Rapid Response Mechanism to internally displaced people, school feeding, and food for training initiatives in Sebha. - As part of a joint initiative between four UN agencies (IOM, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WFP) WFP is providing emergency food assistance to displaced families in and around Tripoli under the [Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)](https://reliefweb.int/node/3098578/). Since its launch in April 2019, WFP has provided assistance to 37,000 people in need through in Tripoli, Ghat, and Murzuq in response to crises. - WFP's School Feeding programme conducted in conjunction with the Libyan Ministry of Education and local municipalities is proceeding successfully, providing a daily date bar snack to 18,038 school age pupils in 58 schools in four municipalities in the southern region of Libya. - WFP signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) as a first step in a partnership that will strengthen WFP's work across the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus. The two organisations will be complementing each other's work, connecting the USIP inter-communal dialogues and WFP's Food Assistance for Training and Food Assistance for Assets programmes, which aim to build household and community resilience. - WFP, UNFPA and UN Women started a project focusing on women and youth empowerment in Sabha in January. The classes focus on English language, IT and business skills that aim to broaden the job opportunities of women and youth. This pilot project will run for three months as a first test of a nexus approach in Libya. Pending the progress and success of the programme, it may be scaled up to reach more people in other locations. - Food insecurity remains a challenge due to protracted displacement, disruption to markets, and dwindling food production. Livelihoods and access to basic social services have been affected by the conflict, exposing the most vulnerable people to inadequate food consumption and forcing people into negative coping strategies, such as spending savings, cutting the number of daily meals, and reducing non-food related expenses, particularly in health and education.

Libië

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/libya/index03.html

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) | | 2003 Libya Special Weapons News [U-S / LIBYA / NUCLEAR](libya-031231-2ce75234.htm) VOA 31 Dec 2003 -- Bush administration officials are confirming news reports that a U-S-led naval operation in October interdicted a shipment of uranium-enrichment components bound for Libya. U-S officials say the seizure may have helped prompt Libya to make its pledge two weeks ago to dismantle weapons of mass destruction. [IAEA / LIBYA](libya-031231-2de75189.htm) VOA 31 Dec 2003 -- The International Atomic Energy Agency says its inspectors had visited nuclear sites in Libya that they did not know existed, and plan to conduct another round of inspections at the end of January. [U-S-Libya-Nuclear](libya-031230-20e74fe4.htm) VOA 30 Dec 2003 -- The United States says it will take a considerable amount of time to determine whether Libya is being completely forthcoming in disclosing its nuclear program. Secretary of State Colin Powell discussed the issue by telephone Tuesday with International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohammed El-Baradei, who has just completed an inspection visit to Libya. [UN atomic agency chief says Libya was in early stages of nuclear programme](libya-031229-unnews01.htm) UN News Centre 29 Dec 2003 -- After visiting Libya to start verifying its clandestine activities, the head of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today said that Tripoli's nuclear programme was "at an early stage of development." [LIBYA/NUCLEAR](libya-031229-2fe74bfa.htm) VOA 29 Dec 2003 -- According to the head of the U-N nuclear watchdog agency, Libya is honoring its pledge to cooperate with weapons inspectors in the process of dismantling Tripoli's programs for production of weapons of mass destruction. [LIBYA/NUCLEAR](libya-031228-26e749d1.htm) VOA 28 Dec 2003 -- International weapons inspectors are in Libya preparing to begin inspections of the country's programs aimed at building banned weapons. [LIBYA/NUCLEAR ](libya-031227-3ae747ec.htm) VOA 27 Dec 2003 -- The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the I-A-E-A, is traveling to (is in) Libya to meet the country's leader, Moammar Gadhafi, to begin the verification process of Tripoli's past and present nuclear activities. [Libya's Weapons Programs](libya-031226-36e7470f.htm) VOA 26 Dec 2003 -- Libyan officials announced last week that their country is ending its program to develop weapons of great destruction. They said Libya plans to give up the program and work instead on development projects. Libya also said it would welcome inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency. [State's Armitage Attributes Positive Developments to Steadfast Policies](/military/ library/news/2003/12/mil-031224-usia03.htm) Washington File 24 Dec 2003 -- Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage dismissed the idea that recent actions on the part of Libya, Syria and Iran were a reaction to the capture of Saddam Hussein but asserted that they are the long-term fruit of persistent policies aimed at bringing these nations into the international mainstream. [LIBYA WMD PLEDGE: RESULT OF IRAQ WAR OR 'PERSISTENT DIPLOMACY?'](wwwh31225.htm) US Dept. of State IIP, Foreign media Reaction 24 Dec 2003 [Security Council hails Libya's cooperation with UN on weapons verification](libya-031223-unnews01.htm) UN News Centre 23 Dec 2003 -- Lauding Libya's renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, Security Council members today encouraged Tripoli to cooperate with the United Nations in verifying that the decision is carried out. [EDITORIAL: LIBYA WEAPONS PLEDGE](libya-031223-3ee74010.htm) VOA 23 Dec 2003 -- Libyan officials have begun meetings with representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The meetings come in the wake of an announcement that Libyan dictator, Colonel Momammar Gadhafi, has pledged to disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction programs. [MORE GADHAFI WEAPONS REACT](libya-031223-23e73fd4.htm) VOA 23 Dec 2003 -- Reaction continues in the American press to Colonel Moammar Gadhafi's concession that he will allow international inspection of Libya's weapons arsenal. [IAEA Director General to Visit Libya](libya-031222-iaea01.htm) IAEA 22 Dec 2003 -- Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei announced today that he will visit the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) in the immediate future with a team of senior IAEA technical experts. [U-S / LIBYA SANCTIONS](libya-031222-29e73dc6.htm) VOA 22 Dec 2003 -- The United States Monday raised the prospect of lifting sanctions against Libya. But the State Department said that will depend on additional steps by the Moammar Gadhafi government beyond its renunciation late last week of weapons of mass destruction. [GADHAFI'S WEAPONS](libya-031222-27e73d1a.htm) VOA 22 Dec 2003 -- Libya's military dictator, Moammar Gadhafi is promising to give up his weapons of mass destruction in an effort to end almost two decades of international isolation. The news comes after months of secret negotiations between the United States, Britain and Libya. The negotiations reportedly began as an offshoot to talks on Lockerbie Pan Am crash reparations. The U-S press has been quick to respond [UN atomic energy agency chief to visit Libya for talks on nuclear activities](libya-031222-unnews01.htm) UN News Centre 22 Dec 2003 -- The head of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today announced plans to visit Libya with a team of senior technical experts to quickly begin an "in-depth process" of verifying all of the country's past and present nuclear activities. [Libya: Analysts Say Decision On WMD Inspired By Economics, Worries About Succession](libya-031222-rferl-164042.htm) RFE/RL 22 Dec 2003 -- Libya says it will abandon its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and will allow international inspections of its facilities. Analysts say a number of political and economic factors are behind Tripoli's decision, which has been praised by Arab states, Israel, and other countries around the world. [IAEA / LIBYA](libya-031222-30e73c6d.htm) VOA 22 Dec 2003 -- The International Atomic Energy Agency says Libya had been hiding its nuclear-weapons program until last Friday, but welcomes Tripoli's intention to co-operate with the agency. [Statement of John Kerry on Libya's Dismantling Weapons of Mass Destruction](libya-031220-kerry.htm) 20 Dec 2003 -- "Libya's agreement to terminate their weapons of mass destructions program is an important step forward in addressing the great security challenge of our time, proliferation. It is particularly important that it will be done within the international non-proliferation treaty regime and using the IAEA, the bases of international law and multilateral cooperation and verification." [Annan welcomes Libya's assurances on weapons of mass destruction](libya-031220-unnews01.htm) UN News Centre 20 Dec 2003 -- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan today hailed Libya's announcement that it will fulfil all obligations under regimes covering the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [White House Hails Libyan Decision to Dismantle Weapons Program](libya-031220-usia01.htm) Washington File 20 Dec 2003 -- The United States welcomes the recently announced decision by the Libyan government to disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction within Libya, say senior Bush administration officials. [LIBYA/I-A-E-A](libya-031221-35e73a2c.htm) VOA 21 Dec 2003 -- Initial meetings between Libyan officials and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency could be the beginnings of a long and complex process to verify Tripoli's nuclear ambitions. [IRAN/LIBYA](../iran/2003/iran-031221-2ae73a11.htm) VOA 21 Dec 2003 -- Iran, which only recently agreed to allow tougher inspections of its nuclear program, says it welcomes news that Libya has decided to scrap its weapons of mass destruction program. [Bush, Blair Welcome Libya's Pledge to Dismantle WMD Programs](libya-031220-afps01.htm) AFPS 20 Dec 2003 -- Libya's leader, Colonel Moammar al Ghadafi, confirmed his commitment to disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction programs and has agreed to allow inspectors from international organizations to enter his country, President Bush said here Dec. 19. [Straw: UK adopting `twin-track` approach to Iran, Libya](libya-031220-irna01.htm) IRNA 20 Dec 2003 -- The British government is adopting a similar approach of "patience" and "diplomacy" to bring both Libya and Iran into the international community, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said Saturday. [BRITAIN/LIBYA](libya-031220-20e73836.htm) VOA 20 Dec 2003 -- Britain is heaping more praise on Libya after it was disclosed late Friday that the country has agreed to dismantle of its weapons of mass destruction. [ISRAEL-LIBYA](libya-031220-25e7386e.htm) VOA 20 Dec 2003 -- Israel has welcomed Libya's decision to renounce its weapons of mass destruction. [FRANCE/LIBYA](libya-031220-34e7382c.htm) VOA 20 Dec 2003 -- French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin praises Libya's surprising decision to abandon its programs to build weapons of mass destruction. [LIBYA/WORLD REACT](libya-031220-3de7384f.htm) VOA 20 Dec 2003 -- The international community has warmly welcomed Libya's decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction program, with praise coming from continents around the world including Asia, Africa and Europe. [LIBYA WRAP](libya-031220-3ee73869.htm) VOA 20 Dec 2003 -- Libyan officials say the country decided to scrap its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction to focus on development projects. [U.S. Security Strategy Induced Libya to Give up WMD Programs](libya-031219-usia01.htm) Washington File 19 Dec 2003 -- The White House said Libya's December 19 announcement that it will dismantle its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a result of President Bush's national security strategy to give regimes a choice between pursuing such weapons at great cost or renouncing them and rejoining the international community. [President Bush Welcomes Libyan Decision to End WMD Programs](libya-031219-usia02.htm) Washington File 19 Dec 2003 -- President Bush announced that he had received a commitment from Libyan leader Colonel Moammar Ghadafi to disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in Libya. [BUSH LIBYA](libya-031219-032ce7375b.htm) VOA 19 Dec 2003 -- President Bush says Libya has agreed to destroy all of its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. [LIBYA-WMD](libya-031219-3ae7374e.htm) VOA 19 Dec 2003 -- British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced late Friday that Libya will dismantle all of its weapons of mass destruction capabilities. [President Bush: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs ](20031219-9.html) December 19, 2003 - Today in Tripoli, the leader of Libya, Colonel Moammar al-Ghadafi, publicly confirmed his commitment to disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction programs in his country. [Libya's Announcement - The President's National Security Strategy to Combat WMD](20031219-8.html) December 19, 2003 - Libya has disclosed to the US and UK significant information on its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, as well as on its biological and ballistic missile-related activities. [PRIME MINISTER WELCOMES DECISION BY LIBYA TO GIVE UP WMD](libya-031219-uk1.htm) (19/12/03) Libya has now declared its intention to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction completely and to limit the range of Libyan missiles to no greater than 300 kms, in accordance with the parameters set by the Missile Technology Control Regime. Colonel Qadhafi has undertaken that this process will be transparent and verifiable. [Libya's statement on weapons ban](031219.htm) (19/12/03) Based on the talks conducted by the Great Arab Socialist People's Libyan Jamahiriya with the United States and the United Kingdom, both permanent members of the UN Security Council responsible for ensuring international peace and security, it (Libya) has decided on its free will to get rid of these materials, equipment and programs, and to become totally free of internationally banned weapons. [U-S / LIBYA TRAVEL](/military/ library/news/2003/11/mil-031124-28e6e72a.htm) VOA 24 Nov 2003 -- The Bush administration said Monday it is renewing the long-standing ban on visits to Libya by U-S citizens for another year. However, in a gesture reflecting an improving climate in contacts between the two countries, the State Department says the ban will be reviewed every three months. [U-S-LIBYA-LOCKERBIE](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030819-35e58b44.htm) VOA 19 Aug 2003 -- The United States is publicly calling on France not to "impede" an agreement under which Libya is to pay compensation for the downing of Pan Am flight 1-0-3 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. France is threatening to veto an enabling resolution in the U-N Security Council to press for a similar settlement for family members of a French plane brought down over Niger. [U-N/ LIBYA SANCTIONS](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030818-3ee58879.htm) VOA 18 Aug 2003 -- Britain has introduced a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council to lift sanctions against Libya. The U-N imposed the sanctions after the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 1-0-3 over Lockerbie, Scotland. British ambassador Emyr Jones Parry says he hopes for a vote in favor of the resolution by the end of the week. But the veto-wielding French are not onboard. [White House Report, August 18; Iraq, Libya, North Korea](/military/ library/news/2003/08/mil-030818-usia02.htm) Washington File 18 Aug 2003 -- U.S. STAYS ON THE "OFFENSIVE" WHILE SABOTAGE HITS IRAQ / U.S. SANCTIONS ON LIBYA TO REMAIN IN PLACE / U.S. TAKES STEPS TO CURTAIL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHIPPING [UK, US tell Security Council they are ready to see sanctions against Libya lifted](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030818-unnews02.htm) UN News Centre 18 Aug 2003 -- The United Kingdom and United States have told the Security Council they are ready to see sanctions lifted against Libya following the North African country's compliance with United Nations resolutions passed against it in connection with the deadly bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. [Security Council should work to formally lift Libya sanctions - Annan](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030817-unnews02.htm) UN News Centre 17 Aug 2003 -- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called for the Security Council to formally lift sanctions imposed against Libya in connection with the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. [Powell Says U.S. Will Continue Bilateral Sanctions on Libya](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030817-usia01.htm) Washington File 17 Aug 2003 -- In recognition of Libya's acceptance of responsibility for its actions in the bombing of flight Pan Am 103 in 1988, the United States will not oppose the lifting of U.N. sanctions on that country, but will continue to maintain bilateral sanctions, Secretary of State Colin Powell said in a statement released August 15. [Annan says Council should work to formally lift Libya sanctions](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030817-unnews01.htm) UN News Centre 17 Aug 2003 -- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called for the Security Council to formally lift sanctions imposed against Libya in connection with the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. [U.S. Will Not Oppose Ending of U.N. Sanctions on Libya](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030815-usia04.htm) Washington File 15 Aug 2003 -- In recognition of Libya's acceptance of responsibility for its actions in the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Scotland in 1988, the United States announced August 15 that "it will not oppose the lifting of United Nations sanctions on Libya." [U-S / LIBYA / LOCKERBIE](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030815-35e57edf.htm) VOA 15 Aug 2003 -- Senior Bush administration officials say there will be no early end to U-S economic sanctions against Libya even though the Muammar Gadhafi government will shortly fulfill terms for the permanent lifting of U-N sanctions stemming from the bombing of Pan Am flight 1-0-3. The families of the 270 victims of the 1988 airliner attack were briefed on the status of the case Friday in Washington. [U-S / LIBYA / LOCKERBIE](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030814-3ae57d23.htm) VOA 14 Aug 2003 -- U-S State Department officials meet today (Friday) with families of victims of Pan Am flight 103 on the emerging deal under which Libya is to take responsibility and pay compensation for the 1988 airliner bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. However a potential veto by France in the United Nations is looming as a new obstacle. [U-S / LIBYA / LOCKERBIE](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030814-33e57b9c.htm) VOA 14 Aug 2003 -- U-S State Department officials meet today (Friday) with families of victims of Pan Am flight 103 on the emerging deal under which Libya is to take responsibility and pay compensation for the 1988 airliner bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. However a potential veto by France in the United Nations is looming as a new obstacle. [BRITAIN / LIBYA/LOCKERBIE](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030814-34e57a73.htm) VOA 14 Aug 2003 -- Relatives of British victims of the 1988 Pan Am bombing over Scotland say they would rather have an independent inquiry into how the attack happened than money from Libya. [BRITAIN / LIBYA LOCKERBIE](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030814-25e578fc.htm) VOA 14 Aug 2003 -- Relatives of British victims of the 1988 Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, say they would rather have an independent inquiry into how the attack happened than money from Libya. [LIBYA/LOCKERBIE](../../../../security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030806-3ae55c8d.htm) VOA 06 Aug 2003 -- The long international dispute with Libya over the 1988 bombing of a jumbo jet over Lockerbie, Scotland may come to a final conclusion as early as next week. An official of the Arab League says a deal to permanently end sanctions against Libya is very close. [Transcript: State's Bolton Says Iraq a Lesson for Syria, Libya, Iran](../../iraq/2003/iraq-030416-usia03.htm) Washington File 16 Apr 2003 -- "The United States is very concerned that states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction give up that quest, and that they live within the commitments that they've made in such things as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the chemical weapons convention, and the biological weapons convention," said the State Department's John Bolton in an interview with Radio Sawa. [ITALY / CHEMICALS](libya-030117-2417fd13.htm) VOA 17 Jan 2003 -- Italian customs police are examining a 50-ton cargo of industrial chemicals bound for Libya. They suspect the material was to be used to produce weapons of mass destruction [U.S. Trade Sanctions on Libya Renewed](libya-030103-usia01.htm) Washington File 03 Jan 2003-- President Bush has renewed the U.S. sanctions against Libya, saying the government of Moammar Gadhafi must fully comply with United Nations resolutions concerning the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988 and "accept responsibility for the actions of its officials and pay compensation." | | NEWSLETTER | Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list | | |

Libië

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5030998.stm

| | By Rana Jawad BBC News, Tripoli Private Libyan airline Buraq Air is due to take possession of two new Boeing aircraft from the United States later this year - something that would have been unthinkable when the country was under sanctions led by the US. | | Libya's airports badly need new investment Libya's inclusion on the US "state sponsor of terrorism" list meant it could not import sophisticated technology for the aviation sector, because this fell under the category of "equipment of dual military and civilian use". This prevented Libya from gaining access to new aviation technology at competitive prices. But the US says it will take Libya off that list. Buraq Air general director Captain Mohamed Bubeida is excited about the changes. He says they're working on opening other routes including: "Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia. With the demands now and the increase of traffic between Tunis, Cairo and Damascus for example, Buraq will at least cover the gap." Buraq Air launched its first domestic flight in 2001 - the following year, it went international with flights to Morocco, Turkey and Syria. Buraq was the first Libyan airline to clinch a deal for the purchase of Boeing planes last year, at a cost of $61m each. But as the number of flights between Tripoli, Africa, and Europe grows, so do flight delays and competition on flight routes. Substandard According to the country's civil aviation authority, Libya has been enjoying a gradual increase of traffic for the past five years, since international sanctions were gradually lifted. Last year, there were 1.5m air travellers - 14% more than the previous year. Many in the aviation industry hope that this increase in traffic will be matched by improvements in the country's airports. "The terminals are not up to standard - the airports we have now, Tripoli International or Maitega, they have to be renewed completely," Captain Bubeida says. "We would like to see a new airport with new facilities and new services. It's a huge investment that needs to be done either by the government or other investors." Changes ahead Tripoli's international airport is a far cry from some of the more developed ones seen in the region, something else which Civil Aviation Authority Director General Mohamed Shleibek blames partly on sanctions: "When you don't have traffic or a clear future, it has an impact on your planning." Mr Shleibek was quick to add that the CAA's estimated $700m proposal to upgrade Libya's airports has been approved by the Libyan government, and they will start renovating as soon as they can. | | Captain Sabri Abdallah says Afriqiyah Airlines could become a regional hub Mr Shleibek also says sanctions are responsible for the current state of the facilities such as air navigation and communication equipment. This equipment, he says, was "originally imported from Canadian manufacturers linked with US companies", so Libya's inclusion on the US sanctions list made it impossible to renew the equipment. But change is approaching fast in the coming weeks, with the US Congress expected to approve the US government's proposal to restore full diplomatic ties with Libya. In 2001, with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi enthusiastic about African unity, a new state-owned airline called Afriqiyah was established. Oil boom As Tripoli and Washington move closer to restoring full diplomatic relations, Afriqiyah Airlines chairman Captain Sabri Abdallah has high expectations. He thinks the impact will be huge - "mainly in purchasing American equipment, and also we'll benefit from training the airlines personnel in the United States". Captain Abdallah says there are no imminent plans for direct flights to the United States, but he adds that it's a "definite future possibility". He points to the gradual progression of economic ties: "We will see American companies, especially in the oil sector, more involved in the Libyan market, and a lot of Libyan institutes will head for the US for training or other business missions." "And don't forget we use Tripoli as a hub for the rest of Africa so we could use the Afriqiyah flights to the US to extend our network of operations," he says.

Libië

http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.php?theme=4&variable_ID=431&action=select_countries

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Libië

http://apha.confex.com/apha/132am/techprogram/paper_91322.htm

| | Ratan Singh, MD1, Mailud Al- Amari, MPH2, and Mohammad A. Dydamouny, MD2. (1) Family and Community Medicine, Al Tahady University, Sirt, Libya., PO BOX 16, Sirt, Libya, (2) Public Health, Garyounis University, PO Box 18251, Benghazi, Libya, 091- 610-1494, [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) The present study has analysed Libyan demographic dynamics, fertility trends and correlates since 1954. Population between 1954 (since first national census) and 2002 increased from 1.041 million to 5.484 million. For every 1000 population, crude birth rate declined from 48.0 to 36.0 and crude death from 22.7 to 7.0. The natural increase rate was 2.5% in 1954, reached a high peak of 3.8% in 1973 and thereafter declined to 2.9 % in 2002. The other fertility indicators like TFR, GFR and ASFRs had dramatically fallen over the period. In fact, between 1949-2002, IMR per 1000 live births had fallen from 300 to a bare minimum of 24.4; whereas, at the same time life expectancy had risen from 42.4 years to 69.5 years. Simultaneously there were equally impressive gains in urban population from 25% to 76%, GNP per capita from 50 to 8220 US$, female education level from 12.2% to 74.0%, female age of marriage from 15 years to 24 years, and contraception use rate from <5% to 45%. However, the proportion of married females (15 years & more) was 42.8% in 1954, increased to 77.3% in 1964 and declined again to 42.8% in 1995. It is speculated that the demographic change in the coming years would result from the interplay of continuing differences in fertility and mortality- which would be determined by availability and access to reproductive health services, upward socio-economic mobility and progress in health development. Learning Objectives: Keywords: Population, Presenting author's disclosure statement: Organization/institution whose products or services will be discussed: Garyounis University I do not have any significant financial interest/arrangement or affiliation with any organization/institution whose products or services are being discussed in this session. [The 132nd Annual Meeting (November 6-10, 2004) of APHA](meeting.htm)

Libië

https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/red-cross-head-libyans-are-suffering-consequences-war-tripoli

The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Peter Maurer said that civilians in Libya are suffering as a result of the war, which affected residential neighbourhoods, health facilities, and schools, according to Maurer. Maurer explained in a statement at the end of his visit to Libya that one out of four Libyans have been affected by the conflict, which entered its ninth year. The aggression against the capital led to the closure of 13 health facilities and 220 schools, and the disruption of health services and education, in addition to an increasing scarcity of essential supplies, according to the Red Cross official. [News](/news)

Libië

http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/Wh_185.html

The Intricacies and Controversies of Facial Recognition in Policing The adoption and misuse of facial… The Evolution of Gig Economy Regulations: Uber and Lyft's Landmark Settlement in Massachusetts The gig… A Strategic Alliance: Volkswagen's Investment in Rivian and the Electric Vehicle Market Evolution The recent… Navigating the Tensions: Apple's App Store Controversy and the European Union's Digital Markets Act The… The Impact of Cyberattacks on Auto Dealerships: A Deep Dive into the CDK Global Incident… Celebrities Learning that you have been accepted to the university of your dreams is one of… Do you have so many tasks that you have to remember to do but your… Day by day life gets harder and harder and you can not have enough time… When life gets hectic, it can be challenging to find the time to take a… People just love to look beautiful, and looking beautiful has two scenarios. One is unmatched… The arrival of warmer temperatures signals the beginning of everyone's "favorite" activity: spring cleaning. Take… Ideas for a hangover kit for the bachelorette party? Do you have any plans for… Do you need to spruce up while you're on the go? After conducting research on… Friday evening, your buddies and you have finally decided to go on that pub crawl… Those who have an exercise regime and maybe go trekking and camping often are well-conscious… Choosing the best body wipes for the elderly may be difficult at the best of… If you're the kind of person who craves adventure and likes to explore new places,… According to Gold Mask, the Gold mask is a tissue-based anti-aging therapy. Improves the look… The majority of us carry some kind of electronic device, whether it be a smartphone,… Everyone wants to look younger, but the earliest indications of aging show up around the… It's no secret that a night of zero sleep, a morning of Zoom meetings and… If we talk about screens, there are a lot of screens that we are surrounded… Your soles, legs, and lumbar can deteriorate if you spend the majority of the workday… Every person should look into getting foot exfoliation. Our feet endure such battering during the… People have been innovative with their treatments and one of those crazy innovations is a…

Libië

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/rellibya04.html

Reports on Religious Freedom: Libya (2004) [Religious Freedom Reports: Table of Contents](/reports-on-religious-freedom-in-the-middle-east) The Government restricts freedom of religion. Although the country is a dictatorship, the Government is tolerant of other faiths, with the exception of fundamentalist or militant Islam, which it views as a threat to the regime. There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report; persons rarely are harassed because of their religious practices unless such practices are perceived as having a political dimension or motivation. Information on the relationship among religions in society is limited. In February, the U.S. Government established an official presence in the country and began discussing religious freedom issues with the Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. Section I. Religious Demography The country's total land area is approximately 675,501 square miles, and its population is approximately 5,241,000. The country is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim (97 percent) and there is no significant Shi'ite presence. There are small Christian communities, composed almost exclusively of foreigners, predominantly African immigrants. A small Anglican community composed of one resident priest and mostly African and Indian immigrant workers in Tripoli is part of the Egyptian Diocese. The Anglican Bishop of Libyais resident in Cairo. There are Union churches in Tripoli and Benghazi as well as small Union congregations scattered throughoutthe country. There are an estimated 50,000 Roman Catholics who are served by two bishops--one in Tripoli and one in Benghazi; both communities are multi-national. Catholic priests and nuns serve in all the main coastal cities, and there is one priest in the southern city of Sebha. Most of them work in hospitals, orphanages, and with the handicapped and the elderly. They enjoy good relations with the Government. The Catholic bishops, priests, and nuns wear religious dress freely in public and report virtually no discrimination. In 1997, the Vatican established diplomatic relations with the country, stating that the country had taken steps to protect freedom of religion. The Vatican's goal was to address the needs of the estimated 100,000 Christians in the country more adequately. There is an accredited Nuncio resident in Malta and a bishop resident in Tripoli. There are also Coptic and Greek Orthodox priests in both Tripoli and Benghazi. There still may be a very small number of Jews. The World Jewish Congress reports that there were no more than 20 Jews in 1974. Most of the Jewish community, which numbered around 35,000 in 1948, left for Israel at various stages between 1948 and 1967. The Government has been rehabilitating the "medina" (old city) in Tripoli and has renovated the large synagogue there; however, the synagogue did not reopen during the period covered by this report. Adherents of other non-Muslim religions, such as Hindus, Baha'is, and Buddhists, are present. There is no information on the number of foreign missionaries in the country. As in other Muslim countries, Christian churches are not allowed to proselytize, although generally, this restriction is not observed. Section II. Status of Religious Freedom Legal/Policy Framework The Government restricts freedom of religion. The country's leadership states publicly its preference for Islam, although it is aggressively opposed to more conservative or militant strains of Islam, which it views as a threat to the regime. The Government has banned the once powerful Sanusiyya Islamic order; in its place, the country'sleader, Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi, established the Islamic Call Society (ICS), which is the Islamic arm of the Government's foreign policy and is active throughout the world. The ICS also is responsible for relations with other religions, including the Christian churches in the country. These churches report good cooperation with the ICS. The ICS's main purpose is to promote a moderate form of Islam that reflects the religious views of the Government and to ban Islamic groups whose beliefs and practices are at variance with the state-approved teaching of Islam. Although most Islamic institutions are under government control, prominent families endow some mosques.However, the mosques generally adhere to the government-approved interpretation of Islam. Restrictions on Religious Freedom The Government controls most mosques and Islamic institutions, and even mosques endowed by prominent families generally remain within the government-approved interpretation of Islam. According to recent reports, individuals rarely are harassed because of their religious practices unless such practices are perceived as having a political dimension or motivation. Members of minority religions are allowed to conduct services. Christian churches operate openly and are tolerated by the authorities. The Government routinely grants visas and residence papers to religious staff from other nations. The Government restoredthe former Catholic church in the medina, and it is currently being used as an exhibition hall. It is not clear if it will be used as a church again. The Government has not yet honored a promise made in 1970 to provide the Anglican Church with appropriate alternative facilities when it took the property used by the Church. The Anglicans shared a villa with other Protestant denominations until 1998 when the Government gave them a small suite of offices to use for worship. Similarly, the Government has not returned Union Church property confiscated in 1971 despite requests from the Church. The Government allowed Orthodox priests to visit six Bulgarian medics held since 1999 for allegedly infecting children with HIV. The medics, convicted and in May sentenced to death, were permitted to attend services under guard, at least until transferred to a prison in Tripoli in June. There are no known places of worship for other non-Muslim religions such as Hinduism, the Baha'i Faith, and Buddhism, although adherents are allowed to practice within the privacy of their homes. Foreign adherents of these religions are allowed to display and sell religious items at bazaars and other gatherings. Abuses of Religious Freedom In 2002, a People's Court in Tripoli sentenced to death Salem Abu Hanak and Abdullah Ahmed Izzedin, 2 out of at least 152 professionals and students who were arbitrarily arrested in 1998 in Benghazi for alleged involvement with Islamic organizations. Eighty-six of the 152 men were sentenced while 66 were acquitted. The convicted received sentences ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment. The appellate hearing began in December 2002, with the next hearing reportedly scheduled to take place inNovember when a verdict is expected. Amnesty International reported that the detainees were held incommunicado and their whereabouts remained unknown for more than 2 years following their detention. Additionally, lawyers for the accused were neither allowed to study their case files nor meet with their clients. The lawyers were denied access to the court, and the judge appointed government clerks to replace them. In April 2001, the People's Court in Tripoli appointed legal representation for the men and family members were allowed to meet the accused briefly for the first time since their arrest; however, family members were not able to meet again with the detainees until at least December 2001. Some practicing Muslims have shaved their beards to avoid harassment from the security services, who tend to associate wearing beards with advocacy of politically motivated Islam. In the late 1980s, the Government began to pursue a domestic policy directed against Islamic fundamentalists; the events of September 11, 2001 have reinforced Qadhafi's view that fundamentalism is a potential rallying point for opponents of the regime. There continue to be reports of armed clashes between security forces and Islamic groups that oppose the current regime and advocate the establishment of a more traditional form of Islamic government. There are currently no reports available on the number or status of individuals detained because of their religious beliefs. Forced Religious Conversion There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United States. A non-Libyan woman who marries a Muslim man is not required to convert to Islam, although many do so; however, a non-Libyan man must convert to marry a Muslim woman. Abuses by Terrorist Organizations There were no reported abuses targeted at specific religions by terrorist organizations during the period covered by this report. Section III. Societal Attitudes Information on the relationship among religions in society is limited, although members of non-Muslim minority religions report that they do not face harassment by authorities or the Muslim majority on the basis of their religious practices. Section IV. U.S. Government Policy In February, the United States established an official presence in the country and began discussing religious freedom issues with the Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. Sources: [U.S. State Department - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor](http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35500.htm)

Libië

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/4708179.stm

Libya has recently undergone a dramatic rehabilitation, after spending years regarded as a pariah state by the West. But Mike Donkin finds it still has some way to go before tourists start flocking in. The first hint of a more worldly Libya comes as you push your trolley through a smartened-up Tripoli Airport. Along with the green slogans of the Revolutionary State of the Masses like "Partners not Wage Workers!", hang new ones: "Rent This Space!" | | Is Libya adopting Western ways? "You are a journalist?" asks the immigration officer. "Welcome to Libya." I am staying, like the last time, at a hotel on the seafront. With its round balconies it looks a bit like a beehive. But there has been a lot of painting done since my last visit. And while reception is not exactly swarming, there are some British oil engineers and a French archaeological group booking in with me. They are competing for those rooms that look across a sparkling Mediterranean towards a Europe that is politically closer now than it has been in all the 36 years since Colonel Gadaffi seized power. There is still the same sharp look from the man in the suit in the lift lobby, though. So, to the sights. Leptis Magna, my guidebook tells me "is one of the finest Roman cities anywhere". Ali, the taxi driver, is solicitous as we set out. "Have you got water? Some sunglasses?" And then we are speeding east along the coast. "Libyan people and English people were always very good friends," Ali says. "But your old leader Mrs Thatcher and Colonel Gaddafi had a big problem. Now you can stay here again and we need the money." "And look, they're building very fast" he says, waving an arm towards cranes and diggers working in a cloud of dust. The passing scenery is dull. Graceful date palms, but otherwise desert scrub with a scattering of old car tyre rubber. We do overtake several open trucks, though, each with half a dozen camels, sat heads-aloft and absorbing the bumps of the road with dignity. English abroad | | Leptis Magna is among five world heritage sites in Libya Leptis Magna is less than under invasion today. There is a choice of guides sitting in the shade of a tree. But I make my own way. Under the towering pillared arch, through the baths built by the Emperor Hadrian, with their marble-flagged floors, their changing rooms and the "laconica" or sweat baths... all wonderfully preserved. In the forum there is a courtyard with treasures heaped among the thistles and just the sound of birdsong. Amazingly, so far, I have had Ancient Leptis all to myself. But now, English voices chatting to their guide. Bruce, Don, Ruth and Robin, it turns out... late 50s, floppy hats, sensible shoes and determinedly curious. 'State business' "So why Libya?" I ask Bruce. "Why not?" he says. "Where else have you holidayed then?" I said. "North Korea," he replied. The Libyans they have met, they tell me, have been charming. The food is great and the prices cheap. But it is different. You cannot travel anywhere on your own. And any talk of politics is totally taboo. Bruce deals in cars back in Solihull and recalls how he asked Mohammed, their guide, why some number plates in Libya were white and others yellow. "How should I know?" Mohammed snapped back. "That's state business." Tourist trade I had already chatted to Mohammed and found out he had given up his poorly paid job as an English teacher to be a guide. Then Mohammed asked me what I did. His face dropped and he switched the topic hurriedly back to monuments. Libya's government has its own structures to develop tourism, of course. But there do also seem to be openings for individual initiatives. Omar is half Italian and he has been living over there, but now he has a mission to show others the homeland he loves. "We want to get a lot more people here but not mass market tourists like next door in Tunisia," he says. Omar's plan is to take parties to camp out under the stars in the sand dunes of the Sahara on journeys of discovery, with a tribal guide. But he is a realist. "Many European friends of mine don't want to come here because they still think it's not safe," he says, "and that is sad because most Libyans haven't met many foreigners, and they'd love to." I went to the beach to meet another tourism entrepreneur. Mou-Awia opened a diving club this summer. He is only 29, but he has got racks of wetsuits and breathing gear... and lots of ambition. "There is so much to discover off the coast here," he says. "You can imagine in World War II Tobruk there are so many things that divers will want to explore". Libya may lack the resorts, the infrastructure just now, Mou-Awia says, "but just give us five years. We're even starting our own website to promote everything!" 'Being watched' What about Libyan nightlife, then? Well, there is not much of that yet. Tripoli's once so-cosmopolitan promenade does have bars where local men, and ONLY men, sip mint tea and puff water pipes and clack-clack dominoes. These are early days. Libya is opening its doors, and there is much to see. But after more than three decades, when surveillance was the norm, old habits do die hard. And it can be difficult to relax on holiday if you feel you are being watched. From Our Own Correspondent was broadcast on Saturday, 23 July, 2005 at 1130 BST on BBC Radio 4. Please check the [programme schedules ](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3187926.stm) for World Service transmission times.

Libië

https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya

[Independence](/place/Libya/History#ref46563) [Revolt in 2011](/place/Libya/The-discovery-of-oil#ref299762) [Postrevolutionary chaos](/place/Libya/Qaddafi-toppled-and-killed#ref325703) [References & Edit History](https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/additional-info) [Facts & Stats](/facts/Libya) Libya Our editors will review what you've submitted and determine whether to revise the article. Libya, [country](https://www.britannica.com/topic/nation-state) located in [North Africa](https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Africa). Most of the country lies in the [Sahara](https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahara-desert-Africa) desert, and much of its population is concentrated along the coast and its immediate hinterland, where [Tripoli](https://www.britannica.com/place/Tripoli) (Ṭarābulus), the [de facto](https://www.britannica.com/topic/de-facto) capital, and [Benghazi](https://www.britannica.com/place/Benghazi) (Banghāzī), another major [city](https://www.britannica.com/topic/city), are located. - Head Of Government: - Prime Minister: Abdul Hamid Dbeibah - Population: - (2024 est.) 7,820,000 - Currency Exchange Rate: - 1 USD equals 4.879 Libyan dinar - Head Of State: - Chairman of the Presidential Council: Mohamed al-Menfi Libya [comprises](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comprises) three historical regions— [Tripolitania](https://www.britannica.com/place/Tripolitania) in the northwest, [Cyrenaica](https://www.britannica.com/place/Cyrenaica) in the east, and [Fezzan](https://www.britannica.com/place/Fezzan) in the southwest. The Ottoman authorities recognized them as separate provinces. Under Italian rule, they were unified to form a single colony, which gave way to independent Libya. For much of Libya's early history, both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were more closely linked with neighbouring territories than with one other. Recent News [Hisham Matar wins Orwell prize for political fiction](https://www.theguardian.com/books/article/2024/jun/27/hisham-matar-wins-orwell-prize-for-political-fiction) [China makes tentative steps to return to Libya after civil war stopped trade](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3267487/china-makes-moves-reopen-economic-ties-libya-13-years-after-suspending-trade) [Libya gas, oil bidding unlikely this year -adviser](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/africa/libya-gas-oil-bidding-unlikely-this-year-adviser-idUSLP534314/) [Interior ministers of Libya and Tunisia agree reopening of major border crossing](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/interior-ministers-libya-tunisia-agree-reopening-major-border-crossing-2024-06-12/) [Exclusive: Migrant expulsions from Tunisia to Libya fuel extortion, abuse, UN says](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/migrant-expulsions-tunisia-libya-fuel-extortion-abuse-un-briefing-2024-06-11/) Before the discovery of oil in the late 1950s, Libya was considered poor in natural resources and severely limited by its desert [environment](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/environment). The country was almost entirely dependent upon [foreign aid](https://www.britannica.com/money/foreign-aid) and imports for the maintenance of its economy; the discovery of [petroleum](https://www.britannica.com/science/petroleum) dramatically changed this situation. The government long exerted strong control over the economy and attempted to develop agriculture and [industry](https://www.britannica.com/money/industry) with wealth derived from its huge oil revenues. It also established a [welfare state](https://www.britannica.com/money/welfare-state), which provides medical care and education at minimal cost to the people. Although Libya's long-ruling leader [Muammar al-Qaddafi](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Qaddafi) espoused an [idiosyncratic](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idiosyncratic) [political ideology](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ideology-society) rooted in socioeconomic [egalitarianism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/egalitarianism) and [direct democracy](https://www.britannica.com/topic/direct-democracy), Libya in practice remained an [authoritarian](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authoritarian) state, with power concentrated among members of Qaddafi's inner circle of relatives and security chiefs. Opposition to the Qaddafi regime reached an unprecedented level in 2011, developing into an armed revolt that forced Qaddafi from power. (For a discussion of unrest in Libya in 2011, see [Libya Revolt of 2011](https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011).) [Mukhtar Mustafa Buru](/contributor/Mukhtar-Mustafa-Buru/433) [Gary L. Fowler](/contributor/Gary-L-Fowler/3934) [Dennis D. Cordell](/contributor/Dennis-D-Cordell/3682) [The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica](/editor/The-Editors-of-Encyclopaedia-Britannica/4419) Land Libya is bounded by the [Mediterranean Sea](https://www.britannica.com/place/Mediterranean-Sea) on the north, [Egypt](https://www.britannica.com/place/Egypt) on the east, [Sudan](https://www.britannica.com/place/Sudan) on the southeast, [Niger](https://www.britannica.com/place/Niger) and [Chad](https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad) on the south, and [Tunisia](https://www.britannica.com/place/Tunisia) and [Algeria](https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria) on the west. [ Britannica Quiz Which Country Is Larger By Area? Quiz ](/quiz/which-country-is-larger-by-area-quiz) Relief Libya is underlain by basement rocks of Precambrian age (from about 4 billion to 540 million years ago) [mantled](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/mantled) with marine and wind-borne deposits. The major physical features are the [Nafūsah Plateau](https://www.britannica.com/place/Nafusah-Plateau) and the [Al-Jifārah](https://www.britannica.com/place/al-Jifarah) (Gefara) Plain in the northwest, the [Akhḍar Mountains](https://www.britannica.com/place/Akhdar-Mountains) ("Green Mountains") in the northeast, and the Saharan [plateau](https://www.britannica.com/science/plateau-landform), which occupies much of the rest of the country. The Al-Jifārah Plain covers about 10,000 square miles (26,000 square km) of Libya's northwestern corner. It rises from [sea level](https://www.britannica.com/science/sea-level) to about 1,000 feet (300 metres) at the foothills of the [Nafūsah Plateau](https://www.britannica.com/place/Nafusah-Plateau). Composed of sand dunes, salt marshes, and steppe, the plain is home to most of Libya's population and to its largest city, Tripoli. The Nafūsah [Plateau](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/Plateau) is a limestone massif that stretches for about 212 miles (340 km) from [Al-Khums](https://www.britannica.com/place/Al-Khums) on the coast to the Tunisian border at Nālūt. West of Tarhūnah it rises steeply from the Al-Jifārah Plain, reaching elevations between 1,500 and 3,200 feet (450 and 975 metres). In northeastern Libya, the [Akhḍar Mountains](https://www.britannica.com/place/Akhdar-Mountains) stretch along the coast between [Al-Marj](https://www.britannica.com/place/al-Marj) and [Derna](https://www.britannica.com/place/Darnah). These limestone mountains rise steeply from the coast to about 2,000 feet (600 metres) and then stretch about 20 miles (30 km) inland, reaching nearly 3,000 feet (900 metres) at their highest points. The [Saharan](https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahara-desert-Africa) plateau makes up about nine-tenths of Libya. About half of the plateau is sand desert, making it truly a sea of sand. [Al-Harūj al-Aswad](https://www.britannica.com/place/Al-Haruj-al-Aswad) is a hilly basaltic plateau in central Libya. Covered with angular stone fragments and boulders, it rises to about 2,600 feet (800 metres) and is [crowned](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/crowned) by volcanic peaks. [Al-Ḥamrāʾ Plateau](https://www.britannica.com/place/Al-Hamra-Plateau) lies south of the Nafūsah Plateau. It harbours bare rock outcroppings that rise to 2,700 feet (820 metres). In the Fezzan region in the southwest, a series of long depressions and basins contain wadis (dry riverbeds) and [oasis](https://www.britannica.com/science/oasis-geological-feature) settlements. Mobile sand dunes that reach heights of 300 feet (90 metres) are found in the Fezzan's [Marzūq](https://www.britannica.com/place/Murzuk) desert and in the eastern [Libyan Desert](https://www.britannica.com/place/Libyan-Desert), which extends into Egypt. The country's highest elevations are Bīkkū Bīttī peak (Picco Bette), which rises to 7,436 feet (2,267 metres) on the Libya-Chad border, and [Mount Al-ʿUwaynāt](https://www.britannica.com/place/Mount-Al-Uwaynat), with an elevation of 6,345 feet (1,934 metres) on the Libya-Sudan-Egypt border. Drainage There are no permanent rivers in Libya. The numerous wadis that drain the uplands are filled by flash floods during the rains but then quickly dry up or are reduced to a trickle. The largest wadi systems are the Wadi Zamzam and Wadi Bayy al-Kabīr, both of which empty into the sea on the western coast of the [Gulf of Sidra](https://www.britannica.com/place/Gulf-of-Sidra). Other large wadis drain the interior [basins](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/basins) of Sirte, [Zelten](https://www.britannica.com/place/Zelten), and the Fezzan. There is also, however, extensive underground water. Numerous oases are watered by wells and springs, and artesian wells tap large deep fossil aquifers in the Fezzan and southeastern Libya; the [Great Man-Made River](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Great-Man-Made-River) was one of the more ambitious projects designed to make use of these underground reserves. (See the map illustrating the phases of the Great Man-Made River project that were planned or completed at the time of the 2011 revolt against the Qaddafi regime.) Along the coastal strip there are several salt flats, or [sebkhas](https://www.britannica.com/science/sabkhah), formed by the ponding and evaporation of water behind coastal dunes. Principal salt flats are found at Tāwurghāʾ, at [Zuwarah](https://www.britannica.com/place/Zuwarah), and on the Benghazi Plain. Soils The gray-brown soils of the Al-Jifārah Plain and the Nafūsah Plateau in the west are fertile, although over-irrigation has led to increased soil salination. In the east the soils of the Barce plain—which stretches between the Akhḍar Mountains and the sea—are light and fertile. Rich alluvial soils are found in the coastal deltas and valleys of large wadis. On the margins of the Sahara, cultivation and overgrazing have seriously depleted the soil. The rest of the country is covered by wind-eroded sand or stony desert. The soils in these areas are poorly developed, with little organic material.

Libië

https://fanack.com/libya/society-media-culture/culture/sports/

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Libië

https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya

[Independence](/place/Libya/History#ref46563) [Revolt in 2011](/place/Libya/The-discovery-of-oil#ref299762) [Postrevolutionary chaos](/place/Libya/Qaddafi-toppled-and-killed#ref325703) [References & Edit History](https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/additional-info) [Facts & Stats](/facts/Libya) Libya Our editors will review what you've submitted and determine whether to revise the article. Libya, [country](https://www.britannica.com/topic/nation-state) located in [North Africa](https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Africa). Most of the country lies in the [Sahara](https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahara-desert-Africa) desert, and much of its population is concentrated along the coast and its immediate hinterland, where [Tripoli](https://www.britannica.com/place/Tripoli) (Ṭarābulus), the [de facto](https://www.britannica.com/topic/de-facto) capital, and [Benghazi](https://www.britannica.com/place/Benghazi) (Banghāzī), another major [city](https://www.britannica.com/topic/city), are located. - Head Of Government: - Prime Minister: Abdul Hamid Dbeibah - Population: - (2024 est.) 7,820,000 - Currency Exchange Rate: - 1 USD equals 4.879 Libyan dinar - Head Of State: - Chairman of the Presidential Council: Mohamed al-Menfi Libya [comprises](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comprises) three historical regions— [Tripolitania](https://www.britannica.com/place/Tripolitania) in the northwest, [Cyrenaica](https://www.britannica.com/place/Cyrenaica) in the east, and [Fezzan](https://www.britannica.com/place/Fezzan) in the southwest. The Ottoman authorities recognized them as separate provinces. Under Italian rule, they were unified to form a single colony, which gave way to independent Libya. For much of Libya's early history, both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were more closely linked with neighbouring territories than with one other. Recent News [Hisham Matar wins Orwell prize for political fiction](https://www.theguardian.com/books/article/2024/jun/27/hisham-matar-wins-orwell-prize-for-political-fiction) [China makes tentative steps to return to Libya after civil war stopped trade](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3267487/china-makes-moves-reopen-economic-ties-libya-13-years-after-suspending-trade) [Libya gas, oil bidding unlikely this year -adviser](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/africa/libya-gas-oil-bidding-unlikely-this-year-adviser-idUSLP534314/) [Interior ministers of Libya and Tunisia agree reopening of major border crossing](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/interior-ministers-libya-tunisia-agree-reopening-major-border-crossing-2024-06-12/) [Exclusive: Migrant expulsions from Tunisia to Libya fuel extortion, abuse, UN says](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/migrant-expulsions-tunisia-libya-fuel-extortion-abuse-un-briefing-2024-06-11/) Before the discovery of oil in the late 1950s, Libya was considered poor in natural resources and severely limited by its desert [environment](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/environment). The country was almost entirely dependent upon [foreign aid](https://www.britannica.com/money/foreign-aid) and imports for the maintenance of its economy; the discovery of [petroleum](https://www.britannica.com/science/petroleum) dramatically changed this situation. The government long exerted strong control over the economy and attempted to develop agriculture and [industry](https://www.britannica.com/money/industry) with wealth derived from its huge oil revenues. It also established a [welfare state](https://www.britannica.com/money/welfare-state), which provides medical care and education at minimal cost to the people. Although Libya's long-ruling leader [Muammar al-Qaddafi](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Qaddafi) espoused an [idiosyncratic](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idiosyncratic) [political ideology](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ideology-society) rooted in socioeconomic [egalitarianism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/egalitarianism) and [direct democracy](https://www.britannica.com/topic/direct-democracy), Libya in practice remained an [authoritarian](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authoritarian) state, with power concentrated among members of Qaddafi's inner circle of relatives and security chiefs. Opposition to the Qaddafi regime reached an unprecedented level in 2011, developing into an armed revolt that forced Qaddafi from power. (For a discussion of unrest in Libya in 2011, see [Libya Revolt of 2011](https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011).) [Mukhtar Mustafa Buru](/contributor/Mukhtar-Mustafa-Buru/433) [Gary L. Fowler](/contributor/Gary-L-Fowler/3934) [Dennis D. Cordell](/contributor/Dennis-D-Cordell/3682) [The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica](/editor/The-Editors-of-Encyclopaedia-Britannica/4419) Land Libya is bounded by the [Mediterranean Sea](https://www.britannica.com/place/Mediterranean-Sea) on the north, [Egypt](https://www.britannica.com/place/Egypt) on the east, [Sudan](https://www.britannica.com/place/Sudan) on the southeast, [Niger](https://www.britannica.com/place/Niger) and [Chad](https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad) on the south, and [Tunisia](https://www.britannica.com/place/Tunisia) and [Algeria](https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria) on the west. [ Britannica Quiz Guess the Country by Its Neighbors Quiz ](/quiz/guess-the-country-by-its-neighbors-quiz) Relief Libya is underlain by basement rocks of Precambrian age (from about 4 billion to 540 million years ago) [mantled](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/mantled) with marine and wind-borne deposits. The major physical features are the [Nafūsah Plateau](https://www.britannica.com/place/Nafusah-Plateau) and the [Al-Jifārah](https://www.britannica.com/place/al-Jifarah) (Gefara) Plain in the northwest, the [Akhḍar Mountains](https://www.britannica.com/place/Akhdar-Mountains) ("Green Mountains") in the northeast, and the Saharan [plateau](https://www.britannica.com/science/plateau-landform), which occupies much of the rest of the country. The Al-Jifārah Plain covers about 10,000 square miles (26,000 square km) of Libya's northwestern corner. It rises from [sea level](https://www.britannica.com/science/sea-level) to about 1,000 feet (300 metres) at the foothills of the [Nafūsah Plateau](https://www.britannica.com/place/Nafusah-Plateau). Composed of sand dunes, salt marshes, and steppe, the plain is home to most of Libya's population and to its largest city, Tripoli. The Nafūsah [Plateau](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/Plateau) is a limestone massif that stretches for about 212 miles (340 km) from [Al-Khums](https://www.britannica.com/place/Al-Khums) on the coast to the Tunisian border at Nālūt. West of Tarhūnah it rises steeply from the Al-Jifārah Plain, reaching elevations between 1,500 and 3,200 feet (450 and 975 metres). In northeastern Libya, the [Akhḍar Mountains](https://www.britannica.com/place/Akhdar-Mountains) stretch along the coast between [Al-Marj](https://www.britannica.com/place/al-Marj) and [Derna](https://www.britannica.com/place/Darnah). These limestone mountains rise steeply from the coast to about 2,000 feet (600 metres) and then stretch about 20 miles (30 km) inland, reaching nearly 3,000 feet (900 metres) at their highest points. The [Saharan](https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahara-desert-Africa) plateau makes up about nine-tenths of Libya. About half of the plateau is sand desert, making it truly a sea of sand. [Al-Harūj al-Aswad](https://www.britannica.com/place/Al-Haruj-al-Aswad) is a hilly basaltic plateau in central Libya. Covered with angular stone fragments and boulders, it rises to about 2,600 feet (800 metres) and is [crowned](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/crowned) by volcanic peaks. [Al-Ḥamrāʾ Plateau](https://www.britannica.com/place/Al-Hamra-Plateau) lies south of the Nafūsah Plateau. It harbours bare rock outcroppings that rise to 2,700 feet (820 metres). In the Fezzan region in the southwest, a series of long depressions and basins contain wadis (dry riverbeds) and [oasis](https://www.britannica.com/science/oasis-geological-feature) settlements. Mobile sand dunes that reach heights of 300 feet (90 metres) are found in the Fezzan's [Marzūq](https://www.britannica.com/place/Murzuk) desert and in the eastern [Libyan Desert](https://www.britannica.com/place/Libyan-Desert), which extends into Egypt. The country's highest elevations are Bīkkū Bīttī peak (Picco Bette), which rises to 7,436 feet (2,267 metres) on the Libya-Chad border, and [Mount Al-ʿUwaynāt](https://www.britannica.com/place/Mount-Al-Uwaynat), with an elevation of 6,345 feet (1,934 metres) on the Libya-Sudan-Egypt border. Drainage There are no permanent rivers in Libya. The numerous wadis that drain the uplands are filled by flash floods during the rains but then quickly dry up or are reduced to a trickle. The largest wadi systems are the Wadi Zamzam and Wadi Bayy al-Kabīr, both of which empty into the sea on the western coast of the [Gulf of Sidra](https://www.britannica.com/place/Gulf-of-Sidra). Other large wadis drain the interior [basins](https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/basins) of Sirte, [Zelten](https://www.britannica.com/place/Zelten), and the Fezzan. There is also, however, extensive underground water. Numerous oases are watered by wells and springs, and artesian wells tap large deep fossil aquifers in the Fezzan and southeastern Libya; the [Great Man-Made River](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Great-Man-Made-River) was one of the more ambitious projects designed to make use of these underground reserves. (See the map illustrating the phases of the Great Man-Made River project that were planned or completed at the time of the 2011 revolt against the Qaddafi regime.) Along the coastal strip there are several salt flats, or [sebkhas](https://www.britannica.com/science/sabkhah), formed by the ponding and evaporation of water behind coastal dunes. Principal salt flats are found at Tāwurghāʾ, at [Zuwarah](https://www.britannica.com/place/Zuwarah), and on the Benghazi Plain. Soils The gray-brown soils of the Al-Jifārah Plain and the Nafūsah Plateau in the west are fertile, although over-irrigation has led to increased soil salination. In the east the soils of the Barce plain—which stretches between the Akhḍar Mountains and the sea—are light and fertile. Rich alluvial soils are found in the coastal deltas and valleys of large wadis. On the margins of the Sahara, cultivation and overgrazing have seriously depleted the soil. The rest of the country is covered by wind-eroded sand or stony desert. The soils in these areas are poorly developed, with little organic material.

Leonardo da Vinci

http://www.fiu.edu/

The Florida Board of Governors has named FIU a Preeminent State Research University. [Learn what makes FIU preeminent](https://www.fiu.edu/lp/preeminence/?utm_medium=university_announcement_banner&utm_campaign=preeminence) The Florida Board of Governors has named FIU a Preeminent State Research University. Top of the Class FIU offers more than 190 degree programs to prepare our students for whatever the future holds. Many of our programs have ranked among the best in the country for their academic excellence and exceptional return on investment. A Degree for Every Interest [Arts and Design](academics/degrees-and-programs/index.html?area-of-interest=Arts-and-Design) [Business and Economics](academics/degrees-and-programs/index.html?area-of-interest=Business-and-Economics) [Education](academics/degrees-and-programs/index.html?area-of-interest=Education) [Hospitality Management](academics/degrees-and-programs/index.html?area-of-interest=Hospitality-Management) [Humanities and Culture](academics/degrees-and-programs/index.html?area-of-interest=Humanities-and-Culture) [Medicine and Health](academics/degrees-and-programs/index.html?area-of-interest=Medicine-and-Health) [Public Policy](academics/degrees-and-programs/index.html?area-of-interest=Public-Policy) [Sciences and Engineering](academics/degrees-and-programs/index.html?area-of-interest=Sciences-and-Engineering) [Technology](academics/degrees-and-programs/index.html?area-of-interest=Technology) Discover the Possibilities with FIU Online With FIU Online you can earn an FIU degree that will change your future from anywhere in the world. Taught by the same award-winning instructors that teach on-campus, our fully online courses are convenient, flexible, and practical. Explore over 130 degrees, program tracks and certificates â anything is possible with FIU Online. A Campus as Diverse as its Students Get lost in the 342-acre city block that is Modesto A. Maidique Campus. Sit on the sandy shores of Biscayne Bay Campus. Or explore any one of our 4 satellite locations across South Florida. With a student body of 58,000, we make sure there's something for everyone here. Campus by the Numbers - 300+ Academic associations, honor and professional societies, cultural organizations and interest groups - 3 Art and history museums - 142 Countries represented in our student body - 17 Intercollegiate athletic teams in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) The Wall Street Journal America's Best Colleges FIU is the No. 29 university in the nation and the fourth-ranked public university, according to the America's Best Colleges 2024 rankings published on [WSJ.com](https://www.wsj.com/rankings/college-rankings/best-colleges-2024). #4 Public University News - Campus & Community Panther preeminence: Itâs a thing Learn more about FIUâs new status as a Preeminent State Research University when you take our short quiz. - Campus & Community Excellence elevated: FIU earns Floridaâs highest public university designation With a roar heard from Miami to Tallahassee, FIU cheers its distinction as a Preeminent State Research University. - Campus & Community FIU designated âpreeminent,â joins elite group of universities The Florida Board of Governors has designated FIU a Preeminent State Research University. - Science & Technology FIU scientists to be featured during National Geographic's SharkFest 2024 The shark experts will appear in multiple programs as they go in search of the oceanâs top predators, investigate when and why sharks attack and more. Statement of Free Expression FIU endorses the Florida Board of Governors' Statement of Free Expression to support and encourage full and open discourse and the robust exchange of ideas and perspectives on our campuses. In addition to supporting this legal right, we view this as an integral part of our ability to deliver a high-quality academic experience for our students, engage in meaningful and productive research, and provide valuable public service. This includes fostering civil and open dialogue in support of critical thinking in and out of the classroom, including events hosted by the university.

Leonardo da Vinci

http://books.google.com/books?id=YISIUycS4HgC&pg=PA13&lpg=PA13&dq=leonardo+cellini+francois+philosopher

Search Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More » Sign in Books Try the new Google Books Check out the new look and enjoy easier access to your favorite features Try it now No thanks Try the new Google Books Try the new Google Books My library Help Advanced Book Search Get print book No eBook available Springer Shop Amazon.com Barnes&Noble.com Books-A-Million IndieBound Find in a library All sellers » Technological Concepts and Mathematical Models in the Evolution of Modern ... edited by Mario Lucertini, Ana Millàn Gasca, Fernando Nicolò About this book Pages displayed by permission of Springer Science & Business Media . Copyright . Page 13

Leonardo da Vinci

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/7056041.stm

Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa originally had eyebrows and eyelashes, a French inventor has claimed after digitally scanning the painting. Pascal Cotte said his 240-megapixel scan revealed traces of facial hair obliterated by restoration efforts. Da Vinci changed his mind about the position of two fingers on her left hand, her face was originally wider and her smile more expressive, he added. Mr Cotte exhibited his findings at the Metreon complex in San Francisco. He said he spent 3,000 hours analysing data from scans he made of the painting in the Louvre's laboratory three years ago. Mr Cotte, a French engineer, used infrared and ultraviolet sensors during the process. His 22-gigabyte digital photo was made using 13 different colour filters rather than the three or four found in standard digital cameras. The scan showed that the merchant's wife in the painting holds a blanket that has all but faded from view today, he said. Mr Cotte also said his analysis revealed what he believed were the painting's original colours - light blues and whites, compared with its current heavy greens, yellows and browns. "To communicate our cultural heritage to our kids, we need to provide the maximum of information," Mr Cotte said. "With just one photo you go deeper into the construction of the painting and understand that Leonardo was a genius." Mr Cotte has made high-resolution scans of more than 500 paintings, including works by Van Gogh, Brueghel, Courbet and other European masters.

Leonardo da Vinci

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/south_of_scotland/7028557.stm

A police raid in Glasgow has recovered a £30m Leonardo da Vinci painting stolen more than four years ago. | | The masterpiece has been at the centre of a worldwide search Three men from Lancashire and one from Glasgow were arrested as officers found the Madonna with the Yarnwinder, taken from the Duke of Buccleuch's estate. Art experts confirmed the painting was the one stolen in August 2003. The artwork was taken from Drumlanrig Castle, near Thornhill, in Dumfries and Galloway. Four anti-crime agencies were involved in the Glasgow raid. Police said that, acting on intelligence, they intercepted a meeting between five people in the centre of Glasgow at about 1100 BST. The painting was recovered at the scene. Four men have been arrested and will appear in Dumfries Sheriff Court on Friday. Police will not confirm further details but it is understood a deal for the sale of the painting may have been under negotiation. The work was taken to a vault for formal identification. The operation was led by Dumfries and Galloway Police and involved the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA), Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and Strathclyde Police. Most wanted "We are extremely pleased to recover the Madonna with the Yarnwinder painting," said lead investigation officer Det Ch Insp Mickey Dalgleish. "The recovery of this artwork is down to extensive police enquiries and the combined efforts of several Scottish police forces, the SCDEA and SOCA. "For four years police staff have worked tirelessly on the theft and with help from the public we have been able to track down and locate the painting." The theft sparked a worldwide search, with the FBI putting the painting on its list of 10 most wanted pieces of stolen artwork. The painting had been in the Buccleuch family for almost 200 years and had been admired by thousands of visitors to the castle every year. The discovery of the artwork comes just a month after the death of the Duke of Buccleuch. He died at the beginning of September at the age of 83.

Leonardo da Vinci

http://www.guardian.co.uk/italy/story/0,12576,1415336,00.html

Art historians had always detected the style of [Leonardo da Vinci](https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/davinci) in the mysterious painting Adoration of the Christ Child, which is regarded as a gem of the Renaissance. But there was never any proof. Now a fingerprint discovered in the original paint may finally solve the puzzle. Experts at Rome's Galleria Borghese, where the painting, widely known as the Tondo (Round), is housed, discovered the print after removing layers of varnish from the 500-year-old circular painting during restoration work last year. "It didn't exactly jump out at first. I wouldn't have found it if I hadn't been using my microscope," said a restorer, Elizabetta Zatti. "But when I had cleaned down to the original paint, I noticed a slightly yellow patch in the top left part of the sky, right near the edge." Given that Leonardo is known to have deliberately left fingerprints hidden in some of his works as a kind of signature, the discovery has raised hopes that this one-metre wide painting of Joseph and the Virgin Mary gazing down at the infant Jesus may also be his. "It's clearly a fingerprint left while the paint was still wet," said Ms Zatti. "But we still don't really know whose finger it belongs to." To identify the fingerprint the Galleria Borghese will send enlarged photos to Poland in March for comparison with a print Leonardo left on his Lady with an Ermine, which is kept at the Czartoryskich Museum in Krakow. Ms Zatti's year-long restoration involved removing layers of varnish that had dulled the colours and concealed some of the details of the original painting. The clean-up revealed much of Leonardo's style, particularly the use of chiaroscuro, and the "sfumato" technique which softens outlines of figures. Other hidden details of the painting were uncovered in the restoration, including typically Leonardesque symbolism such as wild primrose, which represents resurrection, and the blue veronica flower, symbol of the eyes of the Virgin Mary. Art historians will be wary of jumping to conclusions until extensive research has been carried out on the fingerprint. Alessandro Vezzosi, the director of a museum dedicated to Leonardo near Florence, said: "If that is his fingerprint, it means at least that he has worked on that painting." Since the work first appeared in the records of the collection of the Borghese family in the 1790s it has been attributed to various Renaissance artists including Raphael, Ghirlandaio and Lorenzo di Credi. In 1926 a renowned art critic, Roberto Longhi, attributed it to the Florentine artist Fra Bartolomeo.

Leonardo da Vinci

http://www.universalleonardo.org/news.php?item=398

|Annunciation detail © Galleria degli Uffizi| ROME (Reuters) - Move over, Mona Lisa. If Carlo Pedretti's hunch is right, the world may soon have another Leonardo da Vinci masterpiece to admire. A stunningly beautiful painting called Mary Magdalene which the world-class art historian suspects may have been painted by Leonardo da Vinci together with one of his pupils will soon go on public view for the first time in more than half a century. Advertisement The painting, measuring 58 cm by 45 cm, was believed to have been painted in 1515, four years before the master died. It goes on display in October in the Adriatic port of Ancona and depicts Magdalene bare breasted, wearing a red robe and holding a transparent veil over her belly. It has been attributed to Giampietrino, a Leonardo pupil whose work can be found in some of the world's greatest museums, including Leningrad's Hermitage and London's National Gallery. But Pedretti, director of the Armand Hammer Centre for Leonardo Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles, suspects it may be much more. "Because of the very high quality, I am inclined to believe that it is much more than a supervision of the student by the master," he told Reuters in a telephone interview from his part-time home in Tuscany. "I can't say for sure yet, but this is my position and I am prepared to follow up with the whole process of laboratory verification and the rest of it," the 77-year-old professor said, speaking in English. Pedretti, co-curator of the exhibition of works by Giampietrino and others, said the work "has the character of a Giampietrino painting but is far beyond his qualities". PRIVATE COLLECTIONS The painting has been in private collections for nearly all its recorded history in the past 100 years or so. A black-and-white photo of it was taken in the 1920s in Vienna. It was last exhibited briefly in the United States in 1949 and Pedretti recently tracked it down to a private collector in Switzerland. Pedretti, who has devoted most of his life to studying Leonardo, is cautious but hopeful that his hunch will prove correct. He wants the painting to undergo an infrared reflectogram, a technique for viewing the under drawings and various paint stages of a painting using cameras equipped with infrared-sensitive detectors. Pedretti said if traces of sketches were found it would be "extremely important" because Leonardo sketches are very easy to identify. "First of all, it still has to be examined in a laboratory. I want to see a reflectogram and other examinations. But one extraordinary thing is that it is painted on an intact wood panel, just like the Mona Lisa," he said. The exhibition is called "Leonardo - Genius and Vision in the Marche Region", after the area of Italy where it will be held and which is home to the city of Urbino, where Leonardo worked in briefly in 1502. Its co-sponsors include the Italian Culture Ministry and a Vatican foundation. Leonardo is known to have collaborated with students to complete some of his works. For example, one copy of "Virgin of the Rocks" is believed to have been painted jointly by Leonardo and Ambrogio De Predis. If the Magadalene painting turns out to be of Leonardo's hand, even if only partially, it would be only one of a few by the master of a nude woman. Another is "Leda and the Swan". Pedretti said he had no personal agenda to suggest that Leonardo may have had a major role in the painting. "I don't think I need to draw attention to myself at my age. I'm just proposing this possibility in the service of scholarship," he said.

Florence

https://vault.si.com/vault/2008/08/04/balls-and-blood

Balls and Blood IT'S A blistering summer day in Piazza Santa Croce, an ancient square in Florence, Italy, fringed by a 14th-century church and a towering marble statue of Dante Alighieri. Usually a gathering place for churchgoers and reverential tourists, today the piazza is a setting for battle. Two teams of muscular, tattooed, bare-chested men are engaged in hand-to-hand combat over a ball, though with all the bodies flying, it's often impossible to say where it is. A thousand spectators sit in bleachers set up around the square, yelling with rapacious glee. The melee is intermittently obscured by thick, red smoke, generated for the occasion by a machine, creating the illusion that all present—including old Dante—are peering into the fiery depths of hell. For anyone who has ever watched a soccer match and complained about the players' histrionics—the flops, the well-practiced looks of agony—this is another, more Ramboesque, version of the game. A blend, really, of soccer, rugby and mixed martial arts, it's called calcio fiorentino, and its origins can be traced to the first century B.C., when Roman legionnaires played it to prepare for combat. The game's official rules date to 1580, and it was played by the Italian aristocracy, including three popes. Discontinued for centuries, the sport was revived in 1930 as an annual rite in Florence. The rules are few. There is a normal soccer ball, a 100-by-50-meter sand pitch with goals running the width of each end zone and two teams of 27 men. Fifty minutes of play. No timeouts, no substitutions. A few tactics are expressly forbidden, such as sucker-punching and kicking in the head. Otherwise, head-butting, punching, elbowing, choking and throwing sand in opponents' eyes are encouraged, if not applauded. The 2008 calcio fiorentino tournament comprises four teams—Blue, Green, Red and White—each representing one of Florence's ancient quarters. The players are all amateurs, and the tension among teams has the feel of gang rivalry. This year the police have tried to tame the game with new rules, including one barring convicted criminals and anyone whose play in previous years has been deemed too violent. The Greens lost 20 players because of this rule, including Alessandro Pagliazzi, who was disqualified for kicking an opposing player in the head. "Whenever I see games in which I cannot play, I tend to cry," he said before the tournament. Mirko Cardelli, another disqualified player, is a kickboxer who broke both hands during a calcio fiorentino match but kept playing; his only gripe was that he couldn't urinate properly for weeks afterward. "The officials betrayed all of Florence by changing the rules," he said. "I don't see why they have to treat us like animals." SINCE 1981 the Blue team has won all but five titles. This year, however, so many of its players have been disqualified by the police that the team is composed almost entirely of rookies. Still, it advanced to the finals to face the Reds, whose roster had far fewer disqualifications. On the practice field the day before the final, the Blues gravitate toward a bald, barrel-chested man, whose meaty biceps is emblazoned with ZENA. He is 52-year-old Gabriele (Zena) Ceccherelli, and he has been Blue's star player since he was 16. This year Zena was disqualified by another new rule that bars players over 40. He isn't happy. "For 10 years people have told me I'm too old to play," he growls. "I always answer them on the field!" Zena functions as the team's father figure, part coach, part cheerleader. His concern was that the Reds would rely on their fighters—amateur boxers and wrestlers—to stymie the faster Blues; then Red's speediest ballcarriers, its rugby players, would weave between the skirmishes and toss or kick the ball across the goal to score. (Each goal is worth a point; failed attempts earn the defending team a half point.) In the past, Blue was immune to such tactics because it might have a dozen boxers on its roster; this year it had just five. The Blues' only hope was to keep the ball moving. Before the final all the players—along with 500 Florentines in Renaissance garb—parade through the streets. Once, the procession stopped at the church of Santa Maria Novella so the players could pray (presumably for their lives). In the late 1990s, however, players brawled in the church, damaging a 15th-century fresco. Now Santa Maria Novella is off-limits. Church bells ring; cannons fire; the game begins. A referee throws up the ball, but hardly anyone on the field pays attention. A phalanx of Red players moves forward, fists up, ready to brawl. Boxers from the Blue team meet it, and the punching begins. Next Red's wrestlers rush forward and fling themselves at their opponents. The air is thick with the spray of sweat, and there is blood in the sand. Then, out of nowhere, the ball reappears. A formation of runners from the Reds—the rugby players—sprints into Blue territory. The crowd sees it, but most of the Blues don't. They're too deep in battle. A Red player throws the ball at the goal from 15 yards out; it bounces once and pops in. The crowd roars. Cannons fire. It's 1--0, Red. The Reds run a similar play and score again. The brawling continues. The captain of the Blues, 38-year-old fishmonger Riccardo Caparrini, takes a vicious blow to the head and is knocked out. Blue stages a brief rally, closing the deficit to 5--4 with 20 minutes to go, but Red's boxers and wrestlers batter their way to a 9 1/2--4 victory. Afterward the defeated Blues stumble onto the ancient, cobblestone streets—bleary and bloodied. Zena says that he is already thinking about next year when, he hopes, the rules will be amended so that he can return to the pitch and face the Red players. "Ce li mangiamo!" he vows in a low, hoarse snarl. We will eat them! Police have tried to tame the game by passing new rules, including one BARRING CONVICTED CRIMINALS from playing. NOW ON SI.COM BREAKING NEWS, REAL-TIME SCORES AND DAILY ANALYSIS. MATCH MADNESS Check out a photo gallery of the pageantry, drama and ferocious play from this year's calcio fiorentino tournament. SI.COM/PHOTO PHOTO Photograph by Gregory Halpern SKINS GAME In a classic display of the sport's (half) naked aggression, the Reds battered the Blues to win this year's match. PHOTO BOB MARTIN SANDS OF TIME With the piazza and spectators alike dressed for action, Florence's ancient glory comes alive. TWO PHOTOS Photographs by Gregory Halpern [See caption above]

Florence

https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/nov/19/italy-beat-south-africa-first-time

Italy claimed their first victory over South Africa on Saturday, beating the demoralised southern-hemisphere giants 20-18 in Florence. A delirious home crowd gave their team, ranked 13th in the world, a standing ovation after the match as the visitors – ranked fourth – formed a lonely huddle in the middle of the field, reminiscent of their shock loss against Japan in last year's World Cup. Both sides scored two tries, but Italy fed off repeated South Africa mistakes and grew in confidence as the game wore on. Even the crowd, so accustomed to defeat, began to believe. "I am extremely proud," the veteran captain, Sergio Parisse, said, calling it Italy's most important ever victory as they continued their adventure under their new Irish coach, Conor O'Shea, who has taken them back to basics, raised the intensity of training and adopted new, attacking tactics. "For us, this is just a start but it's a very good one," O'Shea said. South Africa, coming off a heavy defeat against England last weekend seemed intent from the outset to register an emphatic win, opening with Bryan Habana's opening try and resisting repeated attempts at goal. But their game was riddled with errors as they passed balls into touch, failed to penetrate with their rolling maul and spilled the ball deep in Italian territory. Italy never went away and, despite having been hammered 68-10 a week ago in Rome by the All Blacks, threw themselves into tackles and defended their line fiercely. They matched South Africa in the scrum and showed them up in the maul. Within moments of Habana's try, after South Africa messed up the restart, Italy's South African-born Andries Van Schalkwyk replied, crossing the line from a rolling maul. From there, the lead see-sawed as centre Damian de Allende ran in a second try for the visitors and Italy again hit back with the winger Giovanbattista Venditti touching down with barely 20 minutes to go. Italy had a try disallowed in the dying moments of the match, but by then a famous victory was already secured, thanks to an earlier penalty goal by Carlo Canna. "We are at an all-time low," Jean de Villiers, who captained South Africa to third at the World Cup 12 months ago, told SuperSport. "A lot needs to change for us to go forward. Everyone needs to take responsibility for this, and if they do that, then we have a chance to get it back on track again," he said. However, the former Springbok fly‑half Naas Botha questioned some of the appointments within the coaching team. "Sometimes you have to say we did make the wrong calls, the wrong appointments," he said. Reuters