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The Bureau’s mission is to provide comprehensive data about the nation’s people and economy. The 2010 census enumerates the number and location of people on Census Day, which is April 1, 2010. However, census operations begin long before Census Day and continue afterward. For example, address canvassing for the 2010 census will begin in April 2009, while the Secretary of Commerce must report tabulated census data to the President by December 31, 2010, and to state governors and legislatures by March 31, 2011. The decennial census is a major undertaking for the Bureau that includes the following major activities: Establishing where to count. This includes identifying and correcting addresses for all known living quarters in the United States (address canvassing) and validating addresses identified as potential group quarters, such as college residence halls and group homes (group quarters validation). Collecting and integrating respondent information. This includes delivering questionnaires to housing units by mail and other methods, processing the returned questionnaires, and following up with nonrespondents through personal interviews (nonresponse follow-up). It also includes enumerating residents of group quarters (group quarters enumeration) and occupied transitional living quarters (enumeration of transitory locations), such as recreational vehicle parks, campgrounds, and hotels. It also includes a final check of housing unit status (field verification) where Bureau workers verify potential duplicate housing units identified during response processing. Providing census results. This includes tabulating and summarizing census data and disseminating the results to the public. Automation and IT are to play a critical role in the success of the 2010 census by supporting data collection, analysis, and dissemination. Several systems will play a key role in the 2010 census. For example, enumeration “universes,” which serve as the basis for enumeration operations and response data collection, are organized by the Universe Control and Management (UC&M) system, and response data are received and edited to help eliminate duplicate responses using the Response Processing System (RPS). Both UC&M and RPS are legacy systems that are collectively called the Headquarters Processing System. Geographic information and support to aid the Bureau in establishing where to count U.S. citizens are provided by the Master Address File/Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (MAF/TIGER) system. The Decennial Response Integration System (DRIS) is to provide a system for collecting and integrating census responses from all sources, including forms and telephone interviews. The Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program includes the development of handheld computers for the address canvassing operation and the systems, equipment, and infrastructure that field staff will use to collect data. Paper-Based Operations (PBO) was established in August 2008 primarily to handle certain operations that were originally part of FDCA. PBO includes IT systems and infrastructure needed to support the use of paper forms for operations such as group quarters enumeration activities, nonresponse follow-up activities, enumeration at transitory locations activities, and field verification activities. These activities were originally to be conducted using IT systems and infrastructure developed by the FDCA program. Finally, the Data Access and Dissemination System II (DADS II) is to replace legacy systems for tabulating and publicly disseminating data. As stated in our testing guide and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards, complete and thorough testing is essential for providing reasonable assurance that new or modified IT systems will perform as intended. To be effective, testing should be planned and conducted in a structured and disciplined fashion that includes processes to control each incremental level of testing, including testing of individual systems, the integration of those systems, and testing to address all interrelated systems and functionality in an operational environment. Further, this testing should be planned and scheduled in a structured and disciplined fashion. Comprehensive testing that is effectively planned and scheduled can provide the basis for identifying key tasks and requirements and better ensure that a system meets these specified requirements and functions as intended in an operational environment. In preparation for the 2010 census, the Bureau planned what it refers to as the Dress Rehearsal. The Dress Rehearsal includes systems and integration testing, as well as end-to-end testing of key operations in a census-like environment. During the Dress Rehearsal period, running from February 2006 through June 2009, the Bureau is developing and testing systems and operations, and it held a mock Census Day on May 1, 2008. The Dress Rehearsal activities, which are still under way, are a subset of the activities planned for the actual 2010 census and include testing of both IT and non-IT related functions, such as opening offices and hiring staff. The Dress Rehearsal identified significant technical problems during the address canvassing and group quarters validation operations. For example, during the Dress Rehearsal address canvassing operation, the Bureau encountered problems with the handheld computers, including slow and inconsistent data transmissions, the devices freezing up, and difficulties collecting mapping coordinates. As a result of the problems observed during the Dress Rehearsal, cost overruns and schedule slippage in the FDCA program, and other issues, the Bureau removed the planned testing of several key operations from the Dress Rehearsal and switched key operations, such as nonresponse follow-up, to paper-based processes instead of using the handheld computers as originally planned. Through the Dress Rehearsal and other testing activities, the Bureau has completed key system tests, but significant testing has yet to be done, and planning for this is not complete. Table 1 summarizes the status and plans for system testing. Effective integration testing ensures that external interfaces work correctly and that the integrated systems meet specified requirements. This testing should be planned and scheduled in a disciplined fashion according to defined priorities. For the 2010 census, each program office is responsible for and has made progress in defining system interfaces and conducting integration testing, which includes testing of these interfaces. However, significant activities remain to be completed. For example, for systems such as PBO, interfaces have not been fully defined, and other interfaces have been defined but have not been tested. In addition, the Bureau has not established a master list of interfaces between key systems, or plans and schedules for integration testing of these interfaces. A master list of system interfaces is an important tool for ensuring that all interfaces are tested appropriately and that the priorities for testing are set correctly. As of October 2008, the Bureau had begun efforts to update a master list it had developed in 2007, but it has not provided a date when this list will be completed. Without a completed master list, the Bureau cannot develop comprehensive plans and schedules for conducting systems integration testing that indicate how the testing of these interfaces will be prioritized. With the limited amount of time remaining before systems are needed for 2010 operations, the lack of comprehensive plans and schedules increases the risk that the Bureau may not be able to adequately test system interfaces, and that interfaced systems may not work together as intended. Although several critical operations underwent end-to-end testing in the Dress Rehearsal, others did not. As of December 2008, the Bureau had not established testing plans or schedules for end-to-end testing of the key operations that were removed from the Dress Rehearsal, nor has it determined when these plans will be completed. These operations include enumeration of transitory locations, group quarters enumeration, and field verification. The decreasing time available for completing end-to-end testing increases the risk that testing of key operations will not take place before the required deadline. Bureau officials have acknowledged this risk in briefings to the Office of Management and Budget. However, as of January 2009, the Bureau had not completed mitigation plans for this risk. According to the Bureau, the plans are still being reviewed by senior management. Without plans to mitigate the risks associated with limited end-to-end testing, the Bureau may not be able to respond effectively if systems do not perform as intended. As stated in our testing guide and IEEE standards, oversight of testing activities includes both planning and ongoing monitoring of testing activities. Ongoing monitoring entails collecting and assessing status and progress reports to determine, for example, whether specific test activities are on schedule. In addition, comprehensive guidance should describe each level of testing and the types of test products expected. In response to prior recommendations, the Bureau took initial steps to enhance its programwide oversight; however, these steps have not been sufficient. For example, in June 2008, the Bureau established an inventory of all testing activities specific to all key decennial operations. However, the inventory has not been updated since May 2008, and officials have no plans for further updates. In another effort to improve executive-level oversight, the Decennial Management Division began producing (as of July 2008) a weekly executive alert report and has established (as of October 2008) a dashboard and monthly reporting indicators. However, these products do not provide comprehensive status information on the progress of testing key systems and interfaces. Further, the assessment of testing progress has not been based on quantitative and specific metrics. The lack of quantitative and specific metrics to track progress limits the Bureau’s ability to accurately assess the status and progress of testing activities. In commenting on our draft report, the Bureau provided selected examples where they had begun to use more detailed metrics to track the progress of end-to-end testing activities. The Bureau also has weaknesses in its testing guidance. According to the Associate Director for the 2010 census, the Bureau did establish a policy strongly encouraging offices responsible for decennial systems to use best practices in software development and testing, as specified in level 2 of Carnegie Mellon’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration. However, beyond this general guidance, there is no mandatory or specific guidance on key testing activities such as criteria for each level or the type of test products expected. The lack of guidance has led to an ad hoc—and, at times—less than desirable approach to testing. In our report, we are making ten recommendations for improvements to the Bureau’s testing activities. Our recommendations include finalizing system requirements and completing development of test plans and schedules, establishing a master list of system interfaces, prioritizing and developing plans to test these interfaces, and establishing plans to test operations removed from the Dress Rehearsal. In addition, we are recommending that the Bureau improve its monitoring of testing progress and improve executive-level oversight of testing activities. In written comments on the report, the department had no significant disagreements with our recommendations. The department stated that its focus is on testing new software and systems, not legacy systems and operations used in previous censuses. However, the systems in place to conduct these operations have changed substantially and have not yet been fully tested in a census-like environment. Consistent with our recommendations, finalizing test plans and schedules and testing all systems as thoroughly as possible will help to ensure that decennial systems will work as intended. In summary, while the Bureau’s program offices have made progress in testing key decennial systems, much work remains to ensure that systems operate as intended for conducting an accurate and timely 2010 census. This work includes system, integration, and end-to-end testing activities. Given the rapidly approaching deadlines of the 2010 census, completing testing and establishing stronger executive-level oversight are critical to ensuring that systems perform as intended when they are needed. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes our statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time. If you have any questions about matters discussed in this testimony, please contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or [email protected] or Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or [email protected]. Other key contributors to this testimony include Sher`rie Bacon, Barbara Collier, Neil Doherty, Vijay D’Souza, Elizabeth Fan, Nancy Glover, Signora May, Lee McCracken, Ty Mitchell, Lisa Pearson, Crystal Robinson, Melissa Schermerhorn, Cynthia Scott, Karl Seifert, Jonathan Ticehurst, Timothy Wexler, and Katherine Wulff. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

The Decennial Census is mandated by the U.S. Constitution and provides vital data that are used, among other things, to reapportion and redistrict congressional seats and allocate federal financial assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census a high-risk area, citing a number of long-standing and emerging challenges, including weaknesses in the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) management of its information technology (IT) systems and operations. In conducting the 2010 census, the Bureau is relying on both the acquisition of new IT systems and the enhancement of existing systems. Thoroughly testing these systems before their actual use is critical to the success of the census. GAO was asked to testify on its report, being released today, on the status and plans of testing of key 2010 decennial IT systems. Although the Bureau has made progress in testing key decennial systems, critical testing activities remain to be performed before systems will be ready to support the 2010 census. Bureau program offices have completed some testing of individual systems, but significant work still remains to be done, and many plans have not yet been developed (see table below). In its testing of system integration, the Bureau has not completed critical activities; it also lacks a master list of interfaces between systems and has not developed testing plans and schedules. Although the Bureau had originally planned what it refers to as a Dress Rehearsal, starting in 2006, to serve as a comprehensive end-to-end test of key operations and systems, significant problems were identified during testing. As a result, several key operations were removed from the Dress Rehearsal and did not undergo end-to-end testing. The Bureau has neither developed testing plans for these key operations, nor has it determined when such plans will be completed. Weaknesses in the Bureau's testing progress and plans can be attributed in part to a lack of sufficient executive-level oversight and guidance. Bureau management does provide oversight of system testing activities, but the oversight activities are not sufficient. For example, Bureau reports do not provide comprehensive status information on progress in testing key systems and interfaces, and assessments of the overall status of testing for key operations are not based on quantitative metrics. Further, although the Bureau has issued general testing guidance, it is neither mandatory nor specific enough to ensure consistency in conducting system testing. Without adequate oversight and more comprehensive guidance, the Bureau cannot ensure that it is thoroughly testing its systems and properly prioritizing testing activities before the 2010 Decennial Census, posing the risk that these systems may not perform as planned.

Under DERP, DOD is required to conduct environmental restoration activities at sites located on former and active defense properties that were contaminated while under its jurisdiction. Program goals include the identification, investigation, research and development, and cleanup of contamination from hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants; the correction of other environmental damage (such as detection and disposal of unexploded ordnance) that creates an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the environment; and the demolition and removal of unsafe buildings and structures. Types of environmental contaminants found at military installations include solvents and corrosives; fuels; paint strippers and thinners; metals, such as lead, cadmium, and chromium; and unique military substances, such as nerve agents and unexploded ordnance. DOD has undergone five BRAC rounds, with the most recent occurring in 2005. Under the first four rounds, in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, DOD closed 97 major bases, had 55 major base realignments, and addressed hundreds of minor closures and realignments. DOD reported that the first four BRAC rounds reduced the size of its domestic infrastructure by about 20 percent and generated about $6.6 billion in net annual recurring savings beginning in fiscal year 2001. As a result of the 2005 BRAC decisions, DOD was slated to close an additional 25 major bases, complete 32 major realignments, and complete 755 minor base closures and realignments. When the BRAC decisions were made final in November 2005, the BRAC Commission had projected that the implementation of these decisions would generate over $4 billion in annual recurring net savings beginning in 2011. In accordance with BRAC statutory authority, DOD must complete closure and realignment actions by September 15, 2011—6 years following the date the President transmitted his report on the BRAC recommendations to Congress. Environmental cleanup and property transfer actions associated with BRAC sites can exceed the 6-year time limit, having no deadline for completion. As we have reported in the past, addressing the cleanup of contaminated properties has been a key factor related to delays in transferring unneeded BRAC property to other parties for reuse. DOD officials have told us that they expect environmental cleanup to be less of an impediment for the 2005 BRAC sites since the department now has a more mature cleanup program in place to address environmental contamination on its bases. In assessing potential contamination and determining the degree of cleanup required (on both active and closed bases), DOD must comply with cleanup standards and processes under all applicable environmental laws, regulations, and executive orders. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) authorizes the President to conduct or cause to be conducted cleanup actions at sites where there is a release or threatened release of hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants which may present a threat to public health and the environment. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) amending CERCLA clarified that federal agencies with such sites shall be subject to and comply with CERCLA in the same manner as a private party, and DOD was subsequently delegated response authority for its properties. To respond to potentially contaminated sites on both active and closed bases, DOD generally uses the CERCLA process, which includes the following phases and activities, among others: preliminary assessment, site investigation, remedial investigation and feasibility study, remedial design and remedial action, and long-term monitoring. SARA also required the Secretary of Defense to carry out the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP). Following SARA’s enactment, DOD established DERP, which consists of two key subprograms focused on environmental contamination: (1) the Installation Restoration Program (IRP), which addresses the cleanup of hazardous substances where they were released into the environment prior to October 17, 1986; and (2) the Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP), which addresses the cleanup of munitions, including unexploded ordnance and the contaminants and metals related to munitions, where they were released into the environment prior to September 30, 2002. While DOD is authorized to conduct cleanups of hazardous substances released after 1986 and munitions released after 2002, these activities are not eligible for DERP funds but are instead considered “compliance” cleanups and are typically funded by base operations and maintenance accounts. Once a property is identified for transfer by a BRAC round, DOD’s cleanups are funded by the applicable BRAC account. While SARA had originally required the government to warrant that all necessary cleanup actions had been taken before transferring property to nonfederal ownership, the act was amended in 1996 to allow expedited transfers of contaminated property. Now such property, under some circumstances, can be transferred to nonfederal users before all remedial action has been taken. However, certain conditions must exist before DOD can exercise this early transfer authority; for example, the property must be suitable for the intended reuse and the governor of the state must concur with the transfer. Finally, DOD remains responsible for completing all necessary response action, after which it must warrant that such work has been completed. DOD uses the same method to propose funding for cleanup at active and BRAC sites and FUDS; and cleanup funding is based on DERP goals and is generally proportional to the number of sites in each of these categories. Specifically, officials in the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and FUDS program who are responsible for environmental restoration at the sites under their jurisdiction formulate cleanup budget proposals based on instructions in DOD’s financial management regulation and DERP environmental restoration performance goals. DOD’s DERP goals include reducing risk to human health and the environment, preparing BRAC properties to be environmentally suitable for transfer, having final remedies in place and completing response actions, and fulfilling other established milestones to demonstrate progress toward meeting program performance goals. DERP goals included target dates representing when the current inventory of active and BRAC sites and FUDS are expected to complete the preliminary assessment and site inspection phases, or achieve the remedy in place or response complete (RIP/RC) milestone. In addition, Congress has required the Secretary of Defense to establish specific performance goals for MMRP sites. Table 1 provides a summary of these goals for the IRP and MMRP. As the table indicates, BRAC sites have no established goals for preliminary assessments or site inspections. For sites included under the first four BRAC rounds, the goal is to reach the RIP/RC milestone at IRP sites by 2015 and at MMRP sites by 2009. For sites included under the 2005 BRAC round, the goal is to reach the RIP/RC milestone at IRP sites by 2014 and at MMRP sites by 2017. DOD’s military components plan cleanup actions that are required to meet these goals at the installation or site level. DOD requires the components to assess their inventory of BRAC and other sites by relative risk to help make informed decisions about which sites to clean up first. Using these relative risk categories, as well as other factors such as stakeholder interest and mission needs, the components set more specific cleanup targets each fiscal year to demonstrate progress and prepare a budget to achieve those goals and targets. The proposed budgets and obligations among site categories are also influenced by the need to fund long-term management activities. While DOD uses the number of sites achieving RIP/RC status as a primary performance metric, sites that have reached this goal may still require long-term management and, therefore, additional funding for a number of years. Table 2 shows the completion status for active and BRAC sites and FUDS, as of the end of fiscal year 2008. Table 3 shows the completion status of BRAC sites and those that require long term management under the IRP, MMRP, and the Building Demolition/Debris Removal Program by military component, for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. DOD data show that, in applying the broad restoration goals, performance goals, and targets, cleanup funding is generally proportional to the number of sites in the active, BRAC, and FUDS site categories. Table 4 shows the total DERP inventory of sites, obligations, and proportions at the end of fiscal year 2008. As the table indicates, the total number of BRAC sites requiring cleanup is about 17 percent of the total number of defense sites, while the $440.2 million obligated to address BRAC sites in fiscal year 2008 is equivalent to about 25 percent of the total funds obligated for cleaning up all defense waste sites. Since DERP was established, approximately $18.4 billion has been obligated for environmental cleanup at individual sites on active military bases, $7.7 billion for cleanup at sites located on installations designated for closure under BRAC, and about $3.7 billion to clean up FUDS sites. During fiscal years 2004 through 2008, about $4.8 billion was spent on cleaning up sites on active bases, $1.8 billion for BRAC sites, and $1.1 billion for FUDS sites. Table 5 provides DOD’s funding obligations for cleanup at BRAC sites by military component and program category for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Table 6 shows DOD’s estimated cost to complete environmental cleanup for sites located at active installations, BRAC installations, and FUDS under the IRP, MMRP, and the Building Demolition and Debris Removal Program for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Finally, table 7 shows the total inventory of BRAC sites and the number ranked as high risk in the IRP and MMRP, by military component, for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Our past work has also identified a number of challenges to DOD’s efforts in undertaking environmental cleanup activities at defense sites, including BRAC sites. For example, we have reported the following: DOD’s preliminary cost estimates for environmental cleanup at specific sites may not reflect the full cost of cleanup. That is, costs are generally expected to increase as more information becomes known about the extent of the cleanup needed at a site to make it safe enough to be reused by others. We reported in 2007 that our experience with prior BRAC rounds had shown that cost estimates tend to increase significantly once more detailed studies and investigations are completed. Environmental cleanup issues are unique to each site. However, we have reported that three key factors can lead to delays in the cleanup and transfer of sites. These factors are (1) technological constraints that limit DOD’s ability to accurately identify, detect, and clean up unexploded ordnance from a particular site, (2) prolonged negotiations between environmental regulators and DOD about the extent to which DOD’s actions are in compliance with environmental regulations and laws, and (3) the discovery of previously undetected environmental contamination that can result in the need for further cleanup, cost increases, and delays in property transfer. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while the data indicate that DOD has made progress in cleaning up its contaminated sites, they also show that a significant amount of work remains to be done. Given the large number of sites that DOD must clean up, we recognize that it faces a significant challenge. Addressing this challenge, however, is critical because environmental cleanup has historically been a key impediment to the expeditious transfer of unneeded property to other federal and nonfederal parties who can put the property to new uses. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further information about this testimony, please contact Anu Mittal at (202) 512- 3841 or [email protected] or John B. Stephenson at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contributors to this testimony include Elizabeth Beardsley, Antoinette Capaccio, Vincent Price, and John Smith. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for cleaning up about 5,400 sites on military bases that have been closed under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, as well as 21,500 sites on active bases and over 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS), properties that DOD owned or controlled and transferred to other parties prior to October 1986. The cleanup of contaminants, such as hazardous chemicals or unexploded ordnance, at BRAC bases has been an impediment to the timely transfer of these properties to parties who can put them to new uses. The goals of DERP include (1) reducing risk to human health and the environment (2) preparing BRAC properties to be environmentally suitable for transfer (3) having final remedies in place and completing response actions and (4) fulfilling other established milestones to demonstrate progress toward meeting program performance goals. This testimony is based on prior work and discusses information on (1) how DOD allocates cleanup funding at all sites with defense waste and (2) BRAC cleanup status. It also summarizes other key issues that GAO has identified in the past that can impact DOD's environmental cleanup efforts. DOD uses the same method to propose funding for cleanup at FUDS, active sites, and BRAC sites; cleanup funding is based on DERP goals and is generally proportional to the number of sites in each of these categories. Officials in the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and FUDS program, who are responsible for executing the environmental restoration activities at their respective sites, formulate cleanup budget proposals using the instructions in DOD's financial management regulation and DERP environmental restoration performance goals. DERP's goals include target dates for reaching the remedy-in-place or response complete (RIP/RC) milestone. For example, for sites included under the first four BRAC rounds, the goal is to reach the RIP/RC milestone at sites with hazardous substances released before October 1986 by 2015 and for sites in the 2005 BRAC round by 2014. DOD's military components plan cleanup actions that are required to meet DERP goals at the installation or site level. DOD requires the components to assess their inventory of BRAC and other sites by relative risk to help make informed decisions about which sites to clean up first. Using these relative risk categories, as well as other factors, the components set more specific restoration targets each fiscal year to demonstrate progress and prepare a budget to achieve those goals and targets. DOD data show that, in applying the goals, and targets, cleanup funding has generally been proportional to the number of sites in the FUDS, active, and BRAC site categories. For example, the total number of BRAC sites requiring cleanup is about 17 percent of the total number of defense sites requiring cleanup, while the $440.2 million obligated to address BRAC sites in fiscal year 2008 is equivalent to about 25 percent of the total funds obligated for this purpose for all defense waste sites. GAO's past work has also shown that DOD's preliminary cost estimates for cleanup generally tend to rise significantly as more information becomes known about the level of contamination at a specific site. In addition, three factors can lead to delays in cleanup. They are (1) technological constraints that limit DOD's ability to detect and cleanup certain kinds of hazards, (2) prolonged negotiations with environmental regulators on the extent to which DOD's actions are in compliance with regulations and laws, and (3) the discovery of previously unknown hazards that can require additional cleanup, increase costs, and delay transfer of the property.

The Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse, that is, the power to spend, collect revenue, and borrow. It does not, however, establish procedures by which Congress must consider budget-related legislation. Instead, it states that each chamber may "determine the Rules of its Proceedings." Over time, Congress has therefore developed various rules and practices to govern consideration of budgetary legislation. The basic framework that is used today for congressional consideration of budget policy was established in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (the Budget Act). This act provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget as a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, the surplus or deficit, and public debt. The Budget Act also established standing committees in both chambers of Congress with jurisdiction over, among other things, the concurrent resolution on the budget. This report describes the structure and responsibilities of the Committee on the Budget in the House of Representatives. The rules of the House require that the Budget Committee's membership be composed of five members from the Committee on Ways and Means, five members from the Committee on Appropriations, and one member from the Committee on Rules. In addition, House rules require that the committee include one member designated by the majority party leadership and one member designated by the minority party leadership. The Committee on Ways and Means exercises sole jurisdiction over revenue-raising matters, and the Appropriations Committee exercises sole jurisdiction over discretionary spending. Granting these committees guaranteed representation on the Budget Committee provides them with an avenue for continuing involvement with decisions affecting their committee's jurisdiction. The Congressional Budget Act originally provided for 23 members to serve on the Budget Committee. Over time, the number of Budget Committee members has varied, and is currently 39. Under House rules, members of the House Budget Committee may not serve more than four in any six successive Congresses. Originally, the Budget Act limited service on the Budget Committee to two in any five successive Congresses. The rotating and representational membership on the Budget Committee affords Members of the House an increased level of participation in the activities of the Budget Committee. The House Democratic Caucus outlines additional term limits for its members serving on the House Budget Committee. Its rules state that no Member, other than the Member designated by leadership, shall serve more than three Congresses in any period of five successive congresses. The House Republican Conference has no comparable rule. Both Democrats and Republicans designate the Budget Committee as a nonexclusive committee. In general, this means that besides the House rule restricting any Member from serving on more than two standing committees, few restrictions apply to Budget Committee members regarding their other committee assignments. Although the Budget Act does not prohibit the creation of subcommittees, the Budget Committee has never had them. The committee, however, sometimes establishes ad hoc task forces to study specific issues. For example, there have been task forces on such subjects as entitlements, tax policy, economic policy, and budget reform. The jurisdiction of the House Budget Committee is derived from the Budget Act as well as House Rule X. This jurisdiction is protected under the Budget Act, which states that no bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report dealing with any matter within the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee shall be considered in the House unless it is a bill or resolution that has been reported by the Budget Committee or unless it is an amendment to a bill or resolution reported by the Budget Committee. House Rule X, clause 1(d) states that the Budget Committee will have jurisdiction over the concurrent resolution on the budget; other matters required to be referred to it pursuant to the Budget Act; establishment, extension, and enforcement of special controls over the federal budget; and the budget process generally. Over the years, the duties and responsibilities of the Budget Committee have been established in statute, as well as House Rules. This report discusses the Budget Committee's responsibilities under the following categories: the budget resolution, reconciliation, budget process reform, oversight of the Congressional Budget Office, revisions of allocations and adjustments, and scorekeeping. The Budget Committee is responsible for developing the annual budget resolution. The budget resolution is a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, the deficit or surplus, and public debt. Its purpose is to create enforceable parameters within which Congress can consider legislation dealing with spending and revenue. The budget resolution also often includes other matters such as reconciliation directives or procedures necessary to carry out the Budget Act. The Budget Committee can use the budget resolution as a means for initiating changes in tax and spending policy, but the other House committees having jurisdiction over those issues would be responsible for any legislation that would implement those changes. So rather than drafting program- or agency-oriented legislation as most other committees do, the Budget Committee, similar to the House Rules Committee, devotes most of its time to developing the parameters within which the House may consider legislation. In developing the budget resolution, the Budget Committee examines a budget outlook report that includes baseline budget projections presented to Congress by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Budget Committee also receives and examines the budget request submitted by the President, and then holds hearings at which they hear testimony from officials who justify and explain the President's budget recommendations. These include the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, and secretaries of each department, as well as other presidential advisors. In addition, CBO issues a report that analyzes the President's budget and compares it to CBO's own economic and technical assumptions. The Budget Committee also gathers information from the other committees of the House. The Budget Committee holds hearings at which individual Members testify. In addition, Committees each submit their "views and estimates" to the Budget Committee, providing information on the preferences and legislative plans of that committee regarding budget matters within its jurisdiction. These "views and estimates" must include an estimate of the total amount of new budget authority and budget outlays for federal programs that are anticipated for all bills and resolutions within the committee's jurisdiction that will be effective during that fiscal year. House rules require that committees submit "views and estimates" to the Budget Committee within six weeks of the President's budget submission or at such time as the Budget Committee may request. During deliberation on the budget resolution, it has been the policy of the Budget Committee to use as a starting point the baseline data prepared by CBO. The Budget Committee then develops and marks up the budget resolution before reporting it to the full House. In marking up the budget resolution, the Budget Committee first considers budget aggregates, functional categories, and other appropriate matter, allowing the offering of amendments. During mark-up, the Budget Committee allows subsequent amendments to be offered to aggregates, functional categories, or other appropriate matters, even if they have already been amended in their entirety. Following adoption of the aggregates, functional categories, and other appropriate matter, the text of the budget resolution is considered for amendment. At the completion of this, a final vote on reporting the budget resolution occurs. Because the budget resolution is a concurrent resolution, once the House and Senate each adopt their own version of the budget resolution, they typically agree to go to conference to reconcile the differences between the two versions. Members of the Budget Committee represent the House in these inter-chamber negotiations. Upon agreement on a conference report, a joint explanatory statement is written to accompany the report. Within this joint explanatory statement are allocations required under Section 302(a) of the Budget Act that establish spending limits for each committee. The text of the budget resolution establishes congressional priorities by dividing spending among the 20 major functional categories of the federal budget. These 20 functional categories do not correspond to the committee jurisdictions under which the House or Senate operate. As a result, the spending levels in the 20 functional categories must subsequently be allocated to the committees having jurisdiction over spending. These totals are referred to as 302(a) allocations and hold committees accountable for staying within the spending limits established by the budget resolution. Members of the conference committee and their staff work to determine appropriate 302(a) allocations to be included in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on the budget resolution. Budget resolutions sometimes include reconciliation instructions that instruct committees to develop legislation that will change current revenue or direct spending laws to conform with policies established in the budget resolution. The Budget Committee can choose to include this in the budget resolution that they report to the full chamber. If the adopted budget resolution does include reconciliation instructions, committees respond by drafting legislative language to meet their specified targets. The Budget Committee is responsible for packaging "without any substantive revision" the legislative language recommended by committees into one or more reconciliation bills. If only a single committee is instructed to recommend reconciliation changes, then those changes are reported directly to the chamber without packaging by the Budget Committee. The Budget Committee is not permitted to revise substantively the reconciliation legislation as recommended by the instructed committees, even if a committee's recommendations do not reach the dollar levels in the reconciliation instructions included in the budget resolution. The Budget Committee, however, may sometimes collaborate with House leadership to develop alternatives that may be offered as floor amendments to the reconciliation bill. Since 1995, House Rules have provided that the Budget Committee shall have jurisdiction over the budget process generally. This includes studying on a continuing basis proposals to improve or reform the budget process, including both singular and comprehensive changes to the budget process. These rule changes can be proposed as a provision in the budget resolution, or as a separate measure. When considering budget reform, the Budget Committee may create a task force (the Budget Committee does not have subcommittees, but sometimes creates ad hoc task forces to address specific issues) to research potential reform issues. The task force may hold hearings where they listen to testimony from current and past Members of Congress, as well as representatives from the Administration, to help determine the need for reform. For example, during the 105 th Congress the Budget Committee created a Task Force on Budget Process, also known as the Nussle-Cardin Task Force, that examined budget reform issues. This task force held hearings and eventually released several recommendations, including making the budget resolution a joint resolution. Although budget process reform measures or budget resolutions may include provisions that have an impact on House rules, jurisdiction over the rules of the House is under the Rules Committee. The Budget Act specifically provides that a budget resolution reported from the Budget Committee that includes any matter or procedure that would change any rule of the House would trigger a referral to the House Rules Committee. In addition to creating the House and Senate Budget Committees, the Budget Act also established the Congressional Budget Office. House rules state that the Budget Committee shall be responsible for oversight of the CBO. Specifically, the rules state that the Committee shall review on a continuing basis the conduct by the CBO of its functions and duties. This oversight can include hearings at which CBO's practices are examined. For example, during the 107 th Congress the House Budget Committee held a hearing titled, "CBO Role and Performance: Enhancing Accuracy, Reliability, and Responsiveness in Budget and Economic Estimates." The Budget Committee also plays a role in the selection of the Director of CBO. The Budget Act states that the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate shall appoint the Director of the CBO after receiving recommendations from the House and Senate Budget Committees. Provisions in individual budget resolutions, as well as the Budget Act, grant the Budget Chair (not the entire Budget Committee) the authority to revise or adjust budget levels and other matters included in the annual budget resolution in certain circumstances. For instance, Congress frequently includes provisions referred to as "reserve funds" in the annual budget resolution, which provide the chairs of the House and Senate Budget Committees the authority to adjust committee spending allocations if certain conditions are met. Typically these conditions consist of a committee reporting legislation dealing with a particular policy or an amendment dealing with that policy being offered on the floor. Once this action has taken place, the Budget Committee Chair submits the adjustment to his respective chamber. Reserve funds frequently require that the net budgetary impact of the specified legislation be deficit neutral. Deficit-neutral reserve funds provide that a committee may report legislation with spending in excess of its allocations, but require the excess amounts be offset by equivalent reductions elsewhere. The Budget Committee Chair may then increase the committee spending allocations by the appropriate amounts to prevent a point of order under Section 302 of the Budget Act. The Budget Committee Chair is also authorized to make adjustments to the budget resolution levels under the "fungibility rule." The "fungibility rule" applies when a committee has been instructed through reconciliation directions to develop legislation that will change both revenue and direct spending laws to conform with policies established in the budget resolution. Under this rule, the Budget Committee Chair is then authorized to submit for printing in the Congressional Record appropriate changes in budget resolution levels, and committee spending allocations. The Budget Act also allows for further revisions to the budget resolution. For more information on revisions and adjustments related to the budget process, see CRS Report RL33122, Congressional Budget Resolutions: Revisions and Adjustments , by [author name scrubbed]. The Budget Committee is responsible for making summary budget scorekeeping reports available to the Members of the House on at least a monthly basis. Scorekeeping is the process of measuring the budgetary effects of pending and enacted legislation against the levels recommended in the budget resolution, in general to determine if proposed legislation would violate the levels set forth in the budget resolution. If a Member raises a point of order that legislation or an amendment being considered on the floor violates fiscal limits, the Parliamentarian relies on the estimates provided by the Budget Committee in the form of scorekeeping reports to advise the presiding officer regarding whether the legislative matter is out of order. Similarly, if a member raises a point of order that legislation or an amendment violates Rule XXI, clause 10, known as the PAYGO rule, the Parliamentarian relies on estimates provided by the Budget Committee. The Budget Committee played a similar role under certain expired budget enforcement statutes such as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act) and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. To assist the Budget Committee in scorekeeping, the Director of CBO is required to issue an up-to-date tabulation of congressional budget action to the Budget Committees on at least a monthly basis. Specifically, this report details and tabulates the progress of congressional action on bills and joint resolutions providing new budget authority or providing an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures for each fiscal year covered by the budget resolution. It has been the policy of the Budget Committee that its scorekeeping reports be prepared by the Budget Committee staff, transmitted to the Speaker in the form of a Parliamentarian's Status Report, and printed in the Congressional Record .

The basic framework that is used today for congressional consideration of budget policy was established in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This act provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget as a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, and public debt. The act also established standing committees in both chambers of Congress with jurisdiction over, among other things, the concurrent resolution on the budget. This report describes the structure and responsibilities of the Committee on the Budget in the House of Representatives. House and party rules specify the composition of the committee's membership and also stipulate that most members of the House Budget Committee may not serve more than four in any six successive Congresses. Unlike most other committees, the Budget Committee does not have subcommittees. Instead, the committee sometimes establishes ad hoc task forces to study specific issues. In addition to committee structure, this report covers the House Budget Committee's responsibilities divided into categories related to the annual budget resolution, reconciliation, budget process reform, oversight of the Congressional Budget Office, revisions and adjustments of allocations, and scorekeeping. This report will be updated as needed.

According to the Federal Trade Commission, identity theft is the most common complaint from consumers in all 50 states, and accounts for over 35% of the total number of complaints the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse received for calendar years 2004, 2005, and 2006. In calendar year 2006, of the 674,354 complaints received, 246,035 or 36% were identity theft complaints. The identity theft victim's information was misused for credit card fraud in 25% of the identity theft complaints; for phone or utilities fraud in 16% of the identity theft complaints; for bank fraud in 16% of the identity theft complaints; for employment-related fraud in 14% of the identity theft complaints; for government documents or benefits fraud in 5% of the identity theft complaints; for loan fraud in 5% of the identity theft complaints; and other types of identity theft fraud made up 24% of the complaints. As a result of identity theft, victims may incur damaged credit records, unauthorized charges on credit cards, and unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts. Sometimes, victims must change their telephone numbers or even their social security numbers. Victims may also need to change addresses that were falsified by the impostor. With media reports of data security breaches increasing, concerns about new cases of identity theft are widespread. This report provides an overview of the federal laws that could assist victims of identity theft with purging inaccurate information from their credit records and removing unauthorized charges from credit accounts, as well as federal laws that impose criminal penalties on those who assume another person's identity through the use of fraudulent identification documents. This report will be updated as warranted. While not exclusively aimed at consumer identity theft, the Identity Theft Assumption Deterrence Act prohibits fraud in connection with identification documents under a variety of circumstances. Certain offenses under the statute relate directly to consumer identity theft, and impostors could be prosecuted under the statute. For example, the statute makes it a federal crime, under certain circumstances, to knowingly and without lawful authority produce an identification document, authentication feature , or false identification document; or to knowingly possess an identification document that is or appears to be an identification document of the United States which is stolen or produced without lawful authority knowing that such document was stolen or produced without such authority. It is also a federal crime to knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable state or local law. The punishment for offenses involving fraud related to identification documents varies depending on the specific offense and the type of document involved. For example, a fine or imprisonment of up to 15 years may be imposed for using the identification of another person with the intent to commit any unlawful activity under state law, if, as a result of the offense, the person committing the offense obtains anything of value totaling $1,000 or more during any one-year period. Other offenses carry terms of imprisonment up to three years. However, if the offense is committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime or in connection with a crime of violence, the term of imprisonment could be up to twenty years. Offenses committed to facilitate an action of international terrorism are punishable by terms of imprisonment up to twenty-five years. The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act was signed on July 15, 2004, ( P.L. 108-275 ). The act amends Title 18 of the United States Code to define and establish penalties for aggravated identity theft and makes changes to the existing identity theft provisions of Title 18. Under the law, aggravated identity theft occurs when a person "knowingly transfers, possess, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person" during and in relation to the commission of certain enumerated felonies. The penalty for aggravated identity theft is a term of imprisonment of two years in addition to the punishment provided for the original felony committed. Offenses committed in conjunction with certain terrorism offenses are subject to an additional term of imprisonment of five years. The act also directs the United States Sentencing Commission to "review and amend its guidelines and its policy statements to ensure that the guideline offense levels and enhancements appropriately punish identity theft offenses involving an abuse of position" adhering to certain requirements outlined in the legislation. In addition to increasing penalties for identity theft, the act authorized appropriations to the Justice Department "for the investigation and prosecution of identity theft and related credit card and other fraud cases constituting felony violations of law, $2,000,000 for FY2005 and $2,000,000 for each of the 4 succeeding fiscal years." While the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) does not directly address identity theft, it could offer victims assistance in having negative information resulting from unauthorized charges or accounts removed from their credit files. The purpose of the FCRA is "to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information." The FCRA outlines a consumer's rights in relation to his or her credit report, as well as permissible uses for credit reports and disclosure requirements. In addition, the FCRA imposes a duty on consumer reporting agencies to ensure that the information they report is accurate, and requires persons who furnish information to ensure that the information they furnish is accurate. The FCRA allows consumers to file suit for violations of the act, which could include the disclosure of inaccurate information about a consumer by a credit reporting agency. A consumer who is a victim of identity theft could file suit against a credit reporting agency for the agency's failure to verify the accuracy of information contained in the report and the agency's disclosure of inaccurate information as a result of the consumer's stolen identity. Under the FCRA, as recently amended, a consumer may file suit not later than the earlier of two years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability, or five years after the date on which the violation occurred. The FACT Act, signed on December 4, 2003, includes, inter alia , a number of amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act aimed at preventing identity theft and assisting victims. Generally, these new provisions mirror laws passed by state legislatures and create a national standard for addressing consumer concerns with regard to identity theft and other types of fraud. Credit card issuers, who operate as users of consumer credit reports, are required, under a new provision of the FCRA, to follow certain procedures when the issuer receives a request for an additional or replacement card within a short period of time following notification of a change of address for the same account. In a further effort to prevent identity theft, other new provisions require the truncation of credit card account numbers on electronically printed receipts, and, upon request, the truncation of social security numbers on credit reports provided to a consumer. Consumers who have been victims of identity theft, or expect that they may become victims, are now able to have fraud alerts placed in their files. Pursuant to the new provisions, a consumer may request a fraud alert from one consumer reporting agency and that agency is required to notify the other nationwide consumer reporting agencies of the existence of the alert. In general, fraud alerts are to be maintained in the file for 90 days, but a consumer may request an extended alert which is maintained for up to seven years. The fraud alert becomes a part of the consumer's credit file and is thus passed along to all users of the report. The alert must also be included with any credit score generated using the consumer's file, and must be referred to other consumer reporting agencies. In addition to the fraud alert, victims of identity theft may also have information resulting from the crime blocked from their credit reports. After the receipt of appropriate proof of the identity of the consumer, a copy of an identity theft report, the identification of the alleged fraudulent information, and a statement by the consumer that the information is not information relating to any transaction conducted by the consumer, a consumer reporting agency must block all such information from being reported and must notify the furnisher of the information in question that it may be the result of identity theft. Requests for the blocking of information must also be referred to other consumer reporting agencies. Victims of identity theft are also allowed to request information about the alleged crime. A business entity is required, upon request and subject to verification of the victim's identity, to provide copies of application and business transaction records evidencing any transaction alleged to be a result of identity theft to the victim or to any law enforcement agency investigating the theft and authorized by the victim to take receipt of the records in question. The Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA) is not an identity theft statute per se , but it does provide consumers with an opportunity to receive an explanation and proof of charges that may have been made by an impostor and to have unauthorized charges removed from their accounts. The purpose of the FCBA is "to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices." The law defines and establishes a procedure for resolving billing errors in consumer credit transactions. For purposes of the FCBA, a "billing error" includes unauthorized charges, charges for goods or services not accepted by the consumer or delivered to the consumer, and charges for which the consumer has asked for an explanation or written proof of purchase. Under the FCBA, consumers are able to file a claim with the creditor to have billing errors resolved. Until the alleged billing error is resolved, the consumer is not required to pay the disputed amount, and the creditor may not attempt to collect, any part of the disputed amount, including related finance charges or other charges. The act sets forth dispute resolution procedures and requires an investigation into the consumer's claims. If the creditor determines that the alleged billing error did occur, the creditor is obligated to correct the billing error and credit the consumer's account with the disputed amount and any applicable finance charges. Similar to the Fair Credit Billing Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act is not an identity theft statute per se , but it does provide consumers with a mechanism for challenging unauthorized transactions and having their accounts recredited in the event of an error. The purpose of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) is to "provide a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems." Among other things, the EFTA limits a consumer's liability for unauthorized electronic fund transfers. If the consumer notifies the financial institution within two business days after learning of the loss or theft of a debt card or other device used to make electronic transfers, the consumer's liability is limited to the lesser of $50 or the amount of the unauthorized transfers that occurred before notice was given to the financial institution. Additionally, financial institutions are required to provide a consumer with documentation of all electronic fund transfers initiated by the consumer from an electronic terminal. If a financial institution receives, within 60 days after providing such documentation, an oral or written notice from the consumer indicating the consumer's belief that the documentation provided contains an error, the financial institution must investigate the alleged error, determine whether an error has occurred, and report or mail the results of the investigation and determination to the consumer within 10 business days. The notice from the consumer to the financial institution must identify the name and account number of the consumer; indicate the consumer's belief that the documentation contains an error and the amount of the error; and set forth the reasons for the consumer's belief that an error has occurred. In the event that the financial institution determines that an error has occurred, the financial institution must correct the error within one day of the determination in accordance with the provisions relating to the consumer's liability for unauthorized charges. The financial institution may provisionally recredit the consumer's account for the amount alleged to be in error pending the conclusion of its investigation and its determination of whether an error has occurred, if it is unable to complete the investigation within 10 business days. The President's Identity Theft Task Force reported its final recommendations April 2007, and recommended a plan that is intended to harness government resources to crack down on the criminals who traffic in stolen identities, strengthen efforts to protect the personal information, help law enforcement officials investigate and prosecute identity thieves, help educate consumers and businesses about protecting themselves, and increase the safeguards on personal data entrusted to federal agencies and private entities. The Plan focuses on improvements in four key areas: keeping sensitive consumer data from identity thieves through better data security and education; making it more difficult for identity thieves who obtain consumer data; assisting the victims of identity theft in recovering from the crime; and deterring identity theft by more aggressive prosecution and punishment. Several recommendations made by the Task Force are aimed at closing the gaps in federal criminal statutes used to prosecute identity theft-related offenses to ensure increased federal prosecution. They are as follows: Amend the identity theft and aggravated identity theft statutes to ensure that identity thieves who misappropriate information belonging to corporations and organizations can be prosecuted Add new crimes to the list of predicate offenses for aggravated identity theft offenses Amend the statute that criminalizes the theft of electronic data by eliminating the current requirement that the information must have been stolen through interstate communications Penalize creators and distributors of malicious spyware and keyloggers Amend the cyber-extortion statute to cover additional, alternate types of cyber-extortion Ensure that an identity thief's sentence can be enhanced when the criminal conduct affects more than one victim In accordance with the REAL ID Act of 2005, on January 11, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the final rule for State-issued driver's licenses and identification cards that federal agencies would accept for official purposes on or after May 11, 2008, in accordance with the REAL ID Act of 2005. The Real ID Rule establishes standards to meet the minimum requirements of the REAL ID Act. These standards involve a number of aspects of the process used to issue identification documents, including information and security features that must be incorporated into each card; proof of identity and U.S. citizenship or legal status of an applicant; verification of the source documents provided by an applicant; and security standards for the offices that issue licenses and identification cards. All states submitting requests will receive extensions until December 31, 2009. In addition, states that meet certain benchmarks for the security of their credentials and licensing and identification processes will be able to obtain a second extension until May 10, 2011. The Rule extends the enrollment time period to allow states determined by DHS to be in compliance with the act to replace all licenses intended for official purpose with REAL ID-compliant cards by December 1, 2014, for people born after December 1, 1964, and by December 1, 2017, for those born on or before December 1, 1964. The rule is effective March 31, 2008.

According to the Federal Trade Commission, identity theft is the most common complaint from consumers in all fifty states, and complaints regarding identity theft have grown for seven consecutive years. Victims of identity theft may incur damaged credit records, unauthorized charges on credit cards, and unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts. Sometimes, victims must change their telephone numbers or even their social security numbers. Victims may also need to change addresses that were falsified by the impostor. This report provides an overview of the federal laws that could assist victims of identity theft with purging inaccurate information from their credit records and removing unauthorized charges from credit accounts, as well as federal laws that impose criminal penalties on those who assume another person's identity through the use of fraudulent identification documents. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Network-centric warfare (NCW), also known as network-centric operations (NCO), is a key element of defense transformation. NCW focuses on using computers, high-speed data links, and networking software to link military personnel, platforms, and formations into highly integrated local and wide-area networks. Within these networks, personnel are to share large amounts of information on a rapid and continuous basis. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy view NCW as a key element of defense transformation that will dramatically improve combat capability and efficiency. The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system links Navy ships and aircraft operating in a particular area into a single, integrated air-defense network in which radar data collected by each platform is transmitted on a real-time (i.e., instantaneous) basis to the other units in the network. Units in the network share a common, composite, real-time air-defense picture. CEC will permit a ship to shoot air-defense missiles at incoming anti-ship missiles that the ship itself cannot see, using radar targeting data gathered by other units in the network. It will also permit air-defense missiles fired by one ship to be guided by other ships or aircraft. The Navy wants to install the system on aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers, selected amphibious ships, and E-2C Hawkeye carrier-based airborne early warning aircraft over the next several years. The system has potential for being extended to include Army and Air Force systems. Tests of CEC aboard Navy ships in 1998 revealed significant interoperability (i.e., compatibility) problems between CEC's software and the software of the air-defense systems on some ships. In response, the Navy undertook a major effort to identify, understand, and fix the problems. The CEC system, with the new fixes, passed its technical evaluation (TECHEVAL) testing in February and March 2001 and final operational evaluation (OPEVAL) testing in April and May 2001. In 2002, the primary CEC contractor, Raytheon, faced potential competition from two firms—Lockheed and a small firm called Solipsys—for developing the next version of CEC, called CEC Block II. Solipsys had devised an alternative technical approach to CEC, called the Tactical Component Network (TCN). Solipsys entered into a teaming arrangement with Lockheed to offer TCN to the Navy as the technical approach for Block II. In late-December 2002, Raytheon announced that it had agreed to purchase Solipsys. In early-February 2003, Raytheon and Lockheed announced that they had formed a team to compete for the development of Block II. Some observers expressed concern that these developments would reduce the Navy's ability to use competition in its acquisition strategy for Block II. As an apparent means of preserving competition, the Navy in mid-2003 announced that it would incorporate open-architecture standards into Block II divide the Block II development effort into a series of smaller contracts for which various firms might be able to submit bids. In December 2003, however, the Navy canceled plans for developing Block II in favor of a new plan for developing a joint-service successor to Block I. The conference report ( H.Rept. 108-283 , page 290) on the FY2004 defense appropriations act ( H.R. 2658 / P.L. 108-87 ) directed the Navy to keep the Appropriations committees informed on potential changes to the CEC Block II acquisition strategy and stated that, if the Navy adopts a new acquisition strategy, "the additional funds provided in this act for CEC Block 2 may be merged with and be available for purposes similar to the purposes for which appropriated." The House and Senate Armed Services Committees, in their reports ( H.Rept. 109-89 , page 178, and S.Rept. 109-69 , pages 108-109, respectively) on the FY2006 defense authorization bill ( H.R. 1815 / S. 1042 ), expressed satisfaction with the Navy's efforts to improve interoperability between the CEC system and other combat direction systems and ended a requirement established in the conference report ( H.Rept. 105-736 ) on the FY1999 defense authorization act ( P.L. 105-261 ) for the Navy to report to Congress on these efforts on a quarterly basis. The Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) system is to combine the CEC system with the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye carrier-based airborne radar and control system (AWACS) aircraft and the SM-6 version of the ship-based Standard air defense missile (both now in development) to expand the Navy's networked air-defense capabilities out to the full range of the SM-6 missile. Among other things, NIFC-CA will enable Navy forces at sea to provide overland defense against enemy cruise missiles. Current Navy plans call for NIFC-CA to be partially deployed in FY2011 and fully deployed in 2014. IT-21, which stands for Information Technology for the 21 st Century, is the Navy's investment strategy for procuring the desktop computers, data links, and networking software needed to establish an intranet for transmitting tactical and administrative data within and between Navy ships. The IT-21 network uses commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) desktop computers and networking software that provide a multimedia organizational intranet. The Navy believes IT-21 will improve U.S. naval warfighting capability and achieve substantial cost reductions by significantly reducing the time and number of people required to carry out various tactical and administrative functions. FY2008 funding requested for IT-21 "continues to provide Integrated Shipboard Network Systems (Increment 1) procurement and installation to achieve a Full Operational Capability (FOC) for all platforms by FY2011." FORCEnet is the Navy's overall approach for linking various networks that contribute to naval NCW into a single capstone information network for U.S. naval forces. The Navy has highlighted FORCEnet as being at the center of Sea Power 21, the Navy's vision statement for the future. The Navy states that "Undersea FORCEnet Satellite Communications (SATCOM) FY2008 funding provides the Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity between Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) platforms to conduct collaborative ASW. Connecting the platforms for collaborative ASW enables sharing of time critical queuing, classification, and targeting data, provides a means for precluding blue-on-blue engagement, and ensures rapid positioning of ASW platforms into the best attack posture to prosecute the threat submarine." Some observers have criticized FORCEnet for being insufficiently defined. The Naval Network Warfare Command issued a functional concept document for FORCEnet in February 2005, but Navy officials acknowledged at the time that the concept was not yet adequately defined and stated that an improved version of the document would be published in 2006. The conference report ( H.Rept. 107-732 ) on the FY2003 defense appropriations bill ( H.R. 5010 / P.L. 107-248 ) expressed concern about "the lack of specificity and documentation on the program," and directed the Navy to submit a detailed report on it by May 1, 2003 (page 279). The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report ( S.Rept. 108-87 , page 156) on the FY2004 defense appropriations bill ( S. 1382 ), expressed support for the FORCEnet program but also said it "is concerned that no requirements have been approved or implemented and that there is duplication of effort, especially in the areas of experimentation and demonstrations. The Committee directs that the FORCEnet program establish these requirements, test them within the Navy Warfighting Experimentations and Demonstrations line (PE0603758N), and release the approved requirements changes as quickly as possible." A significant program related to NCW is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is a corporate-style intranet linking more than 300 Navy and Marine Corps shore installations. NMCI is to include a total 344,000 computer work stations, or "seats." As of January 2006, the Navy had ordered 341,000 seats and fully implemented about 264,000. The Navy planned to achieve steady-state operation of all NMCI seats during FY2007. In October 2000, the Navy awarded an industry team led by Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Corporation an $6.9-billion, five-year contract for installing, supporting, and periodically upgrading the NMCI. In October 2002, Congress, through P.L. 107-254 , authorized a two-year extension to this contract, which is now worth $8.9 billion. Congress has closely followed the program for several years. The NMCI implementation effort has experienced a number of challenges and delays. A 2005 report from DOD's weapons-testing office identified problems found with the program in 2003. On September 30, 2004, the Navy and EDS restructured the terms of the NMCI contract to consolidate the number of performance measures and focus on measuring results rather than implementation steps. User reaction to the system reportedly has been mixed. A December 2006 Government Accountability office (GAO) report on NMCI stated: NMCI has not met its two strategic goals—to provide information superiority and to foster innovation via interoperability and shared services. Navy developed a performance plan in 2000 to measure and report progress towards these goals, but did not implement it because the program was more focused on deploying seats and measuring contractor performance against contractually specified incentives than determining whether the strategic mission outcomes used to justify the program were met. GAO's analysis of available performance data, however, showed that the Navy had met only 3 of 20 performance targets (15 percent) associated with the program's goals and nine related performance categories. By not implementing its performance plan, the Navy has invested, and risks continuing to invest heavily, in a program that is not subject to effective performance management and has yet to produce expected results. GAO's analysis also showed that the contractor's satisfaction of NMCI service level agreements (contractually specified performance expectations) has been mixed. Since September 2004, while a significant percentage of agreements have been met for all types of seats, others have not consistently been met, and still others have generally not been met. Navy measurement of agreement satisfaction shows that performance needed to receive contractual incentive payments for the most recent 5-month period was attained for about 55 to 59 percent of all eligible seats, which represents a significant drop from the previous 9-month period. GAO's analysis and the Navy's measurement of agreement satisfaction illustrate the need for effective performance management, to include examining agreement satisfaction from multiple perspectives to target needed corrective actions and program changes. GAO analysis further showed that NMCI's three customer groups (end users, commanders, and network operators) vary in their satisfaction with the program. More specifically, end user satisfaction surveys indicated that the percent of end users that met the Navy's definition of a satisfied user has remained consistently below the target of 85 percent (latest survey results categorize 74 percent as satisfied). Given that the Navy's definition of the term "satisfied" includes many marginally satisfied and arguably somewhat dissatisfied users, this percentage represents the best case depiction of end user satisfaction. Survey responses from the other two customer groups show that both were not satisfied. GAO interviews with customers at shipyards and air depots also revealed dissatisfaction with NMCI. Without satisfied customers, the Navy will be challenged in meeting program goals. To improve customer satisfaction, the Navy identified various initiatives that it described as completed, under way, or planned. However, the initiatives are not being guided by a documented plan(s), thus limiting their potential effectiveness. This means that after investing about 6 years and $3.7 billion, NMCI has yet to meet expectations, and whether it will is still unclear. Department of Defense officials conceded problems with the implementation of NMCI at a March 28, 2007, hearing before the Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Potential issues for Congress include the following: Is the Navy's implementation of NMCI adequate? To what degree is the system achieving its goals? Does the Navy have a clear and adequate acquisition strategy for developing a successor to CEC Block I? Is the FORCEnet concept adequately defined? Is the Navy taking sufficient actions for preventing, detecting, and responding to attacks on NCW computer networks? Is the Navy taking sufficient steps to provide adequate satellite bandwidth capacity to support NCW? Are Navy efforts to develop new tactics, doctrine, and organizations to take full advantage of NCW sufficient? Has the Navy taken the concept of NCW adequately into account in planning its future fleet architecture? What effect will implementation of NCW in U.S. and allied navies have on U.S.-allied naval interoperability?

Programs for implementing network-centric warfare (NCW) in the Navy include the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) systems, the IT-21 program, and FORCEnet. A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). Congress has expressed concern for some of these programs, particularly NMCI. This report will be updated as events warrant.

The mission of INS, an agency of the Department of Justice, is to administer and enforce the immigration laws of the United States. To accomplish its mission, INS has three interrelated business areas— enforcement, immigration services, and corporate (i.e., mission-support) services. Enforcement includes border inspections of persons entering the United States, detecting and preventing smuggling and illegal entry, and identifying and removing illegal entrants. Immigration services include granting legal permanent residence status, nonimmigrant status (e.g. students and tourists), and naturalization. INS efforts to protect our nation’s borders are performed under both of these core mission areas. Corporate services include functions such as financial and human capital management. INS’ field structure consists of 3 regional offices, 4 regional service centers, 3 administrative centers, 36 district offices, 21 Border Patrol sectors, and more than 300 land, sea, and air ports of entry. To carry out its responsibilities, INS relies on IT. For example, the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) is to provide “24 by 7” border coverage through ground-based sensors, fixed cameras, and computer-aided detection capabilities. Also the Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) is to manage information about nonimmigrant foreign students and exchange visitors from schools and exchange programs. Each year INS invests, on average, about $300 million in IT systems, infrastructure, and services. Recent studies have identified significant weaknesses in INS’ management of IT projects. In August 1998, the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) reported that INS did not track and manage projects to a set of cost, schedule, technical, and benefit baselines. LMI noted that while INS had defined good procedures for developing systems, it did not consistently follow them. Similarly, in July 1999, the Justice Inspector General (IG) reported that INS was not adequately managing its IT systems. In particular, the IG reported that (1) estimated completion dates for some IT projects had been delayed without explanation, (2) project costs continued to spiral upward with no justification for how funds are spent, and (3) projects were nearing completion with no assurance that they would meet performance and functional requirements. In light of the reported problems on individual projects, we reviewed INS’ institutional approach to managing IT to determine the root cause of project problems and to provide the basis for recommending fundamental management reform. In doing so, we focused on two key and closely related IT management process controls: investment management and enterprise architecture management. In August 2000 and December 2000, we reported that INS lacked both of these management process controls because the former agency leadership had not viewed either as an institutional priority. We also provided INS, through our recommenda- tions, a roadmap for establishing and implementing both controls. INS agreed with our findings and recommendations, and it committed to implementing the recommendations. Although INS has made progress to date in doing so, much remains to be accomplished before it will have implemented these management controls and have the capability to effectively and efficiently manage IT. As defined by the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and associated Office and Management and Budget instructions, and as practiced by leading public and private sector organizations, effective IT investment management requires implementing process controls for maximizing the value and assessing and managing the risks of investments. The goal is to have the means in place and functioning to help ensure that IT projects are being implemented at acceptable costs, within reasonable and expected time frames, and are contributing to tangible, observable improvements in mission performance. To help agencies understand their respective IT investment management capabilities, we developed the Information Technology Investment Management (ITIM) maturity framework. The ITIM framework is a tool that identifies critical processes and practices for successful IT investment and organizes them into a framework of increasingly mature stages. A fundamental premise of the framework is that each incremental stage lays a foundation on which subsequent stages build. The initial stage focuses on controlling investments already underway, while also starting to establish a way to select new investments. Later stages emphasize managing investments from a portfolio perspective in which individual investments are evaluated as a set of competing options based on their contribution to mission goals and objectives. The goal is to arrive at the optimal mix of projects in which to invest resources. Agencies can use the framework for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their existing investment management processes and for developing a roadmap for improvement. The Chief Information Officers Council has endorsed the ITIM framework. In order for an agency to achieve a minimum level of IT management effectiveness, it needs to first gain control of its current investments. To do this, it must establish and implement processes and practices for ensuring that projects have defined cost, schedule, and performance expectations; that projects are continuously controlled to determine whether commitments are being met and to address deviations; and that decisionmakers have this basic investment information to use in selecting new projects for funding and deciding whether to continue existing projects. Once it has established these project-specific control and selection processes, the agency then should move to considering each new investment not as a separate and distinct project, but rather as part of an integrated portfolio of investments that collectively contribute to mission goals and objectives. To do this, the agency should establish and implement processes and practices for analyzing the relative pros and cons of competing investment options and selecting a set of investments that agency leadership believes best meets mission-based and explicitly defined investment criteria. Integral to an effective IT investment management process is having a well-defined enterprise architecture or blueprint for guiding the content and characteristics of investments in new and existing IT systems, infrastructure, and services. The goal is to help ensure that the new and modified IT assets will, among other things, be designed and implemented to promote interoperability and avoid duplication, thereby optimizing agencywide performance and accountability. In more specific terms, an enterprise architecture is a comprehensive and systematically derived description of organization’s operations, both in logical terms (including business functions and applications, business rules, work locations, information needs and users, and the interrelation- ships among these variables) and in technical terms (including IT hardware, software, data, communications, security, and performance characteristics and standards). If defined properly, enterprise architectures can clarify and help optimize the connections among an organization’s interrelated and interdependent business operations and the underlying IT supporting these operations. A complete enterprise architecture includes both the current architecture (as it is now) and the target architecture (the goal), as well as a plan for moving between the two. To assist agencies in developing, maintaining, and implementing enterprise architectures, we collaborated with the Chief Information Officers Council to develop a practical guide for enterprise architecture management. In December 2000 we reported that while INS had some investment control elements, it nevertheless lacked the full set of foundational investment management processes and practices needed to effectively control its ongoing IT projects and ensure that it was meeting cost, schedule, and performance commitments and contributing to measurable mission performance and accountability goals. For example, INS had not consistently (1) developed and maintained project management plans that specified cost and schedule baselines, (2) linked projects to INS mission needs, and (3) tracked and monitored projects to determine whether they were meeting project baselines and mission needs. Without this information, the investment review board (that, to its credit, INS had established to make investment selection decisions) could not act to effectively address deviations. The result was increased risk that the technology needed to support mission goals, such as securing America’s borders, would not be delivered on time and on budget and would not perform as intended. We also reported in December 2000 that INS was not effectively managing its IT investments, both new proposals and ongoing projects, as a portfolio, meaning that INS’ investment review board was not making portfolio selection and control decisions in terms of what mix of proposed and ongoing projects collectively best supported achievement of mission needs and priorities. In particular, INS had not defined, and thus was not using, investment selection criteria that were linked to mission needs and addressed cost, schedule, benefits, and risk. Without such criteria, the board lacked the basic information needed to assess the relative merits of and make trade-offs among its options for increasing IT capabilities, including acquiring new, enhancing existing, and operating and maintaining existing systems and infrastructure. By not employing portfolio investment management, we concluded that INS was at risk of not having the right mix of technology in place to support critical mission priorities, such as protecting America’s borders against the threat of terrorism. Accordingly, we made a series of recommendations to INS aimed at, among other things, treating the development and implementation of IT investment management process controls as an agency priority and managing them as such. Since our December 2000 report, INS has taken steps to implement our recommendations for establishing and following rigorous and disciplined investment management controls. In particular, it has developed a guide for IT investment management that, according to INS, defines many of the missing processes and practices. The key for INS will be to ensure that these processes and practices are effectively implemented. Given that the Justice IG, in reporting on IT project problems, found that INS was not following established project management procedures, successful implementation of INS’ newly developed investment guide cannot be taken for granted, and needs to be given the attention it deserves. In July 2000, we reported that INS did not have an enterprise architecture, including a description of both its “as is” and “to be” operational and technology environments and a roadmap for transitioning between the two environments. Moreover, we also reported that the efforts underway to develop the architecture were flawed and unlikely to produce useful architectural products. In particular, the development efforts were limited to a producing a bottom-up description of INS’ current IT environment (e.g., hardware and system software computing platforms, data structures and schemas, software applications) and mapping the software applications to mission areas. While this was a reasonable start to describing the current architectural environment, important steps still needed to be accomplished, such as linking the systems environment description to a decomposed view of agency mission areas, including each area’s component business functions, information needs, and information flows among functions. Moreover, doing this reliably required the participation of agency business owners; however, these owners were not involved. Also, INS had not begun developing either a target architecture or a capital investment plan for sequencing the projects that will it allow to migrate from its current architecture to its target architecture. These two components would be integral to INS’ previously mentioned need to implement effective investment management processes and practices because both controlling and selecting IT projects requires ensuring that these projects are provided for in the sequencing plan and are aligned with the target architecture. By doing so, investment decisionmakers can know (1) how proposed projects contribute to the strategic mission goals, needs, and priorities and (2) whether these projects will be engineered according to the technical models and standards, that are both embedded in the target architecture descriptions. Equally important, we reported that INS’ architecture development efforts were not being managed as a formal program, including having meaningful plans that provided a detailed breakdown of the work and associated schedules and resource needs. Further, these efforts did not include performance measures and progress reporting requirements to ensure that the effort was progressing satisfactorily. As a result, we concluded that it was unlikely that INS could produce a meaningful architecture that could be used to effectively and efficiently guide and constrain IT investment and project decisionmaking. Accordingly, we made a series of recommendations to INS aimed at making development of an enterprise architecture an agency priority and managing it as such.

Information technology (IT) management process controls are predictors of organizational success in developing, acquiring, implementing, operating, and maintaining IT systems and related infrastructure. GAO found that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has not implemented practices associated with effective IT investment and enterprise architecture management. Furthermore, these investments are not aligned with an agencywide blueprint that defines the agency's future operational and technological plans. INS does not know whether its ongoing investments are meeting their cost, schedule, and performance commitments.

Based on state responses to our survey, we estimated that nearly 617,000, or about 89 percent of the approximately 693,000 regulated tanks, had been upgraded with the federally required equipment by the end of fiscal year 2000. EPA data showed that about 70 percent of the total number of tanks that its regions regulate on tribal lands had also been upgraded. With regard to the approximately 76,000 tanks that we estimated have not been upgraded, closed, or removed as required, 17 states and the 3 EPA regions we visited reported that they believed that most of these tanks were either empty or inactive. However, another five states reported that at least half of their non-upgraded tanks were still in use. EPA and states assume that the tanks are empty or inactive and therefore pose less risk. As a result, they may give them a lower priority for resources. However, states also reported that they generally did not discover tank leaks or contamination around tanks until the empty or inactive tanks were removed from the ground during replacement or closure. Consequently, unless EPA and the states address these non-compliant tanks in a more timely manner, they may be overlooking a potential source of soil and groundwater contamination. Even though most tanks have been upgraded, we estimated from our survey data that more than 200,000 of them, or about 29 percent, were not being properly operated and maintained, increasing the risk of leaks. The extent of operations and maintenance problems varied across the states, as figure 1 illustrates. The states reported a variety of operational and maintenance problems, such as operators turning off leak detection equipment. The states also reported that the majority of problems occurred at tanks owned by small, independent businesses; non-retail and commercial companies, such as cab companies; and local governments. The states attributed these problems to a lack of training for tank owners, installers, operators, removers, and inspectors. These smaller businesses and local government operations may find it more difficult to afford adequate training, especially given the high turnover rates among tank staff, or may give training a lower priority. Almost all of the states reported a need for additional resources to keep their own inspectors and program staff trained, and 41 states requested additional technical assistance from the federal government to provide such training. To date, EPA has provided states with a number of training sessions and helpful tools, such as operation and maintenance checklists and guidelines. One of EPA’s tank program initiatives is also intended to improve training and tank compliance with federal requirements, such as setting annual compliance targets with the states. The agency is in the process of implementing its compliance improvement initiative, which involves actions such as setting the targets and providing incentives to tank owners, but it is too early to gauge the impact of the agency’s efforts on compliance rates. According to EPA’s program managers, only physical inspections can confirm whether tanks have been upgraded and are being properly operated and maintained. However, only 19 states physically inspect all of their tanks at least once every 3 years—the minimum that EPA considers necessary for effective tank monitoring. Another 10 states inspect all tanks, but less frequently. The remaining 22 states do not inspect all tanks, but instead generally target inspections to potentially problematic tanks, such as those close to drinking water sources. In addition, not all of EPA’s own regions comply with the recommended rate. Two of the three regions that we visited inspected tanks located on tribal land every 3 years. Figure 2 illustrates the states’ reported inspection practices. According to our survey results, some states and EPA regions would need additional staff to conduct more frequent inspections. For example, under staffing levels at the time of our review, the inspectors in 11 states would each have to visit more than 300 facilities a year to cover all tanks at least once every 3 years, but EPA estimates that a qualified inspector can only visit at most 200 facilities a year. Moreover, because most states use their own employees to conduct inspections, state legislatures would need to provide them additional hiring authority and funding to acquire more inspectors. Officials in 40 states said that they would support a federal mandate requiring states to periodically inspect all tanks, in part because they expect that such a mandate would provide them needed leverage to obtain the requisite inspection staff and funding from their state legislatures. In addition to more frequent inspections, a number of states stated that they need additional enforcement tools to correct problem tanks. EPA’s program managers stated that good enforcement requires a variety of tools, including the ability to issue citations or fines. One of the most effective tools is the ability to prohibit suppliers from delivering fuel to stations with problem tanks. However, as figure 3 illustrates, 27 states reported that they did not have the authority to stop deliveries. In addition, EPA believes, and we agree, that the law governing the tank program does not give the Agency clear authority to regulate fuel suppliers and therefore prohibit their deliveries. Almost all of the states said they need additional enforcement resources and 27 need additional authority. Members of both an expert panel and an industry group, which EPA convened to help it assess the tank program, likewise saw the need for states to have more resources and more uniform and consistent enforcement across states, including the authority to prohibit fuel deliveries. They further noted that the fear of being shut down would provide owners and operators a greater incentive to comply with federal requirements. Under its tank initiatives, EPA is working with states to implement third party inspection programs, using either private contractors or other state agencies that may also be inspecting these business sites for other reasons. EPA’s regions have the opportunity, to some extent, to use the grants that they provide to the states for their tank programs as a means to encourage more inspections and better enforcement. However, the Agency does not want to limit state funding to the point where this further jeopardizes program implementation. The Congress may also wish to consider making more funds available to states to improve tank inspections and enforcement. For example, the Congress could increase the amount of funds it provides from the Leaking Underground Storage Tank trust fund, which the Congress established to specifically provide funds for cleaning up contamination from tanks. The Congress could then allow states to spend a portion of these funds on inspections and enforcement. It has considered taking this action in the past, and 40 states said that they would welcome such funding flexibility. In fiscal year 2000, EPA and the states confirmed a total of more than 14,500 leaks or releases from regulated tanks, although the Agency and many of the states could not verify whether the releases had occurred before or after the tanks had been upgraded. According to our survey, 14 states said that they had traced newly discovered leaks or releases that year to upgraded tanks, while another 17 states said they seldom or never detected such leaks. The remaining 20 states could not confirm whether or not their upgraded tanks leaked. EPA recognizes the need to collect better data to determine the extent and cause of leaks from upgraded tanks, the effectiveness of the current equipment, and if there is a need to strengthen existing equipment standards. The Agency has launched studies in several of its regions to obtain such data, but it may have trouble concluding whether leaks occurred after the upgrades. In a study of local tanks, researchers in Santa Clara County, California, concluded that upgraded tanks do not provide complete protection against leaks, and even properly operated and maintained tank monitoring systems cannot guarantee that leaks are detected. EPA, as one of its program initiatives, is working with the states to gather data on leaks from upgraded tanks in order to determine whether equipment requirements need to be strengthened, such as requiring double-walled tanks. The states and the industry and expert groups support EPA’s actions. In closing, the states and EPA cannot ensure that all regulated tanks have the required equipment to prevent health risks from fuel leaks, spills, and overfills or that tanks are safely operated and maintained. Many states are not inspecting all of their tanks to make sure that they do not leak, nor can they prohibit fuel from being delivered to problem tanks. EPA has the opportunity to help its regions and states correct these limitations through its tank initiatives, but it is difficult to determine whether the Agency’s proposed actions will be sufficient because it is just defining its implementation plans. The Congress also has the opportunity to help provide EPA and the states the additional inspection and enforcement authority and resources they need to improve tank compliance and safety.

Hazardous substances that leak from underground storage tanks can contaminate the soil and water and pose continuing health risks. Leaks of methyl tertiary butyl ether--a fuel additive--have forced several communities to close their wells. GAO surveyed all 50 states and the District of Columbia to determine whether tanks are compliant with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) underground storage tank (UST) requirements. About 1.5 million tanks have been closed since the program was created, leaving about 693,000 tanks subject to UST requirements. Eighty-nine percent of these tanks had the required protective equipment installed, but nearly 30 percent of them were not properly operated and maintained. EPA estimates that the rest were inactive and empty. More than half of the states do not meet the minimum rate recommended by EPA for inspections. State officials said that they lacked the money, staff, and authority to conduct more inspections or more strongly enforce tank compliance. States reported that even tanks with the required leak prevention and detection equipment continue to leak, although the full extent of the problem is unknown. EPA is seeking better data on leaks from upgraded tanks and is considering whether it needs to set new tank requirements, such as double-walled tanks, to prevent future leaks.

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 ) authorizes the President to issue major disaster declarations in response to certain incidents that overwhelm the capabilities of tribal, state, and local governments. The Stafford Act defines a major disaster as any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. Major disaster declarations can authorize several types of federal assistance to support response and recovery efforts following an incident. The primary source of funding for federal assistance following a major disaster is the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). While this fund also provides assistance as a result of emergency declarations and Fire Management Assistance Grants, major disaster declarations historically account for the majority of obligations from the DRF. This report provides a national overview of actual and projected obligations funded through the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations between FY2000 and FY2015. In addition to providing a national overview, the electronic version of this report includes links to CRS products that summarize actual and projected obligations from the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations in each state and the District of Columbia. Each state profile includes information on the most costly incidents and impacted localities. In both the national and state-level products, information is provided on the types of assistance that have been provided for major disasters. Many other federal programs that provide assistance following a major disaster are not funded through the DRF. While the specific agencies and programs called upon will vary from one disaster to another, an overview of selected programs can be found in CRS Report R42845, Federal Emergency Management: A Brief Introduction , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. A total of 936 major disaster declarations were made between FY2000 and FY2015. These declarations resulted in more than $133.6 billion in actual and projected obligations from the DRF. There was a high level of variation in the amount of actual and projected funding obligated for major disasters each year, with more than $48.6 billion in actual and projected obligations for disasters in FY2005 alone. Figure 1 displays the actual and projected obligations for all major disaster declarations each fiscal year. In Figure 1 , obligations associated with each declaration are reported in the fiscal year in which the major disaster was declared. However, disaster response and recovery expenses are often incurred over several years following an incident, including some of the incidents from FY2000 to FY2015. To account for the total amount of federal assistance ultimately obligated for major disasters, the obligations data used throughout this report reflect actual obligations as well as obligations projected under FEMA-approved spending plans. A major disaster declaration can authorize funding for different purposes, depending on the needs of the state. These purposes include the following: Public Assistance , which is used by tribal, state, or local governments, or certain private nonprofit organizations to provide emergency protective services, conduct debris removal operations, and repair or replace damaged public infrastructure; Individual Assistance , which provides direct aid to impacted households; Hazard Mitigation Assistance , which funds mitigation and resiliency projects and programs, typically across the entire state; FEMA administrative costs associated with each disaster declaration; and Mission Assignment , which tasks and reimburses other federal entities that provide direct disaster assistance. The decision concerning which types of assistance to provide is made either when the major disaster is declared or when the declaration is amended. For many major disasters, all of the assistance types outlined above are authorized. For others, some assistance types are not authorized. Figure 2 compares the actual and projected obligations for different types of assistance provided as a result of a major disaster declaration from FY2000 to FY2015. In addition to the major disaster assistance described above, there are other forms of assistance that are funded through the DRF. These include assistance associated with Emergency Declarations and with Fire Management Assistance Grants. The funding associated with these types of assistance typically results in lower obligation levels than assistance provided as a result of major disaster declarations, although there is significant variation across incidents. Emergency Declarations are often made at the time a threat is recognized in order to assist tribal, state, and local efforts prior to an incident. For the period FY2000 through FY2015, total obligations for emergency declarations were just over $2.37 billion. Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAGs) provide aid for the control, management, and mitigation of fires. Total obligations for FMAGs from FY2000 through FY2015 were slightly more than $1.21 billion. Floods represent a majority of all major disaster declarations nationwide. One of the primary sources of assistance for flooding events is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which is not funded through the DRF. For more information on the NFIP, please refer to CRS Report R44593, Introduction to FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Many existing CRS products address issues related to the DRF, the disaster declaration process, and types of DRF assistance. Below is a list of several of these resources: CRS Report R41981, Congressional Primer on Responding to Major Disasters and Emergencies , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43519, Natural Disasters and Hazards: CRS Experts , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43784, FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43537, FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected Issues , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44619, FEMA Disaster Housing: The Individuals and Households Program—Implementation and Potential Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43990, FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program: Background and Considerations for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] In the electronic version of this report, Table 1 includes links to CRS products that summarize major disaster assistance from the DRF for each state and the District of Columbia. Actual and projected obligations from the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations for tribal lands, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau are available upon request.

The primary source of funding for federal assistance authorized by a major disaster declaration is the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Major disaster declarations have occurred in every U.S. state since FY2000, with obligations for each incident ranging from a few hundred thousand dollars to more than $31 billion. This report summarizes DRF actual and projected obligations as a result of major disaster declarations at the national level for the period FY2000 through FY2015. CRS profiles for each state and the District of Columbia are linked to this report. Information on major disaster assistance from the DRF for tribal lands, U.S. territories, and freely associated states is available upon request. This report also includes lists of additional resources and key policy staff who can provide more information on the emergency management issues discussed.

Prior to 1940, U.S. presidents or their descendents typically retained ownership of papers documenting their terms of office. The fate of these papers was up to the former president or his descendents, and some were lost forever. In 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first president to arrange to have a library built using privately raised funds and to then transfer both the facility and his papers to the federal government. Through its Office of Presidential Libraries, NARA operates presidential libraries housing the papers of all subsequent presidents through George W. Bush, as well as President Roosevelt’s predecessor in the White House, Herbert Hoover. At the end of a president’s term, NARA staff begin working with the president’s official records and other materials. This work goes on during library construction and during the period between the dedication of the library facility and its transfer to the federal government. Table 1 provides facts about the 13 presidential libraries and museums operated by NARA. For most of the libraries, as the president’s term was coming to a close or after it ended, friends and supporters of the president created a private charitable foundation to collect donations to construct a library. Under current law, NARA collaborates with each presidential library foundation on the construction of the library facility, and when the facility construction is complete, the foundation deeds or gives the right to use the library facility or a portion of the facility to NARA. The Presidential Libraries Act of 1986 also requires that the National Archives Trust Fund receive an operating endowment for each library before NARA can accept the transfer of the library. These endowments fund some of the federal government’s costs for the operation and maintenance of the presidential libraries. Figure 1 captures key steps of the current process of establishing a presidential library. Some variations from this process may exist. Each library is operated by a director who is a NARA employee, and other library staff who are also NARA employees. The staffs typically include an administrative officer, facility manager, education and exhibits specialists, archivists, archives technicians, and clerks, among other staff. The director of a presidential library is appointed by the Archivist of the United States, the head of NARA, who consults with the former president in selecting a candidate. The Office of Presidential Libraries is headed by the Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries. The Office of Presidential Libraries is responsible for overseeing the management of records at the libraries, the development of policies and procedures for the management and operation of presidential libraries, and the development and coordination of plans, programs, and resource allocations at presidential libraries. The Office of Presidential Libraries is also involved in the creation of new presidential libraries. Funds appropriated by Congress support NARA’s staffing, administration, security, maintenance, and renovation projects at the library. In fiscal year 2009, NARA spent more than $68 million in appropriations to operate the presidential libraries. In addition, for fiscal year 2009 NARA received $41.5 million in special appropriations for repairs and restoration to the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum ($22 million), the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum ($17.5 million), and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library & Museum ($2 million). Each private foundation is operated by a director, president, or CEO and other staff that may include a chief financial officer and director of communications, among other positions. Foundation support enables the libraries to expand their research and archival functions, as well as undertake additional projects such as public outreach efforts. The foundations’ level of involvement in the activities at their associated library, such as collaboration on public and educational programs, varies from library to library. Foundations may also sponsor their own programs and activities, such as hosting a lecture series or academic discussion or producing a newsletter. NARA officials told us that, in most cases, these kinds of programs and activities are offered in conjunction with and supported by library staff. For example, a foundation may pay for a lecture series that is held in NARA-controlled space. The foundations may also generally support their associated libraries with additional funding for new facilities and equipment and for updating permanent exhibits, adding program space, and giving the library the use of foundation staff time for library activities. Foundations provide these resources directly to their associated library. This process generally is handled at the library level based on the relationship between the library and the foundation. Each presidential library also has a trust fund that receives revenue from the sale of publications, museum shop sales, document reproductions, audio-visual reproductions, library admissions, public space rentals, educational conferences, and interest income. Trust- fund money helps the library cover the cost of museum shop inventory, personnel, operational and financial systems, equipment, and supplies. These funds may also support exhibit-related and public-programming expenses. In fiscal year 2009, the trust funds for presidential libraries had a total end-of-year balance of approximately $15 million. In addition to trust funds, presidential libraries also maintain funds from gifts donated to a library for general library support or for specific projects or programs. The federal laws specific to presidential libraries focus primarily on the design and construction of library facilities and, once constructed, the deeding of the library facilities, or the rights to use the facilities, to the federal government. Congress has enacted three primary statutes that provide the legal rules for the design, construction, and transfer of library facilities. NARA’s building-use regulations outline the permissible and prohibited uses of the presidential library facilities by other groups. According to the regulations, other groups may request the use of presidential library facilities when the activity is sponsored, cosponsored, or authorized by the library; conducted to further the library’s interests; and does not interfere with the normal operation of the library. The regulations prohibit the use of the facilities for profit-making, commercial advertisement or sales, partisan political activities, or sectarian activities. When NARA considers it to be in the public interest, NARA may allow for the occasional, nonofficial use of rooms and spaces in a presidential library and charge a reasonable fee for such use. Additionally, the regulations require outside organizations to apply for the use of library space by writing to the library director and submitting an Application for Use of Space in Presidential Libraries. Applying organizations must agree to review their event plans with library staff and that the plans will conform to library rules and procedures. The application also confirms that the organization will not charge admission fees, make indirect assessment fees for admission, or take collections for their events. Further, the application prohibits the organization from suggesting that the library endorses or sponsors the organization. Federal laws and regulations specify for all federal employees—including federal employees working at presidential libraries—what they may and may not do in their official capacity. For example, federal employees may not engage in commercial or political activity associated with their federal positions. According to NARA’s General Counsel, there are no special laws or regulations that apply only to how library employees interact with the foundation or, if applicable, university associated with their library, but the laws and regulations that apply throughout the federal government also apply to library employees. The Hatch Act provides the rules for the activities of library employees at events such as candidate debates or speeches by candidates that sometimes take place at the libraries. The Hatch Act, which is enforced by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), prohibits certain political activities for federal employees. At an event such as these (or at any other time) a library employee may not use official authority to interfere with an election; solicit, accept, or receive political contributions from any person; run for nomination or as a candidate for election to a partisan political office; or solicit or discourage the political activity of any person connected to the business of the employee’s office. NARA employees must also follow the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch issued by the Office of Government Ethics. The standards emphasize that employees have a responsibility to the U.S. government and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws, and ethical principles above private gain, and set forth 14 general principles. Among other things, the standards describe limitations on actions an employee may take while seeking other employment, and require that employees use the time they are serving in an official capacity in an honest effort to perform official duties. NARA’s Office of Presidential Libraries oversees the 13 presidential libraries. That office has developed systemwide policies, including the Presidential Libraries Manual, which discusses museum activities and records topics, and the NARA / Office of Presidential Libraries Architecture and Design Standards for Presidential Libraries. The Office of Presidential Libraries also works with the NARA General Counsel on the development of policies governing the library–foundation relationship. The NARA General Counsel has issued legal opinions on foundations’ use of library facilities, when and how library staff can support foundation activities, and if library staff can fundraise for the foundations. Additionally, NARA officials explained that the NARA General Counsel and the Office of Presidential Libraries negotiate with the foundations on the agreements establishing the relationship between a new library and its associated foundation. According to NARA officials, library directors at the individual libraries consult with the NARA General Counsel about activities that could have political undertones before allowing a program or event. For example, library directors have contacted NARA General Counsel to inquire about using libraries as polling places. NARA approved the use of libraries as polling places as long as certain requirements were met such as that no political solicitation occurs on library-controlled property. In another example, a local political party requested but was not allowed to hold a political forum at the library. NARA officials told us that NARA does not have internal directives specifically regarding the supervision of library and foundation staff. They said that when library staff are concerned about supervision or other issues while working on a collaborative project with the foundations, they are expected to seek advice from the NARA General Counsel’s ethics program staff. Table 3 provides a summary of NARA policies and NARA General Counsel opinions concerning library–foundation activities and other outside uses of the libraries. Each presidential library has a written agreement with its associated foundation and, if applicable, the associated university that governs aspects of the relationship between the entities. These agreements differ in format; content; and the extent to which they address use of facilities, library and foundation staff relationships, and political activities. These agreements must be consistent with the applicable statutes and NARA regulations. At some libraries, the library–foundation relationship is addressed by more than one agreement due to the updating or supplementing of original documents, or to the changing format of the agreements over time. Some of the oldest agreements are primarily a series of Letters of Offer and Acceptance between the foundation and the General Services Administration (GSA), with later agreements taking the form of a mutually signed agreement between the foundation and NARA. For example, the Ford museum and the Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy library agreements (from 1957 to 1980) include one or more Letters of Offer and Acceptance between the foundation and the GSA. Later agreements from more-recently established libraries, as well as earlier libraries that updated their agreements, include mutually signed agreements between the foundation and NARA. Of these later agreements, some focus on a specific project or aspect of the library–foundation relationship, while some focus broadly on the library–foundation relationship. We reviewed the library–foundation agreements and found that, over time, the agreements have become increasingly more detailed, especially regarding staff, each entity’s use and control of the different parts of the facilities, and political activities. Earlier agreements are largely focused on the transfer of property from the foundation to the United States, while later agreements address additional aspects of the library–foundation relationship. For example, later agreements address which entity controls specific parts of the facilities, including details related to one entity’s use of the other’s space (such as the permitted purposes for using the other’s space, and reimbursing the other entity for costs associated with using its space). Later agreements are also more likely to clarify the different roles and responsibilities of library and foundation staff, and address activities or tasks that library staff are not allowed to perform. Some of the later agreements also address potential conflicts of interest between the library and the foundation. For example, two of the later agreements state that foundation staff are to act in the best interests of the foundation, and NARA staff are to act in the best interests of NARA and the United States. Regarding political activities, two of the later agreements state that library space is not allowed to be used for partisan political activities. Also, NARA regulations give library directors the authority to establish supplemental policies. According to NARA officials, these supplemental policies may provide further detail on the library–foundation relationship regarding facilities, staff, and political activities. Our review was limited to NARA- wide policies and library–foundation agreements and we did not review any local library supplemental policies. NARA officials explained that the written agreements between individual libraries and the foundations are important, but that they also do not fully prescribe the relationships between the entities. They said that the relationships are shaped over time and by factors such as the particular foundation’s interest in collaborating with the library or doing charitable work elsewhere. For example, the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum and its associated foundation, the Truman Library Institute, are colocated and often collaborate on educational programs. The foundation describes itself as working with the library to “fulfill the Truman Library’s commitment to research and education.” In contrast, the mission of the foundation associated with the Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, The Carter Center, does not directly focus on the library, but rather “to advance peace and health worldwide.” NARA officials said that interaction between individual libraries and their foundations vary, but they also stressed that no one foundation’s emphasis is more correct than another. These are examples of differences among foundations and how those differences shape the level of involvement by a foundation with a library. We provided a draft of this report to NARA. NARA had no substantive comments and provided technical comments by e-mail, which we incorporated as appropriate. NARA’s letter is reprinted in appendix I. We will send a copy of this report to the Archivist of the United States. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9110 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. In addition to the contact named above, David Lewis, Assistant Director; Sonya Phillips; Juliann Gorse; Brianna Benner; Sabrina Streagle; Lois Hanshaw; Susan Christiansen; Lindsay Read; and Jessica Thomsen made key contributions to this report.

The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) operates presidential libraries for all of the former U.S. presidents since Herbert Hoover. These libraries received over 2.4 million visits in 2009, including researchers, public program attendees, and museum visitors. Each library is associated with a private foundation, which raised the funds to build the library and then turned the library facility over to the federal government. These foundations typically have ongoing relationships with the libraries they built, and some of these library-foundation relationships involve sharing of staff and facilities. Per congressional request, this report describes the principal laws, regulations, and NARA policies that govern library-foundation relationships and the appropriate use of library facilities and staff. GAO reviewed specific laws governing presidential libraries, and NARA regulations and policies. We also reviewed applicable laws and regulations governing activities held on government property and acceptable activities of federal employees. Further, we interviewed relevant NARA officials. NARA reviewed a draft of this report and had no substantive comments. NARA made technical suggestions which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. The federal laws specific to presidential libraries focus primarily on the design and construction of library facilities and, once constructed, the deeding of the library facilities, or the rights to use the facilities, to the federal government. NARA building-use regulations outline the permissible and prohibited uses of presidential library facilities by outside organizations. Prohibited uses include profit-making, commercial advertisement or sales, partisan political activities, or sectarian activities. Other laws and regulations govern what federal employees may and may not do in their official capacity. As federal employees, NARA library employees must follow these rules in their interactions with the foundation associated with the library. NARA's Office of Presidential Libraries has developed a policy manual and standards that address topics such as museum activities and records. This office also works with the NARA General Counsel to develop guidance governing the library-foundation relationship, such as those related to the foundations' use of library facilities and when and how library staff can support foundation activities. The libraries also have one or more written agreements with their associated foundation that govern different aspects of the relationship. These agreements differ in format; content; and the extent to which they address use of facilities, library and foundation staff relationships, and political activities.

This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position from 1973 through 2017, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports. Federal statute provides that the Director of the FBI is to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. When there is a vacancy or an anticipated vacancy, the President begins the appointment process by selecting and vetting his preferred candidate for the position. The vetting process for presidential appointments includes an FBI background check and financial disclosure. The President then submits the nomination to the Senate, where it is referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Committee on the Judiciary usually holds hearings on a nomination for the FBI Director. The committee may then vote to report the nomination back to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Once reported, the nomination is available for Senate consideration. If the Senate confirms the nomination, the individual is formally appointed to the position by the President. Prior to the implementation of the current nomination and confirmation process, J. Edgar Hoover was Director of the FBI for nearly 48 years. He held the position from May 10, 1924, until his death on May 2, 1972. The current process dates from 1968, when the FBI Director was first established as a presidentially appointed position requiring Senate confirmation in an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The proposal for a presidentially appointed Director had been introduced and passed in the Senate twice previously, but had never made it through the House. Floor debate in the Senate focused on the inevitable end of Hoover's tenure (due to his advanced age), the vast expansion of the FBI's size and role under his direction, and the need for Congress to strengthen its oversight role in the wake of his departure. In 1976, the 10-year limit for any one incumbent was added as part of the Crime Control Act of 1976. This provision also prohibits the reappointment of an incumbent. As with the previous measure, the Senate had introduced and passed this provision twice previously, but it had failed to pass the House. From 1973 through 2017, eight nominations for FBI Director were confirmed, and two other nominations were withdrawn. Due to a 2011 statute allowing for the reappointment of a specific incumbent, two of the eight confirmed nominations were of the same person, Robert S. Mueller III. Each of these nominations is shown in Table 1 and discussed below. L. Patrick Gray III. On the day after the death of long-time Director J. Edgar Hoover, L. Patrick Gray was appointed acting Director. President Richard M. Nixon nominated Gray to be Director on February 21, 1973. Over the course of nine days, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the nomination. Although Gray's nomination was supported by some in the Senate, his nomination ran into trouble during the hearings as other Senators expressed concern about partisanship, lack of independence from the White House, and poor handling of the Watergate investigation. The President withdrew the nomination on April 17, and Gray resigned as acting Director on April 27, 1973. Clarence M. Kelley. Clarence M. Kelley was the first individual to become FBI Director through the nomination and confirmation process. A native of Missouri, Kelley was a 21-year veteran of the FBI, becoming chief of the Memphis field office. He was serving as Kansas City police chief when President Nixon nominated him on June 8, 1973. During the three days of confirmation hearings, Senators appeared satisfied that Kelley would maintain nonpartisan independence from the White House and be responsive to their concerns. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary approved the nomination unanimously the following day. He was sworn in by the President on July 9, 1973. Kelly remained FBI Director until his retirement on February 23, 1978. Frank M. Johnson Jr. With the anticipated retirement of Clarence Kelley, President Jimmy Carter nominated U.S. District Court Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. of Alabama, on September 30, 1977. Johnson faced serious health problems around the time of his nomination, however, and the President withdrew the nomination on December 15, 1977. William H. Webster. In the aftermath of the withdrawn Johnson nomination, President Carter nominated U.S. Court of Appeals Judge William H. Webster to be Director on January 20, 1978. Prior to his service on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Webster had been U.S. Attorney and then U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. After two days of hearings, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary unanimously approved the nomination and reported it to the Senate. The Senate confirmed the nomination on February 9, 1978, and Webster was sworn in on February 23, 1978. He served as Director of the FBI until he was appointed as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in May 1987. William S. Sessions. On September 9, 1987, President Ronald W. Reagan nominated William S. Sessions, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court of Western Texas, to replace Webster. Prior to his service on the bench, Sessions had worked as chief of the Government Operations Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and as U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas. Following a one-day hearing, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary unanimously recommended confirmation. The Senate confirmed the nomination, without opposition, on September 25, and Sessions was sworn in on November 2, 1987. Sessions was the first of two FBI Directors to be removed from office. President William J. Clinton removed Sessions from office on July 19, 1993, citing "serious questions ... about the conduct and the leadership of the Director," and a report on "certain conduct" issued by the Office of Professional Responsibility at the Department of Justice. Some Members of Congress questioned the dismissal, but they did not prevent the immediate confirmation of Sessions's successor. Louis J. Freeh. President Clinton nominated former FBI agent, federal prosecutor, and U.S. District Court Judge Louis J. Freeh of New York as FBI Director on July 20, 1993, the day following Sessions's removal. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held one day of hearings and approved the nomination. The nomination was reported to the full Senate on August 3, and Freeh was confirmed on August 6, 1993. He was sworn in on September 1, 1993, and served until his voluntary resignation, which became effective June 25, 2001. Robert S. Mueller III. On July 18, 2001, President George W. Bush nominated Robert S. Mueller III to succeed Freeh. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held two days of hearings, and the nomination was reported on August 2, 2001. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on the same day by a vote of 98-0. Mueller had served as the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California in San Francisco, and as the Acting Deputy U.S. Attorney General from January through May 2001. The former marine had also been U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts and served as a homicide prosecutor for the District of Columbia. Under President George Bush, Mueller was in charge of the Department of Justice's criminal division during the investigation of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the prosecution of Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega. From 1973 through 2016, Mueller was the only FBI Director to be appointed to more than one term. P.L. 112-24 , enacted on July 26, 2011, allowed the incumbent Director to be nominated for, and appointed to, an additional two-year term. After the bill was signed, Mueller was nominated for this second term by President Barack Obama, and he was confirmed the following day by a vote of 100-0. Mueller's two-year term expired on September 4, 2013. James B. Comey Jr. As Mueller's unique two-year term drew to a close, President Obama nominated James B. Comey Jr. to succeed him. Comey had previously served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, from January 2002 to December 2003, and as Deputy Attorney General, from December 2003 to August 2005. The President submitted Comey's nomination on June 21, 2013. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the nomination on July 9 and voted unanimously to report the nomination favorably to the full Senate on July 18. The Senate confirmed the nomination by a vote of 93-1 on July 29. Comey began his term of office on September 4, 2013. Comey was removed from office by President Donald J. Trump on May 9, 2017. Christopher A. Wray. Seven weeks after Comey was removed from office, President Trump nominated Christopher A. Wray to succeed him. From 1997 until 2005, Wray served in several leadership positions at the Department of Justice, including Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. He later worked in private practice at a law firm. The President submitted Wray's nomination on June 26, 2017. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the nomination on July 12 and voted unanimously to report the nomination favorably to the full Senate on July 20. The Senate confirmed the nomination by a vote of 92-5 on August 1. Wray began his term of office on August 2, 2017. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 93 rd Cong., 1 st sess., February 28, 1973; March 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 20, 21, and 22, 1973. Washington: GPO, 1973. —.—. Executive Session, Nomination of L. Patrick Gray, III to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hearing. 93 rd Cong., 1 st sess., April 5, 1973. Unpublished. —.—. Nomination of Clarence M. Kelley to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 93 rd Cong., 1 st sess., June 19, 20, and 25, 1973. Washington: GPO, 1973. —.—. Nomination of William H. Webster, of Missouri, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 95 th Cong., 2 nd sess., January 30 and 31, 1978; February 7, 1978. Washington: GPO, 1978. —.—. Nomination of William S. Sessions, of Texas, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 100 th Cong., 1 st sess., September 9, 1987. S.Hrg. 100-1080. Washington: GPO, 1990. —.—. Nomination of Louis J. Freeh, of New York, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 103 rd Cong., 1 st sess., July 29, 1993. S.Hrg. 103-1021. Washington: GPO, 1995. —.—. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Robert S. Mueller, III to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 107 th Cong., 1 st sess., July 30-31, 2001. S.Hrg. 107-514. Washington: GPO, 2002. —.—. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of James B. Comey, Jr., to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 113 th Cong., 1 st sess., July 9, 2013. S.Hrg. 113-850. Washington: GPO, 2017. —.—. Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Ten-Year Term for FBI Director . Hearing. 93 rd Cong., 2 nd sess., March 18, 1974. Washington: GPO, 1974. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Ten-Year Term for FBI Director . Report to accompany S. 2106 . 93 rd Cong., 2 nd sess. S.Rept. 93-1213. Washington: GPO, 1974. —.—. William H. Webster to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Report to accompany the nomination of William H. Webster to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 95 th Cong., 2 nd sess., February 7, 1978. Exec. Rept. 95-14. Washington: GPO, 1978. —.—. William S. Sessions to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Report to accompany the nomination of William Sessions to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100 th Cong., 1 st sess., September 15, 1987. Exec. Rept. 100-6. Washington: GPO, 1987. —.—. A Bill to Extend the Term of the Incumbent Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Report to accompany S. 1103 . 112 th Cong., 1 st sess., June 21, 2011. S.Rept. 112-23 . Washington: GPO, 2011.

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statutory basis for the present nomination and confirmation process was developed in 1968 and 1976, and has been used since the death of J. Edgar Hoover in 1972. From 1973 through 2017, eight nominations for FBI Director were confirmed, and two other nominations were withdrawn by the President before confirmation. The position of FBI Director has a fixed 10-year term, and the officeholder cannot be reappointed, unless Congress acts to allow a second appointment of the incumbent. There are no statutory conditions on the President's authority to remove the FBI Director. From 1973 through 2017, two Directors were removed by the President. President William J. Clinton removed William S. Sessions from office on July 19, 1993, and President Donald J. Trump removed James B. Comey from office on May 9, 2017. Robert S. Mueller III was the first FBI Director to be appointed to a second term, and this was done under special statutory arrangements. He was first confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2001, with a term of office that expired in September 2011. In May 2011, President Barack Obama announced his intention to seek legislation that would extend Mueller's term of office for two years. Legislation that would allow Mueller to be nominated to an additional, two-year term was considered and passed in the Senate and the House, and President Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 112-24) on July 26, 2011. Mueller subsequently was nominated and confirmed to the two-year term, and he served until September 4, 2013. This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the FBI Director, briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position from 1973-2017, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports.

Immunizations are widely considered one of the leading public health achievements of the 20th century. Mandatory immunization programs have eradicated polio and smallpox in the United States and reduced the number of deaths from several childhood diseases, such as measles, to near zero. A consistent supply of many different vaccines is needed to support this effort. CDC currently recommends routine immunizations against 11 childhood diseases: diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (whooping cough), Haemophilus influenzae type b (most commonly meningitis), hepatitis B, measles, mumps, rubella (German measles), invasive pneumococcal disease, polio, and varicella (chicken pox). By combining antigens (the component of a vaccine that triggers an immune response), a single injection of a combination vaccine can protect against multiple diseases. The federal government, primarily through agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has a role both as a purchaser of vaccines and as a regulator of the industry. The federal government is the largest purchaser of vaccines in the country. CDC negotiates large purchase contracts with manufacturers and makes the vaccines available to public immunization programs under the Vaccines for Children (VFC) program. Under VFC, vaccines are provided for certain children, including those who are eligible for Medicaid or uninsured. Participating public and private health care providers obtain vaccines through VFC at no charge. A second program, established under section 317, of the Public Health Service Act, provides project grants for preventive health services, including immunizations. Currently, CDC supports 64 state, local, and territorial immunization programs (for simplicity, we refer to them as state immunization programs). In total, about 50 percent of all the childhood vaccines administered in the United States each year are obtained by public immunization programs through CDC contracts. The federal government is also responsible for ensuring the safety of the nation’s vaccine supply. FDA regulates the production of vaccines. It licenses all vaccines sold in the United States, requiring clinical trials to demonstrate that vaccines are safe and effective, and reviews the manufacturing process to ensure that vaccines are made consistently in compliance with current good manufacturing practices. Once vaccines are licensed, FDA also conducts periodic inspections of production facilities to ensure that manufacturers maintain compliance with FDA manufacturing requirements. States also have an important role in immunization efforts. Policies for immunization requirements, including minimum school and day care entry requirements are made almost exclusively at the state level, although cities occasionally impose additional requirements. Each state also established an immunization infrastructure to monitor infectious disease outbreaks, administer federal immunization grants, manage centralized supplies of vaccine, and otherwise promote immunization policies. Recent vaccine shortages have necessitated temporary modifications to the recommended immunization schedule and have caused states to scale back immunization requirements. In our survey of 64 state immunization programs, administered through the Association for State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), all 52 responding programs indicated that they had experienced shortages of two or more vaccines and had taken some form of action to deal with the shortages. Vaccine shortages experienced at the state level have, in turn, prompted cutbacks in immunization requirements for admission to day care or school. Thirty-five states reported putting into effect new, less stringent immunization requirements that allow children who have received fewer than the recommended number of vaccinations to attend school. In general, these states have reduced the immunization requirements for day care and/or school entry or have temporarily suspended enforcement of those requirements until vaccine supplies are replenished. For example, the Minnesota Department of Health suspended the school and postsecondary immunization laws for Td vaccine for the second year in a row, with the suspension extending through the 2002-2003 school year. Other states, including South Carolina and Washington, reported allowing children to attend day care or school even if they were not in compliance with immunization requirements, under the condition that they be recalled for vaccinations when supplies became available. While it is too early to measure the effect of deferred vaccinations on immunization rates, a number of states reported that vaccine shortages and missed make-up vaccinations may take a toll on coverage and, therefore, increase the potential for infectious disease outbreaks. The full impact of vaccine shortages is difficult to measure for several reasons. For example, none of the national immunization coverage surveys measures vaccination coverage of children under the age of 18 months—the age cohort receiving the majority of vaccinations. While immunization experts generally agree that the residual effects of historically high immunization rates afford temporary protection for underimmunized children, missed immunizations could make susceptible children vulnerable to disease outbreaks. For example, a CDC analysis of a 1998 outbreak of measles in an Anchorage, Alaska, school showed that only 51 percent of the 2,186 children exposed had received the requisite two doses of measles vaccine. No single reason explains the rash of recent vaccine shortages; rather, multiple factors coincided that affected both the supply of and demand for vaccines. We identified four key factors, as follows. Production Problems - Manufacturing production problems contributed to the shortage of certain vaccines. In some cases, production slowdowns or interruptions occurred when planned maintenance activities took longer than expected; in other cases, production was affected as manufacturers addressed problems identified in FDA inspections. Changes over the last several years in FDA inspection practices may have resulted in the identification of more or different instances of manufacturers’ noncompliance with FDA manufacturing requirements. For example, prior to these changes, biologics inspections tended to focus primarily on scientific or technical issues and less on compliance with good manufacturing practices and documentation issues. FDA did take some steps to inform manufacturers about its inspection program changes; however, some manufacturers reported problems related to how well the changes were communicated. FDA issued a compliance program guidance manual detailing the new protocol for conducting inspections intended for FDA staff. However, the information in it could have provided manufacturers a better understanding of the scope of the inspections, but the manual was not made widely available—only upon request. Removal of Thimerosal - Calls for the removal of the preservative thimerosal from childhood vaccines illustrate the effect that policy changes can have on the supply of vaccine. As a precautionary measure, in July 1999, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) issued a joint statement advising that thimerosal in vaccines be eliminated or reduced as soon as possible. While thimerosal was present in several vaccines, removing it from some vaccines was more complex than for others. For example, one manufacturer of the diphtheria- tetanus-acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP) had to switch its packaging from multidose to single-dose vials due to the removal of the preservative. This process reduced the manufacturer’s output of vaccine by 25 percent, according to the manufacturer. Manufacturer’s Decision to Discontinue Production - Another major factor in the shortage of DTaP, and also Td, was the decision of one manufacturer to discontinue production of all products containing tetanus toxoid. With little advance warning, the company announced in January 2001 that it had ceased production of these vaccines. According to the manufacturer, prior to its decision, it produced approximately one-quarter of all Td and 25 to 30 percent of all DTaP distributed in the United States, so the company’s departure from these markets was significant. In the previous year, another manufacturer that supplied a relatively small portion of DTaP also had stopped producing this vaccine. Together these decisions decreased the number of major manufacturers of DTaP from four to two and of Td from two to one. Unanticipated Demand - The addition of new vaccines to the recommended immunization schedule can also result in shortages if the demand for vaccine outstrips the predicted need and production levels. This was the case with a newly licensed vaccine, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV), which protects against invasive pneumococcal diseases in young children. PCV was licensed by FDA in February 2000 and formally added to the recommended schedule in January 2001. Company officials said an extensive education campaign prior to its availability resulted in record-breaking initial demand for the vaccine. CDC reported shortages of PCV existed through most of 2001, and the manufacturer was only able to provide about half the needed doses during the first 5 months of 2002. Ongoing manufacturing problems limit production, exacerbating the shortage. While the recent shortages have been largely resolved, the vaccine supply remains vulnerable to any number of disruptions that could occur in the future—including those that contributed to recent shortages and other potential problems, such as a catastrophic plant fire. One key reason is that the nature of vaccine manufacturing prevents the quick production of more vaccine when disruptions occur. Manufacturing a vaccine is a complex, highly controlled process, involving living biological organisms, that can take several months to over a year. Another underlying problem is the limited number of manufacturers—five of the eight recommended childhood vaccines have only one major manufacturer each. Consequently, if there are interruptions in supply or if a manufacturer ceases production, there may be few or no alternative sources of vaccine. One situation that may help add to the supply of existing vaccines is the development of new vaccines. A recent example is a new formulation of DTaP that recently received FDA approval and has helped ease the shortage of DTaP. We identified 11 vaccines in development that could help meet the current recommended immunization schedule. These vaccines, some of which are already licensed for use in other countries, are in various stages of development, but all must undergo a rather lengthy process of clinical testing and FDA review. While FDA has mechanisms available to shorten the review process, they are not used for most vaccines under development. FDA policies generally restrict the use of its expedited review processes to vaccines that offer protection against diseases for which there are no existing vaccines. Because childhood vaccines under development often involve new forms or combinations of existing vaccines, they typically do not qualify for expedited FDA review. Federal efforts to strengthen the nation’s vaccine supply have taken on greater urgency with the recent incidents of shortages. As part of its mandate to study and recommend ways to encourage the availability of safe and effective vaccines, the National Vaccine Advisory Committee formed a work group to explore the issues surrounding vaccine shortages and identify strategies for further consideration by HHS. In its preliminary report, the work group identified several strategies that hold promise, such as streamlining the regulatory process, providing financial incentives for vaccine development, and strengthening manufacturers’ liability protection, but it concluded that these strategies needed further study. The work group did express support for expanding CDC vaccine stockpiles In response to the work group’s finding that streamlining the regulatory process needed further study, FDA recently announced that it is examining regulations governing manufacturing processes for both drugs and vaccine products to determine if reform is needed. However, FDA officials told us it is too early to define the scope and time frame for this reexamination. Regarding financial incentives for vaccine development, the Institute of Medicine is currently conducting a study of vaccine pricing and financing strategies that may address this issue. In regard to liability protections, the work group did make recommendations to strengthen the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP). VICP is a federal program authorized in 1986 to reduce vaccine manufacturers’ liability by compensating individuals for childhood-vaccine-related injuries from a VICP trust fund. The program was established, in part, to help stem the exodus of manufacturers from the vaccine business due to liability concerns. Manufacturers, however, reported a recent resurgence of childhood-vaccine-related lawsuits— including class action lawsuits related to past use of thimerosal—that allege that the lawsuits are not subject to VICP. While the work group acknowledged that recent vaccine shortages do not appear to be related to VICP liability issues, it indicated that strengthening VICP would encourage manufacturers to enter, or remain in, the vaccine production business. Legislation has been introduced for the purpose of clarifying and modifying VICP. Also consistent with the work group’s recommendations, CDC is considering whether additional vaccine stockpiles will help stabilize the nation’s vaccine supply. In 1993, with the establishment of the VFC program, CDC was required to purchase sufficient quantities of pediatric vaccines not only to meet normal usage, but also to provide an additional 6-month supply to meet unanticipated needs. Further, to ensure funding, CDC was authorized to make such purchases in advance of appropriations. Despite this requirement, to date, CDC has established partial stockpiles for only two—measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) and inactivated polio vaccine (IPV)—of the eight recommended childhood vaccines. Even if CDC decides to stockpile additional vaccines, the limited supply and manufacturing capacity will restrict CDC’s ability to build certain stockpiles in the near term. CDC estimates it could take 4 to 5 years to build stockpiles for all the currently recommended childhood vaccines—at a cost of $705 million. Past experience also demonstrates the difficulty of rapidly building stockpiles. Neither the current IPV nor MMR stockpiles have ever achieved target levels because of limited manufacturing capacity. In addition to these challenges, CDC will also need to address issues regarding its authority, strategy, and information needed to use stockpiled vaccines. Authority - It is uncertain whether stockpiled vaccines purchased with VFC funds can be used for non-VFC-eligible children. While the 1993 legislation required the Secretary of HHS to negotiate for a 6-month stockpile of vaccines to meet unanticipated needs, the legislation did not state that the supply of stockpiled vaccines may be made available for children not otherwise eligible through the VFC program. CDC officials said that the VFC legislation is unclear as to whether stockpiled vaccines can be used for all children. Strategy - Expanding the number of CDC vaccine stockpiles will require a substantial planning effort—an effort that is not yet complete. For example, CDC has not made key decisions about vaccine stockpiles to ensure their ready release, including the quantity of each vaccine to stockpile, the form of storage, and storage locations. Also, to ensure that use of a stockpile does not disrupt supply to other purchasers, procedures would need to be developed to ensure that stockpiles represent additional quantities to a manufacturer’s normal inventory levels.

Vaccine shortages began to appear in November 2000, when supplies of the tetanus and diptheria booster fell short. By October 2001, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported shortages of five vaccines that protect against eight childhood diseases. In addition to diptheria and tetanus vaccines, vaccines to protect against pertussis, invasive pneumococcal disease, measles, mumps, rubella, and varicella were in short supply. In July 2002, updated CDC data indicated supplies were returning to normal for most vaccines. However, the shortage of vaccine to protect against invasive pneumococcal disease was expected to continue through at least late 2002. Shortages have prompted federal authorities to recommend deferring some vaccinations and have caused most states to reduce or suspend immunization requirements for school and day care programs so that children who have not received all mandatory immunizations can enroll. States are concerned that failure to be vaccinated at a later date may reduce the share of the population protected and increase the potential for disease to spread; however, data are not currently available to measure these effects. Many factors, including production problems and unanticipated demand for new vaccines, contributed to recent shortages. Although problems leading to the shortages have largely been resolved, the potential exists for shortages to recur. Federal agencies and advisory committees are exploring ways to help stabilize the nation's vaccine supply, but few long-term solutions have emerged. Although CDC is considering expanding vaccine stockpiles to provide a cushion in the event of a supply disruption, limited supply and manufacturing capacity will restrict CDC's ability to build them.

The TANF block grant was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and was designed to give states the flexibility to provide both traditional welfare cash assistance benefits as well as a variety of other benefits and services to meet the needs of low-income families and children. States have responsibility for designing, implementing, and administering their welfare programs to comply with federal guidelines, as defined by federal law and HHS that oversees state TANF programs at the federal level. Importantly, with the fixed federal funding stream, states assume greater fiscal risks in the event of a recession or increased program costs. However, in acknowledgment of these risks, PRWORA also created a TANF Contingency Fund that states could access in times of economic distress. Similarly, during the recent economic recession, Congress created a $5 billion Emergency Contingency Fund for state TANF programs through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, available in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. The story of TANF’s early years is well known. During a strong economy, increased federal support for work supports like child care, and the new TANF program’s emphasis on work, welfare rolls were cut by more than half. Many former welfare recipients increased their income through employment, and employment rates among single parents increased. At the same time that some families worked more and had higher incomes, others had income that left them still eligible for TANF cash assistance. However, many of these eligible families were not participating in the program. According to our estimates in a previous report, the vast majority—87 percent—of the caseload decline can be explained by the decline in eligible families participating in the program, in part because of changes to state welfare programs. These changes include mandatory work requirements, changes to application procedures, lower benefits, and policies such as lifetime limits on assistance, diversion policies, and sanctions for non-compliance, according to a review of the research. Among eligible families who did not participate, 11 percent did not work, did not receive means-tested disability benefits, and had very low incomes. While we have not updated this analysis, some research shows that this potentially vulnerable group may be growing. Despite the decrease in the cash assistance caseload overall, the number of cases in which aid was provided only for the children in the household increased slightly, amounting to about half the cash assistance caseload. For these households, the adult is not included in the benefit calculation, generally either because: (1) the parent is receiving cash support through the Supplemental Security Income program; (2) the parent is an immigrant who is ineligible; (3) the child is living with a nonparent caregiver; or (4) the parent has been sanctioned and removed from cash assistance for failing to comply with program requirements. Nationally, about one-third of these “child only” households are children living with non-parent caregivers. We also know that during and after this recent significant recession, while caseloads increased in most states, the overall national increase totaled about 13 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2011. This has been the first test of TANF—with its capped block grant structure—during severe economic times. This relatively modest increase—and decreases in some states—has raised questions about the responsiveness of TANF to changing economic conditions. We recently completed work on what was happening to people who had exhausted their unemployment insurance While almost 40 percent of benefits after losing a job in the recession.near-poor households with children that had exhausted UI received aid through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly known as food stamps), we estimated that less than 10 percent received TANF cash assistance. A key TANF goal is helping parents prepare for and find jobs. The primary means to measure state efforts in this area has been TANF’s work participation requirements. Generally, states are held accountable for ensuring that at least 50 percent of all families receiving TANF cash assistance and considered work-eligible participate in one or more of the federally defined allowable activities for the required number of hours each week. However, over the years, states have not typically engaged that many recipients in work activities on an annual basis—instead, states have engaged about one third of families in allowable work activities nationwide. Most states have relied on a combination of factors, including various policy and funding options in federal law and regulations, to meet the work participation requirements without reaching the specified 50 percent. Factors that influenced states’ work participation rates included not only the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance who participated in work activities, but also: decreases in the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance (not due to program eligibility changes) that provide a state credit toward meeting its rates , state spending on TANF-related services beyond what is required that also provides a state credit toward meeting its rates, state policies that allow working families to continue receiving TANF cash assistance, helping a state to increase its rate, and state policies that provide nonworking families cash assistance outside of the TANF program. For example, some states serve families with work barriers outside of state TANF because of concerns that they will not be able to meet work requirements. Many states have cited challenges in meeting TANF work participation rates, such as requirements to verify participants’ actual activity hours and certain limitations on the types and timing of activities that count toward meeting the requirements. Because of the various factors that affect the calculation of states’ work participation rates, the rate’s usefulness as an indicator of a state’s effort to help participants achieve self-sufficiency is limited. Further, the TANF work participation rates, as enacted, in combination with the flexibility provided, may not serve as an incentive for states to engage more families or to work with families with complex needs. While the focus is often on TANF’s role in cash assistance, it plays a significant role in states’ budgets for other programs and services for low- income families, as allowed under TANF. The substantial decline in traditional cash assistance caseloads combined with state spending flexibilities under the TANF block grant allowed states to broaden their use of TANF funds. As a result, TANF and state TANF-related dollars played an increasing role in state budgets outside of traditional cash assistance payments. In our 2006 report that reviewed state budgets in nine states, we found that in the decade after Congress created TANF, the states used their federal and state TANF-related funds to support a wide range of state priorities, such as child welfare services, mental health services, substance abuse services, prekindergarten, and refundable state earned income credits for the working poor, among others. While some of this spending, such as that for child care assistance, relates directly to helping cash assistance recipients leave and stay off the welfare rolls, other spending is directed to a broader population that did not necessarily ever receive welfare payments. This is in keeping with the broad purposes of TANF specified in the law: providing assistance to needy families so that children could be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; ending needy families’ dependence on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; preventing and reducing the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; encouraging the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. This trend away from cash assistance has continued. In fact, in fiscal year 2011, federal TANF and state expenditures for purposes other than cash assistance totaled 71 percent of all expenditures. This stands in sharp contrast with 27 percent spent for purposes other than cash assistance in fiscal year 1997, when states first implemented TANF. Beyond the cash assistance rolls, the total number of families assisted is not known, as we have noted in our previous work. TANF funds can play an important role in some states’ child welfare budgets. In our previous work, Texas state officials told us that 30 percent of the child welfare agency’s budget was funded with TANF dollars in state fiscal year 2010. Many states have used TANF to fund child welfare services because, although TANF funding is a capped block grant, it is a relatively flexible funding source. However, some states may not be able to continue relying on TANF to fund child welfare services because they need to use TANF funds to address other program goals, such as promoting work. For example, Tennessee officials told us that they previously used some of their TANF grant to fund enhanced payments for children’s relative caregivers and their Relative Caregiver Program, but that the state recently discontinued this practice due to budget constraints. While states have devoted significant amounts of the block grant as well as state funds to these and other activities, little is known about the use of these funds. Existing TANF oversight mechanisms focus more on the cash assistance and welfare-to-work components of the block grant. For example, when states use TANF funds for some purposes, they are not required to report on funding levels for specific services and how those services fit into a strategy or approach for meeting TANF goals. In effect, there is little information on the numbers of people served by TANF- funded programs other than cash assistance, and there is no real measure of workload or of how services supported by TANF and state TANF-related funds meet the goals of welfare reform. This information gap hinders decision makers in considering the success of TANF and what trade offs might be involved in any changes to TANF when it is authorized. The federal-state TANF partnership makes significant resources available to address poverty in the lives of families with children. With these resources, TANF has provided a basic safety net to many families, triggered a focus on work in the nation’s welfare offices while helping many parents step into jobs, and provided states flexibility to help families in ways they believe will help prevent dependence on public assistance and improve the lives of children. At the same time, it does raise questions about the strength and breadth of the TANF safety net. Are some eligible families falling through? The emphasis on work participation rates as a measure of program performance has helped change the culture of state welfare programs to focus on moving families into employment, but weaknesses in the measure undercut its effectiveness. Are the work participation rates providing the right incentive to states to engage parents, including those difficult to serve, and help them achieve self-sufficiency? The flexibility of the TANF block grant has allowed states to shift their spending away from cash assistance and toward other programs and services for low-income families, potentially expanding the ability of states to combat poverty in new ways. However, we do not have enough information about the use of these funds to determine whether this flexibility is resulting in the most efficient and effective strategies at this time of scarce government resources and great need among the nation’s low-income families. Chairman Baucus, Ranking Member Hatch, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have. For questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Alexander G. Galuten, Gale C. Harris, Sara S. Kelly, Kathryn A. Larin, and Theresa Lo. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

This hearing is on combating poverty and understanding new challenges for families. The testimony focuses on the role of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant in helping low-income families with children. As you know, the federal government significantly changed federal welfare policy in 1996 when it created TANF, a $16.5 billion annual block grant provided to states to operate their own welfare programs within federal guidelines. States are also required to maintain a specified level of their own spending to receive TANF funds. Over the past 15 years, the federal government and states have spent a total of $406 billion for TANF, about 60 percent of which were federal funds. This federal-state partnership has undergone multiple program and fiscal changes, including a dramatic drop in the number of families receiving monthly cash assistance benefits, as well as two economic recessions. According to the Bureau of the Census, poverty among children fell from about 21 percent in 1995 to about 16 percent in 2000, rising again to 22 percent in 2010. Examining TANF’s past performance can help shed light on the challenges facing low-income families and the role of the federal government in combating poverty. This testimony–based primarily on reports issued by GAO from 2010 to 2012 on TANF and related issues—will focus on TANF’s performance in three areas: (1) as a cash safety net for families in need, (2) as a welfare-to-work program that promotes employment, and (3) as a funding source for various services that address families’ needs. The federal-state TANF partnership makes significant resources available to address poverty in the lives of families with children. With these resources, TANF has provided a basic safety net to many families and helped many parents step into jobs. At the same time, there are questions about the strength and breadth of the TANF safety net. Many eligible families—some of whom have very low incomes—are not receiving TANF cash assistance. Regarding TANF as a welfare-to-work program, the emphasis on work participation rates as a measure of state program performance has helped change the culture of state welfare programs to focus on moving families into employment. However, features of the work participation rates as currently implemented undercut their effectiveness as a way to encourage states to engage parents, including those difficult to serve, and help them achieve self-sufficiency. Finally, states have used TANF funds to support a variety of programs other than cash assistance as allowed by law. Yet, we do not know enough about this spending or whether this flexibility is resulting in the most efficient and effective use of funds at this time.

DOD’s MCRS-16, which was completed in February 2010, was to provide senior leaders with a detailed understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible future military operations and help leaders make investment decisions regarding mobility systems. The study was driven by strategy current at the time. The study scope included, among other things, the way changes in mobility systems affect the outcomes of major operations and an assessment of the associated risks. MCRS-16 had several objectives, including to determine capability shortfalls (gaps) and excessesmobility force structure, provide a risk assessment, and identify the capabilities and requirements to support national strategy. (overlaps) associated with programmed In order to assess mobility capabilities, DOD officials responsible for the MCRS-16 used three cases to evaluate a broad spectrum of military operations that could be used to inform decisions regarding future mobility capabilities. The three cases are described below: Case 1: U.S. forces conduct two nearly simultaneous large-scale land campaigns and at the same time respond to three nearly simultaneous homeland defense events. Case 2: U.S. forces conduct a major air/naval campaign concurrent with the response to a large asymmetricsignificant homeland defense event. campaign and respond to a Case 3: U.S. forces conduct a large land campaign against the backdrop of an ongoing long-term irregular warfare respond to three nearly simultaneous homeland defense events. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). required, a potential shortfall would exist and there could be a risk that the mission might not be accomplished. If DOD had more aircraft than required, a potential excess could exist, and there could be risk that resources could be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability. In January 2012, DOD issued Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, which describes the projected security environment and the key military missions for which DOD will prepare. DOD may make force and program decisions in accordance with the strategic approach described in this guidance, which could differ from the guidance—the National Military Strategy—that was used by the MCRS-16 to determine requirements. The new strategic guidance is intended to help inform decisions regarding the size and shape of the force, recognizing that fiscal concerns are a national security issue. To support the new strategic guidance and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force has proposed changes concerning the retirement of aircraft in its airlift fleet. Specifically, in February 2012, the Air Force proposed to Retire the oldest 27 C-5 aircraft, thereby reducing the fleet to 275 strategic airlift aircraft—which, according to the Air Force, would consist of 223 C-17s and 52 C-5s. Retire the 65 oldest C-130 aircraft—the primary aircraft used in DOD’s intratheater airlift mission—thereby reducing the fleet to 318 C-130s. Retire or cancel procurement of all 38 planned C-27 aircraft, which were intended to meet time-critical Army missions. While the MCRS-16 included some useful information concerning air mobility systems, the report did not clearly meet two of its objectives because it did not provide decision makers with specific information concerning (1) shortfalls and excesses associated with the mobility force structure or (2) risks associated with shortfalls or excesses of its mobility capabilities. Moreover, the MCRS-16 generally did not make recommendations about air mobility capabilities. These weaknesses in the MCRS-16 raise questions about the ability of the study to provide decision makers with information needed to make programmatic decisions. In addition, DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance could affect its air mobility requirements. I will first address the issues related to DOD’s MCRS-16, and then turn to a discussion of the new strategic guidance. The MCRS-16 did not meet its objective to identify shortfalls and excesses in most of its assessments of mobility systems. For each of the three cases of potential conflicts or natural disasters DOD used in the MCRS-16, the department identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. However, the MCRS-16 stopped short of explicitly stating whether a shortfall or excess existed. Moreover, it did not make recommendations regarding the need for any changes to air mobility assets based on any shortfalls or excesses. Using DOD data from the MCRS-16, we were able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or used as an operational reserve even though the MCRS-16 report was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities existed (see figure). The C-27 Spartan is a mid-range, multifunctional aircraft. Its primary mission is to provide on-demand transport of time-sensitive, mission-critical supplies and key personnel to forward-deployed Army units, including those in remote and austere locations. Its mission also includes casualty evacuation, airdrop, troop transport, aerial sustainment, and homeland security. As shown in the figure, the MCRS-16 determined that in each case, there was unused strategic airlift capacity, but the study did not specifically state whether the unused capacity represented excesses or identify excesses by aircraft type. When an excess exists, decision makers need to know which aircraft and how many could be retired. Specifically, the MCRS-16 did not identify the required number of C-5s or excesses of C-5 aircraft; but at the time of our report, the Air Force stated its intention to seek the retirement of 22 C-5s, which it increased to 27 and proposed again in February 2012. Furthermore, the MCRS-16 did not identify the most combat-effective or the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft even though DOD had previously stated that the MCRS-16 would set the stage to address the cost-effectiveness of its strategic aircraft. Decision makers rely on studies such as the MCRS-16 so that they can make informed choices to address mobility shortfalls and excesses. In our December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD explicitly identify the shortfalls and excesses in the mobility systems that DOD analyzed for the MCRS-16 and provide this additional analysis to DOD and congressional decision makers. In commenting on our draft report, DOD disagreed with our recommendations, stating that the MCRS-16 explicitly identifies shortfalls and excesses in the mobility system. DOD identified strategic airlift as an example of an excess. While the MCRS-16 showed that there was unused capacity associated with strategic airlift, it was not clear from the study whether this unused capacity could serve as an operational reserve. If the study had clearly identified an excess in strategic lift capabilities, decision makers may have chosen to retire aircraft and reallocate resources to other priorities or to keep an operational reserve to militate against unforeseen events. Similarly, if the study had identified a shortfall in strategic lift capabilities, decision makers may have chosen to accept the operational risk or sought to address the shortfall by increasing capabilities. DOD has not taken action based on our recommendation, but we continue to believe that explicitly identifying the shortfalls and excesses in mobility systems is useful to decision makers in making programmatic decisions. The MCRS-16 also did not clearly achieve its study objective to provide Assessing risk related to shortfalls and excesses is risk assessments.important—the risk associated with shortfalls is that the mission might not be accomplished, while the risk associated with excesses is that resources may be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability. However, the MCRS-16 did not include risk assessments of airlift systems. For example, the MCRS-16 showed potential excesses in strategic and intratheater aircraft but did not identify the risk associated with these potential excesses. Furthermore, the MCRS-16 identified a reduced intratheater airlift fleet (401 C-130s) in comparison with the previous fleet (a maximum of 674 C-130s), but it did not describe the level of risk associated with this reduced fleet size. Concerning air refueling, the MCRS-16 reported that airborne tanker demand exceeded tanker capacity by 20 percent in MCRS-16 case two but did not identify the risk associated with that potential shortfall. In our December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD provide a risk assessment for potential shortfalls and excesses and provide this additional analysis to department and congressional decision makers. DOD disagreed, stating that MCRS-16 included a risk assessment which links the ability of mobility systems to achieve warfighting objectives. Therefore, DOD has not taken action on this recommendation. While warfighting risk metrics can inform decision makers concerning overall mobility capabilities, decision makers would benefit from knowing the risk associated with particular mobility systems as they make force structure decisions. Quantifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources, enabling decision makers to address the most risk at the least cost. In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, that will help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. The strategic guidance is to ensure that the military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies. However, the strategic guidance includes changes from previous strategy—for example, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning In the scenarios, which DOD has used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed changes to the mobility air fleet, including the retirement or cancellation of procurement of 130 mobility aircraft. According to Air Force officials, the proposals ensure that the Air Force can deliver the capabilities required by the new strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air Force’s February 2012 document that outlines its proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses. Given the new strategic guidance—which articulates priorities for a 21st century defense—it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed from the MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air Force’s proposal, decision makers will require additional information concerning what types of potential military operations are envisioned by the strategic guidance and to what extent DOD has analyzed its planned force structure using cases that reflect the new strategic guidance. In conclusion, the MCRS-16 study did not fully provide congressional decision makers with a basis for understanding what mobility systems are needed to meet requirements, how many are needed, and what are the risks of having too many or not enough of each aircraft to meet defense strategy. While DOD disagreed with our recommendations, we continue to believe that the study missed opportunities to identify specific shortfalls and excesses and did not provide associated risk assessments. Further, the MCRS-16 study was completed more than 2 years ago using defense planning guidance in effect at that time. With DOD’s newly issued strategic guidance on defense priorities, the department’s potential scenarios may have changed. Decision makers would benefit from a clear understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements and DOD’s ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned air mobility force structure. Chairman Akin and Ranking Member McIntyre, and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to answer any questions that you may have at this time. For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Cary Russell at (404) 679-1808 or [email protected]. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are Alissa H. Czyz, Assistant Director, James P. Klein, Ronald La Due Lake, Richard B. Powelson, Michael C. Shaughnessy, Jennifer B. Spence, Amie M. Steele, Joseph J. Watkins, and Stephen K. Woods. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Over the past 30 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $140 billion in its airlift and tanker forces. In 2010, DOD published its Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was intended to provide an understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible military operations. In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense , affecting force structure decisions. This testimony addresses GAO’s previous findings on the MCRS-16 and air mobility issues to consider in light of DOD’s new strategic guidance. GAO’s December 2010 report on the MCRS-16 (GAO-11-82R) is based on analysis of DOD’s executive summary and classified report, and interviews with DOD officials. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) provided some useful information concerning air mobility systems—such as intratheater airlift, strategic airlift, and air refueling—but several weaknesses in the study raised questions about its ability to fully inform decision makers. In particular, the MCRS-16 did not provide decision makers with recommendations concerning shortfalls and excesses in air mobility systems. In evaluating capabilities, the MCRS-16 used three cases that it developed of potential conflicts or natural disasters and identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. Based on data in the MCRS-16, GAO was able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or an operational reserve, even though the MCRS-16 was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities exist. It also did not identify the risk associated with potential shortfalls or excesses. Identifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources. The Department of Defense (DOD) issued new strategic guidance in January 2012, which is intended to help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. In the past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning scenarios, which it used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed reducing its mobility air fleet by 130 aircraft, which would leave 593 mobility aircraft in the airlift fleet. According to Air Force officials, the proposals will enable the Air Force to deliver the airlift capabilities required to implement the new strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air Force’s document that outlines its proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses used to support the reductions. Given the new strategic guidance, it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed from MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air Force’s proposal, decision makers would benefit from a clear understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements and DOD’s ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned air mobility force structure. GAO previously recommended that DOD clearly identify shortfalls and excesses in the mobility force structure and the associated risks. DOD did not concur with the recommendations, stating that the MCRS-16 identified shortfalls and excesses and included a risk assessment. GAO disagreed, noting for example, that DOD’s MCRS-16 study did not explicitly identify excess aircraft and did not include mobility system risk assessments when potential shortfalls existed.

T he partnership parks of the National Park System are those units that the National Park Service (NPS) owns and/or manages along with one or more partners in the federal, tribal, state, local, or private sectors. The partnership parks differ from traditional units of the National Park System, in which NPS is the sole land manager. Historically, partnership parks constituted a relatively small part of the National Park System. In the past several decades, however, Congress has created a growing number of partnership parks among the system's 410 units. Of the units added to the National Park System in the Administrations of Presidents William Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, nearly half might be considered partnership parks. This report responds to ongoing congressional interest in partnership parks, as Congress seeks to leverage limited financial resources for park management, to respond to concerns about federal land acquisition, and to create park units in "lived-in" landscapes, where natural and historical attractions are mixed with homes and businesses. It discusses several types of partnership parks: parks with a federal partner; parks with a tribal partner; parks with a state or local government partner; parks with a private partner; and parks with a mix of landowners and management partners. The partnership parks vary in their physical characteristics and legislative histories, but in each, NPS collaborates with outside entities to manage the land, significant portions of which may be owned by the partnering entity. Congress typically establishes the broad terms of partnerships in the enabling legislation for the unit. Details of the partnership arrangement may be worked out in cooperative agreements, memoranda of understanding, the park's general management plan, or combinations of these and other tools. Partnership arrangements are specific to each unit and vary widely; there is no overall model that partnership parks must follow. For example, NPS may be the sole or primary manager of land that is owned by another party, such as a conservancy or land trust (as in Tallgrass Prairie National Preserve in Kansas). NPS and a state or local government partner may manage side by side, with each unit of government administering land it owns within the park (as in Redwood National Park in California). In a park unit spread out over an urban or suburban area, NPS may manage visitor centers and provide overall supervision, while a variety of partners own and manage specific sites in the park (as in New Bedford Whaling National Park in Massachusetts). At other units, NPS may serve in a supervisory role only, with partners providing all of the day-to-day management, even on federally owned land (as in First Ladies National Historic Site in Ohio). Partnership parks may be loosely grouped by the type of management partner, whether federal, tribal, state or local, private, or a mix of several types. Table 1 gives examples of partnership parks of each type across the National Park System. Parks with Federal Partners. Federal park partnerships occur when a park unit contains resources managed by a federal agency other than NPS. For example, NPS co-manages some national recreation areas built around reservoirs with the Bureau of Reclamation, which administers the reservoirs' water resources. Similarly, NPS works with the Fish and Wildlife Service to manage several national seashores containing wildlife refuges. Other federal park partners include the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service, the Navy, and the Coast Guard, among others. Many of the Park Service's federal management partnerships are of long standing, dating back 40 years or more. Parks with Tribal Partners. Many national park units have a connection to Native American history and culture. In some of them, Indian tribes play a major role in ownership and/or management of the park. Along with federal partnerships, tribal partnerships are among the longest-standing types of shared land stewardship in the National Park System. Parks with State and Local Government Partners. When NPS manages a national park unit in cooperation with state or local government, some significant portion of the land is generally still owned by the state or locality. In establishing such management partnerships, Congress may aim to leverage both federal and state/local financial resources. For example, cost savings could be realized through smaller outlays for land acquisition (as each level of government owns only a portion of the unit) or through management efficiencies. By ensuring that some park land remains under state or local control, Congress may also address concerns about extending the federal estate. Parks with Private Partners. The number of parks with private ownership and/or management partners has grown in recent decades. Congress may achieve cost savings through these public-private partnerships—as, for example, when historic preservation groups provide the primary on-site staff at a historic site, allowing the Park Service to save on personnel costs. Congress may also establish private partnerships where there is controversy over federal land control. Parks with a Mix of Partners. These parks are often in urban or suburban population centers, where the park coexists with many other public and private land uses. In such areas, the Park Service has stated, "managing through agreements and partnerships is a matter of both practical necessity and philosophy." Congress may specify in these parks' establishing legislation that much of the land is to remain in nonfederal ownership. The legislation may establish a cooperative management body made up of many types of landowners and administrators. With their diverse ownership and management arrangements, some of these park s have served as sites for innovative management techniques within the Park Service. When considering NPS management partnerships, Congress faces a number of issues. Some relate to the treatment of individual partnership sites: Is administration within or outside the National Park System most appropriate? How should financial responsibilities be shared between NPS and its partners? What issues must be resolved with respect to federal versus nonfederal land ownership? What administrative benefits and challenges might the partnership bring? More broadly, do partnership parks further the mission of the National Park Service, or does extending the agency's reach through partnerships weaken its focus on its core priorities? In considering proposals to establish partnership areas, a basic question for Congress is whether the area should become a unit of the National Park System or whether some other arrangement (perhaps with less federal involvement) is more appropriate. On the one hand, inclusion in the park system might better ensure ongoing conservation and stewardship of the land. NPS assumes a basic financial responsibility for park system units, which may be desirable to previous land managers (although in some cases partnership terms may dictate ongoing financial participation by existing land managers). Furthermore, there is evidence that park system units benefit surrounding communities by drawing tourism to the area. On the other hand, some in Congress are reluctant to add new units to the system, contending that the federal government's land holdings are already too large and that budgetary resources would be better used to address problems in existing parks. Existing landholders, too, may have concerns about joining the park system, fearing a loss of control over their lands. In addition, there are procedural hurdles to establishing a new unit of the National Park System. Potential units typically undergo study to determine whether they meet explicit criteria for establishment and then must win congressional approval and funding. Even if successful, this process may take many years. For such reasons, it may be more attractive to legislators to enable the Park Service to assist in other ways—for instance, through the model of a national heritage area (a type of area established by Congress that is not under federal control but receives technical and financial assistance from NPS) or through grant programs such as the Historic Preservation Fund. NPS studies of sites for potential addition to the National Park System are required to consider "whether direct NPS management or alternative protection by other public agencies or the private sector is appropriate for the area." Beyond this broad requirement, individual legislation to authorize studies of potential park units may also contain specific directions for NPS to consider a range of protection options in addition to traditional park unit status. Both NPS and its partners may face constrained financial resources for management of a partnership park. Nonfederal partners may seek national park status with the idea of receiving an infusion of federal funds for a struggling area, while federal legislators may specify partnership arrangements in order to limit the government's financial obligations for a new unit. In some cases, the establishing legislation for partnership units does not specify the exact breakdown of financial responsibilities between the Park Service and partnering managers. Instead, it delineates the broad functional responsibilities of each entity, and the Park Service subsequently works with partners to develop the financial details of these arrangements—for example, through cooperative agreements or memoranda of understanding. In other cases, the establishing legislation does include specific funding directions, such as requiring a 50/50 cost share between the federal government and nonfederal partners. Reflecting current federal economic constraints, some proposals have been made to create National Park System units with no federal funding. Many units of the National Park System—not just the partnership units—contain parcels of land not owned by the federal government. However, Congress typically gives the Park Service authority to acquire these "inholdings" over time, with the goal that the entire unit will eventually come under Park Service management. In many partnership parks, this is not the case; instead, when establishing these parks, Congress has taken into account that land ownership by the federal government may not be feasible or desirable. In heavily populated areas, for example, lands might be prohibitively expensive to acquire, owners might not be willing to sell, and some land might be inappropriate for Park Service management because of existing natural resource degradation or uses that are not part of the NPS mission. Federal land ownership also may be opposed for economic, philosophical, or other reasons. No statute specifies the amount of park land that must be owned by the federal government to justify creation of a national park unit. In a few cases, Congress has created a partnership park with the explicit provision that the federal government will acquire no land in the unit, or will acquire only a very small amount. More commonly, provisions for partnership units (as well as traditionally managed units) state that the federal government may acquire land, but only from willing sellers or donors. In partnership parks with little federally owned land, management plans, cooperative agreements, and/or memoranda of understanding are used to clarify partners' responsibilities and create a joint management framework in accordance with the laws governing the National Park System and the purposes for which the park was created. Still, questions may arise about whether the Park Service has adequate—or excessive—jurisdiction over these nonfederally owned or managed areas within park units. Beyond funding issues and land ownership questions, partnership parks face a variety of administrative issues. Different organizational mandates may lead to conflicts or differences in focus between the Park Service and its partners. From the visitor's standpoint, partnership management may result in confusion about what is and is not a national park—for example, when both NPS and nonfederal partners contribute branding and signs to a unit. From a managerial standpoint, challenges arise as partner organizations confront the institutional culture of the Park Service, and vice versa. Several studies of park partnerships have identified partners' failure to understand each other's procedural requirements, timetables, reporting needs, and similar matters as sources of delays and frustration. Despite administrative challenges, both the Park Service and its partners have reported successes in managing partnerships. NPS case studies have pointed to administrative benefits including cost savings, shared expertise, and innovative management ideas from private-sector partners. The Park Service has reported a growing acceptance of partnerships within the agency and in the general public. Congress may consider both administrative challenges and successes when determining whether to create new partnership parks, or in providing oversight for existing parks. The Park Service has attempted to address administrative issues through active efforts to improve partnering skills among agency staff. The agency established a national partnership office in Washington and regional partnership coordinators around the country. A website contains partnership resources and case studies for agency staff, and the agency encourages training in partnering skills. NPS Director Jonathan Jarvis has stated that when selecting park superintendents, he ranks partnership skills "at the top of my list." Do partnership parks extend the Park Service's capacity to accomplish its central missions of preservation and public enjoyment of resources, or do they draw funds and staff away from the Park Service's core needs and priorities? Members of Congress and other observers have expressed both views. On the one hand, partnerships can enable the preservation of valuable natural, historical, and recreational resources in cases where a traditional national park is not feasible for financial or other reasons. Partnerships also may encourage a paradigm of joint citizen responsibility for the system, rather than agency control. They may bring innovative approaches needed to manage new types of parks in "living landscapes." The National Park Service Advisory Board has recommended partnership management as a way to address large-scale landscape challenges, tackle problems of invasive species control and air and water quality, and better ensure the economic viability of neighboring communities. The board stated: The future should not be about doubling the amount of land owned by NPS; instead it should look to increasing the impact of NPS by enabling the service to do much more through affiliations and partnerships. The "old think" is park units with strict boundaries within which NPS must own, manage, maintain and operate everything. New think is "park areas" in which NPS works collaboratively with other public, private and non-profit organizations—each with a distinct role and complementary function. On the other hand, some Members of Congress and other observers have raised the concern that partnership efforts may divert resources from the Park Service's central needs and priorities. Some in Congress contend that partnership management has served as an incentive to add new units to the National Park System that do not necessarily warrant federal protection or investment. They claim that some of these units lack the national significance of earlier national parks. Rather than seeking to create more parks that might be better managed by nonfederal interests, these observers suggest, Congress should focus NPS funding on the agency's growing maintenance backlog for its existing units, estimated at $11.93 billion for FY2015. Despite these concerns, numerous parks with partnership management provisions have been established or proposed in recent years. Many of the proposals have included cost-sharing requirements for joint activities. Given current economic constraints, ongoing questions about federal land acquisition, and the desire to preserve resources in areas with many different existing uses, interest in partnership parks can be expected to continue.

In recent decades, it has become more common for the National Park Service (NPS) to own and manage units of the National Park System in partnership with others in the federal, tribal, state, local, or private sectors. Such units of the park system are often called partnership parks. Congressional interest in partnership parks has grown, especially as Congress seeks ways to leverage limited financial resources for park management. Congress generally specifies the shared management arrangements for partnership parks in the establishing legislation for each park. The arrangements may aim to save costs for both NPS and nonfederal stakeholders, combining investments so that neither partner carries the entire burden for park administration. Partnerships may also address concerns of Members of Congress and others about federal land acquisition by allowing nonfederal partners to own significant portions of a park unit, and they may address concerns about local input into decisionmaking. Partnership parks span a range of physical settings, including "lived-in" landscapes, where natural and historical attractions are mixed with homes and businesses. When considering NPS management partnerships, Congress faces both specific questions about the suitability and effectiveness of partnerships in particular units and larger questions about the role of these parks in the system as a whole. For specific areas, how much federal involvement is warranted, and how should financial responsibilities be shared between NPS and its partners? What concerns might arise around federal land ownership? What administrative benefits and challenges would NPS and its partners face in a given unit? More broadly, does partnership management help NPS fulfill its statutory mission to preserve valued natural and historic resources and provide for their enjoyment by the public, or does it too broadly diversify the agency's portfolio, compromising its ability to focus on core priorities? To the extent that partnerships enable or require new units to be protected as part of the National Park System, is this desirable? Some in Congress are reluctant to add units to the system, contending that the system is already too large and that NPS's budgetary resources would be better used to address concerns in existing parks, including a substantial maintenance backlog. Others see partnership parks as an opportunity to protect valuable resources that would not be feasible for NPS or its outside partners to administer alone.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was established by Title II of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-344 ; July 12, 1974; 2 U.S.C. 601-603). The organization officially came into existence on February 24, 1975, upon the appointment of the first director, Alice Rivlin. CBO's mission is to support the House and Senate in the federal budget process by providing budgetary analysis and information in an objective and nonpartisan manner. Specific duties are placed on CBO by various provisions in law, particularly Titles II, III, and IV of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended. CBO prepares annual reports on the economic and budget outlook and on the President's budget proposals and provides cost estimates of legislation, scorekeeping reports, assessments of unfunded mandates, and products and testimony relating to other budgetary matters. In addition to statutory duties, CBO is subject to directives included in annual budget resolutions. The FY2009 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. 70 , 110 th Congress), for example, imposed a requirement that the CBO director prepare estimates of the deficit impact of certain legislation in support of a point-of-order procedure in the Senate against legislation increasing the deficit over the long term. Nine persons so far have served as CBO director: Alice Rivlin, Rudolph Penner, Robert Reischauer, June O'Neill, Dan Crippen, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Peter R. Orszag, Douglas Elmendorf, and Keith Hall. The current director, Keith Hall, was first appointed on March 3, 2015. Eleven persons have served as deputy director; five of them also served as the acting director (for periods amounting in total to about three years). The current deputy director, Robert A. Sunshine, was appointed to the position in August 2007; he served as acting director during the two-month interregnum between directors Orszag and Elemendorf. The requirements regarding the appointment and tenure of the CBO director, which are simple and straightforward, are set forth in Section 201(a) of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended, and codified at 2 U.S.C. 601(a) (see the Appendix ). The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate jointly appoint the director after considering recommendations received from the House and Senate Budget Committees. The Budget Committee chairs inform the congressional leaders of their recommendations by letter. The appointment usually is announced in the Congressional Record . Section 201(a) requires that the selection be made "without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of his fitness to perform his duties." Media reports over the years indicate that the CBO director is selected under informal practices in which the House and Senate Budget Committees alternate in recommending a nominee to the Speaker and President pro tempore of the Senate. These reports also indicate that the Speaker and President pro tempore have adhered to the Budget Committees' recommendations in making past selections. To the extent that these practices are informal, there may be disagreement with regard to their operation in the future selection of a CBO director. The director is appointed to a four-year term that begins on January 3 of the year that precedes the year in which a presidential election is held. If a director is appointed to fill a vacancy prior to the expiration of a term, then that person serves only for the unexpired portion of that term. There is no limit on the number of times that a director may be reappointed to another term. Section 201(a) also authorizes a CBO director to continue to serve past the expiration of his term until a successor is appointed. A CBO director may be removed by either house by resolution. Section 201(a) also provides that the director shall appoint a deputy director. The deputy director serves during the term of the director that appointed the deputy director (and until his or her successor is appointed) but may be removed by the director at any time. The deputy director serves as the acting director if the director resigns, is incapacitated, or is otherwise absent. Nine persons have served as director of CBO during the nine terms beginning in 1975 (see Table 1 ): Alice Rivlin served two terms as CBO director from 1975 to 1983. Prior to serving as CBO director, Rivlin served as assistant secretary for planning and evaluation with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and as a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. Rudolph Penner served as CBO director for one term from 1983 to 1987. Previously, Penner served as chief economist at the Office of Management and Budget under President Gerald Ford and as director of tax policy studies with the American Enterprise Institute. Robert Reischauer served two terms as CBO director from 1989 to 1995. (He was not appointed until about halfway into the first four-year term.) Reischauer previously served as CBO deputy director (under Alice Rivlin) and as a senior vice president of the Urban Institute. June O'Neill served as CBO director for one term covering 1995-1999. Previously, O'Neill headed the Center for the Study of Business and Government at Baruch College and was an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Dan Crippen served as CBO director for one term covering 1999-2003. Prior to his appointment, Crippen served as chief counsel and economic policy adviser to Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and domestic policy adviser to President Ronald Reagan and was a member of the law firm Washington Counsel. Douglas Holtz-Eakin served as CBO director for one term (leaving a little more than a year before the term's completion). Prior to beginning his term, he served as chief economist for the Council of Economic Advisers. While director, he was on leave from Syracuse University, where he held the position of Trustee Professor of Economics at the Maxwell School. Peter Orszag served as CBO director for about half of one term. He resigned on November 25, 2008, a little more than two years before the term's completion. Previously, Orszag was the Joseph A. Pechman senior fellow and deputy director of economic studies at the Brookings Institution, and before that, he held positions with the President's Council of Economic Advisers and National Economic Council. Douglas Elmendorf began his service as CBO director on January 22, 2009, about half-way through the term to which Peter Orszag had originally been appointed. Prior to his appointment, Elmendorf was a senior fellow in the economic studies program at the Brookings Institution, serving as the director of the Hamilton Project, and before that, he was a senior economist at the White House's Council of Economic Advisers, a deputy assistant secretary for economic policy at the Department of the Treasury, and an assistant director of the Division of Research and Statistics at the Federal Reserve Board. Keith Hall began his term as the director of CBO on March 3, 2015. Previously, Hall spent more than 10 years with the U.S. International Trade Commission conducting studies on international trade and trade policy. In addition, he served a four-year term as the commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and served as the chief economist for both the White House Council of Economic Advisers and the U.S. Department of Commerce. Eleven persons have served as deputy director of CBO: Robert Reischauer (in two instances), Robert A. Levine, Raymond Scheppach, Eric A. Hanushek, Edward Gramlich, Robert Hartman, James Blum, Barry Anderson, Elizabeth Robinson, Donald B. Marron, and Robert A. Sunshine, the current deputy director. The position was vacant on two occasions. Five different deputy directors served as acting director, as discussed below. As Table 1 shows, the gap between the beginning of a term and the appointment of the director has varied considerably. Peter Orszag was appointed 15 days after the beginning of his term; Alice Rivlin, June O'Neill, Dan Crippen, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, and Keith Hall were appointed (or reappointed) within three months of the beginning of their terms. Rudolph Penner, however, was not appointed until nearly seven months after his term had begun (and did not assume his office until more than a month later). Robert Reischauer began his first term more than two years after it had started. As a consequence of these appointment gaps, incumbent directors have remained in office for weeks or months after their terms have expired, or CBO has operated with an acting director. Alice Rivlin stayed in office for nearly eight months (until August 31, 1983) before her successor, Rudolph Penner, took over. Penner remained in office for about four months (until April 28, 1987) but left long before a new director was appointed. Edward Gramlich, and then James Blum, served successively as acting directors for a period of nearly two years. Robert Reischauer stayed on as director for almost two months (until February 28, 1995) before he was succeeded. June O'Neill stayed in office nearly a month after her term ended (until January 29, 1999) but left about a week before her successor was appointed. James Blum served as acting director during the interim. Barry Anderson served as acting director from the time that Dan Crippen left office on January 3, 2003, until Douglas Holtz-Eakin was appointed to succeed him on February 5. Douglas Elmendorf stayed on as director for two months before he was succeeded. Similarly, appointment gaps may occur when a director resigns before his or her term is completed. As indicated previously, Douglas Holtz-Eakin resigned on December 29, 2005, a little more than a year before the completion of his term (on January 3, 2007). The deputy director, Donald B. Marron, began serving as acting director at that time; he continued in that capacity until the appointment of Peter Orszag just over a year later. Orszag resigned on November 25, 2008, a little more than two years before the term's completion. On the same day, Robert A. Sunshine, the current deputy director, also began serving as the acting director; he continued in that role until the appointment of Douglas Elmendorf about two months later. (2 U.S.C. 601(a))

The requirements regarding the appointment and tenure of the CBO director, which are simple and straightforward, are set forth in Section 201(a) of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended, and codified at 2 U.S.C. 601(a). The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate jointly appoint the director after considering recommendations received from the House and Senate Budget Committees. The Budget Committee chairs inform the congressional leaders of their recommendations by letter. The appointment is usually announced in the Congressional Record. Section 201(a) requires that the selection be made "without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of his fitness to perform his duties." Media reports over the years indicate that the CBO director is selected under informal practices in which the House and Senate Budget Committees alternate in recommending a nominee to the Speaker and President pro tempore of the Senate. These reports also indicate that the Speaker and President pro tempore have adhered to the Budget Committees' recommendations in making past selections. To the extent that these practices are informal, there may be disagreement with regard to their operation in the future selection of a CBO director. The director is appointed to a four-year term that begins on January 3 of the year that precedes the year in which a presidential election is held. If a director is appointed to fill a vacancy prior to the expiration of a term, then that person serves only for the unexpired portion of that term. There is no limit on the number of times that a director may be reappointed to another term. Section 201(a) also authorizes a CBO director to continue to serve past the expiration of his term until a successor is appointed. A CBO director may be removed by either house by resolution. Section 201(a) also provides that the director shall appoint a deputy director. The deputy director serves during the term of the director that appointed the deputy director (and until his or her successor is appointed) but may be removed by the director at any time. The deputy director serves as the acting director if the director resigns, is incapacitated, or is otherwise absent. Nine persons so far have served as CBO director: Alice Rivlin, Rudolph Penner, Robert Reischauer, June O'Neill, Dan Crippen, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Peter R. Orszag, Douglas Elmendorf, and Keith Hall. The current director, Keith Hall, was appointed on March 3, 2015. Eleven persons have served as deputy director; five of them also served as the acting director (for periods amounting in total to about three years). The current deputy director, Robert A. Sunshine, was appointed to the position in August 2007; he served as acting director during the two-month interregnum between directors Orszag and Elemendorf. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

Non-elderly, non-disabled, non-working residents of public housing are subject to a community service and self-sufficiency requirement (referred to as the CSSR or community service requirement). Specifically, all adult residents of a household who are not otherwise exempted are required to participate in eight hours per month of either community service or economic self-sufficiency activities in order to maintain their eligibility for public housing. Exempted residents include those who are 62 years or older; blind or disabled and can certify that they cannot comply with the community service requirement; caretakers of a person with a disability; engaged in work activities; exempt from work activities under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF) or a state welfare program; and/or members of a family in compliance with TANF or a state welfare program's requirements. According to data released by HUD, of the 1.86 million individuals living in public housing, approximately 812,000, or (44%) are potentially subject to the community service requirement. It requires that residents of public housing, unless exempted, participate in eight hours of community service and/or economic self-sufficiency activities per month. PHAs have broad discretion in defining what counts as community service or economic self-sufficiency activities. Allowable activities may include, among others, volunteer work at a local public or nonprofit institution; caring for the children of other residents fulfilling the community service requirements; participation in a job readiness or training program; or attending a two- or four-year college. However, public housing tenants required to fulfill the community service requirements cannot supplant otherwise paid employees of the PHA or other community service organizations. PHAs must review and verify each member of a household's compliance 30 days prior to the end of the household's annual lease. Each nonexempt family member is required to present a signed certification on a form provided by the PHA of CSSR activities performed over the previous 12 months. This form is developed and standardized by the PHA and the submitted form is verified by a third party. In 2016, as a part of a broader set of administrative streamlining actions, HUD began to permit PHAs to adopt policies to allow families to self-certify their compliance with the CSSR, subject to validity testing. If any member of the household fails to comply with the community service requirement, the entire household is considered out of compliance. The tenant must agree to make up the community-service deficit in the following year in order to renew the household's lease through a signed "work-out agreement" with the PHA. If the tenant does not come into compliance, the PHA may not renew the household's lease. However, PHAs may not terminate a household's lease for noncompliance before the lease has expired. Noncompliant tenants may file a grievance to dispute the PHA's decision to terminate tenancy. Each PHA must develop a local policy for administering the community service and economic self-sufficiency requirements and include the policy in its agency plan. PHAs may administer community service activities directly, partner with an outside organization or institution, or provide referrals to tenants for volunteer work or self-sufficiency programs. The community service and economic self-sufficiency requirement applicable to public housing residents originated with the housing reform debates of the 1990s and parallel debates at the time about the role of work and welfare reform. Following several years of legislative effort, in 1997, H.R. 2 , the Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act of 1997, and S. 462 , the Public Housing Reform and Responsibility Act of 1997, were introduced. They sought to reform HUD's low-income housing programs by consolidating the public housing program into a two-part block grant program; denying occupancy to applicants with a history of drug-related activity; and requiring residents of public housing to meet a community service requirement. The community service and economic self-sufficiency requirement was among the most controversial elements of the sweeping bills. While neither H.R. 2 nor S. 462 became law, a compromise version was enacted as the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA), Title V of the FY1999 Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development (VA-HUD) appropriations bill ( H.R. 4194 ), signed into law by then-President Bill Clinton ( P.L. 105-276 ). QHWRA contained many provisions from H.R. 2 and S. 462 , including a version of the community service and economic self-sufficiency requirement. HUD did not issue regulations to implement the community service provisions of QHWRA until March 29, 2000. The regulations took effect beginning on October 1, 2000, and were in effect for just over one year. Language added to the FY2002 VA-HUD appropriations bill ( P.L. 107-73 ), which was enacted in November 2001, prohibited HUD from using any FY2002 funds to enforce the community service and self-sufficiency requirements. The suspension of the provision ended when the FY2003 appropriations bill ( P.L. 108-7 ) was signed into law on February 21, 2003. HUD issued new guidance to the local public housing authorities (PHAs) that administer public housing on June 20, 2003, instructing them to reinstate the community service requirement for public housing residents beginning on August 1, 2003. Following full implementation of the community service requirement, legislation was introduced in several Congresses to repeal the community service requirement, although it was not enacted. As is evident in its legislative and regulatory history, the community service and economic self-sufficiency requirement for residents of public housing has been controversial since its inception. It is consistent with the movement toward required work and self-sufficiency activities that characterized the welfare reform debates of the same era, which culminated in the creation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Supporters of mandatory work policies have argued that low-income families should earn the benefits or subsidies they are receiving. They have also argued that by compelling families into self-sufficiency activities, such policies can improve the lives of poor families and their children by potentially increasing their incomes. Those who have argued against mandatory work requirements contend that such requirements are paternalistic and do not promote real self-sufficiency, but rather, low-wage work that may not be sustainable. All of these disagreements manifested during debate over the provision, and additional arguments were made specifically for and against the public housing requirement. Proponents of the community service requirement cited concerns about a perceived negative culture at public housing developments and the possibility for the community service requirement to help change that culture. Opponents of the provision argued specifically against the idea of a community service "requirement" for public housing residents, arguing it is akin to the forced community work mandated of criminals. Additionally, critics raised questions about the fairness of applying this requirement only to residents of public housing and not to recipients of Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers or Section 8 project-based rental assistance, since the programs serve similar populations. During debate over the provision, concerns were repeatedly raised that the community service requirement would be administratively burdensome or an unfunded mandate. Although only a small number of tenants may actually be subject to the community service requirement at a given PHA, the PHA must certify either the participation or exemption status of every resident of public housing. Furthermore, the grievance and/or eviction process for tenants who are found to be noncompliant with the community service requirement may be costly. Industry groups contended that this requirement is an unreasonable burden for PHAs, that, they argue, are chronically under-funded. Some of the opponents of the policy speculated that PHAs would not aggressively implement the provision; rather, they would try to exempt as many families as possible and set a very broad definition of eligible activities in order to avoid costly grievances and evictions and keep administrative burdens low. Differences of opinion were also expressed regarding whether the community service requirement would be complementary to, or duplicative of, the work requirements that had recently been adopted for cash assistance recipients under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. There has also been some controversy surrounding HUD's implementation of the community service requirement. The statute states that in order to meet one of the exemption criteria, tenants must be engaged in work activities, as defined in the Social Security Act. The Social Security Act definition of work activities does not include a minimum number of hours a person must perform the listed activities in order to be considered engaged in work activities. HUD's 2003 Notice to PHAs encouraged them to consider a tenant engaged in work activities, and therefore exempt from the community service requirement, only if they were working at least 30 hours per week. This guidance initially prompted confusion as to whether PHAs were required to set a 30-hour standard. While the guidance states that PHAs are encouraged to set a 30-hour standard, they are not required to set such a standard. In March 2008, HUD's Inspector General released an audit of HUD's implementation and enforcement of the community service requirement. The audit was performed in response to media reports that the community service requirement was rarely enforced. The audit found that HUD did not have adequate controls to ensure that PHAs properly administered the community service requirement, and the audit estimated that at least 85,000 households living in public housing were ineligible as a result of noncompliance with the community service requirement. In response to these findings, in November 2009, HUD published additional guidance to PHAs regarding the administration of the community service requirements. The guidance largely restated existing requirements, although it did provide enhanced guidance on reporting. It also reiterated steps PHAs may take to enforce the community service requirement, as well as steps HUD may take to sanction PHAs for failing to enforce the community service requirement. In February 2015, HUD's Inspector General released a new audit of HUD's implementation and enforcement of the community service requirement. The audit found that HUD subsidized housing for 106,000 units occupied by noncompliant tenants out of nearly 550,000 units potentially subject to the community service requirement nationwide. As a result, the OIG contended that the agency paid more than $37 million in monthly subsidies for public housing units occupied by noncompliant tenants. The audit recommended that the agency develop and implement a written policy for the community service requirement to ensure adequate compliance and create training and further clarified reporting mechanisms. In response to the audit, HUD issued a notice to PHAs on August 13, 2015, with further guidance related to the statutory/regulatory requirements for administering the community service requirement; data collection and reporting requirements; action to take against noncompliant tenants; and penalties against PHAs that do not comply. The notice also provided clarification that HUD has interpreted the statutory exemptions for compliance with the community service requirement to include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Therefore, if a tenant is a member of a family that receives SNAP, and has been found to be in compliance with SNAP program requirements, then the tenant is exempt from the community service requirement. This clarification is particularly notable because the 2015 OIG report contended that PHAs were incorrectly classifying families as exempt from the community service requirement because of their SNAP participation. Since HUD has now clarified that SNAP families are exempt, the OIG's estimate of the number of noncompliant families is likely overstated to some degree. In August of 2016, HUD published on its website summary data reflecting compliance with the CSS requirement. Those data report that of the 1.86 million people living in public housing, the community service requirement is applicable to 44%, or 812,000 residents. Of those residents to whom the community service requirement applies, approximately 68% are exempt (i.e., are already working, have a disability, etc.). Of the remaining 32% who are not exempt (257,000 residents, or 13% of all people living in public housing), 48% were reported to be in compliance (124,000 individuals, or 7% of all public housing residents), 32% were reported as pending verification by the PHA (83,000 individuals or 4% of all public housing residents), and 19% were reported as being out of compliance (48,000 individuals, or 3% of all public housing residents).

The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-276) included provisions designed to promote employment and self-sufficiency among residents of assisted housing, including a mandatory work or community service requirement for residents of public housing. Non-elderly, non-disabled, non-working residents of public housing are required to participate in eight hours per month of either community service or economic self-sufficiency activities in order to maintain their eligibility for public housing. The community service requirement has been controversial since its inception. Supporters of the provision believe that it is consistent with the goals of welfare reform and that it will promote civic engagement and "giving back" among residents of public housing; detractors argue that it is punitive, unfairly applied, and administratively burdensome. In February 2015, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Inspector General released an audit critical of HUD's implementation and enforcement of the community service requirement. In response to the report, HUD issued further guidance in August 2015 related to the statutory/regulatory requirements for administering the community service requirement; data collection and reporting requirements; action to take against noncompliant tenants; and penalties against PHAs that do not comply. Recent HUD data indicate that approximately 14% of public housing residents are subject to the community service requirement and not otherwise exempt. Of those nonexempt residents, approximately 19% were reported as noncompliant (or about 3% of all public housing residents).

Without accurate and timely accounting, financial reporting, and auditing, it is impossible to know how well or poorly IRS has performed in certain facets of its operations such as tax collections. In addition, IRS’ management and the Congress’ ability to make informed decisions that are “fact based” is substantially hindered when the underlying information that provides the basis for decisions is called into question or when fundamental information is lacking. Our efforts to audit IRS accounting records have resulted in disclaimers of opinion each year. This means that we were unable to determine whether the amounts reported by IRS in its financial statements were right or wrong. Financial reporting at this level and auditable financial statements, as required by the CFO Act, are fundamental tenets of effective financial management. Our disclaimer of opinion means that you do not know whether IRS correctly reported the amount of tax it collected in total, how much money IRS has collected by type of tax and on accounts receivables, the cost of its operations including tax systems modernization (TSM), or any other meaningful measure of IRS’ financial performance. In essence, poor accounting and financial reporting, especially when combined with the absence of an audit, obscures facts. As a result, users of information reported or taken from the underlying accounting systems, risk making errant decisions—whether for budget purposes or operationally—because they relied on questionable information in making decisions. Four of the more significant reasons IRS needs good financial management are to provide for its day to day operations basic accounting that meets the minimal financial management goals of the CFO Act for financial reporting, implement effective internal control procedures—including safeguarding of assets, and ensure IRS’ compliance with pertinent laws and regulations—for example, the Anti-deficiency Act and others related to budget integrity; ensure accurate accounting for and reporting of revenue collections in compliance with the law and help the Congress and others assess the impacts of various tax policies on the budget and to offer accountability to the American taxpayer; better assess and improve IRS’ operating performance; and improve its image as a fair tax collector that holds itself to the same or higher standards than it applies to the taxpaying public. Over the 4 years that we have performed financial statement audits at IRS, IRS has moved from an agency that did not and could not reconcile its fund accounts (Fund Balance With Treasury), akin to a taxpayer’s bank account, to an agency that now attempts to reconcile its accounts regularly even though some unresolved amounts still exist and an agency that could not support the propriety of amounts recorded in its accounting records or that they were recorded in the right accounting period to an agency that has developed and is implementing a strategy that if properly carried out, should be able to accomplish both. If IRS does not achieve and sustain the capacity to perform day to day accounting on its over $7 billion in annual appropriations and the more than $1.4 trillion in taxes it collects, it will not be able to credibly report on the cost and effectiveness of its operations. Furthermore, like any other business or individual that may have similar problems, IRS can assert that no money is missing and that it is in compliance with the Anti-Deficiency Act and other laws; however, if these problems persist, it cannot and does not know if its assertion is true. The following example shows the implications of poor accounting and financial reporting for IRS’ day to day operations. In recent years, IRS has reported the costs of TSM along with projected future costs. However, IRS does not know what its TSM costs have been in total or by specific project. Its efforts to achieve cost accounting for TSM obscure the nature and amount of actual costs of TSM projects through grouping large amounts of costs into generic codes as opposed to tracking these costs on a project specific basis. In addition, no separate records were maintained on TSM costs incurred before 1994. Also, IRS cannot readily link costs projected to be incurred in IRS’ investment strategy with costs that are recorded in its accounting records. To do so would require substantial analysis that would likely require using estimating techniques for which results could not be validated. Thus, no credible records exist to make cost-benefit analysis of the overall project or to assess each project segment as it moves through various stages. In addition to day to day accounting and reporting, IRS’ ability to accurately account for and report tax collections is critical to the Congress, the federal government as a whole, and the American taxpayer. IRS’ inability to account for tax collections in total and by type of tax collected reduces the Congress’ and others’ ability to (1) fully assess the effectiveness of tax policies to achieve their intended goals, (2) know the amount the general revenue fund is subsidizing the Social Security Trust Fund, (3) determine whether excise taxes are being collected and distributed in accordance with legislation, and (4) assess IRS’ collection efforts on unpaid taxes. While IRS is making interim efforts to increase its capability to account for tax collections, longer term solutions will be needed before IRS will be able to provide this information in an accurate and timely manner. The following example shows the implications of poor accounting and reporting for tax collections. In recent years, IRS has reported collections against accounts receivables of about $25 billion annually. However, IRS cannot reliably report cash collections on accounts receivable, and the amounts reported are estimates. IRS’ financial management system does not include a detailed record of debtors who owe taxes (a subsidiary accounts receivable record) that tracks these accounts and their related activity from one reporting period to the next. As a result, IRS has to employ sampling techniques to project estimated collections on accounts receivable. The lack of a detailed subsidiary record also severely hampers the ability to readily and reliably assess the performance of IRS’ various collection efforts because reliable information on accounts receivable activity from one period to the next is not readily available. The ability to account for day to day operations and tax collections accurately is the foundation for any efforts to assess and improve IRS’ operational performance. Even though IRS reports that it collects over $1.4 trillion in taxes and processes billions of documents including tax returns, refunds, correspondence, and the manifold other things it does as part of its tax administration mandate, this reporting does not tell you how well it did it or the cost effectiveness of operations. Good financial management would include developing a cost accounting system that accurately tracks the costs of each part of IRS’ operations. In addition, the related outcomes from operational improvement efforts, including additional revenue collected and other qualitative performance indicators, would be accounted for and linked to the respective operational costs associated with accomplishing the outcomes. Right now, IRS does not have the capacity to account for its costs and outcomes in a manner consistent with good financial management. The following example shows the implications of not having good financial management accounting and reporting in place. IRS reported, as part of its compliance initiative budget requests, that it would achieve certain levels of return in collecting unpaid taxes with the additional funding. These requests typically showed past performance from compliance initiatives and projected future collections expected from the proposed compliance initiative. They also typically showed that a substantial return on investment had been and would be achieved from compliance initiatives. IRS’ financial management systems, however, cannot reliably provide information that links cash collected on tax accounts with its respective programs used to collect unpaid taxes and the program’s related costs, including those supported by its compliance initiatives. As a result, the information provided as IRS’ performance from compliance initiatives was prepared using estimates, selective analysis of information, and unvalidated criteria. We found that the reported incremental collections and the associated costs were not verifiable. IRS currently has a system under development (called the Enforcement Revenue Information System) that will attempt to track and correlate this information. Finally, IRS needs to have good financial management to show that it does not have a double standard for financial management—one that taxpayers must adhere to and another that applies to itself. If IRS had to prepare its own tax return, with the many problems we have found during our financial statement audits of IRS, it would not pass the scrutiny of an IRS audit. Many of its expenses would be disallowed because they were unsupported or reported in the wrong year, and the amounts and nature of its revenue would be questioned. As much as any federal agency and more than most, IRS routinely interacts with taxpayers. Taxpayers’ views of the government and on the fairness of tax administration are shaped in a big way by their perception of IRS. For IRS to demand the kind of recordkeeping it requires for taxpayers to support tax returns (a form of financial reporting) and to not be able to sustain a comparable or better set of records to support its own financial reporting does not bode well. These concerns and views have been conveyed in many published articles on the state of financial management at IRS, and these articles clearly show taxpayers’ expectation for IRS to be able to meet the standards that it expects others to meet. The financial management problems I have discussed today are but a few of the challenges that IRS must confront. These, though, must be overcome for IRS to be able to credibly report the results from its operations whether through annually required financial statements or ad hoc reports provided to the Congress and other users on the various aspects of its operations. It is crucial that IRS maintain its capacity to process the billions of documents and handle the multitude of other tax administration challenges that it is responsible for managing. However, as evidenced in the examples I have highlighted for you today, it is comparably crucial that IRS address its many financial management problems so that decisionmakers can make “fact based,” informed decisions on IRS’ staffing levels, tax policies, and other matters based on the verifiable reported results from IRS’ operations. We issued disclaimers of opinion on each of our four annual audits of IRS’ financial statements (from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 1995). Notable improvement has occurred across IRS as a result of these audits, which were required by the CFO Act as expanded by the Government Management Reform Act. These two pieces of legislation, and particularly their requirement for audited financial statements, have been instrumental in bringing IRS’ top-level management focus to financial management problems that had been neglected for years. Because of our audit efforts, IRS’ management, for the first time, has a fuller understanding of the depth and breadth of the financial management problems that beset the agency and has, as a result, begun taking actions to address the problems. The reasons for our disclaimers of opinion were IRS’ inability to provide support for its reported over $1.4 trillion in collected revenues in total and by type of tax (i.e., income, social security, etc.), accurately identify and provide support for its reported tax receivables that were estimated in the tens of billions, reconcile its Fund Balance With Treasury accounts (these accounts represent IRS’ remaining approved budgetary spending authority—the federal government equivalent of bank accounts), and accurately account for and provide support for significant amounts of its almost $3 billion annually in nonpayroll expenses to establish that these expenses were appropriately included in the respective years’ reported expenses. IRS has made progress on addressing some of these problems, and we have worked closely with it to identify interim solutions to address the problems that can be fixed quicker and partially address the problems that will require longer term solutions. IRS has developed an action plan, with specific timetables and deliverables, to attempt to address the reasons for our audit disclaimer. To date, IRS reported it has identified substantially all of the reconciling items for its Fund Balance With Treasury accounts, except for certain amounts that IRS has deemed not to be cost-beneficial to research further because they were thought to be insignificant or that IRS had exhausted all avenues available to resolve the difference and could not; designed an interim solution, until longer term solutions can be identified and implemented, to capture the detailed support for revenue and accounts receivable; and begun designing a short-term and a long-term strategy to fix the problems that contribute to its nonpayroll expenses being unsupported or reported in the wrong period. We are currently reviewing progress in each of these areas as part of our audit of IRS’ fiscal year 1996 financial statements and will report the status of these efforts as part of our report that will be issued at the completion of this audit. In closing, I want to reiterate that preparing auditable financial statements and obtaining an unqualified audit opinion on those financial statements are basic to good financial management and one indicator of the condition of financial management of an entity. While IRS has made progress, the catalyst for fixing the problems will be its senior management’s continued commitment as well as sustained effective congressional oversight. IRS has recognized its problems and essentially knows what needs to be done. It is now a matter of carrying out improvement plans. This concludes my statement, and I will be glad to answer any questions. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 6015 Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.

GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) financial management challenges. GAO noted that: (1) GAO efforts to audit IRS accounting records have resulted in a disclaimer of opinions each year; (2) IRS' inability to account for tax collections in total and by type of tax collected reduces the Congress' and others' ability to fully assess the effectiveness of tax policies to achieve their intended goals, know the amount the general revenue fund is subsidizing the Social Security Trust Fund, determine whether excise taxes are being collected and distributed in accordance with legislation, and assess IRS' collection efforts on unpaid taxes; (3) while IRS is making interim efforts to increase its capability to account for tax collections, longer term solutions will be needed before IRS will be able to provide this information in an accurate and timely manner; (4) right now, IRS does not have the capacity to account for its costs and outcomes in a manner consistent with good financial management; (5) IRS needs to have good financial management to show that is does not have a double standard for financial management--one that taxpayers must adhere to and another that applies to itself; (6) IRS has made progress on addressing some of these problems, and GAO has worked closely with it to identify interim solutions to address the problems that can be fixed quicker and partially address the problems that will require longer term solutions; and (7) IRS has developed an action plan, with specific timetables and deliverables, to attempt to address the reasons for GAO's audit disclaimer.

The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was established by the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2461, et seq.) and now provides preferential duty-free entry of up to 5,000 agricultural and non-agricultural products for 120 designated beneficiary countries and territories. Agricultural products under the program totaled $2.6 billion in 2015, accounting for 15% of the total value of annual GSP imports. Some in Congress have called for changes to the program that could limit or curtail benefits to certain countries. The program was most recently extended until December 31, 2017 (Title II of P.L. 114-27 ). Expiration of the program in 2017 means that GSP renewal could be a legislative issue in the 115 th Congress. In recent years, GSP has been reauthorized through a series of short-term extensions. In 2015, U.S. imports under GSP totaled $17.7 billion, accounting for roughly 1% of all commodity imports. Leading U.S. imports under the program are manufactured products and parts, chemicals, plastics, minerals, and forestry products. Agricultural products accounted for 15% of all imports under GSP, totaling $2.6 billion in 2015. Compared to 2010, the value of agricultural imports under the program has nearly doubled. Imports under the program account for about 2% of total U.S. agricultural imports. Table 1 shows the leading agricultural products (ranked by value) imported into the United States under the program. Leading agricultural imports (based on value) include processed foods and food processing inputs; beverages and drinking waters; processed and fresh fruits and vegetables; sugar and sugar confectionery; olive oil; and miscellaneous food preparations and inputs for further processing. More than one-third of agricultural imports under GSP (based on value) include food processing inputs, such as miscellaneous processed foods, processed oils and fats, fruit and vegetable preparations, and ag-based chemicals and byproducts ( Table 1 ). About 15% of GSP agricultural imports consist of sugar and sugar-based products, and cocoa and cocoa-containing products. Mineral waters and other types of beverages account for about 12%, while olive oil accounts for about 8% of the value of GSP agricultural imports. Fresh fruits and vegetables account for another 11%, with roughly half of that consisting of bananas and other tropical produce imports. Most GSP agricultural imports are supplied by beneficiary countries that have been identified for possible graduation from the program. In 2015, five beneficiary countries ranked by import value—Thailand, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey—accounted for roughly two-thirds of the value of agricultural imports under the GSP program (see Table 2 ). Thailand and Brazil alone accounted for 40% of agricultural imports under the program. GSP was most recently extended until December 31, 2017 (Title II of P.L. 114-27 ). Over the past decade, GSP renewal has been somewhat controversial. Some in Congress have continued to call for changes to the program, including tightening the program's requirements on products that can be imported under the program and limiting GSP benefits for certain eligible countries. Leaders of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee have continued to express an interest in evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. trade preference programs, including GSP, and broader reform of these programs might be possible. Both committees have conducted a series of oversight hearings in recent years, focused on determining the effectiveness of U.S. trade preference programs and discussing ways to reform them. Others have continued to call for meaningful reforms to GSP. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has published a series of reports highlighting the perceived benefits and shortcomings of U.S. preference programs, including GSP. Amendments to GSP followed extensive debate about the program during the 109 th Congress. Specifically, some in Congress questioned the inclusion of certain more advanced "beneficiary developing countries" (BDCs) under GSP and also commented that certain countries had contributed to the ongoing impasse in multilateral trade talks in the WTO Doha Development Agenda. In response to these concerns, both Congress and the previous Administrations have made changes to the program regarding product coverage (e.g., the type of products that can be imported under the program) and country eligibility (e.g., limiting GSP benefits to certain countries). Congress enacted a number of amendments to GSP as part of its annual review in 2006 by tightening the program's rules on "competitive need limits" (CNL) waivers that allow imports from beneficiary countries in excess of GSP statutory thresholds for some products ( P.L. 109-432 ). CNLs are quantitative ceilings on GSP benefits for a particular product from a particular BDC. CNL waivers allow for certain products to be imported from a country duty-free under GSP despite the statutory import thresholds. Periodically USTR has revoked a country's CNL waiver, as part of the agency's program review. For example, as part of USTR's 2006 review, Côte d'Ivoire lost its CNL waivers for fresh or dried shelled kola nuts (HTS 0802.90.94). In 2006, the statute was amended to allow for the revocation of any waiver that has been in effect for at least five years, if a GSP eligible product from a specific country has an annual trade level in the previous calendar year that exceeds 150% of the annual dollar value limit or exceeds 75% of all U.S. imports. In July 2015, USTR granted a CNL waiver for coconut products (HTS 2008.19.15) from Thailand. USTR further granted CNL waivers, in July 2016, for the following products: (1) certain pitted dates (HTS 0804.10.60) from Tunisia; (2) certain inactive yeasts (HTS 2102.20.60) from Brazil; and (3) certain nonalcoholic beverages (HTS 2202.90.90) from Thailand. Other existing waivers include sugar and preserved bananas (Philippines); sugar, carnations, figs, yams, and gelatin derivatives (Colombia); and animal hides (South Africa and Thailand). A listing of all current CNL waivers, including for agricultural products under GSP, is available in USTR's GSP Guidebook . In addition, the most recent GSP extension in 2015 broadly designated five new cotton products as eligible for GSP status (for least-developed beneficiary developing countries only), along with some other non-agricultural products ( Table 3 ). Some African cotton-producing nations, such as Benin, Burkino Faso, Chad, and Mali, are among the current list of eligible countries. To date, no cotton imports have been reported under these new import categories. In early 2012, the Obama Administration implemented a number of actions affecting certain countries' eligibility under the GSP program. Included was the suspension of GSP eligibility of Argentina. Argentina was among the program's top beneficiary countries, accounting for more than 10% of all agricultural imports under the GSP (ranked by import value). The President suspended GSP benefits for Argentina because "it has not acted in good faith in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or a corporation, partnership, or association that is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens." (In October 2016, the Government of Argentina requested designation as a beneficiary of the GSP, which is under review by USTR.) In 2012, Gibraltar and the Turks and Caicos were graduated from the program after they were determined to have become "high income" countries, while the Republic of South Sudan and Senegal were designated as "least-developed beneficiary developing countries" (LDBDCs), becoming eligible under GSP. Other countries have since been suspended from GSP. The Administration announced the suspension of GSP benefits for Bangladesh in June 2013. To date, USTR has not reinstated Bangladesh's GSP status. In 2014, following Russia's invasion of Crimea, many in Congress became critical of Russia's status as a GSP beneficiary. Russia's GSP status was officially terminated in October 2014. Under GSP, Russia had exported nearly $20 million of agricultural products in 2012, duty-free, including grain-based products, cocoa preparations, sugar and molasses-based confectionary, tree nuts, and other products. In September 2015, President Obama announced, among other things, that Seychelles, Uruguay, and Venezuela had become "high income" countries and were no longer eligible to receive GSP benefits, effective January 1, 2017. In September 2016, USTR reinstated Burma's (Myanmar's) eligibility for GSP benefits as an LDBDC, effective November 13, 2016. For more information and for a discussion of possible legislative options, see CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: Overview and Issues for Congress . Changes made to GSP in the past decade have affected the overall distribution and volume of both agricultural and non-agricultural product imports under the program. The suspension from GSP of some countries, such as Argentina, likely has had an impact on agricultural trade under the program. Argentina had been among the main beneficiary countries under GSP and in earlier years accounted for more than one-tenth of all agricultural imports under GSP (ranked by import value). In 2012, Argentina had exported $116 million of agricultural products under the program, accounting for nearly 5% of the total value of GSP agricultural imports. Products imported from Argentina under GSP included casein, olive oil, prepared meats, gelatin derivatives, cheese and curd, sugar confectionery, wine, and other food products. Other countries whose GSP beneficiary status has been suspended or who have graduated out of the program had not been major suppliers of U.S. agricultural imports under the program. Aside from changes made to the list of eligible GSP countries, other statutory changes to GSP tightening rules for CNL waivers may not have greatly affected U.S. agricultural imports under the program. Historically, there have been few CNL waivers for agricultural products imported duty-free under GSP. Other types of program changes, however, could affect U.S. agricultural imports under the program, including additional limits on CNL waivers from certain countries or graduation of some beneficiary countries. Some African cotton-producing nations are now eligible to supply certain cotton products to the United States, but data are not yet available to determine whether imports will consequently increase under these new categories. Although USTR has continued to conduct annual reviews of the program, it has not conducted a broad review that has solicited extensive stakeholder comment. However, previous comments submitted to USTR as part of its 2006 review from U.S. agricultural industry groups indicate that opinions vary among U.S. agricultural groups regarding the program. For example, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) expressed its general opposition to the GSP program, stating that products imported duty-free under the program compete with U.S.-produced goods without granting a commensurate level of opportunity for U.S. producers in foreign markets. AFBF further supported withdrawal of CNL waivers for the Philippines, Argentina, and Colombia. The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) expressed support for the current GSP program and identified certain agricultural products of importance to GMA under the program, including sugar confections, spices, and certain processed foods and inputs from Brazil, India, and Argentina. GMA's position was generally supported by comments from the American Spice Trade Association, the National Confectioners Association, and the Chocolate Manufacturers Association. GMA has previously supported congressional efforts to extend GSP. What remains unclear is whether duty-free access for most agricultural imports under the GSP greatly influences a country's willingness to export these products to the United States. In most cases, costs associated with import tariffs are borne by the importer. These costs may be passed on to the BDCs in terms of lower import prices. However, import tariffs to the United States for most of these products tend to be low. As calculated by CRS, ad valorem equivalent tariffs range from 3% to 4% for sugar, 2% to 10% for cocoa-containing products, 5% to 12% for confectionery, 1% to 2% for most processed meats, about 2% for olive oil, less than 1% for mineral water, and about 5% for agriculture-based organic chemicals. In general, any additional costs that might be incurred by the BDCs as a result of the proposed changes could be more than offset by the generally higher U.S. prices for most products compared to prices in other world markets. Nevertheless, the imposition of even relatively low import tariffs could represent an increase in input costs to some U.S. food processors and industrial users. These costs could be passed on to consumers through higher prices for these and other finished agricultural or manufactured products. As shown in Table 1 , most GSP agricultural imports are intermediate goods and inputs, such as raw sugar, miscellaneous processed foods, preparations, and byproducts, and agriculture-based organic chemicals.

The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from designated developing countries. Agricultural imports under GSP totaled $2.6 billion in 2015, nearly 15% of the value of all U.S. GSP imports. Leading agricultural imports (based on value) include processed foods and food processing inputs; beverages and drinking waters; processed and fresh fruits and vegetables; sugar and sugar confectionery; olive oil; and miscellaneous food preparations and inputs for further processing. The majority of these imports are from Thailand, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey, which combined account for roughly two-thirds of total agricultural GSP imports. GSP was most recently extended until December 31, 2017 (Title II of P.L. 114-27). Expiration of the program in 2017 means that GSP renewal could be a legislative issue in the 115th Congress. Additional background information on such legislation is available in CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: Overview and Issues for Congress. Over the past decade, GSP renewal has been somewhat controversial. Some in Congress have continued to call for changes to the program. Both Congress and the previous Administrations have made changes to the program regarding product coverage (e.g., the type of products that can be imported under the program) and country eligibility (e.g., limiting GSP benefits to certain countries). Both Congress and the previous Administrations have tightened and/or expanded the program's requirements on imports under certain circumstances. In recent years, a number of countries have had their GSP status revoked, including Argentina and Russia, among others. In September 2015, President Obama announced, among other things, that Seychelles, Uruguay, and Venezuela had become "high income" countries and were no longer eligible to receive GSP benefits, effective January 1, 2017. Also, as part of the most recent GSP extension, Congress designated a few new product categories as eligible for GSP status, including some cotton products (for least-developed beneficiaries only) and other non-agricultural products. Congressional leaders have continued to express an interest in evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. trade preference programs, including GSP, and broader reform of these programs might be possible. Opinion within the U.S. agriculture industry is mixed, reflecting both support for and opposition to the current program.

The U.S. strategy in pursuing the war on international terrorism involves a variety of missions conducted by military and civilian intelligence personnel characterized as "special operations" or paramilitary operations. The separate roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are not always clearly reflected in media accounts and at times there has been considerable operational overlap. Proposals such as those made by the 9/11 Commission to change organizational relationships will, however, be evaluated on the basis of separate roles and missions, operating practices, and relevant statutory authorities. DOD defines special operations as "operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement." DOD defines paramilitary forces as "forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training or mission." In this report, the term "paramilitary operations" will be used for operations conducted by the CIA whose officers and employees are not part of the armed forces of the United States. (In practice, military personnel may be temporarily assigned to the CIA and CIA personnel may temporarily serve directly under a military commander.) In general, special operations are distinguishable from regular military operations by degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and mode of employment among other factors. DOD special operations are frequently clandestine—designed in such a way as to ensure concealment; they are not necessarily covert, that is, concealing the identity of the sponsor is not a priority. The CIA, however, conducts covert and clandestine operations to avoid directly implicating the U.S. Government. USSOCOM was established by Congress in 1987 ( P.L. 99-661 , 10 U.S.C. §167). USSOCOM's stated mission is to plan, direct and execute special operations in the conduct of the War on Terrorism in order to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United States. The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) to collect intelligence through human sources and to analyze and disseminate intelligence from all sources. It was also to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the National Security Council may direct." This opaque phrase was, within a few months, interpreted to include a range of covert activities such as those that had been carried out by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Although some observers long maintained that covert actions had no statutory basis, in 1991 the National Security Act was amended (by P.L. 102-88 ) to establish specific procedures for approving covert actions and for notifying key Members of Congress. The statutory definition of covert action ("activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly....") is broad and can include a wide range of clandestine efforts—from subsidizing foreign journals and political parties to participation in what are essentially military operations. In the case of paramilitary operations, there is a clear potential for overlap with activities that can be carried out by DOD. In general, the CIA would be designated to conduct operations that are to be wholly covert or disavowable. In practice, responsibilities for paramilitary operations have been assigned by the National Security Council on a case-by-case basis. In addition to acquiring intelligence to support US military operations from the Korean War era to Iraq today, the CIA has also worked closely alongside DOD personnel in military operations. On occasion it has also conducted clandestine military operations apart from the military. One example was the failed Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba in 1961. Especially important was a substantial CIA-managed effort in Laos in the 1960s and 1970s to interdict North Vietnamese resupply efforts. The CIA was directed to undertake this effort in large measure to avoid the onus of official U.S. military intervention in neutral Laos. The CIA's paramilitary operations in Afghanistan in 2001 have been widely described; CIA officers began infiltrating Afghanistan before the end of September 2001 and played an active role alongside SOF in bringing down the Taliban regime by the end of the year. According to media reports, the CIA has also been extensively involved in operations in Iraq in support of military operations. SOF have reportedly been involved in clandestine and covert paramilitary operations on numerous occasions since the Vietnam War. Operations such as the response to the TWA 847 and Achille Lauro highjackings in 1985, Panama in 1989, Mogadishu in 1993, and the Balkans in the late 1990s have become public knowledge over time but other operations reportedly remain classified to this day. Some speculate that covert paramilitary operations would probably become the responsibility of a number of unacknowledged special operations units believed to exist within USSOCOM. Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report states: "Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command." The 9/11 Commission's basis for this recommendation appears to be both performance and cost-based. The report states that the CIA did not sufficiently invest in developing a robust capability to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel prior to 9/11, and instead relied on improperly trained proxies (foreign personnel under contract) resulting in an unsatisfactory outcome. The report also states that the United States does not have the money or people to build "two separate capabilities for carrying out secret military operations," and suggests that we should "concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authorities in one entity." Some observers question whether procedures are in place to insure overall coordination of effort. Press reports concerning an alleged lack of coordination during Afghan operations undoubtedly contributed to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation regarding paramilitary operations. Although such accounts have been discounted by some observers, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ( P.L. 108-458 ) included a provision (Section 1013) that requires DOD and CIA to develop joint procedures "to improve the coordination and deconfliction of operations that involve elements" of the CIA and DOD. When separate missions are underway in the same geographical area, the CIA and DOD are required to establish procedures to reach "mutual agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the region and a clear delineation of operational responsibilities to prevent conflict and duplication of effort." Some observers suggest that a capability to plan and undertake paramilitary operations is directly related to the Agency's responsibility to obtain intelligence from human sources. Some individuals and groups that supply information may also be of assistance in undertaking or supporting a paramilitary operation. If CIA were to have no responsibilities in this area, however, certain types of foreign contacts might not be exploited and capabilities that have proven important (in Afghanistan and elsewhere) might erode or disappear. Some question if this proposed shift in responsibility would place additional strains on SOF who are extensively committed worldwide. Others argue that SOF lack the experience and requisite training to conduct covert operations. They suggest that if SOF do undertake covert operations training, that it could diminish their ability to perform their more traditional missions. The 9/11 Report notes the CIA's "reputation for agility in operations," as well as the military's reputation for being "methodical and cumbersome." Some experts question if DOD and SOF are capable of operating in a more agile and flexible manner. They contend that the CIA was able to beat SOF into Afghanistan because they had less bureaucracy to deal with than did SOF, which permitted them to "do things faster, cheaper, and with more flexibility than the military." Some are concerned that if SOF takes over responsibility for clandestine and covert operations that they will become less agile and perhaps more vulnerable to bureaucratic interference from defense officials. Section 1208 of P.L. 108-375 permits SOF to directly pay and equip foreign forces or groups supporting the U.S. in combating terrorism. Although not a recommendation in the 9/11 Commission's report, many feel that this authority will not only help SOF in the conduct of unconventional warfare, but could also be a crucial tool should they become involved in covert or clandestine operations. In Afghanistan, SOF did not have the authority to pay and equip local forces and instead relied on the CIA to "write checks" for needed arms, ammunition, and supplies. Congress may choose to review past or current paramilitary operations undertaken by the CIA and might also choose to assess the extent of coordination between the CIA and DOD. P.L. 108-458 required that a report be submitted to defense and intelligence committees by June 2005 describing procedures established in regard to coordination and deconfliction of CIA and DOD operations. That report provided an opportunity to indicate how initiatives by the executive branch have addressed relevant issues. CIA has not maintained a sizable paramilitary force "on the shelf." When directed, it has built paramilitary capabilities by using its individuals, either U.S. or foreign, with paramilitary experience under the management of its permanent operations personnel in an entity known as the Special Activities Division. The permanent staff would be responsible for planning and for maintaining ties to former CIA officials and military personnel and individuals (including those with special language qualifications) who could be employed should the need arise. Few observers doubt that there is a continuing need for coordination between the CIA and DOD regarding paramilitary capabilities and plans for future operations. Furthermore, many observers believe that the CIA should concentrate on "filling the gaps," focusing on those types of operations that DOD is likely to avoid. Nevertheless, they view this comparatively limited set of potential operations to be a vitally important one that should not be neglected or assigned to DOD. There may be occasions when having to acknowledge an official U.S. role would preclude operations that were otherwise considered vital to the national security; the CIA can provide the deniability that would be difficult, if not impossible, for military personnel. Some experts believe that there may be legal difficulties if SOF are required to conduct covert operations. One issue is the legality of ordering SOF personnel to conduct covert activities that would require them to forfeit their Geneva Convention status to retain deniability. To operate with deniability, SOF could be required to operate without the protection of a military uniform and identification card which affords them combatant status under the Geneva Convention if captured. Also, covert operations can often be contrary to international laws or the laws of war and U.S. military personnel are generally expected to follow these laws. Traditionally, the public text of intelligence legislation has included few provisions regarding paramilitary operations; levels of funding and other details are included in classified annexes which are understood to have the force of law. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees do have considerable influence in supporting or discouraging particular covert actions. In a few cases Congress has formally voted to deny funding to ongoing covert operations. Special Forces, however, fall under the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and it is unclear how Congress would handle oversight if covert operations are shifted to SOF as well as how disputes between the intelligence and armed services committees would be dealt with. The 109 th Congress did not address this issue legislatively. On November 23, 2004, President Bush issued a letter requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to review matters relating to Recommendation 32 and submit their advice to him by February 23, 2005. In unclassified testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2005, the Director of the CIA testified that the CIA and DOD disagreed with the 9/11 Commission's recommendation. In June of 2005 it was reported that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency responded to the President, stating that "neither the CIA nor DOD endorses the commission's recommendation on shifting the paramilitary mission or operations." The Administration reportedly rejected the 9-11 Commission's recommendation to shift the responsibility for paramilitary operations to DOD. The 110 th Congress saw the enactment of P.L. 110-53 , Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 which did not address either paramilitary operations by CIA or special operations by DOD. Opposition by the Pentagon, the Intelligence Community, and the Bush Administration undoubtedly affected the congressional response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation to vest responsibilities for paramilitary operations in DOD. CIA's reputation may have also been assisted by the generally favorable assessments given to the Agency's post-9/11 performance, especially in the initial phases of the Afghan campaign that led to the collapse of the Taliban regime in December 2001. Although most observers believe that there remains little inclination among Members to transfer responsibilities for all paramilitary operations out of CIA, some Members have expressed concerns about apparent blurring of lines between DOD clandestine operations and CIA intelligence-gathering operations.

The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The President directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to review this recommendation and present their advice by mid-February 2005, but ultimately, they did not recommend a transfer of paramilitary responsibilities. This Report will briefly describe special operations conducted by DOD and paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA and discuss the background of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. For additional information see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed].

This report provides an overview of the major issues which have been raised recently in the Senate and in the press concerning the constitutionality of a Senate filibuster (i.e., extended debate) of a judicial nomination. The Senate cloture rule (Rule XXII, par. 2) requires a super-majority vote to terminate a filibuster. The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President is to "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, ... appoint" judges, does not impose a super-majority requirement for Senate confirmation. Since it has the effect of requiring a super-majority vote on a nomination, because it usually requires the votes of 60 Senators to end a filibuster, it has been argued that a filibuster of a judicial nomination is unconstitutional. In the absence of (1) any constitutional provision specifically governing Senate debate and (2) any judicial ruling directly on point, and given the division of scholarly opinion, this report will examine the issues but will not attempt a definitive resolution of them. The framers of the Constitution were committed to majority rule as a general principle. However, no provision of the Constitution expressly requires that the Senate and the House act by majority vote in enacting legislation or in exercising their other constitutional powers. There is a provision specifying that "a majority of each [House] shall constitute a quorum to do business." There are also a few provisions dictating that the Senate or House muster a two-thirds extraordinary majority to transact certain business of an exceptional nature. Although there is no constitutional provision requiring that the Senate act by majority vote in instances not governed by one of the provisions mandating an extraordinary majority, "the Senate operates under 'a majority rule' to transact business—a majority of the Senators voting, a quorum being present—with the exceptions set forth in the Constitution and the rules of the Senate." The Supreme Court has found that "the general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body," except when there is a specific constitutional limitation. However, the Court has also found that the Constitution, history, and judicial precedents do not require that a majority prevail on all issues. Does the commitment of the framers to majority rule as a general principle, the fact that the Senate usually operates pursuant to majority rule, and the enumeration in the Constitution of certain extraordinary majority voting requirements mean that any exception to majority rule other than the enumerated ones is unconstitutional? Is there any constitutional defense to be offered for a Senate filibuster? Article I, Section 5, clause 2, of the Constitution authorizes "each House [to] determine the rules of its proceedings.... " The rule-making power has been construed broadly by the courts. It has been argued that the rule-making power and historical practice are the foundation for the filibuster, and that Article I, Section 5, permits the Senate to adopt procedures unless they conflict with a constitutional prohibition. Supporters of the filibuster have contended that Senate rules are not in conflict with the Constitution because the rules require 60 votes to end debate on a nomination, not to confirm a nominee, and that therefore the Senate rules are not unconstitutional because they are not at odds with the few constitutional provisions in which the framers specified a particular type of majority. Opponents of the filibuster have claimed that Senate rules violate the constitutional principle of majority rule and in effect impose an extraordinary majority requirement for confirmation of nominees that is at odds with the Appointments Clause. Several factors have the effect of entrenching the filibuster. First, Senate Rule XXII, par. 2 (the cloture rule) applies, inter alia , to amendments to the Senate rules. (A vote of three fifths of the entire Senate is usually required to invoke cloture. A vote of two thirds of the Senators present and voting is required to invoke cloture on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules.) Second, Senate Rule V, par. 2, provides that "the rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules." And third, because the Senate is a continuing body, its rules "are not newly adopted with each new session of Congress." Because the cloture rule may be applied to debate on a proposal to change the filibuster rule, it has been argued that the filibuster rule unconstitutionally interferes with the right of a majority to exercise the constitutional rulemaking authority by majority vote. However, supporters of the filibuster have contended that "there is no constitutional directive against entrenchment," and that the reference to "each House" in the rule-making clause (Article I, Section 5), authorizing each House to "determine the rules of its proceedings," means the House and Senate separately (not the Congress), and does not mean that one session of the Senate is barred from binding the next session. The entrenchment issue has given rise to a suggested scenario under which a simple majority might vote in favor of an amendment to the filibuster rule, a point of order might be raised asserting that a majority vote is sufficient to cut off debate on the amendment and to pass it (because the two-thirds requirement is unconstitutional), the matter would be referred by the Vice President to the Senate, and the point of order would be sustained by a simple majority of the Senate. A judicial appeal might ensue. Senators have considered changing Senate rules or practice by invoking the "constitutional" or "nuclear" option, terms that refer to various types of proceedings. This option was a focal point of a recent bipartisan agreement. The filibuster of a judicial nomination raises constitutional issues, particularly separation of powers ones, not posed by the filibuster of legislation. These issues should be considered in light of the pertinent language of the Constitution and the intent of the Framers. The Appointments Clause provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.... " There are three stages in presidential appointments by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. First, the President nominates the candidate. Second, the President and the Senate appoint the individual. And third, the President commissions the officer. It is noted that the Appointments Clause is in Article II of the Constitution, which sets forth the powers of the President. The power of appointment is one of the executive powers of government. "... [T]he power of appointment by the Executive is restricted in its exercise by the provision that the Senate, a part of the legislative branch of the Government, may check the action of the Executive by rejecting the officers he selects." The language of the Appointments Clause is ambiguous. It does not specify procedures or time limits applicable in confirmation proceedings, and it does not require that the Senate take a final vote on a nomination. "There is little evidence indicating the exact meaning of 'advice and consent' intended by the Framers.... Records of the constitutional debates reveal that the Framers, after lengthy discussions, settled on a judicial selection process that would involve both the Senate and the President. This important governmental function, like many others, was divided among coequal branches to protect against the concentration of power in one branch." The Senate's role of advice and consent was intended as a safeguard against executive abuses of the appointment power. Citing the language of the Appointments Clause and the intent of the Framers, supporters and critics of filibusters of judicial nominations disagree about the relative roles of the President and the Senate in regard to judicial appointments, about whether the Senate has a duty to dispose of the President's judicial nominations in a timely fashion, and about whether a majority of Senators has a constitutional right to vote on a nomination. If the Senate filibusters a judicial nomination, the President has "countervailing powers," including the ability to make a recess appointment, which does not require Senate confirmation but which is only temporary, expiring at the end of the next session of Congress. Because recess appointments deny the Senate the opportunity to consider the appointees, they raise separation of powers questions about the roles of the President and the Senate in the appointments process. Special issues are raised by recess appointments of Article III judges. The independence of such judges is generally guaranteed by their life tenure. However, "a recess appointee lacks life tenure.... As a result, such an appointee is in theory subject to greater political pressure than a judge whose nomination has been confirmed." The constitutionality of the filibuster has been challenged in court, and such litigation raises justiciability issues. In a number of cases, the courts have shown a reluctance to interpret the rules of either House or to review challenges to the application of such rules. However, the case law is not entirely consistent, and it has been suggested that a court will be more likely to reach the merits if a rule has an impact on parties outside the legislative sphere. Standing and the political question doctrine would be the primary justiciability issues raised by a court challenge to the filibuster rule. Standing is a threshold procedural question which turns not on the merits of the plaintiff's complaint but rather on whether he has a legal right to a judicial determination of the issues he raises. To satisfy constitutional standing requirements, "'[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'" It has been suggested that those who might have standing to challenge the rule would include a judicial nominee not confirmed because of a filibuster; the President; and Senators who are part of a majority in favor of a nomination, but who cannot obtain the necessary votes to invoke cloture or to change the filibuster rule, who might allege a dilution of their voting strength. A nominee might have suffered a personal injury, caused by a filibuster, which might be remedied if the filibuster were declared unconstitutional. The standing of the President and of Senators raises more difficult questions than does the standing of a nominee. In Raines v. Byrd , the Court reviewed historical practice and concluded that constitutional disputes between the branches have generally not been resolved by the judiciary in cases brought by Members of Congress or presidents. Because the constitutionality of the filibuster is an issue in contention between the branches, the courts, applying Raines , might not accord standing to Senators or President Bush. Other issues, under Raines , arise in regard to the standing of Senators. Under Raines , to challenge executive branch action or the constitutionality of a public law, a Member must assert a personal injury or an institutional injury amounting to nullification of a particular vote. In regard to the filibuster dispute, it is questionable whether a Senator has suffered either a personal injury or an institutional one that has the effect of nullifying a particular vote. Under Raines , the availability of some means of legislative redress precludes a finding of nullification, and a court might find that the possibility of amending the filibuster rule is a means of legislative redress, even though a proposed amendment to the rule could itself be the subject of a filibuster. Judicial review is not available where the matter is considered to be a political question within the province of the executive or legislative branch. "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; ... or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.... " The rule-making clause (Article I, Section 5, clause 2) is a textual commitment of authority to each House to make and interpret its own rules of proceedings. Notwithstanding this textual commitment, the political question doctrine will not preclude judicial review where there is a constitutional limitation imposed on the exercise of the authority at issue by the political branch. It might be argued that the political question doctrine bars judicial review of the constitutionality of the filibuster rule because the rulemaking clause permits the Senate to make its own rules, and the Constitution does not expressly limit debate. On the other hand, it might be argued that the political question doctrine does not preclude judicial review because the exercise of the rulemaking power is restricted since the entrenchment of the filibuster may be at odds with "constitutional principles limiting the ability of one Congress to bind another." The question of the constitutionality of the Senate filibuster of a judicial nomination has divided scholars and has not been addressed directly in any court ruling. The constitutionality of the filibuster of a judicial nomination turns on an assessment of whether the Senate's power to make rules governing its own proceedings is broad enough to apply the filibuster rule to nominations. Supporters and critics of the filibuster of judicial nominations disagree about the relative roles of the President and the Senate in regard to judicial appointments, about whether the Senate has a duty to dispose of the President's judicial nominations in a timely fashion, and about whether a simple majority of Senators has a constitutional right to proceed to a vote on a nomination. The constitutionality of the filibuster might be challenged in court, but it is uncertain whether such an action would be justiciable.

The Senate cloture rule requires a super-majority vote to terminate a filibuster (i.e., extended debate). The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President is to "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, ... appoint" judges, does not impose a super-majority requirement for Senate confirmation. Critics of the Senate filibuster argue that a filibuster of a judicial nomination is unconstitutional in that it effectively requires a super-majority vote for confirmation, although the Appointments Clause does not require such a super-majority vote. It has been argued that the Senate's constitutional power to determine the rules of its proceedings, as well as historical practice, provide the foundation for the filibuster. The question of the constitutionality of the filibuster of a judicial nomination turns on an assessment of whether the Senate's power to make rules governing its own proceedings is broad enough to apply the filibuster rule to nominations. Several factors have the effect of entrenching the filibuster (i.e., making it possible to filibuster a proposed amendment to the rules). Supporters and critics of the filibuster of judicial nominations disagree about the relative roles of the President and the Senate in regard to judicial appointments, about whether the Senate has a duty to dispose of the President's judicial nominations in a timely fashion, and about whether a simple majority of Senators has a constitutional right to proceed to a vote on a nomination. The constitutionality of the filibuster might be challenged in court, but it is uncertain whether such an action would be justiciable (i.e., appropriate for judicial resolution). Standing and the political question doctrine would be the primary justiciability issues raised by a court challenge to the filibuster rule. (Note: This report was originally written by [author name scrubbed], Legislative Attorney.)

Pharmacy Co-payments (formerly collected in theHealth Services Improvement Fund -- HSIF). In FY2002, Congresscreated a new fund (Health Services Improvement Fund) to collect increases inpharmacy copayments (from $2 to $7 for a 30-day supply of outpatient medication)that went into effect on February 4, 2002. The Consolidated AppropriationsResolution, 2003 ( P.L.108-7 ) granted VA the authority to consolidate the HSIF withMCCF and granted permanent authority to recover copayments for outpatientmedications. Long-Term Care Co-payment Account (formerlythe Veterans' Extended Care Revolving Fund). The MillenniumHealth Care and Benefits Act ( P.L.106-117 ) provided VA authority to collectlong-term care copayments. These out-of- pocket payments include per diemamounts and copayments from certain veteran patients receiving extended careservices. These funds are used to provide extended care services, which accordingto the Administration's budget documents, are defined as geriatric evaluation, nursinghome care, domiciliary services, respite care, adult day health care, and othernoninstitutional alternatives to nursing home care. (29) Compensated Work Therapy Program (formerlythe Special Therapeutic and Rehabilitation Activities Fund). Theprogram was created by the Veterans' Omnibus Health Care Act of 1976 ( P.L.94-581 ) to provide rehabilitative services to certain veteran beneficiaries receivingmedical care and treatment from VA. Funds collected in this program are derivedfrom goods and services produced and sold by patients and members in VA healthcare facilities. Compensation and Pension Living ExpensesProgram (formerly the Medical Facilities Revolving Fund). Theprogram was established by the Veterans' Benefits Act of 1992 ( P.L.102-568 ). Underthis program, veterans who do not have either a spouse or child may have theirmonthly pension reduced to $90 after the third month a veteran is admitted for nursing home care. The difference between the veteran's pension and the $90 is usedfor the operation of the VA medical facility. Parking Program (formerly the Parking RevolvingFund). The program provides funds for construction and acquisitionof parking garages at VA medical facilities. VA collects fees for use of these parkingfacilities. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 authorized collections fromthe Parking Program to be deposited in MCCF and be used for medical services. Funds for construction or alterations of parking facilities will now be included underthe construction major projects and construction minor projects accounts. (30) Sale of Assets (formerly the Nursing HomeRevolving Fund). This fund provides for construction, alteration,and acquisition (including site acquisition) of nursing home facilities as provided forin appropriation acts. Collections to this revolving fund are realized from the transferon any interest in real property that is owned by VA and has an estimated value inexcess of $50,000. No budget authority is required for this revolving fund, and fundsare available without fiscal year limitation. Medical Services. Provides fundsfor treatment of veterans and eligible beneficiaries in VA medical centers, nursinghomes, outpatient clinic facilities, and contract hospitals. Hospital and outpatientcare is also provided by the private sector for certain dependents and survivors ofveterans under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of VA (CHAMPVA). Funds are also used to train medical residents, interns, and other professional,paramedical and administrative personnel in health science fields to support VA'smedical programs. Overhead costs associated with medical and prosthetic researchis also funded by this account. Medical Administration. Providesfunds for the management and administration of VA's health care system. Funds areused for the costs associated with the operation of VA medical centers, otherfacilities, VHA headquarters, costs of Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN)offices, billing and coding activities, and procurement. (31) Medical Facilities. Provides fundsfor the operation and maintenance of VHA's infrastructure. Funds are used for costsassociated with utilities, engineering, capital planning, leases, laundry, food services,groundskeeping, garbage disposal, facility repair, and selling and buying of property. Medical and Prosthetic Research. Provides funds for medical, rehabilitative, and health services research. The medicaland prosthetic research program is an intermural program. In addition to funds fromthis appropriation, reimbursements from the Department of Defense (DOD), grantsfrom the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and private sources supports VAresearches. Medical research supports basic and clinical studies that advancesknowledge so that efficient, and rational interventions can be made to prevent, carefor, or alleviate disease. The prosthetic research program is involved in thedevelopment of prosthetic, orthopedic and sensory aids to improve the lives ofdisabled veterans. The health services research program focuses on improving theoutcome effectiveness and cost-efficiency of health care delivery for the populationof veterans. Overhead costs associated with medical and prosthetic research are alsofunded by the medical services account. Medical Administration. Providesfunds for costs associated with operation of medical centers, other facilities and VHAheadquarters as well as VISN offices. It also funds all the medical informationtechnology, including patient records, computer equipment and softwaredevelopment, which are considered capital assets by VA. Medical Facilities. Provides fundsfor the operation and maintenance of VHA's infrastructure. Funds are used for costsassociated with utilities, engineering, capital planning, leases, laundry, food services,groundskeeping, garbage disposal, facility repair, and selling and buying of property. Construction Major. Providesfunds for capital projects costing $7 million or more that are intended to design,build, alter, extend or improve a VHA facility. As part of VA's budget process,Congress reviews, approves, and funds major construction on a project by projectbasis. Typical major construction projects are replacements of hospital buildings,addition of large ambulatory care centers, and new hospitals or nursing homes. Construction Minor Projects. Provides funds for capital projects costing $500,000 or more and less than $7 millionthat are intended to design, build, alter, extend or improve a VHA facility. Minorconstruction projects are approved at the Veterans Integrated Service Network(VISN) level. Grants for Construction of State Extended CareFacilities. Provides grants to states for construction or acquisitionof state home facilities, including funds to remodel, modify or alter existing buildingsused for furnishing domiciliary, nursing home or hospital care to veterans. A grantmay not exceed 65% of the total cost of the project.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides services and benefits such as hospital andmedical care, rehabilitation services, and pensions, among other things, to veterans who meet certaineligibility criteria. VA provides these benefits and services through four administrative units: theVeterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), the NationalCemetery Administration (NCA), and the Board of Veterans' Appeals. VHA is primarily a directservice provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support servicesto veterans through an integrated health care system. Funding for VHA is an issue of perennial interest to Congress, especially with the increasingdemand for VA medical services and with some veterans increasingly having to wait more than sixmonths for a primary care or speciality care appointment. VHA is funded through multipleappropriation accounts, which are supplemented by other sources of revenue. Over the past decade,the composition of VHA's funding has changed. Not only has VA's appropriation account structurebeen modified, but also VA's ability to retain nonappropriated funds has increased. These changespresent challenges in comparing VHA funding over a period of time. Between FY1995 and FY2004, appropriations for VA medical care grew by 63%. For thefirst four years of this time period, from FY1995 through FY1999, appropriations for VA medicalcare grew by 6.7%, from $16.2 billion in FY1995 to $17.3 billion in FY1999. In comparison, duringthe last five years of this time period, from FY1999 through FY2004, VA medical careappropriations grew by 52.7%, from $17.3 billion in FY1999 to $26.4 billion in FY2004. Theseamounts do not include appropriations for medical research, medical administration andmiscellaneous operating expenses (MAMOE), and funds from nonappropriated funding sources. The total number of veteran enrollees has grown by 76.9% from FY1999, the first year VHAinstituted an enrollment system, to FY2004. During this same period the number of veteransreceiving medical care has grown by almost 50%, from 3.2 million veterans in FY1999 to anestimated 4.7 million veterans in FY2004. This report will not be updated.

Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, insurance regulation is generally left to the individual states. For several years prior to the recent financial crisis, some Members of Congress had introduced legislation to federalize insurance regulation along the lines of the regulation of the banking sector, although none of this legislation reached the committee markup stage. Various other pieces of legislation have also been introduced to reform insurance regulation in more narrow ways. The debate around federal involvement in insurance regulation had traditionally focused on the negative and positive aspects of the state-centered approach compared to increased federal government involvement. The recent financial crisis, particularly the involvement of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) and the smaller bond insurers, changed the tenor of the debate around insurance regulation. The crisis grew largely from sectors of the financial industry that had previously been perceived as presenting little systemic risk. Many see the crisis as resulting from failures or gaps in the financial regulatory structure, particularly a lack of oversight for the system as a whole and a lack of coordinated oversight for the largest actors in the system. This increased urgency in calls for overall regulatory changes, such as the implementation of increased systemic risk regulation and federal oversight of insurance, particularly of larger insurance firms. Generally good performance of insurers through the crisis, however, has also provided additional arguments for those seeking to retain the state-based insurance system. Although insurers in general appear to have weathered the financial crisis reasonably well, the insurance industry saw two significant failures, one general and one specific. The first failure involved financial guarantee or "monoline" bond insurers. Before the crisis, there were only about a dozen bond insurers in total, with four large insurers dominating the business. This type of insurance originated in the 1970s to cover municipal bonds, but the insurers expanded their businesses since the 1990s to include significant amounts of mortgage-backed securities. In late 2007 and early 2008, strains appeared due to exposure to mortgage-backed securities. Ultimately some smaller bond insurers failed and the larger insurers saw their previously triple-A credit ratings downgraded significantly. These downgrades rippled throughout the municipal bond markets, causing unexpected difficulties for both individual investors and municipalities who might have thought they were relatively insulated from problems stemming from rising mortgage defaults. The second failure in the insurance industry was that of a specific company, AIG. AIG had been a global giant of the industry, but it essentially failed in mid-September 2008. To avoid bankruptcy in September and October 2008, AIG was forced to seek more than $100 billion in assistance from, and give 79.9% of the equity in the company to, the Federal Reserve. Multiple restructurings of the assistance have followed, including up to $69.8 billion through the U.S. Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). AIG is currently in the process of selling off parts of its business to pay back assistance that it has received from the government; how much value will be left in the 79.9% government stake in the company at the end of the process remains an open question. The near collapse of the bond insurers and AIG could be construed as regulatory failures. One of the responsibilities of an insurance regulator is to ensure that insurers remain solvent and are able to pay future claims. Because the states are the primary insurance regulators, some may go further and argue that these cases specifically demonstrate the need for increased federal involvement in insurance. The case of AIG, however, is complicated. AIG was primarily made up of state-chartered insurance subsidiaries, but the state insurance regulators did not oversee the entire company. At the holding company level, AIG was a federally regulated thrift holding company and thus overseen by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). The immediate losses that caused AIG's failure came from both derivatives operations overseen by OTS and from securities lending operations that originated with securities from state-chartered insurance companies. OTS claimed that it had sufficient regulatory authority and competence to oversee a complicated holding company such as AIG. Others, particularly the Federal Reserve, disputed this claim and argued that a single body is needed to oversee systemic risk and large financial holding companies. The Dodd-Frank Act was passed in the House on June 30, 2010, by vote of 237-192, and in the Senate, on July 15, 2010, by a vote of 60-39. President Obama signed the legislation, now P.L. 111-203 , on July 21, 2010. Title V, Subtitle A of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside of the Department of the Treasury. A similar office was previously proposed in a 2008 Treasury "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure," in H.R. 5840 in the 110 th Congress, and in H.R. 2609 in the 111 th Congress. FIO is to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and coordinate and develop policy relating to international agreements. It has the authority to preempt state laws and regulations when these conflict with international agreements. This preemption authority is somewhat limited. It can only apply when the state measure (1) results in less favorable treatment of a non-U.S. insurer compared with a U.S. insurer, and (2) is inconsistent with a written international agreement regarding prudential measures. Such an agreement must achieve a level of consumer protection that is "substantially equivalent" to the level afforded under state law. FIO preemption authority does not extend to state measures governing rates, premiums, underwriting, or sales practices, nor does it apply to state coverage requirements or state antitrust laws. FIO preemption decisions are also subject to de novo judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act. The monitoring function of FIO includes information gathering from both public and private sources. This is backed by subpoena power if the director issues a written finding that the information being sought is necessary and that the office has coordinated with other state or federal regulators that may have the information. Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection within the Federal Reserve. This bureau enjoys significant budgetary independence, and the director is to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Consumer protection issues relating to the business of insurance, however, do not fall under the oversight of the bureau, but would remain within the purview of the states. Consumer protection issues that relate to insurance products that are also considered securities continue to be addressed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Although insurance products are generally under state regulation, there are some products, particularly variable annuities, that are considered securities products under federal law and jointly overseen by the SEC. In 2008, the SEC adopted new rules, generally known as "Rule 151A," that would have expanded SEC oversight to include some fixed indexed annuities that previously had solely been overseen by the states as insurance products. This rule provoked controversy, with Representative Gregory Meeks and Senator Benjamin Nelson introducing the Fixed Indexed Annuities and Insurance Products Classification Act of 2009 ( H.R. 2733 / S. 1389 ) to overturn Rule 151A. H.R. 4173 included no provisions addressing Rule 151A as it moved through consideration in the House, and neither did S. 3217 in the Senate. Senator Tom Harkin proposed S.Amdt. 3920 , which would have added the text of H.R. 2733 / S. 1389 to S. 3217 ; but the amendment was not considered on the floor of the Senate. The conference committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Harkin, contained in Section 989J of the act, that did not insert the previous language specifically nullifying Rule 151A, but is broadly aimed at returning indexed annuities solely to state oversight. The exemption from SEC oversight in Section 989J depends in part on either the states or the companies meeting certain consumer protection standards. Depending on future regulatory action by the SEC, this exemption language may require court action before the full impact of Section 989J is known. In addition to the language on annuities, Section 913 of the act may affect some insurance producers who also sell security products. This section authorizes the SEC to establish a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers who give personalized investment advice. SEC-registered investment advisers are already subject to a fiduciary duty, which requires them to act in their customers' best interests. Broker-dealer recommendations, on the other hand, must be suitable for customers; the act directs the SEC to harmonize the standards applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers. This provision is of interest to the insurance industry because agents who sell securities products, such as mutual funds or variable annuities, have been required to register as broker-dealers, but not generally as investment advisers. If the SEC issues rules creating a fiduciary duty, such agents will have to meet the best-interests standard that applies to advisers. The Dodd-Frank Act provides for systemic risk provisions that affect the insurance industry primarily through oversight of firms deemed systemically significant and through specific financial resolution authority. Financial companies, including insurers, judged to be systemically significant by the Financial Stability Oversight Council are to be subject to Federal Reserve oversight and higher prudential standards. The council includes a presidential appointee who is to be familiar with insurance issues, a state insurance commissioner, and the director of the Federal Insurance Office with the latter two being non-voting members. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act includes restrictions on proprietary trading by banking entities, a provision commonly known as the "Volcker Rule." Insurers that have banking subsidiaries or who are under a holding company structure with other banking subsidiaries would be subject to these restrictions, potentially affecting the investment strategies of these insurers. The language, however, includes an exemption for trading done "by a regulated insurance company directly engaged in the business of insurance for the general account of the company by any affiliate of such regulated insurance company, provided that such activities by any affiliate are solely for the general account of the regulated insurance company." The transactions must also comply with applicable law, regulation, or guidance; and there must be no determination by the regulators that a relevant law, regulation, or guidance is insufficient to protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity or the financial stability of the United States. A financial company could be subject to the act's special resolution regime based on a finding that its failure would cause systemic risk. Any insurance subsidiaries of such a financial company, however, would not be subject to this regime. Instead, the resolution of insurance companies would continue to be conducted in accordance with the applicable state insurance resolution system. With regard to funding for the resolution of systemically significant financial firms, there is no pre-funded resolution mechanism under the act. Instead, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is to impose assessments on financial companies with more than $50 billion in assets, as well as other financial firms that are overseen by the Federal Reserve, to fund the resolution of a systemically significant firm in the event the assets of the failed firm are insufficient to do so. The FDIC is to impose such assessments on a risk-adjusted basis. When imposing such assessments on an insurance company, the FDIC is to take into account the insurers' contributions to the state insurance resolution regimes. Title V, Subtitle B of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 and includes essentially the same language as H.R. 2571 / S. 1361 . Similarly titled bills were introduced in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses and passed the House, but were not considered by the Senate. This language addresses a relatively narrow set of insurance regulatory issues pre-dating the financial crisis. In the area of nonadmitted (or "surplus lines") insurance, the act harmonizes, and in some cases reduces, regulation and taxation of this insurance by vesting the "home state" of the insured with the sole authority to regulate and collect the taxes on a surplus lines transaction. Those taxes that would be collected may be distributed according to a future interstate compact, but absent such a compact their distribution would be within the authority of the home state. It also preempts any state laws on surplus lines eligibility that conflict with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model law and implements "streamlined" federal standards allowing a commercial purchaser to access surplus lines insurance. For reinsurance transactions, it vests the home state of the insurer purchasing the reinsurance with the authority over the transaction while vesting the home state of the reinsurer with the sole authority to regulate the solvency of the reinsurer.

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, broad financial regulatory reform legislation was advanced by the Obama Administration and by various Members of Congress. Ultimately Congress passed, and the President signed, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203). The Dodd-Frank Act largely responded to the financial crisis that peaked in September 2008, but other efforts at revising the state-based system of insurance regulation also pre-date this crisis. Members of Congress previously introduced both broad legislation to federalize insurance regulation along the lines of the regulation of the banking sector, as well as more narrowly tailored bills addressing specific perceived flaws in the state-based system. The financial crisis, particularly the role of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) and the smaller bond insurers, changed the tenor of the existing debate around insurance regulation, with increased emphasis on the systemic importance of some insurance companies. Although it could be argued that insurer involvement in the financial crisis suggested a need for full-scale federal regulation of insurance, the Dodd-Frank Act did not implement such a federal regulatory system for insurance. Title V of the Dodd-Frank Act addressed specifically insurance, with a subtitle creating a Federal Insurance Office (similar to language originally contained in H.R. 2609) and a subtitle streamlining the existing state regulation of surplus lines and reinsurance (similar to language originally contained in H.R. 2572/S. 1363). The Federal Insurance Office is to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and coordinate and develop policy relating to international agreements. It also has limited authority to preempt state laws and regulations when these conflict with international agreements. The act harmonizes, and in some cases reduces, regulation and taxation of surplus lines insurance by vesting the "home state" of the insured with the sole authority to regulate and collect the taxes on a surplus lines transaction. For reinsurance transactions, the act vests the home state of the insurer purchasing the reinsurance with the authority over the transaction while vesting the home state of the reinsurer with the sole authority to regulate the solvency of the reinsurer. In addition to Title V's specific insurance provisions, various other parts of the act may affect insurers and the insurance industry, including provisions addressing systemic risk, consumer protection, investor protection, and securities regulation. This report explains how insurance markets were affected by the financial crisis and summarizes the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that pertain to insurance. It will not be updated.

We must modernize the Air Force. This isn't optional. We must do it. And it will be painful because we will have to make hard choices.—General Mark Welsh, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force We can't – particularly with $17 billion less in 2017 – we're not going to be able to do it all. — Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force The U.S. Air Force is in the midst of an ambitious modernization program, driven primarily by the age of its curren t aircraft fleets. It has undertaken three major programs, repeatedly declared to be the service's top procurement priorities: the F-35A strike fighter, to replace several aircraft types whose designs date from the 1970s; the KC-46A tanker, to replace KC-135s designed in the 1950s; the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), initially to replace B-52s and B-1s, whose designs date from the 1950s and 1970s, respectively. In addition, the Air Force continues to procure variants of the C-130 cargo aircraft and a relatively small number of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPA, as the Air Force refers to unmanned aerial systems). Together, these five programs account for $67.2 billion over the FY2016-2020 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). In FY2016, the four procurement programs (F-35A, KC-46, C-130, and RPA) account for 99% of the Air Force's aircraft acquisition budget; LRS-B is 5% of the Air Force overall research and development (R&D) budget, but 60% of the budget for Advanced Component Development & Prototypes. Those are not the Air Force's only modernization requirements. The FY2016-2020 FYDP also includes initial funding for JSTARS recapitalization, to develop a successor for the E-8 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, with a projected entry into service of FY2022; a new combat rescue helicopter (CRH) to retrieve downed airmen and other personnel, to succeed the HH-60G; a Presidential Aircraft Replacement (PAR) program to develop and acquire a replacement for two VC-25 aircraft popularly referred to as Air Force One; and a new advanced trainer aircraft, called the T-X, to replace T-38 trainers designed in the 1950s. Perhaps notably, no funded plan exists for recapitalizing the E-3 AWACS fleet, based on the same airframe as the KC-135 and E-8. The current plan also includes no funding for the long-expected CVLSP helicopter replacement program. Any such programs would add to the outyear funding issue discussed below. The total investment required for these nine programs, combined with the budgetary restrictions in place as a consequence of the Balanced Budget Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-67 ), or BBA, poses a significant challenge to Air Force budgeters. Because defense budget exhibits project only five years into the future, however, that challenge may not be immediately evident. A more detailed explanation follows. As Figure 1 shows, projected program spending for F-35A and KC-46 procurement is substantial and steady, while RPAs add a relatively small share and spending on the C-130 declines over time. (As this report went to press, the Air Force announced a plan to acquire 75 more MQ-9 Reaper RPAs; the cost of that acquisition is not reflected in these figures.) The major R&D programs offer a different picture. Spending for the LRS-B, following its recent contract award and entering its engineering and manufacturing development phase, is projected to triple over the course of the FYDP. The newer programs begin with relatively low spending in the current FYDP; the challenge will come if those programs proceed to advanced development and eventually procurement. With F-35A and KC-46 slated to continue for many years (and, in KC-46's case, a successor KC-Y programmed to immediately follow), procurement spending on established programs will continue to be substantial. How will the future Air Force procurement budget accommodate the new programs as well? LRS-B complicates the picture further. It is funded (at least through the current FYDP) in the R&D budget, where both the program's size and its increasing budget requirements will place pressure on the newer programs. At some point, LRS-B may shift from R&D to the procurement budget, but that appears to be somewhere beyond FY2020 at the earliest—which is when CRH, PAR, T-X, and JSTARS Recap might also be expected to move from R&D to procurement, exacerbating the rivalry for resources. The net effect of starting these new programs atop a full procurement budget is a classic "bow wave" of procurement, with increasing numbers of programs with growing budgets all trying to fit within a fixed budget topline at the same time while building requirements for increased future funding. One might expect the chart of a procurement "bow wave" to show expenses increasing in the outyears. Figure 1 and Figure 2 both show an increase in FY2018 and FY2019, then a drop for FY2020. Also, the increases for FY2018 and FY2019 do not appear very large in Figure 1 . If an Air Force modernization bow wave exists, why doesn't it show more vividly on the charts? There are three reasons. Two are substantive; one is purely graphical. First, because the FYDP includes only six years' data (the year currently executed, the requested year, and the following four years), the effects of the bow wave are difficult to portray, as the highest development and procurement costs of the new starts and LRS-B would take place after FY2020. What is seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2 can be considered the seeds of the challenge, with the full effects coming in the years beyond the chart. Second, the Air Force has been managing its current programs to remain under its topline budget cap. This has the effect of flattening all spending, as programs that might otherwise grow are constrained, extended, and/or delayed ("moved right," in budget parlance) to keep the modernization accounts under their caps. It is not unreasonable to hypothesize that absent the caps, the program budgets might show greater growth. The purely graphical reason that Figure 1 appears to show virtually flat spending is that the sums for the current procurement programs (F-35A, KC-46, C-130, and RPA) are so large that even significant variations in the smaller programs are visually minimized. By omitting the larger established programs, Figure 2 shows the shape of those newer programs more clearly. It may be tempting to say that because the Air Force has been able to fit its current major procurement and R&D programs into its budget, there is no current modernization budget challenge. In response, one could note that some of those programs, like T-X and CRH, have been delayed from when they were initially required, leading to additional costs to keep the older aircraft that would otherwise have been replaced operating past their designed service lives. Those costs come from the operations and maintenance budgets, and are thus not reflected here, but keeping modernization programs under a current cap does result in costs elsewhere in the Air Force. Perhaps the most significant potential change in the Air Force's budgetary landscape is the end of the BBA-mandated budget caps in FY2021. The end of caps does not mean that the Air Force will get more money, but the R&D programs appear all to be timed such that the bulk of their funding requirements will come after the caps end. Whether this is a deliberate strategy on the part of the Air Force or a coincidence of timing is unclear, but it appears that the Air Force is gambling that the budget caps will not be extended or replaced. Even with the current caps, normal program growth and program changes (like the eventual transfer of LRS-B and other R&D programs from the R&D budget to the procurement budget) will increase the competition for procurement dollars. The F-35A and KC-46 programs will continue for decades, offering little prospective relief. And until its possible transfer, the significant growth of LRS-B within the smaller R&D advanced development budget may seriously challenge the newer programs' development schedules. Also, as Figure 1 and Figure 2 show, current Air Force plans result in a surge in modernization spending in FY2018 and FY2019. Recently, the DOD Comptroller stated that "there'll probably be some slowdowns in some modernization programs" in the FY2017 budget submission from their projected level to accommodate other Air Force priorities. A reduction in FY2017 could make the significant increases planned for FY2018 and FY2019 harder to achieve. When trying to fit growing numbers of growing programs under a fixed budget topline, the broad mechanical choices seem simple: raise the topline or reduce the programs. However, the details matter, especially in how one reduces programs and which programs are reduced. As noted, the BBA-mandated caps on defense spending end in FY2021. However, increasing the Air Force modernization budget after the caps expire (and assuming they are not extended or replaced with a similar mechanism) likely requires a chain of events: that defense is then able to get a larger share of the federal budget, and/or that the Air Force is able to get a larger share of the defense budget, and that competing internal Air Force priorities allow the bulk of any increase to be allocated to aviation modernization. This is not a given, as other, non-aviation Air Force activities like modernization of strategic nuclear systems are expected to require increased funding at the same time. Different means of changing programs yield different effects. Canceling programs can lead to gaps in important capabilities. Delaying or deferring programs can cause cost growth, possible mismatches of capabilities to requirements, and/or loss of industrial base capacity. One also has to guess correctly which programs to reduce as the program delayed or deferred today may be exactly the one needed sooner should requirements, scenarios, adversary capabilities, or other factors change in the future. Noting that CRS does not endorse any particular option, some possible spending reductions or deferrals that Congress may consider include (but are not limited to) the following: Aviation modernization is just one part of the overall Air Force budget. Whether the Air Force ultimately receives an increased topline or not, it is possible to move funds from other programs and activities to fund modernization, as the service has already been doing. The different sources of funds impose various costs. For example, reducing operations and maintenance funding to fund modernization can reduce the current readiness of Air Force units. Retiring or reducing older fleets (as the Air Force has proposed to do with the A-10 attack aircraft) may lead to real or perceived capability gaps. Deferring other major programs (like nuclear modernization) may also create real or perceived capability gaps. Reducing personnel to fund modernization could challenge the Air Force's ability to carry out its full range of missions. The F-35A represents 42% of the FYDP budget for these nine programs. The Air Force intends to acquire 60 F-35As per year. Some commentators have proposed reducing the annual buy to 48 per year, which would free up approximately $1 billion per year for other priorities, either within the roughly $15 billion modernization budget or elsewhere in the Air Force. Those figures do not take into account any costs that would be incurred for extending the life of aircraft the F-35A is intended to replace; capability gaps created through the delayed introduction of more modern aircraft; the increased cost of other F-35 models to other services and allies resulting from a reduced annual buy; and/or the resulting match between U.S. capabilities and adversary air and air defense systems. As noted earlier, the Air Force has already deferred some new starts to keep its modernization programs within a constrained topline. Further delaying or restricting the growth of T-X, JSTARS Recap, CRH, and/or PAR could help synchronize outyear program growth so that they are not all peaking at the same time as LRS-B or each other. However, these programs exist because older platforms are becoming increasingly expensive to maintain and operate. Further deferring them would continue those costs while extending systems—often many decades old—with declining capability. This is even more relevant in the case of LRS-B, as the B-52s it is intended to replace are already programmed to remain in service longer than any operational combat aircraft in history. Slowing or deferring LRS-B could require prolonging the B-52 fleet's life into technically—and budgetarily—unknown territory. The KC-46 program is expected to provide 179 new aerial refueling tankers over 15 years to replace roughly one-third of the KC-135 fleet. A successor program, called KC-Y, is intended to provide another 179, notionally as a continuation of KC-46. Depending on the success of KC-46, the condition of the remaining air tanker fleet, and the number of aircraft requiring refueling (which may be determined in part by which other options the Air Force may take), it may be possible to defer KC-Y for some years. However, doing so could create capability gaps, decrease industrial base capability, and increase the costs of eventual KC-Y aircraft. Also, as KC-Y procurement is not scheduled to begin until after FY2027, the KC-Y program may be starting well after the main effects of the bow wave are felt. As part of its markup of the Navy's proposed FY2015 budget, Congress created the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), a fund in the DOD budget that was to be separate from the Navy's regular shipbuilding account, to fund development of SSBN(X), the replacement of the Ohio -class ballistic missile submarine. This was based on two arguments: (1) that the strategic deterrence mission of the SSBN(X) was a national mission, not unique to the Navy, and (2) that funding the procurement of SSBN(X)s outside the Navy's shipbuilding budget would preserve Navy shipbuilding funds for other Navy shipbuilding programs. The same arguments could be applied to LRS-B. With new weapon system development in some cases taking several decades, illustrating the budget in five- or six-year slices makes visualizing future budgetary needs difficult. Congress has mandated that DOD provide 30-year plans for shipbuilding and aviation programs, but the differing levels of detail in those plans impair their utility in projecting phenomena like the Air Force outyear bow wave. A revision in the FYDP from projecting 5 years in the future to 10 years—even if that implies some reduced-fidelity detail in the outyears—could more tangibly illustrate the resource decisions required today to avoid budgetary "train wrecks" in the future.

The U.S. Air Force is in the midst of an ambitious aviation modernization program, driven primarily by the age of its current aircraft fleets. Four major programs are in procurement, with five more in research and development (R&D). The need to replace several types of aircraft simultaneously poses challenges to future budgets, as the new programs compete with existing program commitments and normal program growth under a restricted service topline. The impending expiration of caps imposed by the Balanced Budget Act coincides with when modernization programs can be expected to experience the most growth, but does not necessarily offer sufficient relief to avoid program cuts or other funding approaches. To meet its modernization requirements, the Air Force may need to revise that topline, defer or delay other programs (including possibly reducing the quantity of aircraft already in procurement), or find other sources of funding to carry all its plans to fruition. Some specific options may include (but are not limited to) raising the Air Force topline (and/or the aviation modernization share); pusharounds or reductions in Air Force programs and activities other than modernization; reducing annual quantities of the F-35A; further retarding the growth of R&D programs; deferring the KC-Y follow-on tanker; funding the long-range strike bomber through a non-Air Force budget. The report examines these options in further detail.

Through the impartial and independent investigation of citizens’ complaints, federal ombudsmen help agencies be more responsive to the public, including people who believe that their concerns have not been dealt with fully or fairly through normal channels. Ombudsmen may recommend ways to resolve individual complaints or more systemic problems, and may help to informally resolve disagreements between the agency and the public. While there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the operation of federal ombudsman offices, the Administrative Conference of the United States recommended in 1990 that the President and the Congress support federal agency initiatives to create and fund an external ombudsman in agencies with significant interaction with the public. In addition, several professional organizations have published relevant standards of practice for ombudsmen. Both the recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States and the standards of practice adopted by various ombudsman associations incorporate the core principles of independence, impartiality (neutrality), and confidentiality. For example, the ABA’s standards define these characteristics as follows: Independence—An ombudsman must be and appear to be free from interference in the legitimate performance of duties and independent from control, limitation, or penalty by an officer of the appointing entity or a person who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry. Impartiality—An ombudsman must conduct inquiries and investigations in an impartial manner, free from initial bias and conflicts of interest. Confidentiality—An ombudsman must not disclose and must not be required to disclose any information provided in confidence, except to address an imminent risk of serious harm. Records pertaining to a complaint, inquiry, or investigation must be confidential and not subject to disclosure outside the ombudsman’s office. Relevant professional standards contain a variety of criteria for assessing an ombudsman’s independence, but in most instances, the underlying theme is that an ombudsman should have both actual and apparent independence from persons who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry. According to ABA guidelines, for example, a key indicator of independence is whether anyone subject to the ombudsman’s jurisdiction can (1) control or limit the ombudsman’s performance of assigned duties, (2) eliminate the office, (3) remove the ombudsman for other than cause, or (4) reduce the office’s budget or resources for retaliatory purposes. Other factors identified in the ABA guidelines on independence include a budget funded at a level sufficient to carry out the ombudsman’s responsibilities; the ability to spend funds independent of any approving authority; and the power to appoint, supervise, and remove staff. The Ombudsman Association’s standards of practice define independence as functioning independent of line management; they advocate that the ombudsman report to the highest authority in the organization. According to the ABA’s recommended standards, “the ombudsman’s structural independence is the foundation upon which the ombudsman’s impartiality is built.” One aspect of the core principle of impartiality is fairness. According to an article published by the U.S. Ombudsman Association on the essential characteristics of an ombudsman, an ombudsman should provide any agency or person being criticized an opportunity to (1) know the nature of the criticism before it is made public and (2) provide a written response that will be published in whole or in summary in the ombudsman’s final report. In addition to the core principles, some associations also stress the need for accountability and a credible review process. Accountability is generally defined in terms of the publication of periodic reports that summarize the ombudsman’s findings and activities. Having a credible review process generally entails having the authority and the means, such as access to agency officials and records, to conduct an effective investigation. The ABA recommends that an ombudsman issue and publish periodic reports summarizing the findings and activities of the office to ensure its accountability to the public. Similarly, recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States regarding federal ombudsmen state that they should be required to submit periodic reports summarizing their activities, recommendations, and the relevant agency’s responses. Federal agencies face legal and practical constraints in implementing some aspects of these standards because the standards were not designed primarily with federal agency ombudsmen in mind. However, ombudsmen at the federal agencies we reviewed for our 2001 report reflected aspects of the standards. We examined the ombudsman function at four federal agencies in addition to EPA and found that three of them—the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service—had an independent office of the ombudsman that reported to the highest level in the agency, thus giving the ombudsmen structural independence. In addition, the ombudsmen at these three agencies had functional independence, including the authority to hire, supervise, discipline, and terminate their staff, consistent with the authority granted to other offices within their agencies. They also had control over their budget resources. The exception was the ombudsman at the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, who did not have a separate office with staff or a separate budget. This ombudsman reported to the Assistant Administrator of the agency instead of the agency head. In our July 2001 report, we recommended, among other things, that EPA modify its organizational structure so that the function would be located outside of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, whose activities the national ombudsman was charged with reviewing. EPA addresses this recommendation through its placement of the national ombudsman within the OIG, where the national ombudsman will report to a newly-created position of Assistant Inspector General for Congressional and Public Liaison. OIG officials also told us that locating the national ombudsman function within the OIG offers the prospect of additional resources and enhanced investigative capability. According to the officials, the national ombudsman will likely have a small permanent staff but will also be able to access OIG staff members with expertise in specific subject matters, such as hazardous waste or water pollution, on an as-needed basis. Further, OIG officials anticipate that the ombudsman will adopt many of the office’s existing recordkeeping and reporting practices, which could help address the concerns we noted in our report about accountability and fairness to the parties subject to an ombudsman investigation. Despite these aspects of EPA’s reorganization, several issues merit further consideration. First and foremost is the question of intent in establishing an ombudsman function. The term “ombudsman,” as defined within the ombudsman community, carries with it certain expectations. The role of an ombudsman typically includes program operating responsibilities, such as helping to informally resolve program-related issues and mediating disagreements between the agency and the public. Assigning these responsibilities to an office within the OIG would conflict with statutory restrictions on the Inspector General’s activities. Specifically, the Inspector General Act, as amended, prohibits an agency from transferring any function, power, or duty involving program responsibilities to its OIG. However, if EPA omits these responsibilities from the position within the OIG, then it will not have established an “ombudsman” as the function is defined within the ombudsman community. In our April 2001 report, we noted that some federal experts in dispute resolution were concerned that among the growing number of federal ombudsman offices there are some individuals or activities described as “ombuds” or “ombuds offices” that do not generally conform to the standards of practice for ombudsmen. A related issue is that ombudsmen generally serve as a key focal point for interaction between the government, or a particular government agency, and the general public. By placing the national ombudsman function within its OIG, EPA appears to be altering the relationship between the function and the individuals that make inquiries or complaints. Ombudsmen typically see their role as being responsive to the public, without being an advocate. However, EPA’s reorganization signals a subtle change in emphasis: OIG officials see the ombudsman function as a source of information regarding the types of issues that the OIG should be investigating. Similarly, rather than issue reports to complainants, OIG officials expect that the national ombudsman’s reports will be addressed to the EPA Administrator, consistent with the reporting procedures for other OIG offices. The officials told us that their procedures for the national ombudsman function, which are still being developed, could provide for sending a copy of the final report or a summary of the investigation to the original complainant along with a separate cover letter when the report is issued to the Administrator. Based on the preliminary information available from EPA, the reorganization raises other issues regarding the consistency of the agency’s ombudsman function with relevant professional standards. For example, under EPA’s reorganization, the national ombudsman will not be able to exercise independent control over budget and staff resources, even within the general constraints that are faced by federal agencies. According to OIG officials, the national ombudsman will have input into the hiring, assignment, and supervision of staff, but overall authority for staff resources and the budget allocation rests with the Assistant Inspector General for Congressional and Public Liaison. OIG officials pointed out that the issue our July 2001 report raised about control over budget and staff resources was closely linked to the ombudsman’s placement within the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. The officials believe that once the national ombudsman function was relocated to the OIG, the inability to control resources became much less significant as an obstacle to operational independence. They maintain that although the ombudsman is not an independent entity within the OIG, the position is independent by virtue of the OIG’s independence. Despite the OIG’s argument, we note that the national ombudsman will also lack authority to independently select and prioritize cases that warrant investigation. According to EPA, the Inspector General has the overall responsibility for the work performed by the OIG, and no single staff member—including the ombudsman—has the authority to select and prioritize his or her own caseload independent of all other needs. Decisions on whether complaints warrant a more detailed review will be made by the Assistant Inspector General for Congressional and Public Liaison in consultation with the national ombudsman and staff. EPA officials are currently reviewing the case files obtained from the former ombudsman, in part to determine the anticipated workload and an appropriate allocation of resources. According to OIG officials, the national ombudsman will have access to other OIG resources as needed, but EPA has not yet defined how decisions will be made regarding the assignment of these resources. Under the ABA guidelines, one measure of independence is a budget funded at a level sufficient to carry out the ombudsman’s responsibilities. However, if both the ombudsman’s budget and workload are outside his or her control, then the ombudsman would be unable to assure that the resources for implementing the function are adequate. Ombudsmen at other federal agencies must live within a budget and are subject to the same spending constraints as other offices within their agencies, but they can set their own priorities and decide how their funds will be spent. EPA has also not yet fully defined the role of its regional ombudsmen or the nature of their relationship with the national ombudsman in the OIG. EPA officials told us that the relationship between the national and regional ombudsmen is a “work in progress” and that the OIG will be developing procedures for when and how interactions will occur. Depending on how EPA ultimately defines the role of its regional ombudsmen, their continued lack of independence could remain an issue. In our July 2001 report, we concluded that the other duties assigned to the regional ombudsmen—primarily line management positions within the Superfund program—hamper their independence. Among other things, we cited guidance from The Ombudsman Association, which states that an ombudsman should serve “no additional role within an organization” because holding another position would compromise the ombudsman’s neutrality. According to our discussions with officials from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and the OIG, the investigative aspects of the ombudsman function will be assigned to the OIG, but it appears that the regional ombudsmen will respond to inquiries and have a role in informally resolving issues between the agency and the public before they escalate into complaints about how EPA operates. For the time being, EPA officials expect the regional ombudsmen to retain their line management positions. Finally, including the national ombudsman function within the Office of the Inspector General raises concerns about the effect on the OIG, even if EPA defines the ombudsman’s role in a way that avoids conflict with the Inspector General Act. By having the ombudsman function as a part of the OIG, the Inspector General could no longer independently audit and investigate that function, as is the case at other federal agencies where the ombudsman function and the OIG are separate entities. As we noted in a June 2001 report on certain activities of the OIG at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, under applicable government auditing standards the OIG cannot independently and impartially audit and investigate activities it is directly involved in. A related issue concerns situations in which the national ombudsman receives an inquiry or complaint about a matter that has already been investigated by the OIG. For example, OIG reports are typically transmitted to the Administrator after a review by the Inspector General. A process that requires the Inspector General to review an ombudsman- prepared report that is critical of, or could be construed as reflecting negatively on, previous OIG work could pose a conflict for the Inspector General. OIG officials are currently working on detailed procedures for the national ombudsman function, including criteria for opening, prioritizing, and closing cases, and will have to address this issue as part of their effort. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we believe that several issues need to be considered in EPA’s reorganization of its ombudsman function. The first is perhaps the most fundamental—that is, the need to clarify the intent. We look forward to working with members of the Committee as you consider the best way of resolving these issues.

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) hazardous waste ombudsman was established as a result of the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Recognizing that the ombudsman provides a valuable service to the public, EPA retained the ombudsman function as a matter of policy after its legislative authorization expired in 1988. Over time, EPA expanded the national ombudsman's jurisdiction to include Superfund and other hazardous waste programs, and, by March 1996, EPA had designated ombudsmen in each of its ten regional offices. In November 2001, the agency announced that the national ombudsman would be relocated from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and would address concerns across the spectrum of EPA programs, not just hazardous waste programs. Although there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the operation of ombudsman offices, several professional organizations have published standards of practice relevant to ombudsmen who deal with public inquiries. If EPA intends to have an ombudsman function consistent with the way the position is typically defined in the ombudsman community, placing the national ombudsman within the OIG does not achieve that objective. The role of the ombudsman typically includes program operating responsibilities, such as helping to informally resolve program-related issues and mediating disagreements between the agency and the public. Including these responsibilities within the OIG would likely conflict with the Inspector General Act, which prohibits the transfer of program operating responsibilities to the Inspector General; yet, omitting these responsibilities would result in establishing an ombudsman that is not fully consistent with the function as defined within the ombudsman community.

Telecommuting in the public sector began about 10 years ago as a federal pilot project. Its goals were to save energy, improve air quality, reduce congestion and stress on our highways, and help employees better balance the competing demands of work and family obligations. Typically, formal telecommuting arrangements establish specific times, generally ranging from 1 to 5 days per week, in which employees work at their homes or other remote locations. However, employers may also allow telecommuting on an informal basis, where arrangements are more episodic, shorter term, and designed to meet special employer or employee needs. Although estimates vary depending on the definition of telecommuting that is used, recent data indicate that the number of employers and employees involved in telecommuting arrangements has grown over the past 10 years. In 1992, the U.S. Department of Transportation estimated that there were 2 million telecommuters (1.6 percent of the labor force) working from their homes 1 or 2 days per week. Last year, a private association that promotes the concept of telecommuting, estimated that 9.3 million employees telecommuted at least 1 day per week and 16.5 million telecommuted at least 1 day per month. These estimates show that out of 138 million wage and salary workers in the United States, about 7 to 12 percent telecommute periodically. For the federal workforce, a recent OPM survey of 97 federal agencies showed that 45,298 workers or 2.6 percent of their total workforce, telecommuted at least 52 days per year. In our examination of barriers to telecommuting in the private sector, we found that decisions on whether an organization ultimately adopted telecommuting programs or expanded them over time was heavily dependent on the resolution of three concerns: identifying the positions and employees suitable for telecommuting; protecting data; and controlling the costs associated with telecommuting. The concerns held by private sector management were similar to those of managers in federal agencies. Of those management concerns that pose a potential barrier to telecommuting, the first involved identifying those positions and employees best suited for telecommuting. Our analysis and interviews with employers, proponents of telecommuting, and other experts, showed that telecommuting is not a viable option for every position or employee. For example, site-specific positions involving manufacturing, warehousing, or face-to-face interaction with customers are usually not suitable for telecommuting. Conversely, positions involving information handling and professional knowledge-related tasks, such as administrative activities and report writing, can often be performed from a remote location. Beyond having jobs suitable for telecommuting, an organization must also have employees that are able to perform in a telecommuting environment. The current literature showed that telecommuting is best suited for high-performing and self-motivated employees with a proven record of working independently and with limited supervision. If an organization determines that it lacks the positions or employees that are suitable for telecommuting, it may choose not to establish or expand such arrangements. A second management concern pertained to an employer’s ability to protect proprietary and sensitive data and monitor employee access to such data without invading individual privacy rights. Our analysis of current literature and studies on this subject, as well as interviews with employers, showed that security concerns generally centered on potential vulnerabilities associated with providing employees with remote access to internal record systems. Access involving the Internet and employers’ ability to prevent unauthorized copying, manipulation, and modification of company information was of particular concern. We also identified uncertainties among employers regarding the extent to which electronic monitoring of employee activities is permissible or considered an infringement on individual privacy. Left unresolved, these data security issues could potentially cause employers to choose not to adopt telecommuting arrangements. The third management concern involved assessing the costs associated with starting a telecommuting program and its potential impact on productivity and profits. Telecommuting programs often involve some employer investment related to upgrading systems and software to permit remote access, providing employees with hardware and software to work from their homes, or incurring additional costs to rent space and equipment available at telecenters. These costs may adversely affect profits if productivity does not increase or at least remain the same. The potential barriers to private sector telecommuting discussed today are similar in many ways to those confronting telecommuting in the federal government, as noted in prior GAO work and OPM’s June 2001 report. In 1997, we reported on the implementation of telecommuting (then referred to as flexiplace) in federal agencies. Among the topics discussed in our report were barriers affecting the growth of telecommuting programs. The most frequently cited obstacle to increased use of telecommuting related to management concerns. Interviews with agency and union officials disclosed that managers and supervisors were hesitant to pursue telecommuting arrangements because of fears that employee productivity would diminish if they worked at home. Other related concerns cited in our report included management views that agencies did not have sufficient numbers of suitable employees and positions for telecommuting arrangements; concerns regarding the treatment of sensitive data, especially the additional cost of ensuring the security of data accessed from remote locations; and lack of resources necessary to provide additional computers, modems, and phone lines for the homes of telecommuters. OPM’s June 2001 report on federal agency efforts to establish telecommuting policies identified similar potential barriers. OPM reported that its survey of 97 federal agencies showed that management reluctance was the most frequently cited barrier to increased telecommuting among federal employees. Basic concerns centered on the ability to manage workers at remote sites and the associated loss of control over telecommuters. OPM also noted that security concerns about allowing remote access to sensitive and classified data remained high, as did questions about funding the purchase of additional computer hardware and software for equipment that would be deployed at telecommuters’ homes. While management concerns are often cited as a potential barrier to private and federal telecommuting programs, our work identified a number of laws and regulations that could also impact these arrangements. These laws and regulations include those covering taxes, workplace safety, recordkeeping, and liability for injuries. Because several of these laws and regulations predate the shift toward a more technological and information-based economy in which telecommuting has developed, their application to telecommuting is still evolving and unclear at this time. Of those laws and regulations that could impact an employer’s provisions of telecommuting arrangements, increased state tax liability for employers and employees involved in interstate telecommuting arrangements may have the greatest potential to undermine further growth. At issue for employers is whether having telecommuters work from their residence in a state where a company has no other physical presence can expose the company to additional tax liabilities and burdens. For the employees, the tax issue has taken on increasing importance, most notably in the Northeastern United States, where a number of states have tax rules that allow them to deem all wages of nonresident telecommuters working for companies located in their states as taxable whenever working at home is for the employee’s convenience rather than an employer necessity. At the same time, the state where the telecommuter resides and works via telecommuting may be taxing some of the same income because it was earned while they worked at home, which in effect “double taxes” that income. Our discussions and other information we received during our review, brought to our attention at least 13 tax cases related to telecommuting and taxing issues. One such case showing the long reach of a tax authority involves New York State’s taxing the wages of a telecommuting Tennessee resident who was employed by a company located in New York, but worked 75 percent of the time from home. A number of telecommuting experts and employers we interviewed believed that the uncertainties surrounding the application of individual state tax laws to telecommuting situations was a significant emerging issue that, if left unresolved, could ultimately impact the willingness of employers and individuals (including federal employees) to participate in telecommuting programs. Beyond the issue of state taxation, our work identified a number of other barriers to private-sector telecommuting programs that are also applicable to federal agencies. First, in regard to workplace safety, one concern was that employers would have to conduct potentially costly inspections of workers’ home offices. The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act requires private employers to provide a place of employment that is free from recognized, serious hazards. A February 2000 OSHA policy directive stated that it would not inspect home offices, hold employers liable for their safety, or require employers to inspect these workplaces. Some employers and telecommuting proponents, however, remained concerned that this internal policy could be reversed in the future, exposing employers to workplace safety violations and ultimately requiring them to complete costly home office inspections. A number of employers told us they were attempting to eliminate potential workplace safety issues by offering employees guidance on home office safety and design or providing them with ergonomic furniture. Other experts have suggested that a training program on safety be part of an employer’s program. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, federal agencies must also establish and maintain safety and health programs consistent with OSHA standards. To the extent that they attempt to meet OSHA safety standards for their telecommuters’ home offices, the potential financial and administrative costs of initiatives similar to those taken in the private sector may serve as a barrier to implementation. Second, federal wage and hour law and regulations may also pose a barrier to telecommuting programs in both the private and public sectors. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires, among other things, that employers maintain sufficient records to document all hours worked, including overtime. Concerns voiced by telecommuting experts in this area centered on the increased documentation burden this may pose, as well as the uncertainties regarding an employer’s ability to sufficiently monitor hours worked and control labor costs. However, our review and interviews with employers showed that most telecommuters fall under employee classifications (i.e., executive, administrative, or professional) that are exempt from FLSA requirements. In addition, to comply with the law and control labor costs for the few employees to whom the FLSA did apply, some employers developed ad hoc procedures to preauthorize and record hours and overtime worked. As a result, monitoring the hours of telecommuting workers was not viewed as a substantial barrier. However, to the extent that federal agencies have a workforce covered by the FLSA, concerns about the ability to sufficiently control and track telecommuter hours worked may serve as a barrier to implementation. A final issue I will discuss relates to the potential for increased employer liability for home workplace injuries and the rising worker compensation costs this could bring. Generally, work-related injuries are covered under state workers’ compensation programs. Numerous telecommuting experts are concerned that, because injuries at home are not usually witnessed, determining whether they are truly work-related is problematic. Our analysis and interviews showed that this is an area that could be vulnerable to increased fraud and abuse. The employers we interviewed and other experts have said that they were not yet experiencing significant problems with home workplace injuries or workers’ compensation claims. However, some experts noted that this could become a larger issue as more individuals telecommute. Telecommuting offers a new set of opportunities that could benefit employers, employees, and society as a whole. Whether these opportunities are realized, however, will depend on resolving fundamental questions about how telecommuting affects an employer’s ability to manage employees and other resources, specifically about its suitability as a work arrangement as well as questions about data security and overall costs. Knowing the extent to which these questions apply to federal agencies would provide important information for making decisions about telecommuting by federal workers. Realizing the full potential of telecommuting also requires looking beyond internal management concerns to the laws that govern an organization’s operating environment. Some of these laws were put in place before we could imagine a world in which employees lived in one state, but through technology, worked in another distant state, and as a result, they may unintentionally discourage telecommuting. Further examining how current laws and regulations could potentially impact telecommuters and their employers would provide the opportunity to mitigate their effects. In conclusion, pursuing the question of how to promote telecommuting is really a question of how to adapt current management practices, and laws and regulations to changing work arrangements that are, and will be, part of the information age in which we now live. This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Telecommuting refers to work that is done at an employee's home or at a job site other than a traditional business office. Perhaps the biggest challenge to establishing and expanding telecommuting programs in both the public and private sectors is management's concerns about the types of positions and employees suitable for telecommuting, protecting proprietary and sensitive data, and establishing cost-effective telecommuting programs. Some federal and state laws and regulations, including those governing taxes, workplace safety, workforce recordkeeping, and liability for home workplace injuries, are also potential obstacles to telecommuting. Overall, the application of state tax laws to telecommuting arrangements, as well as other laws and regulations enacted before the transition to a more technological and information based economy, is evolving and their ultimate impact remains unclear.

Federal civilian employees may be compensated for periods of illness, disability, or injury through one of three systems: paid sick leave, disability retirement, or workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained at work. In most cases, short-term illness or injury is compensated through paid sick leave. A federal employee who experiences a permanent disability can take a disability retirement before reaching the statutory retirement age. Disability retirement benefits differ between the two federal retirement systems: the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS). Federal employees hired before 1984 are covered by CSRS and those who were hired in 1984 or later are covered by FERS. Employees enrolled in CSRS do not pay Social Security taxes and do not earn Social Security benefits while employed by the federal government. Employees enrolled in FERS pay Social Security taxes and earn Social Security benefits. Until the age of 62, disability retirement annuities under FERS are offset in part by the amount of Social Security benefits the annuitant receives. Workers who experience short-term illnesses or injuries can use paid sick leave to take time off from work. Federal employees accrue sick leave at the rate of 4 hours for each two-week pay period up to a total of 104 hours (13 days) per year. Unused sick leave continues to accrue without limit throughout a federal employee's career. If an employee has exhausted his or her accrued sick leave balance, the worker's employing agency can advance up to 30 days of sick leave per year. Ill or injured workers who have exhausted their accrued sick leave but who expect to be able to return to work can use their accrued annual leave or, in some cases, can take leave without pay until they have recovered and can return to work. The federal government does not offer short-term disability insurance to workers who have exhausted their accrued sick leave and annual leave. The Federal Employees Leave Sharing Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-566 ) authorizes a voluntary leave bank program through which federal agencies may allow employees to donate unused annual leave to employees who have exhausted their accrued sick leave. Employees cannot donate unused sick leave. When a worker covered by CSRS or FERS retires, any unused sick leave that he or she has accrued is added to the employee's length of service for purposes of computing the employee's annuity. A federal employee enrolled in CSRS is eligible for a disability retirement if he or she has completed at least five years of creditable civilian service; the employee has a disability that results in deficient performance, conduct, or attendance or that is incompatible with the individual continuing to perform useful and efficient service in his or her job; a physician certifies that the disability is expected to last a year or more; the worker's employing agency is unable to accommodate the disability in the worker's current job or in an existing vacant position at the same grade or pay and in the same commuting area; and an application for disability retirement is filed with the employing agency before separation or with the Office of Personnel Management within one year of the date of separation from employment. Unlike the eligibility requirements for benefits under the Social Security Disability Insurance Income (SSDI) and Supplemental Security (SSI) programs, eligibility for a CSRS disability retirement annuity does not require the employee to be disabled for any employment in the national economy. Instead, to be eligible for a CSRS disability retirement annuity, the employee must be unable to perform the job to which he or she was assigned or a job at the same pay in the same commuting area. Unless the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) certifies that the individual's disability is permanent, an employee who has retired due to disability is required to undergo periodic medical reevaluations until the age of 60. If the individual recovers, disability annuity payments continue temporarily while the individual seeks reemployment. The disability annuity terminates at the earliest of (1) the date on which the individual is reemployed by the government, (2) one year from the date of a medical examination showing that the individual has recovered from the illness or disability, or (3) six months from the end of the calendar year in which the individual demonstrates that his or her earning capacity has been restored. The individual's earning capacity is deemed to have been restored if, in any calendar year, his or her income from wages, self-employment, or both is equal to at least 80% of the current rate of pay for the position he or she occupied immediately before retiring. Under CSRS, a disabled worker is eligible for a retirement annuity equal to the greater of (1) the annuity that he or she would receive under the regular retirement formula, or (2) a minimum benefit that is the lesser of 40% of the average of the employee's highest three consecutive years of basic pay ("high-three" pay), or the annuity that would be paid if the employee continued working until the age of 60 at the same high-three pay, including in the annuity computation the number of years of service and the years between the date of retirement and the date on which the individual would reach the age of 60. The method of computing a CSRS disability retirement annuity assures that an employee will not receive a larger annuity through a disability retirement than he or she would receive from having worked to the minimum age and years of service required for a normal retirement. In general, a worker who becomes disabled after 22 or more years of federal service will receive an annuity computed under the regular CSRS annuity formula, regardless of his or her age. Because CSRS has been closed to new entrants since 1984, most federal employees covered by CSRS now have 30 or more years of service. Under CSRS, a regular retirement annuity for 30 years of service would replace 56.25% of the worker's high-three average pay. A federal employee covered by CSRS can take regular retirement with an immediate, unreduced annuity at the age of 55 or later with at least 30 years of service, at the age of 60 or later with at least 20 years of service, or at the age of 62 with at least five years of service. CSRS retirement annuities are indexed annually to the rate of growth of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), regardless of whether the individual retired due to disability or under normal retirement rules. A federal employee who is enrolled in FERS must have completed at least 18 months of service to be eligible for a disability retirement. All other eligibility rules for disability retirement under FERS are the same as under CSRS. Federal employees enrolled in FERS also are covered by Social Security, and the amount of a disability annuity under FERS is offset until the age of 62 by a portion of any Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefit that the individual receives. Federal employees covered by FERS who apply for disability retirement also must apply for Social Security disability benefits. Eligibility for Social Security disability benefits requires a determination by the Social Security Administration that the individual is unable to perform substantial gainful activity in any job in the national economy. Therefore, an individual covered by FERS may be determined to be disabled for purposes of his or her job with the federal government, but not with respect to other employment. In such a case, the individual would be eligible to receive a FERS disability annuity but be ineligible for SSDI. A federal employee who is disabled under both the FERS and Social Security statutes would be eligible to receive both a FERS disability annuity and a Social Security benefit, subject to the provisions of federal law integrating the two benefits. For federal employees under 62 years of age, the FERS disability retirement annuity in the first year of disability is 60% of the individual's high-three average pay minus 100% of any Social Security benefit that he or she is receiving. In years after the first year of disability, the FERS disability annuity is 40% of the individual's high-three average pay minus 60% of any Social Security benefit that he or she is receiving. The FERS disability annuity remains at that level—adjusted annually by the FERS cost-of-living adjustment—until the individual reaches the age of 62. When a FERS disability annuitant reaches the age of 62, the FERS annuity is adjusted to the amount that the individual would have received if he or she had continued to work until the age of 62. This ensures that an individual who retires from federal employment as the result of disability does not receive a higher annuity after this age than he or she would have received as the result of taking a normal retirement. The adjusted annuity at the age of 62 is equal to 1.0% of the individual's high-three average pay (increased by the FERS cost-of-living adjustments since the date of the disability retirement) multiplied by the sum of years of service performed before the date of disability retirement plus the number of years since that date. If the total number of years is 20 or more, the annuity is 1.1% of high-three average pay multiplied by this number of years. If an employee covered by FERS becomes disabled at the age of 62 or later, his or her FERS annuity is computed under the regular FERS retirement rules. In most cases, the adjusted FERS benefit payable at the age of 62 will be lower than the annuity that was paid before age 62. However, at the age of 62 and later, the offset to the FERS annuity for any Social Security benefits that the individual may be receiving will cease. Also, a worker who was receiving a FERS annuity but was not eligible for SSDI can apply for Social Security retired worker benefits at the age of 62, provided that he or she has completed the required 40 quarters of employment covered by Social Security. The Social Security benefit will compensate in part for the reduction in the FERS annuity. FERS disability annuities are adjusted for inflation beginning in the second year of payment. If the CPI has increased by 2.0% or less during the year ending on September 30, the FERS cost-of-living adjustment in the following January is equal to the percentage change in the CPI. If the CPI has increased by more than 2.0% but less than 3.0%, the FERS COLA is 2.0%. If the CPI has increased by 3.0% or more, the FERS COLA is one percentage point less than the increase in the CPI. FERS retirement benefits consist of the FERS annuity, Social Security, and the Thrift Savings Plan. P.L. 108-92 (October 3, 2003) changed the computation of the FERS annuity for federal employees who are injured on the job. An injured employee cannot contribute to Social Security or to the Thrift Savings Plan while receiving workers' compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. Social Security taxes and TSP contributions must be paid from earnings , and workers' compensation payments are not classified as earnings under either the Social Security Act or the Internal Revenue Code. As a result, the employee's future retirement income from Social Security and the TSP may be reduced. P.L. 108-92 increased the FERS basic annuity from 1.0% of the individual's high-three average pay to 2.0% of high-three average pay for the duration of the period when the individual received workers' compensation. This is intended to replace income that may have been lost from lower Social Security benefits and reduced income from the TSP. The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) provides benefits to federal employees who suffer a partial or total disability as the result of an injury incurred at work. In the event of the worker's death as the result of an on-the-job injury, FECA pays benefits to the worker's surviving dependents. FECA pays benefits only in the case of an illness, injury, or disability that is determined to be work-related. Federal workers are covered by FECA immediately upon employment. FECA benefits consist of cash compensation, payment of medical expenses related to the illness or injury, vocational rehabilitation assistance, and payment for attendant care services. The cash payment is calculated as a percentage of average annual earnings prior to the individual's injury or death. FECA benefits are indexed annually to the rate of growth of the CPI. FECA benefits are not subject to income taxes. FECA cash compensation equals two-thirds of lost earning capacity if the worker has no dependents or three-fourths of lost earning capacity if the worker has dependents. FECA payments may not exceed 75% of the maximum rate of pay for grade GS-15 of the general schedule, and in case of total disability, may not be less than the minimum pay for the GS-2 pay grade. FECA cash benefits continue as long as the disability lasts. Compensation does not end when the individual reaches retirement age. An injured employee may elect to receive a disability retirement annuity instead of FECA benefits, but may not receive both simultaneously. If an employee covered by FERS elects to receive FECA compensation, it will be reduced by the amount of any Social Security benefits that are based on the period of his or her federal employment. An election between FECA and a disability retirement annuity may be changed at any time. For certain listed injuries, minimum cash benefits are provided, regardless of how long the disability lasts. In case of injuries resulting from a specific incident, the employee's full pay continues for the term of the disability up to a maximum of 45 days, after which regular FECA compensation payments begin if the disability continues. If a federal employee dies from a work-related injury, FECA pays cash compensation to the worker's surviving dependents. A surviving spouse receives annual compensation equal to 50% of the worker's last annual rate of pay. Benefits terminate if the surviving spouse remarries before age 60, although in the event of remarriage before the age of 60, the surviving spouse is paid a lump sum equal to two years of benefits. If the worker had both a spouse and dependent children, the spouse's benefit is equal to 45% of the worker's last annual rate of pay, and each dependent child receives a benefit equal to 15% of pay, up to a maximum family benefit equal to 75% of pay. If the worker had dependent children but no spouse, the compensation is equal to 40% of pay for one child and an additional 15% for each additional child up to a maximum of 75% of pay. A dependent child's benefit ends at the age of 19, unless he or she is incapable of self-support due to disability. In some cases, other surviving dependent relatives, including parents, siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren may be eligible for compensation, according to the extent of their financial dependence on the deceased worker. Section 651 of P.L. 104-208 , the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY1997, authorizes the heads of federal agencies to pay a gratuity payment of up to $10,000 to the executor of the estate of a federal employee who dies as the result of injury sustained in the performance of official duties after August 1, 1990.

Paid sick leave, disability retirement, or workers' compensation may provide benefits for federal civilian employees during periods of illness, disability, or workplace injury, respectively. Federal civilian employees earn 13 days of paid sick leave per year. Sick leave can be used because of the worker's own illness or injury or to care for an ill or injured family member. A worker's employing agency can advance up to 30 additional days of sick leave to an employee who has exhausted his or her accrued sick leave. A federal worker with a long-term disability can separate from service through a disability retirement. A federal employee who sustains a disabling injury on the job can receive benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), the workers' compensation program for federal employees. FECA benefits consist of cash compensation, payment of medical costs related to the injury, vocational rehabilitation assistance, the cost of attendant care services, and burial benefits. A disabled federal employee may not receive a disability retirement annuity and FECA benefits simultaneously.

Mexico held presidential and congressional elections on July 2, 2006. The presidential vote was the second since the end of the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) 71-year authoritarian rule in 2000. President Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) was constitutionally prohibited from seeking re-election. The three major candidates were populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), conservative Felipe Calderón Hinojosa of the PAN, and Roberto Madrazo of the PRI. Mexican law requires only a plurality of votes in a presidential race and does not provide for a second round of voting. After a highly contested election, PAN candidate Felipe Calderón was named president-elect of Mexico on September 5, 2006, and is due to be sworn into office on December 1, 2006. According to the final vote count, Calderón won just under 36% of the vote, defeating PRD candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador by less than 234,000 votes. Voter turnout was 59%. Although Mexico's Federal Elections Institute (IFE) planned to announce results on July 2, the vote was too close to call. At the end of the preliminary vote count, Calderón held a slight lead over López Obrador, prompting the PRD candidate to call for a full recount of the votes. López Obrador challenged the July election results, alleging fraud at the polling places and illegal interference in the election by President Fox and conservative business groups. Mexico's Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF), whose decisions cannot be appealed, issued a series of decisions related to fraud allegations in the presidential campaign and vote. First, it ordered a recount of 9% of polling places in early August. In a unanimous decision issued August 28, the Tribunal held that although there were some irregularities, the election was fair. The Tribunal annulled nearly 238,000 votes as a result of irregularities. On September 5, 2006, the Tribunal ruled unanimously that, although President Fox's comments jeopardized the election, they did not amount to illegal interference in the campaign. The Tribunal also found that commercials paid for by business groups at the end of the campaign were illegal but that the impact of the ads was insufficient to warrant the annulment of the presidential election. As a result of these findings, the Tribunal named Felipe Calderón president-elect on September 5, 2006. After the vote, Andrés Manuel López Obrador led a campaign of civil disobedience, including the blockade of Mexico City's principal avenue, Paseo de la Reforma, until mid-September. It reportedly cost Mexico City businesses over $500 million in revenue. On September 1, 2006, PRD members of congress prevented President Fox from delivering the state of the union address at the Mexican congress. López Obrador rejected the election tribunal's September 5 ruling and was named the "legitimate president" of Mexico at a democratic convention held on September 16 at the Zocalo, Mexico City's main square. The PRD candidate is due to be sworn in as president of a "parallel government" on November 20. The convention also created three committees: one responsible for political negotiation, another to coordinate future civil disobedience, and a third to call a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. It is not clear how this parallel government will operate or how much support it has. In mid-September PRD founder Cuahtémoc Cárdenas criticized López Obrador's tactics as undemocratic and criticized him for surrounding himself with advisors who helped to orchestrate what many believe to be Carlos Salinas de Gortari's fraudulent defeat of Cuahtémoc Cárdenas in the 1988 elections. Harvard-trained economist Felipe Calderón, the PAN presidential candidate, has been active in the conservative PAN since his youth. He served two terms in the Chamber of Deputies (1991-1994 and 2000-2003), was PAN party president (1996-1999) and Energy Minister (2003-2004) under President Vicente Fox. Calderón surprised many by winning the PAN nomination, since many observers anticipated that former Interior Minister Santiago Creel would easily win the nomination. Although Calderón was relatively unknown to the Mexican electorate in December 2005, by mid-June 2006 polls showed that he was in a tight race with PRD candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Calderón's rise in the polls was believed to be the result of missteps by López Obrador and negative advertisements claiming the PRD candidate is a "danger to Mexico." Running under the campaign slogan "Felipe Calderón: Jobs President (presidente de empleo)," Calderón maintained that Mexico's main problem is a shortage of well-paid jobs, which leads many Mexicans to migrate to the United States. He stressed that investment and competitiveness are keys to economic growth and job creation. Calderón pledged to create a positive investment climate by pursuing sound macroeconomic policies, balanced and sustainable budgets, and social investment; strengthening the rule of law; and creating funds to support social investment during economic downturns. He also expressed support for a development plan, similar to the European Union plan that stimulated the Irish and Spanish economies, funded by NAFTA members to increase jobs and reduce migration from under-developed regions of Mexico. Calderón also proposed opening Mexico's oil sector to private investment in the form of joint-ventures with the state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) to further explore Mexican oil reserves, particularly potential deep-water reserves in the Gulf of Mexico. Calderón pledged to address Mexico's public security crisis by, among other measures, combating corruption; creating an agency to combat drug trafficking; extraditing criminals; unifying all federal police forces; and creating a national crime database to better understand the nature of criminal activity in Mexico. Calderón indicated he will pursue an active foreign policy, and work to restore relations with Venezuela, even though he does not support its ideology. PRD presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a native of the southern state of Tabasco, studied political science and public administration at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) before returning to Tabasco to work with the Chontal Indian community. In the late 1980s, he aligned himself with Cuahtémoc Cárdenas, who had left the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and founded the PRD in 1989. López Obrador was named party president for Tabasco in 1989, served as national party president (1996-1999), and was elected mayor of Mexico City (2000-2005). Extremely popular as mayor, he was expected to win the presidency easily in 2006. He led in the polls until late April 2006, when he lost support likely due to comments deemed disrespectful of President Fox and because of his refusal to take part in the April 25, 2006, presidential debates. In mid-June 2006, polls again showed López Obrador with a slight lead over PAN candidate Felipe Calderón. López Obrador's campaign slogan was "For the good of all, the poor first (Por el bien de todos, primeros los pobres)." Not surprisingly, then, many of his 50 campaign pledges focused on poverty reduction, job creation, indigenous rights, and infrastructure investment. Proposed measures included guaranteeing a pension to all Mexicans over 70 years of age; protecting the rights of the indigenous and reducing poverty in indigenous communities; expanding access to education and improving its quality; increasing access to health care; creating incentives for maquila operators to stay in Mexico; and building high-speed rail lines. Of particular interest to the United States was his pledge to re-open NAFTA negotiations to protect Mexican corn and bean farmers. López Obrador opposes opening the state-owned oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), to private investment, and charges that PEMEX's inefficiency is the result of corruption and a bloated bureaucracy. He planned to make Mexico self-sufficient in gasoline within three years of his taking office. López Obrador indicated that he would focus on Mexico's internal problems, not foreign policy, as president. Nevertheless, López Obrador stated that he will have a positive relationship with the United States. He planned to reduce emigration by addressing poverty and job creation. López Obrador, like Calderón, said he would be an advocate for the rights of Mexican migrants in the United States. In the June 6 debate he indicated that he would employ Mexico's consulates as branches of the Attorney General's office to protect Mexican migrants from discrimination. During the debate, López Obrador also stated that he would increase the role of the army to combat narcotics trafficking. Some observers feared that López Obrador would become an ally of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, while others disputed this, pointing to the candidate's statements that he will focus on Mexico, not foreign policy. Another native of Tabasco, attorney Roberto Madrazo Pintado, was the PRI candidate for president. The son of a prominent PRI leader, he has served as a federal deputy (1976 and 1991-1993), senator (1988-1991), Governor of Tabasco (1994-2000), and national PRI party president (2002-2005). Opinion polls consistently put Madrazo in third place throughout the campaign. Already a divisive candidate within the PRI, his poor showing in polls led some PRI leaders to shift their support to Calderón or López Obrador while encouraging PRI voters to do the same rather than "waste" votes on Madrazo. On May 30, the PRI expelled 28 leaders who endorsed one of the two leading candidates. During the campaign, Madrazo pledged to create jobs, improve security, facilitate remittances from the United States to Mexico, modernize the energy sector by permitting joint ventures between PEMEX and private companies, and increase the number of Mexicans who benefit from stable macroeconomic policies and export growth. He proposed shifting public investment to infrastructure and public works and improving linkages between the export sector and the internal market. He supported an immigration accord with the United States and said that more job creation is needed to prevent Mexican emigration. Madrazo also pledged to improve public security by placing federal police forces under a unified command and expanding the authority of the "preventive police" to include the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Mexico has a bicameral legislature comprised of a 500-member Chamber of Deputies and a 128-member Senate. Mexican voters elected a completely new congress on July 2, 2006. Consecutive re-election is prohibited. Deputies are elected to three-year terms with 300 elected by direct vote and 200 proportionally elected from party lists in five 40-member districts. Senators are elected to six-year terms. Each of Mexico's 32 states directly elects three senators; the two from the slate winning the plurality of votes and the first candidate from the second-place list. Another 32 senators are elected by proportional vote from national party lists. Both the PAN and PRD gained significant representation in the new congress sworn in on September 1, 2006, while the PRI was significantly weakened in both houses. The PRI delegation in the Chamber of Deputies fell from the largest to the third largest; PRI fell to the second largest delegation in the Senate. Although the PAN is the largest party in both houses, it failed to win a majority. Given the tension between the PAN and PRD stemming from the presidential election, some analysts believe the PRI will be influential in the upcoming congress as the PAN delegation seeks additional votes to pass legislation. The United States and Mexico have a multifaceted relationship, with recent emphasis on migration, border security, drug trafficking, trade, and energy policy. President-elect Felipe Calderón is likely to continue Mexico's advocacy for immigration reform in the United States. Differences over migration policy and border security are likely to continue to strain U.S.-Mexico relations. During the campaign, Calderón indicated his support for legalization of Mexicans who have been illegally present in the United States for five years. He also opposed construction of additional barriers along the U.S.-Mexican border. In September 2006, President-elect Calderón charged that the border fence under consideration by the U.S. Congress will be ineffective in combating illegal immigration. In October, the Mexican government officially requested that President Bush veto the Secure Fence Act of 2006 ( H.R. 6061 ) approved by Congress on September 29, 2006, that would authorize construction of a border fence along 700 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border. President Bush is expected to sign the bill and on October 4, 2006, signed the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for 2007, which provides $1.2 billion to build the fence. Calderón recently re-emphasized his support for the extradition of drug kingpins to the United States and called for Mexico's political parties to work together to develop legislative and law enforcement solutions to the drug violence that plagues Mexico. NAFTA stipulates further opening of agricultural trade in 2008, including the sensitive bean and corn crops, causing concern in Mexico about the potentially adverse effects on domestic production. President-elect Calderón indicated during the campaign that he would address these concerns within the NAFTA framework, in contrast to López Obrador's call to re-open NAFTA negotiations. President-elect Calderón has also proposed the opening of Mexico's oil industry to private investment. President-elect Felipe Calderón pledged to continue the active foreign policy pursued by the Fox administration. During the campaign he expressed hope of restoring Mexico's ambassador to Venezuela. Calderón also presented himself as an alternative regional influence to Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. His first trip abroad as president-elect, in early October, was to nine Central and South American nations. Calderón has indicated that he will re-orient Mexico's foreign policy to emphasize its relationships with its southern neighbors.

Mexico held national elections for a new president and congress on July 2, 2006. Conservative Felipe Calderón of the National Action Party (PAN) narrowly defeated Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in a highly contested election. Final results of the presidential election were only announced after all legal challenges had been settled. On September 5, 2006, the Elections Tribunal found that although business groups illegally interfered in the election, the effect of the interference was insufficient to warrant an annulment of the vote, and the tribunal declared PAN-candidate Felipe Calderón president-elect. PRD candidate López Obrador, who rejected the Tribunal's decision, was named the "legitimate president" of Mexico by a National Democratic Convention on September 16. The electoral campaign touched on issues of interest to the United States including migration, border security, drug trafficking, energy policy, and the future of Mexican relations with Venezuela and Cuba. This report will not be updated. See also CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32735, Mexico-United States Dialogue on Migration and Border Issues, 2001-2006 , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications , by [author name scrubbed].

In the past, Congress has regularly acted to extend expired or expiring temporary tax provisions. Collectively, these temporary tax provisions are often referred to as "tax extenders." Of the 33 temporary tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2016 and extended retroactively through 2017, three are individual income tax provisions. The three individual provisions that expired at the end of 2017 have been included in recent tax extenders packages. The above-the-line deduction for certain higher-education expenses, including qualified tuition and related expenses, was first added as a temporary provision in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16 ), but has regularly been extended since. The other two individual extender provisions are housing related. The provision allowing homeowners to deduct mortgage insurance premiums was first enacted in 2006 (effective for 2007). The provision allowing qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence to be excluded from income was first enacted in 2007. Both provisions were temporary when first enacted, but in recent years have been extended as part of the tax extenders. In recent years, Congress has chosen to extend most, if not all, recently expired or expiring provisions as part of "tax extender" legislation. The most recent tax extender package is the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123 ). Information on costs associated with extending individual income tax expired provisions is provided in Table 1 . The provisions that were extended in the BBA18 were extended for one year, retroactive for 2017. The estimated cost to make expired provisions permanent is reported by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). The JCT reports estimated deficit effects of extending expired and expiring tax provisions through the 10-year budget window (2018–2027). Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the amount canceled has been included in the taxpayer's gross income. This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income. Canceled (or forgiven) mortgage debt is common with a "short sale." In a short sale, a homeowner agrees to sell their house and transfer the proceeds to the lender in exchange for the lender relieving the homeowner from repaying any debt in excess of the sale proceeds. For example, in a short sale, a homeowner with a $300,000 mortgage may be able to sell their house for only $250,000. The lender would receive the $250,000 from the home sale and forgive the remaining $50,000 in mortgage debt. Lenders report the canceled debt to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) using Form 1099-C. A copy of the 1099-C is also sent to the borrower, who in general must include the amount listed in his or her gross income in the year of discharge. It may be helpful to explain why forgiven debt is viewed as income from an economic perspective in order to understand why it has historically been taxable. Income is a measure of the increase in an individual's purchasing power over a designated period of time. When individuals experience a reduction in their debts, their purchasing power has increased (because they no longer have to make payments). Effectively, their disposable income has increased. From an economic standpoint, it is irrelevant whether a person's debt was reduced via a direct transfer of money to the borrower (e.g., wage income) that was then used to pay down the debt, or whether it was reduced because the lender forgave a portion of the outstanding balance. Both have the same effect, and thus both are subject to taxation. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ), signed into law on December 20, 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income that is associated with a primary residence from taxation. Thus, the act allowed taxpayers who did not qualify for one of several existing exceptions to exclude canceled mortgage debt from gross income. The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Division A of P.L. 110-343 ) extended the exclusion of qualified mortgage debt for debt discharged before January 1, 2013. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ) subsequently extended the exclusion through the end of 2013. The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (Division A of P.L. 113-295 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2014. The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2016. The act also allowed for debt discharged after 2016 to be excluded from income if the taxpayer had entered into a binding written agreement to sell his or her house before January 1, 2017. Most recently, the BBA18 ( P.L. 115-123 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2017. The rationales for extending the exclusion are to minimize hardship for households in distress and lessen the risk that nontax homeowner retention efforts are thwarted by tax policy. It may also be argued that extending the exclusion would continue to assist the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy. Opponents of the exclusion may argue that extending the provision would make debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations. The exclusion may also be viewed by some as unfair, as its benefits depend on whether a homeowner is able to negotiate a debt cancelation, the income tax bracket of the taxpayer, and whether the taxpayer retains ownership of the house following the debt cancellation. The JCT estimated the one-year extension included in the BBA18 would result in a 10-year revenue loss of $2.4 billion (see Table 1 ). Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as any property taxes they pay as long as they itemize their tax deductions. Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 ). Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if the homeowner itemized, and if the homeowner's adjusted gross income was below a certain threshold ($55,000 for single, and $110,000 for married filing jointly). Originally, the deduction was only to be available for 2007, but it was extended through 2010 by the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ). The deduction was extended again through 2011 by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-312 ), through the end of 2013 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ), and through the end of 2014 by the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (Division A of P.L. 113-295 ). The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), extended the deduction through the end of 2016. Most recently, the BBA18 ( P.L. 115-123 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2017. A justification for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums is the promotion of homeownership and, relatedly, the recovery of the housing market following the Great Recession (the Great Recession began in December 2007 and lasted to June 2009). Homeownership is often argued to bestow certain benefits to society as a whole, such as higher property values, lower crime, and higher civic participation, among others. Homeownership may also promote a more even distribution of income and wealth, as well as establish greater individual financial security. Last, homeownership may have a positive effect on living conditions, which can lead to a healthier population. With regard to the first justification, it is not clear that the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums has an effect on the homeownership rate. Economists have identified the high transaction costs associated with a home purchase—mostly resulting from the downpayment requirement, but also closing costs—as the primary barrier to homeownership. The ability to deduct insurance premiums does not lower this barrier—most lenders will require mortgage insurance if the borrower's downpayment is less than 20% regardless of whether the premiums are deductible. The deduction may allow buyers to borrow more, however, because they can deduct the higher associated premiums and therefore afford a higher housing payment. Concerning the second justification, it is also not clear that the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums is still needed to assist in the recovery of the housing market. Based on the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller U.S. National Composite Index, home prices have generally increased since the bottom of the market following the Great Recession. In addition, the available housing inventory is now slightly below its historical level. Both of these indicators suggest that the market as a whole is stronger than when the provision was enacted, and that it may no longer be warranted. Economists have noted that owner-occupied housing is already heavily subsidized via tax and nontax programs. To the degree that owner-occupied housing is oversubsidized, extending the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums would lead to a greater misallocation of resources that are directed toward the housing industry. The JCT estimated the one-year extension included in the BBA18 would result in a 10-year revenue loss of $1.1 billion (see Table 1 ). The BBA18 extended the above-the-line deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses through the 2017 tax year. This provision allows taxpayers to deduct up to $4,000 of qualified tuition and related expenses for postsecondary education (both undergraduate and graduate) from their gross income. Expenses that qualify for this deduction include tuition payments and any fees required for enrollment at an eligible education institution. Other expenses, including room and board expenses, are generally not qualifying expenses for this deduction. The deduction is "above-the-line," that is, it is not restricted to itemizers. Individuals who could be claimed as dependents, married persons filing separately, and nonresident aliens who do not elect to be treated as resident aliens do not qualify for the deduction, in part to avoid multiple claims on a single set of expenses. The deduction is reduced by any grants, scholarships, Pell Grants, employer-provided educational assistance, and veterans' educational assistance. The maximum deduction taxpayers can claim depends on their income level. Taxpayers can deduct up to $4,000 if their income is $65,000 or less ($130,000 or less if married filing jointly); or $2,000 if their income is between $65,000 and $80,000 ($130,000 and $160,000 if married filing jointly). Taxpayers with income above $80,000 ($160,000 for married joint filers) are ineligible for the deduction. These income limits are not adjusted for inflation. One criticism of education tax benefits is that the taxpayer is faced with a confusing choice of deductions and credits and tax-favored education savings plans, and that these benefits should be consolidated. Tax reform proposals have consolidated these benefits into a single education credit in some cases. Taxpayers may use this deduction instead of education tax credits for the same student. These credits include permanent tax credits: the Hope Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit. The Hope Credit has been expanded into the American Opportunity Tax Credit, a formerly temporary provision that was made permanent by the PATH Act. The American Opportunity Tax Credit and the Hope Credit are directed at undergraduate education and have a limited number of years of coverage (two for the Hope Credit and four for the American Opportunity Tax Credit). The Lifetime Learning Credit (20% of up to $10,000) is not limited in years of coverage. These credits are generally more advantageous than the deduction, except for higher-income taxpayers, in part because the credits are phased out at lower levels of income than the deduction. For example, for single taxpayers, the Lifetime Learning Credit begins phasing out at $56,000 for 2017. The deduction benefits taxpayers according to their marginal tax rate. Students usually have relatively low incomes, but they may be part of families in higher tax brackets. The maximum amount of deductible expenses limits the tax benefit's impact on individuals attending schools with comparatively high tuitions and fees. Because the income limits are not adjusted for inflation, the deduction might be available to fewer taxpayers over time if extended in its current form. The distribution of the deduction in Table 2 indicates that some of the benefit is concentrated in the income range where the Lifetime Learning Credit has phased out, but also significant deductions are claimed at lower income levels. Because the Lifetime Learning Credit is preferable to the deduction at lower income levels, it seems likely that confusion about the education benefits may have caused taxpayers not to choose the optimal education benefit. The JCT estimated the one-year extension included in the PATH Act would result in a 10-year revenue loss of $0.4 billion (see Table 1 ). Table A-1 provides information on key policy staff available to answer questions with respect to specific provisions or policy areas.

Three individual temporary tax provisions expired in 2017. In the past, Congress has regularly acted to extend expired or expiring temporary tax provisions. Collectively, these temporary tax provisions are often referred to as "tax extenders." Most recently, Congress addressed tax extenders in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123). Three of the four individual income tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2016 were extended in the BBA18, retroactive to 2017. These include the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt, Mortgage Insurance Premium Deductibility, and Above-the-Line Deduction for Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses. Brief background information on these provisions is provided in this report. The other individual income tax provision that expired at the end of 2016, the medical expense deduction adjusted gross income (AGI) floor of 7.5% for individuals aged 65 and over, was expanded to all taxpayers through 2017 and 2018 in the December 2017 tax legislation (P.L. 115-97). Options related to expired tax provisions in the 115th Congress include (1) extending all or some of the provisions that expired at the end of 2017 or (2) allowing expired provisions to remain expired. This report provides background information on individual income tax provisions that expired in 2017. For information on other tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016, see CRS Report R44677, Tax Provisions that Expired in 2016 ("Tax Extenders"), by [author name scrubbed]. See also CRS Report R44990, Energy Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders"), by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44930, Business Tax Provisions that Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders"), coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

According to the State Department, no country in the world poses a more immediate narcotics threat to the United States than Mexico. Estimates indicate that up to 70 percent of the more than 300 tons of cocaine that entered the United States in 1994 came through Mexico. In March 1996, the State Department reported that Mexico supplied up to 80 percent of the foreign-grown marijuana consumed in the United States and from 20 to 30 percent of the heroin. Furthermore, during the past 3 years, Mexican trafficking organizations operating on both sides of the border have replaced U.S.-based outlaw motorcycle gangs as the predominant methamphetamine manufacturers and traffickers in the United States. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates that up to 80 percent of the methamphetamine available in the United States is either produced in Mexico and transported to the United States or manufactured in the United States by Mexican traffickers. Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have complete control over the production and distribution of methamphetamine. In recent years, drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico have become more powerful, expanding their methamphetamine operations and also their cocaine-related activities. DEA reports that Mexican drug traffickers have used their vast wealth to corrupt police and judicial officials as well as project their influence into the political sector. According to DEA’s Administrator, some Mexican organizations have the potential of becoming as powerful as their Colombian counterparts. Furthermore, proximity to the United States, endemic corruption, and little or no financial regulation have combined to make Mexico a money-laundering haven for the initial placement of drug profits into the world’s financial systems. Drug traffickers use a variety of air, land, and sea conveyances and routes to move cocaine from Colombia to Mexico and then overland through Mexico into the United States. Traditionally, traffickers have relied on twin-engine general aviation aircraft to deliver cocaine shipments that ranged from 800 to 1,000 kilograms. Beginning in 1994, however, some trafficking groups began using larger Boeing 727-type jet aircraft that can fly faster than U.S. and Mexican detection and monitoring aircraft and deliver up to 10 metric tons of cocaine per trip. To date, there have been eight known deliveries using this means of transport. Furthermore, as we recently reported, traffickers in the Caribbean have changed their primary means of delivery and are increasingly using commercial and noncommercial maritime vessels. According to U.S. Embassy officials, about two-thirds of the cocaine currently entering Mexico is transported by maritime means. Mexico has taken some counternarcotics actions. Mexico eradicated substantial amounts of marijuana and opium poppy crops in 1995 with the assistance of up to 11,000 soldiers working on drug eradication programs. According to the Department of State, Mexican personnel effectively eradicated 29,000 acres of marijuana and almost 21,000 acres of opium poppy in 1995. Furthermore, President Zedillo directed the Mexican Air Force to use its F-5 aircraft to assist in air interdiction efforts in 1995. On the other hand, the amount of cocaine seized and the number of drug-related arrests in Mexico have declined from 1993 to 1995 compared to those before U.S. assistance was terminated. For example, the average annual amount of cocaine seized in Mexico between 1990 and 1992 was more than 45 metric tons, including more than 50 tons in 1991. In contrast, from 1993 to 1995, average cocaine seizures declined to about 30 metric tons annually. The number of drug-related arrests declined by nearly two-thirds between 1992 and 1995. Mexico’s efforts to stop the flow of drugs have been limited by numerous problems. First, despite the efforts that President Zedillo has undertaken since late 1994, both State and DEA have reported that corruption in Mexico is still widespread and that pervasive corruption is seriously undermining counternarcotics efforts. Second, serious economic and political problems have limited Mexico’s counternarcotics effectiveness. In December 1994, Mexico experienced a major economic crisis—a devaluation of the peso that eventually resulted in a $20-billion U.S. financial assistance package. In addition, high rates of unemployment and inflation have continued to limit Mexico’s economic recovery. Also, Mexico has had to focus funds and resources on the Chiapas region to suppress an insurgency movement. Third, Mexico has lacked some basic legislative tools needed to combat drug-trafficking organizations, including the use of wiretaps, confidential informants, and a witness protection program. New legislation authorizing these activities recently passed the Mexican Congress and is expected to be enacted following ratification by the Mexican states. Also, until May 1996, the laundering of drug profits was not a criminal offense and Mexico’s laws lacked sufficient penalties to effectively control precursor chemicals that are used to manufacture methamphetamine. To counter the growing threat posed by these chemicals, the United States encouraged Mexico to adopt strict chemical control laws. Fourth, the counternarcotics capabilities of the Mexican government to interdict drug-trafficking activities are hampered by inadequately equipped and poorly maintained aircraft. In addition to equipment problems, some Mexican pilots, mechanics, and technicians are not adequately trained. For example, many F-5 pilots receive only a few hours of proficiency training each month, which is considered inadequate to maintain the skills needed for interdiction. Moreover, assigning the aircraft to interdiction efforts may not have an immediate impact because of deficiencies in the capabilities and maintenance of the F-5s. Between fiscal years 1975 and 1992, Mexico was the largest recipient of U.S. counternarcotics assistance, receiving about $237 million in assistance. In fiscal year 1992, the United States provided about $45 million in assistance that included excess helicopters, aviation maintenance support, military aviation training, and some equipment. In early 1993, the Mexican government assumed responsibility for the cost of all counternarcotics efforts in Mexico. Since then, U.S. aid has declined sharply and, in 1995, amounted to about $2.6 million, mostly for helicopter spare parts and a limited amount of training to Mexican personnel. According to the State Department, U.S. efforts in Mexico are guided by an interagency strategy developed in 1992 that focused on strengthening the political commitment and institutional capability of the Mexican government, targeting major trafficking organizations, and developing operational initiatives such as drug interdiction. A key component of the strategy, developing Mexican institutional capabilities to interdict drugs, was severely hampered when State Department funding was largely eliminated in January 1993. U.S. policy decisions have also affected drug control efforts in the transit zone and Mexico. In November 1993, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 14, which changed the focus of the U.S. international drug control strategy from interdicting cocaine as it moved through the transit zone of the Caribbean and Mexico to stopping cocaine in the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. To accomplish this, drug interdiction resources were to be reduced in the transit zone, while, at the same time, increased in the source countries. As we reported in April 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies involved in drug interdiction activities in the transit zone began to see major reductions in their drug interdiction resources and capabilities in fiscal year 1993. The amount of U.S. funding for the transit zone declined from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1992 to about $569 million in fiscal year 1995—a decline of 43 percent. Reductions in the size of the counternarcotics program have resulted in corresponding decreases in the staff available to monitor how previously provided U.S. helicopters and other assistance are being used, a requirement of section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The Mexican government, however, has objected to direct oversight of U.S.-provided assistance and, in some instances, has refused to accept assistance that was contingent upon signing such an agreement. In other instances, Mexico’s position resulted in lengthy negotiations between the two countries to develop agreements that satisfied the requirements of section 505 and were more sensitive to Mexican concerns about national sovereignty. Prior to the “Mexicanization” policy, the State Department employed several aviation advisers who were stationed at the aviation maintenance center in Guadalajara and the pilot training facility at Acapulco. One of the duties of these advisers was to monitor how U.S. assistance was being used. However, with the advent of the Mexicanization policy in 1993, the number of State Department and contract personnel was greatly reduced and the U.S.-funded aviation maintenance contract was not renewed. As a result, the State Department currently has no personnel in the field to review operational records on how the 30 U.S.-provided helicopters are being used. According to U.S. officials, the U.S. Embassy relies heavily on biweekly reports that the Mexican government submits. Unless they request specific operational records, U.S. personnel have little knowledge of whether helicopters are being properly used for counternarcotics activities. There are also limitations in U.S. interdiction efforts. The 1993 change in the U.S. drug interdiction strategy reduced the detection and monitoring assets in the transit zone. U.S. Embassy officials stated that this reduction created a void in the radar coverage, and some drug-trafficking aircraft are not being detected as they move through the eastern Pacific. DOD officials told us that radar voids have always existed throughout the transit zone and the eastern Pacific area. These voids are attributable to the vastness of the Pacific Ocean and the limited range of ground- and sea-based radars. As a result, DOD officials believe that existing assets must be used in a “smarter” manner, rather than flooding the area with expensive vessels and ground-based radars, which are not currently available. In Mexico, U.S. assistance and DEA activities have focused primarily on interdicting aircraft as they deliver their illicit drug cargoes. However, as previously mentioned, traffickers are increasingly relying on maritime vessels for shipping drugs. Commercial smuggling primarily involves moving drugs in containerized cargo ships. Noncommercial smuggling methods primarily involved “mother ships” that depart Colombia and rendezvous with either fishing vessels or smaller craft, as well as “go-fast” boats that depart Colombia and go directly to Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula. Efforts to address the maritime movements of drugs into Mexico are minimal, when compared with the increasing prevalence of this trafficking mode. State Department officials believe that Mexican maritime interdiction efforts would benefit from training offered by the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard in port inspections and vessel-boarding practices. Since our August 1995 testimony, a number of events have occurred that could affect future drug control efforts by the United States and Mexico. Specifically: The U.S. Embassy elevated counternarcotics from the fourth highest priority—its 1995 ranking—in its Mission Program Plan to its co-first priority, which is shared with the promotion of U.S. business and trade. In July 1995, the Embassy also developed a detailed embassy-wide counternarcotics plan for U.S. efforts in Mexico. The plan involves the activities of all agencies involved in counternarcotics activities at the Embassy, focusing on four established goals, programs that the Embassy believes will meet these goals, and specific milestones and measurable objectives. It also sets forth funding levels and milestones for measuring progress. The Embassy estimated that it will require $5 million in State Department funds to implement this plan during fiscal year 1996. However, only $1.2 million will be available, according to State Department personnel. After taking office in December 1994, President Zedillo declared drug trafficking “Mexico’s number one security threat.” As such, he advocated legislative changes to combat drugs and drug-related crimes. During the most recently completed session, the Mexican Congress enacted legislation that could improve some of Mexico’s counternarcotics capabilities such as making money laundering a criminal offense. However, legislation to provide Mexican law enforcement agencies with some essential tools needed to arrest and prosecute drug traffickers and money launderers requires ratification by the Mexican states. These tools include the use of electronic surveillance and other modern investigative techniques that, according to U.S. officials, are very helpful in attacking sophisticated criminal organizations. Furthermore, to date, the Mexican Congress has not addressed several other key issues, such as a requirement that all financial institutions report large cash transactions through currency transaction reports. In March 1996, Presidents Clinton and Zedillo established a high-level contact group to better address the threat narcotics poses to both countries. The Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy co-chaired the first contact group meeting in late March, which met to review drug control policies, enhance cooperation, develop new strategies, and begin to develop a new plan for action. Binational working groups have been formed to plan and coordinate implementation of the contact group’s initiatives. According to officials from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, a joint antinarcotics strategy is expected to be completed in late 1996. In April 1996 the United States and Mexico signed an agreement that will facilitate the transfer of military equipment and, shortly thereafter, the United States announced its intention to transfer a number of helicopters and spare parts to the Mexican government. Twenty UH-1H helicopters are scheduled to be transferred in fiscal year 1996 and up to 53 in fiscal year 1997. State Department personnel stated that the details about how the pilots will be trained, as well as how the helicopters will be operated, used, and maintained, are being worked out. It is too early to tell whether these critical efforts will be implemented in such a way as to substantially enhance counternarcotics efforts in Mexico. This concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 6015 Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.

GAO discussed the results of its review of counternarcotics efforts in Mexico. GAO noted that: (1) U.S. and Mexican interdiction efforts have had little impact on the flow of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States; (2) instead of concentrating on intercepting drugs as they move through the transit zone, the United States has focused its interdiction efforts on stopping cocaine production in South America; (3) Mexico's efforts to stop the flow of drugs have been limited by widespread political corruption, lack of legislative tools to combat drug trafficking organizations, and poorly maintained aircraft; (4) U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics programs have declined over the past few years; and (5) the United States and Mexico signed an agreement in April 1996 to facilitate the transfer of military equipment to enhance counternarcotics efforts in Mexico.

The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appoin tees. Presidential appointments with Senate confirmation are often referred to with the abbreviation PAS. This report identifies, for the 114 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for executive-level full-time positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. It excludes appointments to regulatory boards and commissions as well as to independent and other agencies, which are covered in other Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2016 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Related CRS reports regarding the presidential appointments process, nomination activity for other executive branch positions, recess appointments, and other appointment-related matters may be found at http://www.crs.gov . Table 1 summarizes appointment activity, during the 114 th Congress, related to full-time PAS positions in the 15 executive departments. President Barack H. Obama submitted 102 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 102 nominations, 64 were confirmed; 8 were withdrawn; and 30 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. The length of time a given nomination may be pending in the Senate has varied widely. Some nominations were confirmed within a few days, others were confirmed within several months, and some were never confirmed. This report provides, for each executive department nomination confirmed in the 114 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). Under Senate Rules, nominations not acted on by the Senate at the end of a session of Congress (or before a recess of 30 days) are returned to the President. The Senate, by unanimous consent, often waives this rule—although not always. In cases where the President resubmits a returned nomination, this report measures the days to confirm from the date of receipt of the resubmitted nomination, not the original. For executive department nominations confirmed in the 114 th Congress, a mean of 156.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 125.5. Each of the 15 executive department profiles provided in this report is divided into two parts. The first table lists the titles and pay levels of all the department's full-time PAS positions as of the end of the 114 th Congress. For most presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation, pay levels fall under the Executive Schedule. As of the end of the 114 th Congress, these pay levels range from level I ($205,700) for Cabinet-level offices to level V ($150,200) for lower-ranked positions. The second table lists appointment action for vacant positions during the 114 th Congress in chronological order. This table provides the name of the nominee, position title, date of nomination or appointment, date of confirmation, and number of days between receipt of a nomination and confirmation, and notes relevant actions other than confirmation (e.g., nominations returned to or withdrawn by the President). When more than one nominee has had appointment action, the second table also provides statistics on the length of time between nomination and confirmation. The average days to confirm are provided in two ways: mean and median. The mean is a more familiar measure, though it may be influenced by outliers in the data. The median, by contrast, does not tend to be influenced by outliers. In other words, a nomination that took an extraordinarily long time to be confirmed might cause a significant change in the mean, but the median would be unaffected. Examining both numbers offers more information with which to assess the central tendency of the data. For a small number of positions within a department, the two tables may contain slightly different titles for the same position. This is because the title used in the nomination the White House submits to the Senate, the title of the position as established by statute, and the title of the position used by the department itself are not always identical. The first table listing incumbents at the end of the 114 th Congress uses data provided by the department itself. The second table listing nomination action within each department relies primarily upon the LIS database of Senate nominations. This information is based upon nominations sent to the Senate by the White House. Any inconsistency in position titles between the two tables is noted following each appointment table. Appendix A provides two tables. Table A-1 relists all appointment action identified in this report and is organized alphabetically by the appointee's last name. Table entries identify the agency to which each individual was appointed, position title, nomination date, date confirmed or other final action, and duration count for confirmed nominations. The table also includes the mean and median values for the "days to confirm" column. Table A-2 provides summary data for each of the 15 executive departments identified in this report. The table summarizes the number of positions, nominations submitted, individual nominees, confirmations, nominations returned, and nominations withdrawn for each department. It also provides the mean and median values for the numbers of days taken to confirm nominations within each department. A list of department abbreviations can be found in Appendix B . Appendix A. Presidential Nominations, 114 th Congress Appendix B. Abbreviations of Departments

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone, or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 350 full-time leadership positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate during the 114th Congress for full-time positions in these 15 executive departments. Information for each department is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each executive department. Additional summary information across all 15 executive departments appears in the Appendix. During the 114th Congress, the President submitted 102 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 102 nominations, 64 were confirmed, 8 were withdrawn, and 30 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 156.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 125.5. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2016 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions). This report will not be updated.

In 2010, various communities across America were hit hard by natural disasters ranging from the Tennessee and Arkansas floods to tornadoes in the Midwest and Tropical Storm Hermine in the Gulf region. When volunteers go to these disaster areas as they did when Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana and the surrounding states in 2005, questions arise as to the potential civil liability of those volunteer health professionals (VHPs)—individually licensed medical professionals who gratuitously provide medical services in response to these regions' clear need for medical skills and services. The concern is that the potential threat of medical malpractice liability, in particular, may give pause to these VHPs. This report discusses the patchwork of federal and state laws that operate to protect volunteers generally, which can include VHPs, and those laws that trigger liability protection only for VHPs —with a focus on some of the midwestern states in addition to the Gulf region. Whether a VHP is protected from civil liability depends on a number of factors, including under whose control the VHP operates and whether or not a state of emergency has been declared. The liability protections discussed in this report generally shield volunteers from civil liability for negligent conduct (i.e., a failure to take adequate care that results in injuries or losses to others). Civil liability for conduct that is more egregious than mere negligence, such as willful, or grossly negligent conduct, is not protected, unless otherwise noted. Criminal conduct is also not protected. Laws shielding volunteers from liability have been enacted on both the federal and state level; the statutes discussed in this section apply in non-emergency as well as emergency situations. On the federal level, Congress passed the Volunteer Protection Act (VPA) in 1997. This statute provides immunity for ordinary negligence to volunteers (not only medical volunteers) of nonprofit organizations or governmental entities so long as (1) the volunteer was acting within the scope of his or her responsibilities; (2) the volunteer was licensed or certified in the state where the harm occurred, if licensure or certification was required ; (3) the harm was not the result of willful action, grossly negligent behavior, etc.; and (4) the harm was not caused by the volunteer's operation of a vehicle. The act does not prohibit the nonprofit or governmental entity from bringing a civil action against its own volunteers, nor does the act shield from liability the nonprofit or governmental entity for the actions of its volunteers. Furthermore, the VPA expressly preempts state standards that provide less protection than the act. On the state level, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted their own volunteer protection statutes that provide varying degrees of liability protection. These state statutes are not preempted by federal law so long as they provide greater liability protections. Mississippi, for instance, provides broad civil liability protection to any volunteer who qualifies under the statute by providing services or goods to a volunteer agency, unless the injury complained of was the result of (a) conduct that was intentional, grossly negligent, etc., or (b) the operation of a motor vehicle. Texas also provides immunity to volunteers of a charitable organization for any act or omission resulting in death, damage, or injury if the volunteer was acting in the course and scope of the volunteer's duties or functions. Many states, in addition to having VPA-type laws, have enacted statutory provisions geared specifically toward volunteer health professionals (VHPs). These statutes are like the VPA in that they provide immunity from civil liability and are not dependent on, or triggered by, an emergency situation. Often immunity is provided so long as certain conditions are met. For example, as discussed above, Texas has statutory provisions that provide immunity to ordinary volunteers of charitable organizations, but Texas law also shields from civil liability a VHP who serves as a direct service volunteer of a charitable organization. For the VHP to be eligible for such immunity, the patient or party responsible for the patient must sign a written statement that acknowledges (1) that the volunteer is providing care that is not administered for or in expectation of compensation, and (2) the limitations on the recovery of damages from the volunteer in exchange for receiving health care services. Notwithstanding these requirements, a VHP can still be immune from civil liability even if the patient is incapacitated due to illness or injury or the patient is a minor and the person responsible for the patient is not reasonably available to sign the acknowledgment required. Similarly, Oklahoma's Volunteer Professional Services Immunity Act protects Oklahoma-licensed VHPs from civil liability, when, among other things, such VHPs receive no compensation and the patient signs a consent form. Mississippi and Alabama have somewhat broader provisions. Mississippi protects Mississippi-licensed medical personnel and extends this liability protection to other medical personnel who receive special volunteer licenses to practice in the state. Alabama provides civil liability protections to VHPs who gratuitously provide limited medical services as part of an "established free medical clinic." Under Alabama's statute, VHPs can be licensed in any state to receive protection. Other statutes can be somewhat vague; for example, Louisiana's statute that protects licensed VHPs operating as part of nonprofit medical clinics does not appear to provide any reference as to whether such protection is limited only to those VHPs licensed in Louisiana or whether it includes out-of-state medical licensees. In addition to VPA-like statutes, every state and the District of Columbia has enacted its own "Good Samaritan" statute, which protects individuals who gratuitously provide emergency assistance from civil liability. Generally, Good Samaritan statutes lower the applicable standard of care owed by the person providing assistance. These statutes were first enacted to protect the doctor, who, although under no duty to help, provides emergency assistance to another but fails to adhere to the otherwise applicable standard of care when doing so. "Emergency" in this context refers to medical emergencies. To be eligible for immunity, many Good Samaritan statutes require that the volunteer or rescuer act in good faith and must not have received or expected any compensation for his or her efforts. Not all Good Samaritan statutes are the same, as some protect a narrow class of individuals such as physicians and other medically licensed personnel, while others protect a broader class of persons such as the casual bystander who renders emergency assistance. Another example of how Good Samaritan statues vary is that some limit protection to care provided at the scene of an "accident," whereas others apply to an "emergency"; some apply to both accidents and emergencies. Illinois, Alabama, and Louisiana, for instance, have Good Samaritan laws that offer broad but varying degrees of coverage to medically related personnel. Illinois's Good Samaritan law protects physicians licensed in any American state or territory who provide emergency care, so long as the resulting harm was not caused by willful or wanton conduct. Again, however, the term "emergency" is used in the medical context, and courts are left to determine on a case-by-case basis what constitutes an emergency that triggers the act's protections. Alabama's Good Samaritan statute protects medical personnel who gratuitously and in good faith provide emergency care "at the scene of an accident, casualty, or disaster" from being liable for any civil damages arising out of such care. Louisiana's Good Samaritan statute provides liability protection to medical personnel licensed in Louisiana who provide medical services "at the scene of an emergency." It appears that while a medical personnel licensed to practice in another state does not enjoy protection under Louisiana's Good Samaritan statute, such individual cannot be prosecuted for practicing without a license if he offers gratuitous assistance in an emergency situation. In contrast, Iowa's Good Samaritan statute protects from liability all individuals , not just medical personnel, who render emergency care or assistance "at the place of emergency or accident or while the [injured] person is in transit" unless their acts or omissions constitute reckless or willful and wanton misconduct. Debate exists as to how far Good Samaritan laws should extend in terms of who is covered and for what kind of actions. For example, there was much controversy surrounding the California Supreme Court decision in Van Horn v. Watson , which held that the state statute only shields rescuers from liability if they provide medical care in an emergency situation. The Van Horn case stemmed from a 2003 car accident in the Los Angeles area where the passenger-defendant pulled the plaintiff out of what she thought was a car at risk of exploding. The plaintiff was left a paraplegic and sued Torti, one of the defendants, for negligence. Torti sought immunity under California's general Good Samaritan provision. The court of appeals held and the California Supreme Court affirmed that the civil liability protections did not apply to Torti because she was not providing emergency medical care to the plaintiff. Since the ruling in December 2008, California lawmakers amended the state Good Samaritan provision to offer greater legal liability protections to those who "render emergency medical or nonmedical care at the scene of an emergency." Except insofar as they waive it, the federal and state governments enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. The federal government has waived this immunity with the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and some state governments have similar statutory provisions. Such acts generally immunize government employees from tort liability for torts committed within their scope of employment, and instead allow the government to be held liable in accordance with the law of the state where a tort occurred. Thus, apart from the VPA, VPA-like statutes, and Good Samaritan statutes, one additional way to shield VHPs from individual civil liability during an emergency is to declare them non-paid employees of the federal government or a state government for liability purposes. This can be done for particular volunteers in all situations or only when a general state of emergency or public health emergency has been declared. Under federal law, one example is the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act. It permits the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to appoint VHPs as intermittent personnel of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), which provides medical services when a disaster overwhelms local emergency services. NDMS volunteers benefit from the same immunity from civil liability that many employees of the Public Health Service enjoy. Emergencies can be declared at both federal and state levels by the President of the United States, a state governor, and sometimes by other local authorities. Depending on the type of emergency declaration—for example, disaster or public health emergency—and the level of authority from which the declaration derives—that is, federal, state, or local government—the extent to which VHPs can be deployed, utilized, or immunized from liability will vary. Every state has a regime for declaring a general emergency or disaster, and such a declaration can explicitly trigger liability protections or allow the governor to do so. Kansas's emergency management statute, for example, shields state government employees, agents, and volunteer workers from civil liability for any death or injury to persons or damage to property as a result of any activity performed during the declared emergency, except where there is willful misconduct, bad faith, or gross negligence. In such an emergency situation, Kansas's provisions also deem any member of a regional medical emergency response team to be a state employee for liability purposes. Alabama's statutory provisions protects a broad group of "emergency management workers," as the definition of the term includes employees, volunteers, or entities of other states performing emergency management services during a declared emergency. By contrast, Mississippi's emergency management statute provides civil liability protection only to state government employees and agents during a declared emergency. Some states also have regimes for public health emergencies, which, like general emergency management statutes, provide varying degrees of coverage. The declaration of a public health emergency triggers special protections for medical personnel, which often includes liability protection for VHPs. Florida's health emergency statute, for example, extends the liability protections that state employees enjoy to all volunteers who respond to a public health emergency declaration. Louisiana's health emergency statute declares that "during a state of public health emergency, any health care providers (licensed in-state) shall not be civilly liable for causing the death of, or injury to, any person, or damage to any property except in the event of gross negligence or willful misconduct." Even where emergency or public health emergency statutes do not explicitly grant liability protections to VHPs, these statutes generally allow governors to impose such protections for volunteers where appropriate. In 2005, for example, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, pursuant to her public health emergency powers, issued an executive order temporarily suspending all licensure requirements for medical volunteers (so long as they are licensed in other states) and declaring such volunteers to be state employees shielded from civil liability. Emergency mutual aid agreements may be instituted among political subdivisions and Indian tribal nations within a state, out-of-state with neighboring political subdivisions, or internationally with Canadian provinces. Approved by Congress in 1996, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which has been codified into state statutes, provides a prearranged structure for a state to request aid from other states when affected by disaster. Since 1996, all 50 states have agreed to the terms of EMAC, as have the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. In addition to EMAC, states have entered into other interstate mutual aid agreements. EMAC addresses concerns regarding liability protection and represents an attempt by its signatories to remove legal obstacles that can impede the flow of aid from bordering states in times of emergency. Under EMAC, when officers or employees of one state render aid in another, they are treated as agents of the requesting state for tort and immunity purposes. Such individuals, nor the state itself, would not face liability for acts or omissions committed in good faith while rendering aid (including providing supplies and related equipment). Furthermore, EMAC contains a relatively broad reciprocity agreement for persons who from one state render assistance in another. It provides that such individuals who hold a license, certificate, or other permit for the practice of professional, mechanical, or other skills will be considered to be licensed, certified, or permitted to exercise those duties in the requesting state, subject to limitations or conditions set by the governor of the requesting state. Notwithstanding the recognition of out-of-state licenses, reciprocity is not automatically extended to VHPs who provide services that are not pursuant to an EMAC request for assistance. Unless authorities can verify an individual's claims, they may be reluctant to accept the individual's professional services, particularly where VHPs arrive "spontaneously." Because licensure of medical professionals is a state matter, verifying whether a VHP is properly licensed during a time of emergency can become problematic. Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, Congress authorized creation of the Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP). Based in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response in HHS, the ESAR-VHP is a federal program that supports states and territories in establishing standardized volunteer registration programs for disasters, public health, and medical emergencies. The program, administered on the state level, verifies the credentials of VHPs in advance so that emergency managers and others have the ability to quickly identify and facilitate the use of VHPs in local, state, and federal emergency responses.

The devastation inflicted on the Gulf region by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008, in addition to recent disasters in the Midwest due to tornadoes and flooding, triggered mass relief efforts by local, state, and federal government agencies, as well as private organizations and individuals. As unpaid volunteers have carried out much of the relief effort, some have questioned whether such volunteers—particularly medical personnel, so-called "volunteer health professionals" (VHPs)—will be protected from potential civil liability in carrying out their duties. This report provides a general overview of the various federal and state liability protections available to VHPs responding to disasters. This report does not discuss liability of VHPs who go abroad to render assistance.

The offices of the resident commissioner from Puerto Rico and the delegates to the House of Representatives from American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are created by statute, not by the Constitution. Because they represent territories and associated jurisdictions, not states, they do not possess the same parliamentary rights afforded Members. This report examines the parliamentary rights of the delegates and the resident commissioner in legislative committee, in the House, and in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union. Under clause 3 of Rule III, the delegates and the resident commissioner are elected to serve on standing committees in the same manner as Representatives and have the same parliamentary powers and privileges as Representatives there: the right to question witnesses, debate, offer amendments, vote, offer motions, raise points of order, include additional views in committee reports, accrue seniority, and chair committees and subcommittees. The same rule authorizes the Speaker of the House to appoint delegates and the resident commissioner to conference committees as well as to select and joint committees. The delegates and the resident commissioner may not vote in or preside over the House. Although they take an oath to uphold the Constitution, they are not included on the Clerk's roll of Members-elect and may not vote for Speaker. They may not file or sign discharge petitions. They may, however, sponsor and cosponsor legislation, participate in debate—including managing time—and offer any motion that a Representative may make, except the motion to reconsider. A delegate or resident commissioner may raise points of order and questions of personal privilege, call a Member to order, appeal rulings of the chair, file reports for committees, object to the consideration of a bill, and move impeachment proceedings. Under the rules of the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), the delegates and the resident commissioner may not vote in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union. In a change from the rules of the prior Congress, however, they may preside over the Committee of the Whole. Under Rules III and XVIII, as adopted in both the 110 th and 111 th Congresses (2007-2010), when the House was sitting as the Committee of the Whole, the delegates and resident commissioner had the same ability to vote as Representatives, subject to immediate reconsideration in the House when their recorded votes had been "decisive" in the committee. These prior House rules also authorized the Speaker to appoint a delegate or the resident commissioner to preside as chairman of the Committee of the Whole. These rules of the 110 th and 111 th Congresses were identical in effect to those in force in the 103 rd Congress (1993-1994), which permitted the delegates and the resident commissioner to vote in, and to preside over, the Committee of the Whole. These provisions were stricken from the rules as adopted in the 104 th Congress (1995-1996) and remained out of effect until readopted in the 110 th Congress. They were again removed from House rules at the beginning of the 112 th Congress (2011-2012). At the time of the adoption of the 1993 rule, then-Minority Leader Robert H. Michel and 12 other Representatives filed suit against the Clerk of the House and the territorial delegates seeking a declaration that the rule was unconstitutional. The constitutionality of the rule was ultimately upheld on appeal based on its inclusion of the mechanism for automatic reconsideration of votes in the House. The votes of the delegates and the resident commissioner were decisive, and thus subject to automatic revote by the House, on three occasions in the 103 rd Congress. There were no instances identified in the 110 th Congress in which the votes of the delegates and the resident commissioner were decisive. In the 111 th Congress, the votes of the delegates were decisive, and subject to an automatic revote, on one occasion. The prior rule governing voting in the Committee of the Whole by delegates and the resident commissioner was not interpreted to mean that any recorded vote with a difference of six votes or fewer was subject to automatic reconsideration. In determining whether the votes of the delegates and the resident commissi oner were decisive, the chair followed a "but for" test—namely, would the result of a vote have been different if the delegates and the commissioner had not voted? If the votes of the delegates and resident commissioner on a question were determined to be decisive by this standard, the committee automatically rose and the Speaker put the question to a vote. The vote was first put by voice, and any Representative could, with a sufficient second, obtain a record vote. Once the final result of the vote was announced, the Committee of the Whole automatically resumed its sitting.

As officers who represent territories and properties possessed or administered by the United States but not admitted to statehood, the five House delegates and the resident commissioner from Puerto Rico do not enjoy all the same parliamentary rights as Members of the House. They may vote and otherwise act similarly to Members in legislative committee. They may not vote on the House floor but may participate in debate and make most motions there. Under the rules of the 115th Congress (2017-2018), the delegates and resident commissioner may not vote in, but are permitted to preside over, the Committee of the Whole. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

As we reported in July 2013, DHS has not yet fulfilled the 2004 statutory requirement to implement a biometric exit capability, but has planning efforts under way to report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle on the costs and benefits of such a capability at airports and seaports. Development and implementation of a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS’s efforts to implement a biometric entry and exit system. For example, in February and August 2007, we found that DHS had not adequately defined and justified its proposed expenditures for exit pilots and demonstration projects and that it had not developed a complete schedule for biometric exit implementation. Further, in September 2008, we reported that DHS was unlikely to meet its timeline for implementing an air exit system with biometric indicators, such as fingerprints, by July 1, 2009, because of several unresolved issues, such as opposition to the department’s published plan by the airline industry. In 2009, DHS conducted pilot programs for biometric air exit capabilities in airport scenarios, and in August 2010 we found that there were limitations with the pilot programs—for example, the pilot programs did not operationally test about 30 percent of the air exit requirements identified in the evaluation plan for the pilot programs—that hindered DHS’s ability to inform decision making for a long-term air exit solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of information on air exit’s operational impacts. In an October 2010 memo, DHS identified three primary reasons why it has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric exit capability at airports: (1) The methods of collecting biometric data could disrupt the flow of travelers through airport terminals; (2) air carriers and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate biometric data collection into passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3) challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the point of departure, including determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric information at airports. In July 2013, we reported that, according to DHS officials, the challenges DHS identified in October 2010 continue to affect the department’s ability to implement a biometric air exit system. With regard to an exit capability at land ports of entry, in 2006, we reported that according to DHS officials, for various reasons, a biometric exit capability could not be implemented without incurring a major impact on land facilities. For example, at the time of our 2006 report, DHS officials stated that implementing a biometric exit system at land ports of entry would require new infrastructure and would produce major traffic congestion because travelers would have to stop their vehicles upon exit to be processed. As a result, as of April 2013, according to DHS officials, the department’s planning efforts focus on developing a biometric exit capability for airports, with the potential for a similar solution to be implemented at seaports, and DHS’s planning documents, as of June 2013, do not address plans for a biometric exit capability at land ports of entry. Our July 2013 report found that since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its collection and use of biographic data to identify potential overstays. For example, DHS is working to address weaknesses in collecting exit data at land borders by implementing the Beyond the Border initiative, through which DHS and the Canada Border Services Agency exchange data on travelers crossing the border between the Because an entry into Canada constitutes a United States and Canada. departure from the United States, DHS will be able to use Canadian entry data as proxies for U.S. departure records. As a result, the Beyond the Border initiative will help address those challenges by providing a new source of biographic data on travelers departing the United States at land ports on the northern border. Our July 2013 report provides more information on DHS’s actions to improve its collection and use of biographic entry and exit data. In 2011, DHS directed S&T, in coordination with other DHS component agencies, to research long-term options for biometric air exit. In May 2012, DHS reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis of previous air exit pilot programs and assessment of available technologies, and the report made recommendations to support the planning and development In that report, DHS concluded that the of a biometric air exit capability.building blocks to implement an effective biometric air exit system were available. In addition, DHS’s report stated that new traveler facilitation tools and technologies—for example, online check-in, self-service, and paperless technology—could support more cost-effective ways to screen travelers, and that these improvements should be leveraged when developing plans for biometric air exit. However, DHS officials stated that there may be challenges to leveraging new technologies to the extent that U.S. airports and airlines rely on older, proprietary systems that may be difficult to update to incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS reported in May 2012 that significant questions remained regarding (1) the effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes and the error rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of cost-effectively integrating biometrics into the air departure processes (e.g., collecting biometric scans as passengers enter the jetway to board a plane), (3) the additional value biometric air exit would provide compared with the current biographic air exit process, and (4) the overall value and cost of a biometric air exit capability. The report included nine recommendations to help inform DHS’s planning for biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and an evaluation framework that would, among other things, assess the value of collecting biometric data in addition to biographic data and determine whether biometric air exit is economically justified. DHS reported in May 2012 that it planned to take steps to address these recommendations by May 2014; however, as we reported in July 2013, according to DHS Office of Policy and S&T officials, the department does not expect to fully address these recommendations by then. In particular, DHS officials stated that it has been difficult coordinating with airlines and airports, which have expressed reluctance about biometric air exit because of concerns over its effect on operations and potential costs. To address these concerns, DHS is conducting outreach and soliciting information from airlines and airports regarding their operations. In addition, DHS officials stated that the department’s efforts to date have been hindered by insufficient funding. In its fiscal year 2014 budget request for S&T, DHS requested funding for a joint S&T-CBP Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering Apex project. Apex projects are crosscutting, multidisciplinary efforts requested by DHS components that are high- priority projects intended to solve problems of strategic operational importance. According to DHS’s fiscal year 2014 budget justification, the Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering Apex project will develop tools to model and simulate air entry and exit operational processes. Using these tools, DHS intends to develop, test, pilot, and evaluate candidate solutions. As of April 2013, DHS Policy and S&T officials stated that they expect to finalize goals and objectives for a biometric air exit system in the near future and are making plans for future scenario-based testing. Although DHS’s May 2012 report stated that DHS would take steps to address the report’s recommendations by May 2014, DHS officials told us that the department’s current goal is to develop information about options for biometric air exit and to report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional benefits that a biometric air exit system provides beyond an enhanced biographic exit system and (2) costs associated with biometric air exit. However, as we reported in July 2013, DHS has not yet developed an evaluation framework, as recommended in its May 2012 report, to determine how the department will evaluate the benefits and costs of a biometric air exit system and compare it with a biographic exit system. According to DHS officials, the department needs to finalize goals and objectives for biometric air exit before it can develop such a framework, and in April 2013 these officials told us that the department plans to finalize these elements in the near future. However, DHS does not have time frames for when it will subsequently be able to develop and implement an evaluation framework to support the assessment it plans to provide to Congress. According to A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, which provides standards for project managers, specific goals and objectives should be conceptualized, defined, and documented in the planning process, along with the appropriate steps, time frames, and milestones needed to achieve those results. In fall 2012, DHS developed a high-level plan for its biometric air exit efforts, which it updated in May 2013, but this plan does not clearly identify the tasks needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework. For example, the plan does not include a step for developing the methodology for comparing the costs and benefits of biometric data against those for collecting biographic data, as recommended in DHS’s May 2012 report. Furthermore, the time frames in this plan are not accurate as of June 2013 because DHS is behind schedule on some of the tasks and has not updated the time frames in the plan accordingly. For example, DHS had planned to begin scenario-based testing for biometric air exit options in August 2013; however, according to DHS officials, the department now plans to begin such testing in early 2014. A senior official from DHS’s Office of Policy told us that DHS has not kept the plan up to date because of the transition of responsibilities within DHS; specifically, in March 2013, pursuant to the explanatory statement for DHS’s 2013 appropriation, DHS established an office within CBP that is responsible for coordinating DHS’s entry and exit policies and operations.process as of June 2013, and CBP told us that it planned to establish an integrated project team in July 2013 that will be responsible for more detailed planning for the department’s biometric air exit efforts. DHS Policy and S&T officials agreed that setting time frames and milestones is important to ensure timely development and implementation of the evaluation framework in accordance with DHS’s May 2012 recommendations. According to DHS officials, implementation of a biometric air exit system will depend on the results of discussions between the department and Congress after the department provides this assessment of options for biometric air exit. In summary, we concluded in our July 2013 report that without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework for this assessment, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that it will be able to provide this assessment to Congress for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, any delays in providing this information to Congress could further affect possible implementation of a biometric exit system to address statutory requirements. Therefore, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish time frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department’s assessment of biometric exit options. DHS concurred with this recommendation and indicated that its component agencies plan to finalize the goals and objectives for biometric air exit by January 31, 2014, and that these goals and objectives will be used in the development of an evaluation framework that DHS expects to have completed by June 30, 2014. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and members of the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time. For information about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other individuals making key contributions include Kathryn Bernet, Assistant Director; Frances A. Cook; Alana Finley; and Ashley D. Vaughan. 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This testimony discusses the status of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement a biometric exit system. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an entry and exit data system to track foreign nationals entering and leaving the United States. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate implementation of a biometric entry and exit data system that matches available information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival in and departure from the United States. In 2003, DHS initiated the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to develop a system to collect biographic data (such as name and date of birth) and biometric data (such as fingerprints) from foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry. Since 2004, DHS has tracked foreign nationals' entries into the United States as part of an effort to comply with legislative requirements, and since December 2006, a biometric entry capability has been fully operational at all air, sea, and land ports of entry. However, GAO has identified a range of management challenges that DHS has faced in its effort to fully deploy a corresponding biometric exit capability to track foreign nationals when they depart the country. For example, in November 2009, GAO found that DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a biometric exit system. In these reports, GAO made recommendations intended to help ensure that a biometric exit capability was planned, designed, developed, and implemented in an effective and efficient manner. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken action to implement a number of them. Most recently, in July 2013, GAO reported on DHS's progress in developing and implementing a biometric exit system, as well as DHS's efforts to identify and address potential overstays--individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized period of admission. This statement is based on GAO's July 2013 report and, like that report, discusses the extent to which DHS has made progress in developing and implementing a biometric exit system at air ports of entry, which is DHS's priority for a biometric exit capability. GAO concluded in its July 2013 report that without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework for this assessment, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that it will be able to provide this assessment to Congress for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, any delays in providing this information to Congress could further affect possible implementation of a biometric exit system to address statutory requirements. Therefore, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish time frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department's assessment of biometric exit options. DHS concurred with this recommendation and indicated that its component agencies plan to finalize the goals and objectives for biometric air exit by January 31, 2014, and that these goals and objectives will be used in the development of an evaluation framework that DHS expects to have completed by June 30, 2014.

Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate or labor union treasury funds from being spent for "electioneering communications." BCRA defines "electioneering communication" as any broadcast, cable, or satellite transmission made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election (sometimes referred to as the "blackout periods") that refers to a candidate for federal office and is targeted to the relevant electorate. In a 2003 decision, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Section 203 of BCRA against a First Amendment facial challenge even though the provision regulates not only campaign speech or "express advocacy," (speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate), but also "issue advocacy," (speech that discusses public policy issues, while also mentioning a candidate). Specifically, the Court determined that the speech regulated by Section 203 was the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy. On July 26, 2004, Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a corporation that accepts contributions from other corporations, began broadcasting advertisements exhorting viewers to contact Senators Feingold and Kohl to urge them to oppose a Senate filibuster to delay and block consideration of federal judicial nominations. WRTL planned to run the ads throughout August 2004 and to finance them with its general treasury funds, thereby running afoul of Section 203, as such ads would have been broadcast within the 30-day period prior to the September 14, 2004, primary. Anticipating that the ads would be illegal "electioneering communications," but believing that they nevertheless had a First Amendment right to broadcast them, WRTL filed suit against the FEC, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that Section 203's prohibition was unconstitutional as applied to the ads and any future ads that they might plan to run. Just prior to the BCRA 30-day blackout period, a three-judge district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that McConnell v. FEC left no room for such an "as-applied" challenge. Accordingly, WRTL did not broadcast its ads during the blackout period, and the district court subsequently dismissed the complaint in an unpublished opinion. On appeal, in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL I), the Supreme Court vacated the lower court judgment, finding that by upholding Section 203 against a facial challenge in McConnell, "we did not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges." On remand, after permitting four Members of Congress to intervene as defendants, the three-judge district court granted WRTL summary judgment, determining that Section 203 was unconstitutional as applied to WRTL's ads. It concluded that the ads were genuine issue ads, not express advocacy or its "functional equivalent" under McConnell , and held that no compelling interest justified their regulation. The FEC appealed. In a 5 to 4 decision, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II) , affirming a lower court ruling, the Supreme Court found that Section 203 of BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the WRTL ads, and that they should have been permissible to broadcast. In a plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito—Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas —the Court announced that "[b]ecause WRTL's ads may reasonably be interpreted as something other than an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate, we hold they are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore, fall outside the scope of McConnell ' s holding." In determining the threshold question, as required by McConnell, of whether the ads were the "functional equivalent" of speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office or genuine issue advocacy, the Court observed that it had long recognized that the practical distinction between campaign advocacy and issue advocacy can often dissolve because candidates, particularly incumbents, "are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions." Nonetheless, the Court stated, its jurisprudence in this area requires it to make such a distinction, and "[i]n drawing that line, the First Amendment requires ... err[ing] on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it." In WRTL II, the FEC appealed the lower court ruling arguing that in view of the fact that McConnell had already held that Section 203 was facially valid, WRTL—and not the government—should bear the burden of demonstrating that BCRA is unconstitutional as applied to its ads. Rejecting the FEC's contention, the Court pointed out that Section 203 burdens political speech and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the Court determined that the FEC—not the regulated community—had the burden of proving that the application of Section 203 to WRTL's ads furthered a compelling interest, and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. As it had already ruled in McConnell that Section 203 "survives strict scrutiny to the extent it regulates express advocacy or its functional equivalent," the Court found that in order to prevail, the FEC needed to show that the WRTL ads it sought to regulate fell within that category. On the other hand, if the speech that the FEC sought to regulate is not express advocacy or its functional equivalent, the Court cautioned that the FEC's task is "more formidable" because it must demonstrate that banning such ads during the blackout periods is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, a conclusion that no precedent has reached. In response to the FEC's and the dissent's argument that McConnell established a test for determining whether an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy, that is, "whether the ad is intended to influence elections or has that effect," the Court disagreed, finding that it had not adopted any type of test as the standard for future as-applied challenges. Instead, the Court found that its analysis in McConnell was grounded in the evidentiary record, particularly studies showing "that BCRA's definition of Electioneering Communications accurately captures ads having the purpose or effect of supporting candidates for election to office." Hence, when the McConnell Court made its assessment that the plaintiffs in that case had not sufficiently proven that Section 203 was overbroad and could not be enforced in any circumstance, it did not adopt a particular test for determining what constituted the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy. Indeed, the Court held, the fact that in McConnell it looked to such intent and effect "neither compels nor warrants accepting that same standard as the constitutional test for separating, in an as-applied challenge, political speech protected under the First Amendment from that which may be banned." Accordingly, the Court turned to establishing the proper standard for an as-applied challenge to Section 203 of BCRA, finding that such a standard "must be objective, focusing on the substance of the communication rather than amorphous considerations of intent and effect," involving "minimal if any discovery" so that parties can resolve disputes "quickly without chilling speech through the threat of burdensome litigation," and eschewing "'the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors,' which 'invit[es] complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable appeal.'" In summation, the Court announced that the standard "must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech." Taking such considerations into account, the Court held that [A] Court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. Under this test, WRTL's three ads are plainly not the functional equivalent of express advocacy. First, their content is consistent with that of a genuine issue ad: The ads focus on a legislative issue, take a position on the issue, exhort the public to adopt that position, and urge the public to contact public officials with respect to the matter. Second, their content lacks indicia of express advocacy: The ads do not mention an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger; and they do not take a position on a candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for office. Moreover, the Court cautioned, contextual factors "should seldom play a significant role in the inquiry." Although courts are not required to ignore basic background information that provides relevant contextual information about an advertisement—such as whether the ad describes a legislative issue that is under legislative consideration—the Court found that such background information "should not become an excuse for discovery." In applying the standard it developed for as-applied challenges to the ads that WRTL sought to broadcast, the Court determined that the FEC had failed to demonstrate that such ads constituted the functional equivalent of express advocacy because they could reasonably be interpreted as something other than a vote for or against a candidate. The Court's established jurisprudence has recognized the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in elections, which has been invoked in order to justify contribution limits and, in certain circumstances, spending limits on electioneering expenditures that pose the risk of quid pro quo corruption. In McConnell, the Court noted, it had applied this interest in justifying the regulation of express advocacy and its functional equivalent, but in order to justify regulating WRTL's ads, "this interest must be stretched yet another step to ads that are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy." In strongly worded opposition to extending the application of this governmental interest yet again, the Court announced, "[e]nough is enough." The WRTL ads are not equivalent to contributions—they are political speech—and the governmental interest in avoiding quid pro quo corruption cannot be used to justify their regulation. The Court also announced that the discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also be relevant to an election: "Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor." In an equally strongly worded dissent, Justice Souter—with whom Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined—argued that WRTL II overruled that portion of McConnell v. FEC upholding Section 203 of BCRA against a facial constitutional challenge. Among other points in opposition to the Court's ruling, the dissent observed that Section 203 was less restrictive than the Court's opinion would indicate in that it did not effect a complete ban on corporate and labor union funds being spent on electioneering communications. Indeed, the dissent remarked, quoting McConnell , "'corporations and unions may finance genuine issue ads [in the runup period] by simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad from a segregated [PAC] fund.'" Moreover, the dissent added, a nonprofit corporation, regardless of its source of funding, may communicate its criticism or support of a particular candidate within days of an election by speaking via a newspaper ad or on a website and, in accordance with earlier Court precedent, may use its general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications so long as it does not finance such ads with funding from business corporations and unions. Of particular significance, the dissent cautioned that it is possible, based on the reasoning of the Court's ruling, that even advertisements containing express words of advocacy—known as "magic words"—could now escape regulation under Section 203. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in WRTL II , application of the federal law prohibiting corporate and labor union treasury funds from being spent on ads that are broadcast 30 days before a primary and 60 days before a general election has been limited. That is, only those ads that are susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than an exhortation to vote for or against a candidate can be regulated. While the Court's ruling was careful not to overrule explicitly McConnell v. FEC where it upheld this portion of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), WRTL II seems to indicate that the FEC's ability to regulate the "electioneering communication" ban has nonetheless been circumscribed. In a case currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) , the constitutionality of the BCRA "electioneering communication" provision is once again under consideration. On March 24, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in this case and again on September 9, after ordering the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the Court should overrule its earlier holdings in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the portion of its decision in McConnell v. FEC addressing the facial validity of Section 203 of BCRA, the "electioneering communication" prohibition. A decision in this case is expected in early 2010.

Voting 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2007 decision FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II) held that a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), prohibiting corporate or labor union treasury funds from being spent on advertisements broadcast within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. sought to run. While not expressly overruling its 2003 ruling in McConnell v. FEC, which upheld the BCRA provision against a First Amendment facial challenge, the Court limited the law's application. Specifically, it ruled that advertisements that may reasonably be interpreted as something other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy and, therefore, cannot be regulated. In a case currently pending before the Supreme Court, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the constitutionality of the BCRA "electioneering communication" provision is once again under consideration. On March 24, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in this case and again on September 9, after ordering the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the Court should overrule its earlier holdings in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the portion of its decision in McConnell v. FEC addressing the facial validity of Section 203 of BCRA, the "electioneering communication" prohibition. A decision in this case is expected in early 2010.

The government contracting process provides for consideration of various aspects of contractor performance at multiple points: Past performance as source selection factor: Only relatively recently have federal agencies been required to consider past performance in selecting their contractors. In 1997, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was modified to require that agencies consider past performance information as an evaluation factor in source selection. Past performance is now required to be an evaluation factor in selecting contractors, along with factors such as price, management capability, and technical approach to the work. Responsibility determinations: Once a contractor is selected for award, the contracting officer must make an affirmative determination that the prospective awardee is capable and ethical. This is known as a responsibility determination, and includes, for example, whether a prospective awardee has adequate financial resources and technical capabilities to perform the work, has a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics, and is eligible to receive a contract under applicable laws and regulations. As part of the responsibility determination, the contracting officer also must determine that the prospective awardee has a “satisfactory performance record” on prior contracts. This determination of the prospective awardee’s responsibility is separate from the comparison of the past performance of the competing offerors conducted for purposes of source selection. Surveillance of performance under the current contract: Once a contract is awarded, the government should monitor a contractor’s performance throughout the performance period. Surveillance includes oversight of a contractor’s work to provide assurance that the contractor is providing timely and quality goods or services and to help mitigate any contractor performance problems. An agency’s monitoring of a contractor’s performance may serve as a basis for past performance evaluations in future source selections. GAO reported in March, 2005 on shortfalls at DOD in assigning and training contract surveillance personnel, and recommended improvements in this area. Suspension and debarment: Contractor performance also comes into play in suspensions and debarments. A suspension is a temporary exclusion of a contractor pending the completion of an investigation or legal proceedings, while a debarment is a fixed-term exclusion lasting no longer than 3 years. To protect the government’s interests, agencies can debar contractors from future contracts for various reasons, including serious failure to perform to the terms of a contract. Suspensions and debarments raise a whole set of procedural and policy issues beyond past performance, not the least of which is the question of whether these are useful tools in an environment in which recent consolidations have resulted in dependence on fewer and larger government contractors. Questions have also been raised about whether delinquent taxes or an unresolved tax lien should result in suspension or debarment. A proposed revision to the FAR would list these tax issues as grounds for suspension or debarment. In July 2005, GAO reported on the suspension and debarment process at several federal agencies and recommended ways to improve the process. In the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, Congress stated that in the award of contracts, agencies should consider the past performance of contractors to assess the likelihood of successful performance of the contract. FASA required the adoption of regulations to reflect this principle, and the FAR now requires the consideration of past performance in award determinations. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has issued guidance on best practices for using past performance information in source selection, and individual agencies have issued their own guidance on implementing the FAR requirements. For agencies under the FAR, a solicitation for a contract must disclose to potential offerors all evaluation factors that will be used in selecting a contractor. Agencies are required to consider past performance in all negotiated procurements above the simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 and in all procurements for commercial goods or services. Although past performance must be a significant evaluation factor in the award process, agencies have broad discretion to set the precise weight to be afforded past performance relative to other factors in the evaluation scheme. Whatever they decide about weights, agencies must evaluate proposals in accordance with the evaluation factors set forth in the solicitation, and in a manner consistent with applicable statutes and regulations. Agencies must allow offerors to identify past performance references in their proposals, but also may consider information obtained from any other source. In evaluating an offeror’s past performance, the agency must consider the recency and relevance of the information to the current solicitation, the source and context of the information, and the general trends in the offeror’s past performance. Offerors who do not have any past performance may not be evaluated favorably or unfavorably. That is, they must receive a neutral rating. In addition, the OFPP has issued guidance on best practices for considering past performance data. Consistent with the FAR, OFPP guidance states that agencies are required to assess contractor performance after a contract is completed and must maintain and share performance records with other agencies. The guidance encourages agencies to make contractor performance records an essential consideration in the award of negotiated acquisitions, and gives guidelines for evaluation. It also encourages agencies to establish automated mechanisms to record and disseminate performance information. If agencies use manual systems, the data should be readily available to source selection teams. Performance records should specifically address performance in the areas of: (1) cost, (2) schedule, (3) technical performance (quality of product or service), and (4) business relations, including customer satisfaction, using a five-point rating scale. Agencies may also issue their own supplemental regulations or guidance related to past performance information. All of the three largest departments in federal procurement spending - the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Homeland Security - provide at least some additional guidance in the use of past performance data, addressing aspects such as the process to be followed for considering past performance during contract award and what systems will be used to store and retrieve past performance data. Below are some examples that illustrate the types of guidance available. DOD offers instruction on using past performance in source selection and contractor responsibility determinations through the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement and related Procedures, Guidance, and Information. DOD’s Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy also has made available a guide that provides more detailed standards for the collection and use of past performance information, including criteria applicable to various types of contracts. DOE also provides additional guidance to contracting officers in the form of an acquisition guide that discusses current and past performance as a tool to predict future performance, including guidelines for assessing a contractor’s past performance for the purpose of making contract award decisions as well as for making decisions regarding the exercise of contract options on existing contracts. At DHS, the department’s supplemental regulations outline which systems contracting officers must use to input and retrieve past performance data. Specifically, contracting officers and contracting officer representatives are required to input contractor performance data into the Contractor Performance System, managed by the National Institutes of Health, and use the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) - which contains contractor performance ratings from multiple government systems - to obtain information on contractor past performance to assist with source selection. Although a seemingly simple concept, using past performance information in source selection can be complicated in practice. GAO has not evaluated the practices that agencies use regarding contractor past performance information in source selection or whether those practices promote better contract outcomes. Our bid protest decisions, however, illustrate some of the complexities of using past performance information as a predictor of future contractor success. Some of these issues are listed below. In all of these cases, the key consideration is whether the performance evaluated can reasonably be considered predictive of the offeror’s performance under the contract being considered for award. Who: One issue is whose performance agencies should consider. Source selection officials are permitted to rate the past performance of the prime contractor that submits the offer, the key personnel the prime contractor plans to employ, the major teaming partners or subcontractors, or a combination of any or all of these. For example, in one case, GAO found that the agency could consider the past performance of a predecessor company because the offeror had assumed all of the predecessor’s accounts and key personnel, technical staff, and other employees. In another case, GAO held that an agency could provide in a solicitation for the evaluation of the past performance of a corporation rather than its key personnel. What: Also at issue is what information agencies are required or permitted to consider in conducting evaluations of past performance. The issue is one of relevancy. Agencies must determine which of the contractor’s past contracts are similar to the current contract in terms of size, scope, complexity, or contract type. For example, is past performance building single family homes relevant to a proposal to build a hospital? Agencies do not have to consider all available past performance information. However, they should consider all information that is so relevant that it cannot be overlooked, such as an incumbent contractor’s past performance. In one case, GAO found that an agency reasonably determined that the protester’s past performance on small projects was not relevant to a contract to build a berthing wharf for an aircraft carrier. When: Agencies also have to determine the period of time for which they will evaluate the past performance of contractors. Agencies are required to maintain performance data for 3 years after the conclusion of a contract although agencies have discretion as to the actual length of time they consider in their evaluation of past performance and could, for example, choose a period longer than 3 years. In one case, GAO held that although the solicitation required the company to list contracts within a 3-year time frame, the agency could consider contract performance beyond this timeframe because the solicitation provided that the government may “consider information concerning the offeror’s past performance that was not contained in the proposal.” Where: Once agencies determine who they will evaluate, what information they will consider, and the relevant time frame, they still may have difficulties obtaining past performance information. Agencies can obtain past performance information from multiple sources, including databases such as PPIRS - a centralized, online database that contains federal contractor past performance information. However, in 2006, the General Services Administration noted that PPIRS contains incomplete information for some contractors. Agencies may also obtain information from references submitted with proposals and reference surveys. One case illustrates how an agency evaluated a company based on limited past performance information. The agency assigned the company a neutral rating because the agency did not receive completed questionnaires from the company’s references listing relevant work and the solicitation provided that it was the company’s obligation to ensure that the past performance questionnaires were completed and returned. These are just some of the many issues that have been the subject of protests involving the use of past performance. Our cases are not necessarily representative of what may be occurring throughout the procurement system, but they do provide a window that allows us to get a glimpse of how the issue is handled across a number of agencies. At a minimum, however, our cases suggest that the relatively straightforward concept of considering past performance in awarding new contracts has given rise to a number of questions that continue to surface as that concept is implemented. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. For further information regarding this testimony, please contact William T. Woods at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Carol Dawn Petersen, E. Brandon Booth, James Kim, Ann Marie Udale, Anne McDonough-Hughes, Kelly A. Richburg, Marcus Lloyd Oliver, Michael Golden, Jonathan L. Kang, Kenneth Patton, and Robert Swierczek. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

The federal government is the largest single buyer in the world, obligating over $400 billion in fiscal year 2006 for a wide variety of goods and services. Because contracting is so important to how many agencies accomplish their missions, it is critical that agencies focus on buying the right things the right way. This includes ensuring that contracts are awarded only to responsible contractors, and that contractors are held accountable for their performance. Use of contractor performance information is a key factor in doing so. This testimony covers three main areas concerning the use of contractor performance information: (1) the various ways in which a contractor's performance may be considered in the contracting process; (2) how information on past performance is to be used in selecting contractors, as well as the various mechanisms for how that occurs; and (3) some of the key issues that have arisen in considering past performance in source selection, as seen through the prism of GAO's bid protest decisions. GAO has previously made recommendations for improving the use of contractor performance information, but is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. The government contracting process provides for consideration of various aspects of contractor performance at multiple points: (1) Source selection: Past performance is required to be an evaluation factor in selecting contractors, along with factors such as price, management capability, and technical approach to the work. (2) Responsibility determinations: Once a contractor is selected for award, the contracting officer must make a responsibility determination that the prospective awardee is capable and ethical. This includes, for example, whether the prospective awardee has a satisfactory performance record on prior contracts. (3) Surveillance under the current contract: Once a contract is awarded, the government monitors a contractor's performance throughout the performance period, which may serve as a basis for performance evaluations in future source selections. (4) Debarment: To protect the government's interests, agencies can debar, that is preclude, contractors from receiving future contracts for various reasons, including serious failure to perform to the terms of a contract. Agencies are required to consider past performance in all negotiated procurements above the simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 and in all procurements for commercial goods or services. Although past performance must be a significant evaluation factor in the award process, agencies have broad discretion to set the precise weight to be afforded to past performance relative to other factors in the evaluation scheme. Whatever they decide about weights, agencies must evaluate proposals in accordance with the evaluation factors set forth in the solicitation, and in a manner consistent with applicable statutes and regulations. In evaluating an offeror's past performance, the agency must consider the recency and relevance of the information to the current solicitation, the source and context of the information, and general trends in the offeror's past performance. The key consideration is whether the performance evaluated can reasonably be considered predictive of the offeror's performance under the contract being considered for award. Although a seemingly simple concept, using past performance information in source selections can be complicated in practice. GAO bid protest decisions illustrate some of the complexities of using past performance information as a predictor of future contractor success. Some of the questions raised in these cases are: (1) Who: Whose performance should the agencies consider? (2) What: What information are agencies required or permitted to consider in conducting evaluations of past performance? (3) When: What is the period of time for which agencies will evaluate the past performance of contractors? (4) Where: Where do agencies obtain contractor performance information?

Since 1988, Congress has passed several laws concerning television reception via satellite: the 1988 Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA, P.L. 100-667 ), amendments to the act in 1994, the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (SHVIA, P.L. 106-113 ) , and the most recent law, the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act (SHVERA). SHVERA was passed as Division J of Title IX of the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 4818 , P.L. 108-447 ) in December 2004. A number of changes were made to provisions affecting consumers who receive analog "distant network signals" and "local-into-local" network signals. Three factors are important in understanding the eligibility criteria for these different signals: signal strength, distant and local signals, and unserved households. Signal strength can be visualized as two concentric circles around a TV station's transmitter. Points in the inner circle close to the transmitter can receive a strong, "Grade A" television broadcast signal, via an over-the-air antenna (rooftop or "rabbit ears"). Points in the outer circle can receive a weaker, "Grade B" signal. Beyond the outer circle, where no signal can be received, are "white areas." Over-the-air signal strength is the guiding factor in determining which households are eligible to receive distant network signals via satellite. A network broadcast signal is one received by a household located within a network television affiliate's local area. When retransmitted by satellite back into the same local area, such signals are called "local-into-local." A distant network signal is one received from outside the local network affiliate's area. It is referred to as a distant network signal because it originates in one place and is received in another. Local-into-local signals were first offered to satellite television subscribers in 1999 under the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA). It permitted, but did not require, satellite television companies to offer local-into-local signals. Subscribers who were eligible for distant network signals under SHVIA could also receive local-into-local, if offered in their area. Households are generally defined as either "served" or "unserved" under SHVERA based on the signal strength they can receive. Under the law, only unserved households are eligible to receive distant network television signals via satellite. "Unserved" households include those that are unable to receive a "grade B" signal via an over-the-air antenna; or were "grandfathered" per a May 1998 federal court ruling; (see below) have satellite TV dishes mounted on a recreational vehicle or commercial truck (that are not fixed dwellings). In the late 1990s, some satellite television companies broadcast distant network signals to subscribers who were not eligible to receive them. Broadcasters filed suit against those satellite television companies. In May 1998, a federal court ruled that a company called PrimeTime 24 had violated the Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA) by retransmitting broadcast network television signals to both served and unserved households. The court ruled in favor of the broadcasters, meaning that many satellite TV subscribers would have lost access to distant network signals. However, Congress was debating satellite TV legislation (SHVIA) at the time and chose to allow some of those subscribers—called "grandfathered subscribers"—to continue to receive the signals for five more years (until December 31, 2004). Under SHVIA, subscribers receiving distant network signals could also subscribe to local-into-local when it became available. In 2004, Congress again deliberated satellite TV legislation, ultimately passing SHVERA. Sections 103 and 204 of SHVERA differentiated three groups of subscribers: grandfathered, other, and future subscribers. In areas where local-into-local service was available, some had to choose between distant network signals or local-into-local. Each subscriber's situation was unique, complicating efforts to understand how the new provisions affected a particular household. This group consists of households that had been receiving distant network signals illegally per the 1998 Miami court ruling. Under SHVERA, if local-into-local was offered in their area, or became available later, this group was required to choose between retaining distant network signals or receiving local-into-local signals within 60 days of being notified by their satellite company. They could no longer receive both. This group consists of households who received distant network signals legally. Under SHVERA, if a satellite company offered local-into-local in a subscriber's area on January 1, 2005, these subscribers could receive both distant network signals and local-into-local signals. If a satellite company did not offer local-into-local service in the subscriber's area on January 1, 2005, but it became available later, the subscriber would then have to choose between distant network signals or local-into-local. This group consists of households that subscribe to satellite television after December 8, 2004, the date of enactment of SHVERA. If local-into-local service is offered in their area, they may not receive distant network signals. If local-into-local is not offered when they subscribe, and they are eligible for distant network signals (i.e. they are "unserved"), they may receive distant network signals until such a time as local-into-local is offered. To summarize, if local-into-local is offered in a particular area: subscribers who were receiving distant network signals at the time SHVERA was enacted (December 8, 2004), because they were grandfathered in, could continue to receive distant network signals, but could not receive local-into-local at the same time. They had to choose one or the other. subscribers who are receiving distant network signals because they cannot get a grade B signal may continue to receive distant network signals if their satellite TV provider was not offering local-into-local on January 1, 2005. If local-into-local becomes available after January 1, 2005, they will have to choose between distant network signals and local-into-local. subscribers to satellite television after the date of enactment of SHVERA (December 8, 2004) may receive distant network signals if they are eligible for them and local-into-local is not offered. If local-into-local later becomes available, they must subscribe to local-into-local. As noted above in the section " Unserved Households ," EchoStar Communications, also known as the DISH Network, was charged with violating the Satellite Home Viewer Act in 1998. EchoStar chose to defend its actions, and the company's distant network signals have been unaffected during the eight years the issue has been litigated. In May 2006, an Atlanta appeals court ordered a permanent injunction on EchoStar's carriage of all distant signals, including those provided to eligible consumers who cannot receive a grade B signal. In order to avoid a circumstance in which customers would lose access to distant signals they were eligible to receive, negotiations were undertaken between EchoStar and the four major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX) to set the terms under which EchoStar could continue to carry those signals for eligible customers. A negotiated settlement was reached with three networks, but not with FOX. EchoStar claims that FOX chose not to negotiate a settlement because it is part of a vertically integrated company that is a partial owner of DirecTV, which would stand to gain customers at the expense of EchoStar if EchoStar's eligible customers could no longer receive distant FOX signals. FOX, on the other hand, counters that it was involved in this litigation for five years before its parent company took operational control of DirecTV, and having won the case in court, had no responsibility to negotiate a settlement that differed from the court's decision. On October 20, 2006, a Florida district court upheld the injunction and voided the proposed settlement reached by ABC, CBS, NBC, and EchoStar. The court set December 1, 2006, as the effective date of signal cutoff. Seven pieces of legislation were introduced that would have lessened the impact of the injunction ( S. 4067 and H.R. 6402 , S. 4068 and H.R. 6340 , S. 4074 , S. 4080 and H.R. 6384 ), but none were passed before the December deadline.

In 2004, Congress passed the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act, SHVERA, as part of the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447). Among its many provisions, the law modified subscriber eligibility for distant and local analog broadcast network television signals. Some satellite television subscribers had to choose between either local or distant broadcast network signals instead of receiving both. This report explains the provisions in SHVERA, and outlines subsequent court decisions involving direct broadcast satellite providers, including EchoStar Communications. It will be updated as necessary.

The nation has had a long history of guest worker programs targeted at the agricultural industry, which have enabled farmers to temporarily import foreign workers to perform seasonal jobs without adding permanent residents to the U.S. population. Unsuccessful attempts were made during the past few Congresses to amend the H-2A program, the only means currently available to employers who want to legally utilize aliens in temporary farm jobs. Recent interest among some Members of Congress in a broad-based guest worker program has renewed efforts to enact legislation that relates specifically to the agricultural sector. The elements of the debate concerning an agricultural guest worker program have changed very little over the years. Its principal points are twofold: whether there is an adequate supply of workers in the United States to fulfill the widely fluctuating labor requirements of some farmers; and whether the temporary admission of aliens to perform seasonal farm jobs adversely affects the labor market prospects of domestic workers. Growers of perishable, labor-intensive crops (e.g., fruit, vegetable, and horticultural specialty products) whose demand for directly hired and contract workers typically peaks during the harvest season argue that they need access to foreign labor because insufficient U.S. workers are available at that time. They assert that importing workers to perform seasonal farm tasks does not harm U.S. workers because the two groups do not compete. In other words, they contend that domestic workers are largely unwilling to perform the farm work in question—even if higher wages were offered them. Domestic workers, it is claimed, have more attractive alternatives to seasonal farm employment (e.g., nonfarm jobs arguably are less strenuous and dirty as well as more stable and prestigious). Without access to foreign labor, grower advocates maintain that crops could not be harvested; consumer prices would rise due to the reduced supply of U.S.-grown produce; and the nation would become more dependent on low-wage foreign competitors for a portion of its food supply. Farm worker advocates contend that if growers raised wages and improved working conditions, more domestic workers would be willing to accept seasonal farm employment. They assert that the employment and wage prospects of domestic workers are depressed by additions to the U.S. labor supply through guest worker programs. It is argued that these programs also harm similarly employed U.S. workers by weakening incentives to develop and adopt innovations that improve their working conditions and labor-saving technologies that increase their productivity (and hence, the wages of a smaller workforce). Opponents of temporary alien worker programs further declare that growers prefer foreign over domestic workers because the former are not covered by the same laws as domestic workers (e.g., Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Unemployment Insurance, and Social Security); are less demanding due to lower wages and poorer working conditions in their home countries; and are easier to control because they cannot easily work for another U.S. employer if the grower terminates them. The remainder of this report focuses on the impact an agricultural guest worker program might have on U.S. workers. The adequacy of the domestic supply of farm workers is addressed in another CRS Report. Fundamentally, the debate over the effect on U.S. workers of temporarily admitting foreign workers centers on whether an increase in the supply of labor reduces the wages and employment of domestic workers. Economic theory can help clarify this debate. Before the entrance of foreign workers to the U.S. labor market, the amount of labor that domestic workers are willing to supply to employers is represented by the curve labeled S1 in Figure 1 . It is upward sloping because workers are willing to supply more labor services in response to higher wages. Employers' demand for labor is represented by the curve labeled D, which slopes downward because employers are willing to employ more workers at lower wages. Equilibrium in this labor market occurs at point A, where those willing to work for wage W 1 equals employer willingness to hire at that wage. In the absence of foreign labor, then, U.S. farm employment is equal to E 1 and U.S. farm workers' wage rate is equal to W 1 . The addition of foreign workers expands the total quantity of labor at any given wage rate. This is represented by the rightward shift of the supply curve to S2, with the additional labor represented by the difference between S1 and S2. This increase in the labor force will only find employment if the wage falls, for only at a lower wage will employers be willing to hire more workers. Thus, equilibrium after the importation of labor occurs at point B, where the wage rate of domestic and alien farm workers drops to W 2 and employment of domestic and alien farm workers expands to E 2 . In summary, the theory of supply and demand predicts that the wage rate for all workers falls from W 1 to W 2 after the entrance of foreign workers to the U.S. labor market. As a result of the drop in wages, total employment expands from E 1 to E 2; domestic employment contracts from E 1 to E 3 ; and alien worker employment is equal to E 2 minus E 3 . Because the lower wage (W 2 ) makes farm work less rewarding, some domestic workers likely will look for jobs outside the agricultural sector. Employment of domestic farm workers accordingly will decline (from E 1 to E 3 ). While the total employment of foreign workers (E 2 minus E 3 ) expands, a portion is at the expense of the farm jobs formerly held by domestic workers (E 1 minus E 3 ). This is called the displacement effect . The size of the displacement effect depends on the shape of the labor demand and domestic labor supply curves. Along with lower domestic employment in agriculture, the presence of foreign farm workers reduces the amount of wages that accrues to domestic farm workers. Because the addition of foreign workers also expands output, agricultural prices are expected to fall and thereby benefit U.S. consumers including domestic farm workers. Authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act at Section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(A) as modified by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, P.L. 99-603 ), the H-2A program was begun in 1952. It allows an unlimited number of foreign workers to temporarily enter the United States to fill seasonal farm jobs at employers who demonstrate the existence of labor shortages by undertaking recruitment efforts prescribed by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). Principally East Coast growers of perishable labor-intensive crops, who largely did not utilize the Bracero program, were the original applicants for H-2A workers. The H-2A program "was able to escape the heavy criticism levelled against the Bracero program primarily by keeping a low profile." In other words, there were a great many more braceros than H-2A workers when both the Bracero program (1942-1964) and H-2A program (1952-present) were in effect. (The Bracero program is discussed below.) Despite increases in H-2A worker certifications issued by the U.S. Department of Labor in recent years, the number of H-2A workers remains quite small compared to the nearly 1 million hired farm and agricultural service workers employed in 2008. Thus, even if the labor certification process has not operated as intended—to protect similarly employed U.S. workers—the H-2A program's low utilization suggests that its overall impact on the domestic farm labor force has been minimal. However, the reliance on the H-2A program of tobacco, fruit (e.g., apple, peach, and tomato), vegetable (e.g., onion and squash), and grain growers in some states (e.g., North Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, Idaho, California, and Texas) might have had a more substantial effect on domestic farm workers in certain local labor markets. Some proposals to modify the H-2A program either by legislation or regulation might make it easier for growers to temporarily employ foreign workers. Farmers, as a consequence, would likely import more H-2A workers than they had previously. Given authorized aliens' potentially greater share of the hired and contract farm labor force as a result of changes to guest worker policy, it appears that the effects of the Bracero program on domestic farm workers are more relevant than the (unquantified) effects of the H-2A program. At its peak in 1956, the Bracero program allowed some 445,000 Mexican workers to take temporary jobs in the U.S. agricultural industry. The few studies that tried to empirically estimate the labor market impact of the Bracero program are examined below. Morgan and Gardner examined a seven-state area, in which more than 90% of braceros had been employed, to estimate the impact of the program on the wage and employment levels of hired farm labor. Its effect was found to be consistent with economic theory: the Bracero program increased total farm employment, reduced employment of domestic farm workers, and lowered the farm wage rate. Morgan and Gardner concluded that the wage loss to all nonbracero farm workers was 6% to 7% of total wages paid to farm workers in the bracero-using states between 1953 and 1964, or some $139 million per year (in 1977 dollars). U.S. farmers were found to have gained from the program by being able to hire about 120,000 more workers at 15-20 cents less per hour than they would have in the program's absence. Such a large employment response (about 26%) to a much smaller decrease in wages (less than 9%) is consistent with the informal observation that braceros were a substitute for mechanization, notably in High Plains cotton, and that the end of the program substantially accelerated the mechanization of Texas cotton. This is also the period in which the tomato harvester came into widespread use in California. Wise examined the experience in California for two heavily bracero-dependent crops to determine whether U.S. workers would accept farm jobs if wages were raised. He estimated that a small increase in wages would bring about a larger increase in the supply of domestic farm workers: in winter melon production, a 1% increase in wages was associated with a 2.7% increase in the domestic supply of labor; in strawberry production, a 1% increase in wages was related to a 3.4% increase in the domestic labor supply. Similarly, Mason found that a small increase in wages paid by the formerly bracero-dominated pickle industry in Michigan induced a larger increase in U.S. workers willing to pick the crop. At least for the mid-to-late 1960s, then, these findings appear to refute the notion that increased agricultural wages would not have prompted many more domestic workers to accept farm employment . Wise additionally found that termination of the Bracero program led to a decrease in total employment, an increase in U.S. farm worker employment, and an increase in wages on strawberry and melon farms in California. More precisely, he estimated that without bracero labor from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, domestic farm worker employment in California would have been between 51% (in strawberry production) and 261% (in melon production) higher, and wages would have been between 12% (in strawberry production) and 67% (in melon production) higher. While Mason estimated that shortly after the Bracero program's demise farm wages rose significantly in Michigan, he was unable to determine how much the absence of bracero labor or other variables contributed to the increase. In contrast, Jones and Rice found that the trend in farm wages did not change significantly in four southwestern states between the 1954-1964 bracero period and the 1965-1977 post-bracero period. Although the latter study would imply that the Bracero program's end did not have an impact on farm wages, the lack of a discernible wage effect might be explained by the replacement of braceros with unauthorized aliens—which effectively would have left the supply of labor little changed . In summary, the limited empirical research on the impact of the Bracero program on U.S. workers suggests that while the program successfully expanded the supply of temporary farm labor, it did so at the expense of domestic farm workers as measured by their reduced wages and employment. Although the magnitudes of these adverse effects might differ today depending on the extent to which U.S. farm labor and product markets have changed over time, their direction likely would be the same.

Guest worker programs are meant to assure employers (e.g., fruit, vegetable, and horticultural specialty growers) of an adequate supply of labor when and where it is needed while not adding permanent residents to the U.S. population. They include mechanisms such as the H-2A program's labor certification process to avoid adversely affecting the wages and working conditions of comparable U.S. workers. If changes to the H-2A program or creation of a new agricultural guest worker program led growers to employ many more aliens, the effects of the Bracero program might be instructive: although the 1942-1964 Bracero program succeeded in expanding the farm labor supply, studies estimate that it also harmed domestic farm workers through reduced wages and employment. The magnitudes of these adverse effects might differ today depending upon how much the U.S. farm labor and product markets have changed over time, but their direction likely would be the same.

The federal government supplies subsidies to PHAs to help make up the difference between what low-income tenants pay in rent and the cost of operating low-rent public housing. The formula for providing these operating funds changed in January 2007. Under the formula change, some PHAs were eligible to receive an increase in federal operating funds compared to the previous formula, and others qualified for a decrease. Both the increases and the decreases are phased in; PHAs facing decreases had an opportunity to limit their formula eligibility losses through the adoption of management changes. However, the amount that a PHA qualifies for under the new operating fund formula (whether it is an increase or a decrease) is reduced if Congress appropriates less money than is necessary to fund all agencies at 100% of their eligibility (as Congress has done in most recent years). This report is designed to provide a brief overview of the changes to the public housing operating fund formula that began in January 2007. Public housing costs are divided into two main categories: capital costs and operating costs. Capital costs are the costs of major renovations or modernizations. Operating costs are the day-to-day costs of running a building, such as utility, administrative, and routine maintenance costs. Operating costs vary based on many factors, including the age of a building, its heating and cooling systems, and its location. In the early years of the public housing program, PHAs were expected to meet their operating costs through the rents they collected. Over time, tenant rents were no longer sufficient to cover public housing operating expenses, in part because tenants became poorer and therefore unable to pay as much in rent, and in part because the costs of maintaining the buildings increased as they aged. In the late 1960s, Congress began providing operating subsidies to PHAs to supplement the low rents paid by tenants. The system in place for providing those subsidies until 2001 was the Performance Funding System (PFS). In a 1998 public housing reform law, Congress responded to criticisms that the PFS formula was outdated by creating a new Public Housing Operating Fund. The law required the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to use negotiated rulemaking to develop a new formula for distributing the funds. A negotiated rulemaking committee convened in 1999 involved PHAs and other stakeholder groups. During deliberation, it was agreed that sufficient data were not available to determine the true costs of operating public housing and that a study should be undertaken. Until the results of the study were available, the committee agreed to use a modified version of the PFS to create an interim operating fund formula. This interim formula took effect in 2001. HUD contracted with the Harvard Graduate School of Design to conduct the public housing operating cost study; its results were published in 2003. Another negotiated rulemaking committee was established to use the results of the study to develop a final formula to replace the interim formula. HUD published a proposed rule in the spring of 2005, but the rule was criticized for differing significantly from the agreements made during negotiated rulemaking. HUD published a final rule in the fall of 2005 that more closely resembled the initial agreement of the negotiated rulemaking committee. The new formula took effect in January 2007. PHAs, which are funded on a calendar year basis, began receiving funding under the new formula in CY2007. The operating fund provides subsidies to PHAs to make up the difference between what it costs to run public housing and what low-income tenants pay in rent. Under the interim formula, the calculation for determining a PHA's operating subsidy eligibility used two components: formula expenses (meant to represent the cost of running public housing) and formula income (meant to represent the amount collected in tenant rents). HUD subtracts a PHA's formula income from its formula expenses and the amount by which the income is short of the expenses is the PHA's operating subsidy eligibility. The new operating fund formula uses the same principle, but a more complex equation with changes to the way certain components are calculated. Formula expenses are the sum of three categories of estimated expenses: non-utility expenses, utility expenses, and other add-ons. Non-utility expense levels are per unit estimates of the basic non-utility operating costs of maintaining public housing. Under the old formula, the non-utility expense levels set for a PHA were called Allowable Expense Levels (AELs). They were set for most PHAs under the PFS in 1975 and subsequently updated for inflation. The AELs were modified in 1992 and again in 2001 when the interim rule was adopted. To calculate the non-utility expense component of a PHA's formula expenses under the interim operating fund formula, the number of public housing units in a PHA's inventory was multiplied by the agency's AEL. The new operating fund formula sets new non-utility expense levels for PHAs based on the data from the Harvard study and adjusted for inflation. These new project expense levels (PELs) are not applied at the agency level (as under the interim rule), rather, they differ for each project within a PHA's portfolio based on the characteristics of that project. To calculate the non-utility expense component of a PHA's formula expenses under the new operating fund formula, the number of eligible public housing units in each project in a PHA's inventory is multiplied by each project's PEL and those amounts are then summed. For the CY2007 funding cycle, HUD developed weighted average project expense levels (WAPELs) for each PHA, and applied the WAPEL to all PHA units; for CY2008 and beyond, HUD has used individual PELs. Utility expense levels (UELs) are estimates of the utility costs that can be attributed to a unit of public housing. They are calculated for each utility based on a PHA's consumption level and the applicable rates for that utility. The interim formula had aspects designed to encourage PHAs to adopt more energy-efficient practices and reduce consumption. The Harvard Cost Study did not make recommendations for changing utility expense levels, citing a lack of available data. The final rule largely maintains the existing formula for calculating UELs, although the rule does state that HUD will study options for calculating utility costs and will convene a negotiated rulemaking committee to come up with a new formula. In addition to basic utility and non-utility expenses, the interim operating fund formula included some add-on costs that PHAs could qualify to include in their formula expenses. Some of these add-ons were flat per-unit per-month or per-unit per-year fees; others were open-ended reimbursements. The new operating fund formula includes several new add-ons, including the reasonable cost of a self sufficiency program; an asset management fee for PHAs in compliance with asset management requirements ($4 per unit per month for PHAs with more than 250 units and $2 per unit per month for PHAs with 250 units or less); information technology fees ($2 per unit per month); asset repositioning fees (for units being removed from the public housing stock that are not eligible for operating funds); reasonable costs for energy conservation measures; and payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) costs (which were included in the AELs under the old formula). Formula income represents the income a PHA collects from rents. Under the interim rule, formula income was calculated by computing a PHA's average monthly rental charge per unit, applying an upward trend factor, and multiplying it by the number of units expected to be occupied. Under the new operating fund rule, formula income was initially calculated by taking the average rent charged by each PHA in its 2004 fiscal year and multiplying it by the PHA's eligible units. Each PHA's formula income was frozen at this 2004 level through the CY2009 funding cycle. Because tenants in public housing pay an income-based rent, as their incomes rise, so does the amount they pay in rent. With formula income frozen at the 2004 level, PHAs were provided an incentive to encourage families to increase their incomes, as the increased revenue from rents was not used when calculating a PHA's operating fund eligibility until after 2009. According to HUD, "unfreezing" income in 2010 resulted in the accounting for an additional $400 million in rental income over 2009. Under the new formula, some PHAs were "gainers," meaning that they were eligible for an increase in funding under the new formula as compared to the amount of funding they would have received under the old formula. Others were "decliners," meaning that they qualified for less funding under the new formula then they would have if the old formula had been maintained. A HUD analysis found that 74% of PHAs would have qualified for higher funding if the new operating fund formula had been in place in 2004; 26% of PHAs would have qualified for less funding. To help ease the transition, losses will be phased in over five years; gains were phased in over two years (see Table 1 for the phase-in schedule). To implement the phase-in, HUD calculated a transition amount for each PHA. The transition amount was the difference between a PHA's operating subsidy eligibility in 2004 and what the PHA's eligibility would have been if the new formula had been in effect. The transition amount for each PHA was adjusted by each year's phase-in level and then either added to or subtracted from each PHA's operating subsidy eligibility level for that year. For example, if a PHA's operating subsidy eligibility was $500,000 in 2004 but would have been only $450,000 if the new formula had been in place, the PHA would be considered a decliner, and its transition amount would be $50,000. Under the phase-in schedule, declines are limited to 5% in the first year, and so $47,500 (50,000 x 95%), would have been added to the PHA's 2007 operating subsidy eligibility. If the situation were reversed and the PHA would have gone from $450,000 under the old formula to $500,000 under the new formula, the PHA would be considered a gainer. Its transition amount would still be $50,000, but since gains are limited to 50% in the first year, $25,000 would have been subtracted from the PHA's 2007 operating subsidy eligibility. PHAs wishing to limit their losses can transition to asset-based management before the 2011 deadline (discussed below). PHAs that transition to asset-based management in the preceding year stopped their losses for the following year and thereafter at that year's phase-in rate. For example, a PHA that adopted asset-based management by the deadline in the first year would have limited its losses to 5%, meaning that HUD will add 95% of its transition amount to its operating subsidy eligibility each year. One major recommendation of the Harvard study was that PHAs should transition to asset-based management. In the past, PHAs budgeted and were funded on an agency-wide basis, rather than on a project-by-project basis. They were also permitted to manage all of their units from a central office. This system differed from private market multifamily housing norms, where each property is treated as an individual asset and managed on an individual basis. In the final operating fund rule, HUD directed PHAs to adopt project-based budgeting and project-based accounting by PHA FY2007, and project-based management by PHA FY2011. The amount of operating subsidy a PHA is eligible to receive is not necessarily the amount of funding it will actually receive. The amount of funding appropriated by Congress for the operating fund is generally less than the amount necessary to fund all PHAs at 100% of their eligibility. As a result, HUD must apply an across-the-board cut to PHAs' operating subsidy levels in order to stay within the amount appropriated by Congress. The percentage of formula eligibility PHAs receive after the across-the-board cut is referred to as the proration level. As shown in Table 2 , for several years proration levels were declining, meaning that PHAs were receiving a smaller and smaller share of the total funding for which they are eligible. Proration levels began increasing in recent years and reached over 100% in CY2010. The substantial increase in proration in CY2010 appears to be due, in part, to the effect of "unfreezing" formula income, which accounted for an additional $400 million in formula eligibility that did not have to be met through subsidy. Without the "unfreezing" of formula income, the proration level in CY2010 would have been about 94%. The Harvard Operating Cost study found that, on the whole, the government has been under-funding the operating costs of PHAs. HUD's own transition analysis indicated that if the new formula had been in place in 2004, PHAs would have been eligible for an additional $264 million. That means that if the new formula had been in place in 2004, with the same appropriations level, the proration level for 2004 would have been lower (and PHAs would have received less than 98% of their funding eligibility).

The local public housing authorities (PHAs) that administer the federal public housing program began receiving their annual federal operating subsidies under a new formula in January 2007. As a result of this formula change, some PHAs were eligible for an increase in their eligibility for funding and others were eligible for a decrease. Both the increases and the decreases were phased in (over two and five years, respectively) and PHAs that faced declines were eligible to limit their losses by adopting management reforms—which were also a part of the new operating fund requirements—earlier than required. Since the formula is only used to determine eligibility for funding, the amount that a PHA qualifies for under the formula (whether it is an increase or a decrease) will be reduced if Congress appropriates less money than is necessary to fund all agencies at 100% of their eligibility, which it has done in the past.

The United States prefers to conduct operations as part of a coalition when possible. In prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism, the United States, through the U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM), has acted in concert with a number of other countries as part of a coalition to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. Most of these countries have sent officers to CENTCOM headquarters—located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida—to act as liaisons between their countries and CENTCOM commanders and assist in planning and other operational tasks. As coalition liaison officers began arriving to assist in Operation Enduring Freedom, CENTCOM officials established a secure area with trailers outfitted as offices for the officers to use. As the coalition expanded and Operation Iraqi Freedom started, the number of liaison officers grew, as did the need for more trailers and administrative support. CENTCOM officials initially paid for the support from Combatant Commander’s Initiative Funds earmarked for short-term initiatives identified by the commander. However, as the coalitions for both operations grew and were expected to continue into fiscal year 2003, CENTCOM requested that Congress allow the command to use funds from its budget to pay for the support provided to the liaison officers. Congress responded in the fiscal year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act by authorizing the Secretary of Defense to provide administrative services and support to those liaison officers of countries involved in a coalition with the United States and to pay the travel, subsistence, and personal expenses of those liaison officers from developing countries. This legislation expires September 30, 2005. The legislation does not direct us to assess whether it should be renewed and we did not do so. Although it is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to formulate general defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to DOD, we could find no evidence of guidance issued by DOD to combatant commanders on how to implement the legislation allowing DOD to provide support to coalition liaison officers. Also, we could not identify any office within DOD that has responsibility for implementing the legislation and, therefore, may have promulgated guidance on the legislation. Guidance for issues that affect all the components originates at the DOD level. Typically, DOD will issue a directive—a broad policy document containing what is required to initiate, govern, or regulate actions or conduct by DOD components. This directive establishes a baseline policy that applies across the combatant commands, services, and DOD agencies. DOD may also issue an instruction, which implements the policy or prescribes the manner or a specific plan or action for carrying out the policy, operating a program or activity, and assigning responsibilities. In our opinion, this guidance is important for consistent implementation of a program across DOD. To determine what guidance has been provided to the commands, we contacted offices within DOD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff to determine which office has responsibility for implementing this legislation. After calls to the Offices of Legislative Affairs and Comptroller within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Joint Staff’s Plans and Policy Directorate and Comptroller, neither we nor the DOD Inspector General, our focal point within DOD, were able to locate any office having this responsibility. In the data collection instrument we sent to the combatant commands, we asked whether the commands had received any guidance on how to implement the legislation. All commands replied that they had received no guidance from any office within DOD. Although the legislation was inspired by the needs of the coalition assembled for the Global War on Terrorism, its authority is available through the Secretary of Defense to all combatant commanders. However, according to the results of our research, the awareness of and need to use the legislation by combatant commands vary widely. To determine the extent to which the combatant commands are aware of and using this legislation, we created a data collection instrument and e-mailed it to representatives at each combatant command. In responding to this instrument, representatives from Northern Command, Southern Command, European Command, Transportation Command, and Strategic Command stated that they were not aware of nor did they have a need to use the legislation, while representatives of Joint Forces Command, Special Operations Command, and Pacific Command were aware of, but had no need to use, the legislation. CENTCOM and one of its subordinate commands were the only commands both aware of and using the legislation. CENTCOM is providing administrative services and support to more than 300 foreign coalition liaison officers from over 60 countries fighting the Global War on Terrorism with the United States. In addition, CENTCOM is paying travel, subsistence, and personal expenses to over 70 liaison officers from more than 30 developing countries that are included in the larger number. In the absence of guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff, CENTCOM officials established internal operating procedures to provide the administrative and travel related support that the foreign coalition liaison officers needed. These procedures are not written, but they are based on existing criteria defining developing countries, federal regulations governing travel, economies of scale, and what appears to be prudent fiscal management. In providing administrative services and support, CENTCOM officials determined that each country’s delegation (limited to no more than five foreign coalition liaison officers) would be provided a trailer for office space with furniture, telephone, computer, printer, copier, and shredder. Some of the smaller delegations share office space. CENTCOM pays for the furniture, shredders, copiers, telephones, and part of the custodial expense. MacDill Air Force Base, which is host to CENTCOM, pays for trailer leases, utilities, external security, and part of the custodial expense. These trailers are located on MacDill property in a fenced compound with security guards on duty. We toured some of the trailers and determined that CENTCOM was providing the space and equipment typical of a small office for the coalition officers. However, CENTCOM officials told us that some countries have spent their own funds to upgrade the office space provided. In determining how to pay the travel, subsistence, and personal expenses for coalition liaison officers from developing countries, CENTCOM officials told us they used existing criteria and federal regulations to guide their decisions. Absent a DOD or Department of State list of what would be considered developing countries, CENTCOM officials told us they use a list of countries generated by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, an international organization to which the United States belongs, and defined by that organization as “Least Developed: Other Low Income and Lower Middle Income.” According to the officials, this list is recognized by the Joint Staff. To determine the appropriate amounts to provide for travel, subsistence, and personal expenses, CENTCOM officials use the Joint Federal Travel Regulations. CENTCOM officials established some basic standards for authorizing travel, subsistence, and personal expenses for the coalition liaison officers from developing countries. CENTCOM pays for one round-trip airplane ticket from an officer’s country of origin to Tampa, Florida, where CENTCOM is headquartered, and return during a tour of duty. Other trips home are at an officer’s or his or her country’s expense. Meals and incidental expenses are based on the Joint Federal Travel Regulations’ rate for Tampa ($42 per day in fiscal year 2003) paid monthly based on the number of days the officer actually spends in Tampa. CENTCOM provides housing for foreign coalition liaison officers through contracts it has negotiated with gated apartment complexes offering on-site security. Because of the number of officers needing housing (including those officers not from developing countries, who pay for their own housing), CENTCOM officials told us that they were able to negotiate rates for housing between $58 and $65 per day, which are less than Joint Federal Travel Regulations’ per diem rate for the Tampa area ($93 per day in fiscal year 2003). CENTCOM does not pay any expenses incurred for family members of the coalition liaison officer who might accompany the officer to the United States. In fiscal year 2002, the first year the coalition was formed, coalition liaison officers had to find their own housing, which was more expensive than the contracts currently in place. CENTCOM officials also told us that they rent cars for the coalition liaison officers from the General Services Administration at a cost of $350 per car per month, which is less expensive than renting from a commercial car leasing company at a cost of $750 per month. Again, because there are so many officers who require transportation, CENTCOM was able to negotiate a lower rate. Officers are allowed one car for each three members of a delegation. The officer whose name is on the car rental agreement is allowed $60 per month for gas. The officers assigned to the car must pay for any additional gas. CENTCOM and MacDill Air Force Base spent a total of almost $30 million between fiscal year 2002 and 2003 to support coalition liaison officers (see table 1). In fiscal year 2002, CENTCOM and MacDill Air Force Base spent $12.4 million to provide the administrative services and support and pay travel, subsistence, and personal expenses for the coalition liaison officers assigned to CENTCOM headquarters. The money came from Combatant Commander’s Initiative Funds and MacDill Air Force Base funds. The amount spent in fiscal year 2003—nearly $17.1 million—included $898,000 in Commander’s Initiative Funds to pay for travel, subsistence, and personal expenses, which was used until the legislation to provide support to coalition liaison officers was passed and the funds became available. The remaining amount came from CENTCOM and MacDill funds. In addition to CENTCOM, the Coalition Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, a CENTCOM subordinate operating command, reported spending over $300,000 to provide administrative support and pay travel, subsistence, and personal expenses to 13 liaison officers assigned to the task force headquarters. No other subordinate operating command or component command reported spending funds to support coalition liaison officers. CENTCOM officials stated that this legislation has benefited the coalition by providing maximum communication and coordination for the deployment of those forces committed to fighting the Global War on Terrorism. They also stated that without the presence of the liaison officers at CENTCOM, they could not accomplish the coalition integration planning and coordination important to the Global War on Terrorism as effectively or efficiently as they are doing. CENTCOM officials stated that the legislation’s authority to pay for travel, subsistence, and personal expenses for developing countries’ liaison officers also has given the command a tool to use in negotiating with developing countries for their participation in the coalition force. DOD-wide guidance provides uniform direction throughout the department on how to implement programs and policies. While CENTCOM has developed procedures for managing support to coalition liaison officers and has taken steps to provide the support authorized by the legislation in the least costly way, in the absence of DOD-wide guidance, there can be no assurance that prudent procedures will always be followed. Moreover, without DOD guidance, should other commands choose to use the authority granted by this legislation, there is no assurance that they will implement it in a uniform and prudent manner. As of January 2004, there was no DOD office responsible for the implementation of the legislative authority allowing commands to pay for support for coalition liaison officers and no DOD-wide guidance on its use. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: (1) designate an office within DOD to take responsibility for this legislation and (2) direct this designated office to promulgate and issue guidance to the combatant commands and their component and subordinate commands on how to implement this legislation. In official oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the report. DOD stated that it would designate the Joint Staff as the office responsible for implementing the legislation and issuing appropriate guidance. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me on (757) 552-8100 or by e-mail at [email protected]. Major contributors to this report were Steven Sternlieb, Ann Borseth, Madelon Savaides, David Mayfield, and Renee McElveen.

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide administrative services and support to foreign coalition liaison officers temporarily assigned to the headquarters of a combatant command or any of its subordinate commands. Congress required GAO to assess the implementation of this legislation. Specifically, GAO's objectives were to determine (1) what guidance the Department of Defense (DOD) has provided on the implementation of this legislation, (2) the extent to which the commands are aware of and are using this legislation, and (3) the level of support being provided by commands using this legislation and the benefits derived from it. GAO could find no evidence that DOD had issued any guidance to combatant commanders on how to implement this legislation. In addition, GAO was unable to identify an office within DOD that has responsibility for implementing this legislation. The DOD Office of the Inspector General, as GAO's focal point within DOD, was also unable to identify a responsible office. Although the legislation was inspired by the needs of the coalition assembled for the Global War on Terrorism, its authority is available through the Secretary of Defense to all combatant commanders. According to the results of GAO's research, the combatant commands' awareness of and need to use the legislation varied widely with Central Command being the only command using the authority to support liaison officers. Central Command, spent $17 million in fiscal year 2003 to provide administrative services and support to more than 300 coalition liaison officers from over 60 countries. As allowed by the legislation, the command also paid the travel, subsistence, and personal expenses of over 70 of these officers from more than 30 developing countries. Central Command officials stated that they could not accomplish the coalition integration planning and coordination important to the Global War on Terrorism as effectively or efficiently as they are doing without the liaison officers. They also commented that the legislation helps facilitate the participation of a developing country in the coalition if the command can pay for travel and subsistence.

In every war fought by the United States, civilian ships have supported military operations by transporting supplies and personnel. The civilians that have served on these vessels historically have worked in varying capacities either for private shipping companies under contract with the federal government or for the government itself. These civilians are collectively referred to as merchant mariners . In World War II, an estimated 8,500 merchant mariners were killed and 11,000 were wounded. During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it is estimated that 63% of the military cargo shipped to the Middle East and Afghanistan was delivered by U.S.-flagged commercial vessels crewed by merchant mariners and an additional 35% of military cargo was transported by government-owned vessels crewed by civilian federal employees and federal contractors. Although merchant mariners have always played an important role in support of U.S. war efforts, they generally have not been considered veterans for the purposes of federal benefits. Currently, only limited groups of World War II-era merchant mariners are eligible for benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). After World War II, merchant mariners sought through legislation to gain recognition as veterans. Legislation was introduced either to provide benefits to merchant mariners comparable to those provided under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (P.L. 78-346), commonly known as the GI Bill, or to expand the employee benefits merchant mariners were receiving at that time. During hearings in late 1945, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries heard testimony on four bills that would have provided some benefits to merchant seamen. One of these bills, H.R. 2346, would have provided benefits to merchant mariners comparable to those of other World War II veterans. Testimony in favor of H.R. 2346 was heard from a number of former merchant seamen and the Merchant Marine Veterans Association. Testimony in opposition to H.R. 2346 came from various agencies, including the War Department, the Veterans Administration, and the American Legion. Opponents to granting veteran status to merchant mariners generally focused on the freedom of a merchant mariner to make decisions about whether or not to take a particular voyage or leave service. They also focused on the higher earnings of merchant mariners relative to uniformed Navy personnel. H.R. 476, introduced in 1947, would have expanded the existing benefits for merchant seamen related to health care and disability and introduced an education benefit. Ultimately, no legislation was enacted in the immediate aftermath of World War II to grant veteran status to merchant mariners or to provide additional benefits to merchant mariners related to health care, disability, or education. Section 401 of the GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977 ( P.L. 95-202 ) granted veterans' benefit eligibility to civilians who served as Women's Air Forces Service Pilots (WASPS) during World War II. In addition, Section 401 of P.L. 95-202 provided the Secretary of Defense the authority to extend "active duty" status for the purpose of eligibility for federal veterans' benefits to other groups of civilian federal employees or contractors who rendered service to the Armed Forces and were "similarly situated" to the WASPS. Regulations implementing P.L. 95-202 , issued as Department of Defense Directive 1000.20, delegated the authority to grant active duty status to civilian groups to the Secretary of the Air Force. In addition, Directive 1000.20 established the Department of Defense Civilian/Military Service Review Board to review each application for active duty status. The factors to be used in reviewing such applications included the uniqueness of service rendered by the group and whether or not the group was subject to military control, discipline, and justice. A complete list of groups granted active duty status for the purpose of eligibility for veterans' benefits pursuant to P.L. 95-202 is provided in regulation. In 1982, the Secretary of the Air Force rejected the application for active duty status for oceangoing merchant mariners who served during World War II. In 1985, the Secretary rejected the applications of merchant mariners who served in contested waters in World War II, merchant mariners involved in any military invasion during World War II, and all merchant mariners involved in Operation Mulberry during World War II. These rejections were recommended by the Civilian/Military Service Review Board. The rejection of the oceangoing merchant mariners was based on the Secretary of the Air Force's decision that these groups received only limited military training; did not render service exclusively for the Armed Forces; were not subject exclusively to military discipline; were not subject to "pervasive" military control; had no reasonable expectation of "active military service" status, and were not part of a wartime organization formed for or because of a wartime need. In recommending the rejection of the application of the Operation Mulberry group, the Civilian/Military Service Review Board stated that this group "was too broad and diverse to make an adequate determination as to the roles played by the multitude of subgroups and members that made up Operation Mulberry." However, although the application of all merchant mariners that participated in Operation Mulberry was rejected, the application of those who served only on blockships during this operation was approved. In recommending the approval of the blockship group's application, the Civilian/Military Review Board stated that [t]hese merchant marines performed a uniquely military mission in a combat zone that would not normally be considered a mission of the Merchant Marine. The merchant crews were not tasked with delivering a cargo, per se, but were asked to be a part of a team to create an artificial harbor a beachhead mission normally associated with military engineers for a military operation. This is not a mission that the Merchant Marine historically perform. This group, then, was a creation of World War II for that specific time and place, i.e., the Invasion of Normandy. Following the 1985 rejections of applications of merchant mariners for active duty status, a lawsuit was filed challenging the denial of active duty status for World War II oceangoing merchant mariners and those who participated in World War II invasions. The plaintiffs argued that the merchant mariners included in these applications satisfied the established criteria to a greater extent than many of the previously approved groups and argued that the denials were inconsistent with the Secretary of the Air Force's prior decisions. The Secretary of the Air Force responded that the plaintiffs misunderstood the designation criteria and outlined characteristics that the approved groups shared. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Secretary of the Air Force erred in rejecting the applications of the oceangoing merchant mariners and those that participated in World War II invasions. The court remanded these individuals' applications back to the Secretary of the Air Force for reconsideration. In 1988, following the Schumacher decision, the Secretary of the Air Force granted active duty status for the purpose of eligibility for veterans' benefits to World War II-era merchant mariners who served on vessels engaged in oceangoing service from December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945. Section 402 of the Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1988 ( P.L. 105-368 ) extended veterans' burial benefits and the right to interment in national cemeteries to merchant mariners who served on vessels engaged in oceangoing service from August 16, 1945, to December 31, 1946. In 1999, the Secretary of the Air Force determined that the service of oceangoing merchant marines during the period from August 15, 1945, to December 31, 1946 (those covered by P.L. 105-368 ) is not considered active duty under the provisions of P.L. 95-202 for the purposes of other benefits administered by the VA. Under current law and regulations, only the following groups of merchant mariners are considered to have served on active duty or are otherwise eligible for veterans' benefits. No other merchant mariners are eligible for any veterans' benefits administered by the VA. United States merchant seamen who served on blockships in support of Operation Mulberry. American merchant marine in oceangoing service during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, and who meet the following qualifications: was employed by the War Shipping Administration or Office of Defense Transportation (or their agents) as a merchant seaman documented by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Department of Commerce (Merchant Mariner's Document/Certificate of Service) or as a civil servant employed by the U.S. Army Transport Service (later redesignated U.S. Army Transportation Corps, Water Division) or the Naval Transportation Service; and served satisfactorily as a crew member during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, aboard merchant vessels in oceangoing—that is, foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise—service (per 46 U.S.C. §§10301 and 10501) and further to include near foreign voyages between the United States and Canada, Mexico, or the West Indies via ocean routes, or public vessels in oceangoing service or foreign waters. Served between August 16, 1945, and December 31, 1946, as a member of the United States merchant marine (including the Army Transport Service and the Naval Transport Service) serving as a crewmember of a vessel that was operated by the War Shipping Administration or the Office of Defense Transportation (or an agent of either); operated in waters other than inland waters, the Great Lakes, and other lakes, bays, and harbors of the United States; under contract or charter to, or property of, the government of the United States; and serving the Armed Forces; and while so serving, was licensed or otherwise documented for service as a crewmember of such a vessel by an officer or employee of the United States authorized to license or document the person for such service. Although some World War II-era merchant mariners were granted eligibility for veterans' benefits in 1985 and 1988, the passage of time between their service and the granting of this eligibility may have made it impossible for them to fully access these benefits. For example, when these former merchant mariners were of typical college age after the war, they were not eligible for benefits under the GI Bill. In addition, those with service-connected disabilities or medical conditions may have lost out on nearly 40 years of VA disability compensation or medical benefits. H.R. 154 , the Honoring Our WWII Merchant Mariners Act of 2017, would provide compensation to former World War II-era merchant mariners to account for the benefits they were not able to access before being granted veterans' benefit eligibility in the 1980s. Similar legislation has been introduced in each Congress since the 108 th Congress. Specifically, this legislation would provide a one-time payment of $25,000 to any merchant mariner who served between December 7, 1941, and December 31, 1946, and who otherwise meets the definition of service provided for burial benefits and interment eligibility in P.L. 105-368 . Eligible persons would have one year from the date of enactment of the legislation to apply for benefits. A total of $125 million would be authorized to be appropriated in FY2017 for these benefits, to be available until expended. Although the benefits created by this legislation would partially compensate former merchant mariners for lost benefits, H.R. 154 would place the former merchant mariners in a unique position compared to other civilians who served in World War II and other veterans. Active duty status for the purposes of eligibility for veterans' benefits has been extended under the provisions of P.L. 95-202 to 33 groups of civilians who served during World Wars I and II, all of whom can claim to have missed the opportunity to claim certain benefits during the period between their service and the granting of active duty status. However, if H.R. 154 were to be enacted, only the two merchant mariner groups would be eligible for any form of compensation to account for these lost benefits. In addition, merchant mariners would join Medal of Honor winners as the only groups eligible for cash compensation from the VA without having to demonstrate a financial hardship (for VA pension benefits) or a service-connected disability (for VA disability compensation).

Although merchant mariners have supported the Armed Forces in every war fought by the United States, they generally are not considered veterans for the purpose of eligibility for federal benefits. Pursuant to legislation enacted in 1977 (P.L. 95-202) and 1988 (P.L. 105-368) and to decisions made by the Secretary of the Air Force in 1985 and 1988, the following groups of World War II-era merchant mariners are the only merchant mariners eligible for veterans' benefits. Eligible for all veterans' benefits: United States merchant seamen who served on blockships in support of Operation Mulberry. American merchant marine in oceangoing service during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, and who meet the following qualifications: employed by the War Shipping Administration or Office of Defense Transportation (or their agents) as a merchant seaman documented by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Department of Commerce (Merchant Mariner's Document/Certificate of Service) or as a civil servant employed by the U.S. Army Transport Service (later redesignated U.S. Army Transportation Corps, Water Division) or the Naval Transportation Service; and served satisfactorily as a crew member during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, aboard merchant vessels in oceangoing—that is, foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise—service (per 46 U.S.C. §§10301 and 10501) and further to include near foreign voyages between the United States and Canada, Mexico, or the West Indies via ocean routes, or public vessels in oceangoing service or foreign waters. Eligible for burial benefit and national cemetery interment only: Served between August 16, 1945, and December 31, 1946, as a member of the United States merchant marine (including the Army Transport Service and the Naval Transport Service), serving as a crewmember of a vessel that was operated by the War Shipping Administration or the Office of Defense Transportation (or an agent of either); operated in waters other than inland waters, the Great Lakes, and other lakes, bays, and harbors of the United States; under contract or charter to, or property of, the government of the United States; and serving the Armed Forces; and while so serving, was licensed or otherwise documented for service as a crewmember of such a vessel by an officer or employee of the United States authorized to license or document the person for such service. H.R. 154, the Honoring Our WWII Merchant Mariners Act of 2017, would provide one-time compensation of $25,000 to World War-II merchant mariners to account for benefits they were not able to access before being granted veterans' benefit eligibility.

Enactment of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) culminated years of effort by nonfederal government officials and their advocates to control, if not eliminate, the federal imposition of unfunded mandates. Supporters contend that the statute is needed to forestall federal legislation and regulations that impose questionable or unnecessary burdens and have resulted in high costs and inefficiencies. Opponents argue that mandates may be necessary to achieve results in areas in which voluntary action may be insufficient or state actions have not achieved intended goals. Since the mid-1980s, Congress debated legislation to slow or prohibit the enactment of unfunded federal mandates. The inclusion of the issue in the Contract with America, the blueprint of legislative action developed by the House Republican leadership when it gained the majority, practically guaranteed that action would be taken. UMRA was signed into law early in the 104 th Congress, on March 22, 1995. Under UMRA, federal mandates include provisions of law or regulation that impose enforceable duties, including taxes. They also include provisions that reduce or eliminate federal financial assistance available for carrying out an existing duty. UMRA distinguishes between "intergovernmental mandates," imposed on state, local, or tribal governments, and "private sector mandates." Intergovernmental mandates include legislation or regulations that would (1) reduce certain federal services to state, local, and tribal governments (such as border control or reimbursement for services to illegal aliens); and (2) tighten conditions of assistance or reduce federal funding for existing intergovernmental assistance programs with entitlement authority of $500 million or more. Exclusions and exemptions outside the reach of the statute are discussed later in this report. Under UMRA, an intergovernmental mandate is considered unfunded unless the legislation authorizing the mandate meets its costs by either (1) providing new budget authority (direct spending authority or entitlement authority) or (2) authorizing appropriations. If appropriations are authorized, the mandate is considered unfunded unless the legislation ensures that in any fiscal year (1) the actual costs of the mandate will not exceed the appropriations actually provided; (2) the terms of the mandate will be revised so that it can be carried out with the funds appropriated; (3) the mandate will be abolished; or (4) Congress will enact new legislation to continue the mandate as an unfunded mandate. The act consists of five prefatory sections and four titles. The prefatory sections address matters such as the purpose, short title, and exclusions from coverage of the act. Title I amends the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, as amended, to permit Congress to (1) identify legislation proposing mandates, and (2) decline to consider legislation proposing unfunded intergovernmental mandates. Title I also sets forth thresholds for action, authorizations, and definitions. Title II requires that federal agencies assess the financial impact of proposed rules on nonfederal entities, determine whether federal resources exist to pay those costs, solicit and consider input from affected entities, and generally select the least costly or burdensome regulatory option. Title III called for a review of federal mandates to be completed within 18 months of enactment. This statutory requirement was not completed. UMRA assigned the study to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), which no longer exists. The ACIR completed a preliminary report in January, 1996, but the final report was not released. Title IV authorizes judicial review of federal agency compliance with Title II provisions. The remainder of this report summarizes the requirements set forth in Titles I, II, and IV of the act. Referred to as "Legislative Accountability and Reform," Title I establishes requirements for committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to study and report on the magnitude and impact of mandates in proposed legislation. Title I also creates point-of-order procedures through which these requirements can be enforced and the consideration of measures containing unfunded intergovernmental mandates can be blocked. Under UMRA, congressional committees have the initial responsibility to identify federal mandates in measures under consideration. Committees may have CBO study whether proposed legislation could have a significant budgetary impact on nonfederal governments, or a financial or employment impact on the private sector. Also, committee chairs and ranking minority members may have CBO study any legislation containing a federal mandate. When an authorizing committee orders reported a public bill or joint resolution containing a federal mandate, it must provide the measure to CBO. CBO must report to the committee an estimate of mandate costs. The office must prepare full quantitative estimates if costs are estimated to exceed $59 million (for intergovernmental mandates) or $117 million (for private sector mandates) in any of the first five fiscal years the legislation would be in effect. Below these thresholds, CBO must prepare brief statements of cost estimates. For each reported measure with costs over the thresholds, CBO is to submit to the committee an estimate of the direct costs of federal mandates contained in it, or in any necessary implementing regulations; and the amount of new or existing federal funding the legislation authorizes to pay these costs. If reported legislation authorizes appropriations to meet the estimated costs of an intergovernmental mandate, the CBO report must include a statement on the new budget authority needed, for up to 10 years, to meet these costs. For a measure that reauthorizes or amends an existing statute, the direct costs of any mandate it contains are to be measured by the projected increase over those costs required by existing law. The calculation of increased costs must include any projected decrease in existing federal aid that provides assistance to nonfederal entities. The committee is to include the CBO estimate in its report or publish it in the Congressional Record . The committee's report on the measure must also identify the direct costs to the entities that must carry out the mandate; assess likely costs and benefits; describe how the mandate affects the "competitive balance" between the public and private sectors; and state the extent to which the legislation would preempt state, local, or tribal law, and explain the effect of any preemption. These requirements apply to all proposed mandates, both intergovernmental and private sector. For intergovernmental mandates alone, the committee is to describe in its report the extent to which the legislation authorizes federal funding for the direct costs, and details on whether and how funding is to be provided. UMRA establishes that when any measure is taken up for consideration in either house, a point of order may be raised that the measure contains unfunded intergovernmental mandates exceeding the $59 million threshold. This point of order applies to the measure as reported, including, for example, a committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The point of order may also be raised if CBO reported that no reasonable estimate of the cost of intergovernmental mandates was feasible. A point of order also may be raised against consideration of a measure reported from committee if the committee has not published a CBO estimate of mandate costs. This point of order applies to both intergovernmental and private sector mandates. In the Senate, either point of order may be waived by majority vote. Otherwise, if the chair sustains the point of order, the measure may not be considered. In ruling on these points of order, the chair is to consult with the Committee on Governmental Affairs on whether the measure contains intergovernmental mandates. Also, the unfunded costs of the mandate are to be determined based on estimates by the Committee on the Budget (which may draw for this purpose on the CBO estimate). For the House, UMRA provides that if either point of order is raised, the chair does not rule on it. Instead, the House votes on whether to consider the measure despite the point of order. To prevent dilatory use of the point of order, the chair need not put the question of consideration to a vote unless the Member making the point of order meets the "threshold burden" of identifying specific language that is claimed to contain the unfunded mandate. Also, if several points of order could be raised against the same measure, House practices under UMRA afford means for all to be consolidated in a single vote on consideration. Finally, if the Committee on Rules proposes a special rule for considering the measure that waives the point of order, UMRA subjects the special rule itself to a point of order, which is disposed of by the same mechanism. These procedures are intended to insure that the House, like the Senate, will always have an opportunity to determine, by vote, whether to consider a measure that may contain an unfunded mandate. Also, if the House votes to consider a measure in spite of the point of order, UMRA protects the ability of Members to offer amendments in the Committee of the Whole to strike out unfunded intergovernmental mandates, unless the special rule specifically prohibits such amendments. A point of order under the UMRA mechanism may be raised not only against initial consideration of a bill or resolution, but also against consideration of an amendment, conference report, or motion (e.g., a motion to recommit with instructions or a motion to concur in an amendment of the other house with an amendment) that would cause the unfunded costs of intergovernmental mandates in a measure to exceed the specified threshold. UMRA does not require amendments or motions to be accompanied by CBO mandate cost estimates, but a Senator may request CBO to estimate the costs of mandates in an amendment he or she prepares. If an amended bill or resolution or a conference report contains a new mandate or other new increases in mandate costs, the conferees are to request a supplemental estimate, which CBO is to attempt to provide. UMRA requires no publication of these supplemental estimates. The UMRA points of order are not applicable against consideration of appropriations bills. However, if an appropriation bill contains legislative provisions that would create unfunded intergovernmental mandates in excess of the threshold, the UMRA point of order may be raised against the provisions themselves. In the Senate, if this point of order is sustained, the provisions are stricken from the bill. Legislation pertinent to the following subject matters remains exempt from the UMRA point-of-order procedures: individual constitutional rights, discrimination prohibitions, auditing compliance, emergency assistance requested by nonfederal government officials, national security or treaty obligations, emergencies as designated by the President and the Congress, and Social Security. The provisions of Title I pertinent to federal agencies (for example, the requirement that agencies determine whether sufficient appropriations exist to provide for proposed costs) do not apply to federal regulatory agencies. Also, provisions establishing conditions of federal assistance or duties stemming from participation in voluntary federal programs are not mandates. Title II requires that federal agencies prepare written statements that identify costs and benefits of a federal mandate to be imposed through the rulemaking process. The requirement applies to regulatory actions determined to result in costs of $117 million or more in any one year (2003 figure, as adjusted for inflation). The written assessments to be prepared by federal agencies must identify the law authorizing the rule, anticipated costs and benefits, the share of costs to be borne by the federal government, and the disproportionate costs on individual regions or components of the private sector. Assessments must also include estimates of the effect on the national economy, descriptions of consultations with nonfederal government officials, and a summary of the evaluation of comments and concerns obtained throughout the promulgation process. Impacts of "any regulatory requirements" on small governments must be identified; notice must be given to those governments; and technical assistance must be provided. Also, UMRA requires that federal agencies consider "a reasonable number" of policy options and select the most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative. The requirements in Title II pertaining to the preparation of a mandate assessment statement and notification of impact on small governments remain subject to judicial review. A federal court may compel a federal agency to comply with these requirements, but such a court order cannot be used to stay or invalidate the rule.

This summary of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995 will assist Members of Congress and staff seeking succinct information on the statute. The term "unfunded mandates" generally refers to requirements that a unit of government imposes without providing funds to pay for costs of compliance. UMRA establishes mechanisms to limit federal imposition of unfunded mandates on other levels of government (intergovernmental mandates) and on the private sector. The act establishes points of order against proposed legislation containing an unfunded intergovernmental mandate, requires executive agencies to seek comment on regulations that would constitute a mandate, and establishes a means for judicial enforcement. This report will be updated if the act is amended.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the implementation of the Community Policing Act with special attention to statutory requirements for implementing the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants. The Community Policing Act authorized $8.8 billion to be used from fiscal years 1995 to 2000 to enhance public safety. Its goals are to add 100,000 officer positions, funded by grants, to the streets of communities nationwide and to promote community policing. This statement is based primarily on our September 3, 1997, report on the design, operation, and management of the COPS grant program. At that time, the COPS grant program was midway through its 6-year authorization period. Thus, the information contained in this statement should be considered as a status report at that time rather than a reflection of current operations. My statement makes the following points. COPS grants were not targeted on the basis of greatest need for assistance. However, the higher the crime rate, the more likely a jurisdiction was to apply for a COPS grant. COPS office grant monitoring was limited. Monitoring guidelines were not prepared, site visits and telephone monitoring did not systematically take place, and information on activities and accomplishments was not consistently collected or reviewed. Small communities were awarded most COPS office grants, but large cities received larger awards. In accordance with the act, about half the funds were awarded to agencies serving populations less than 150,000. As of June 1997, a total of 30,155 law enforcement positions funded by COPS grants were estimated by the COPS office to be on the street. Community policing is a philosophy under which local police departments develop strategies to address the causes of and reduce the fear of crime through problem solving tactics and community-police partnerships. Community policing emphasizes the importance of police-citizen partnerships and cooperation to control crime, maintain order, and improve the quality of life in communities. Community Policing Act, the Attorney General had discretion to decide which Justice component would administer community policing grants. Justice officials believed that a new, efficient customer-oriented organization was needed to process the record number of grants. The result was the creation of the new Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). The Community Policing Act requires that grantees contribute 25 percent of the costs of the program, project, or activity funded by the grant, unless the Attorney General waives the matching requirement. According to Justice officials, the basis for waiver of the matching requirements is extraordinary local fiscal hardship. The act also requires that grants be used to supplement, not supplant, state and local funds. To prevent supplanting, grantees must devote resources to law enforcement beyond those resources that would have been available without a COPS grant. In general, grantees are expected to use the hiring grants to increase the number of funded sworn officers above the number on board in October 1994, when the program began. Grantees are required to have plans to assume a progressively larger share of the cost over time, looking toward keeping the increased number of officers by using state and local funds after the expiration of the federal grant program at the end of fiscal year 2000. The Community Policing Act does not target grants to law enforcement agencies on the basis of which agency has the greatest need for assistance, but rather to agencies that meet COPS program criteria. In one of our previous reports, among other things, we reviewed alternative strategies for targeting grants. We noted that federal grants have been established to achieve a variety of goals. For example, if the desired goal is to target fiscal relief to areas experiencing greater fiscal stress, grant allocation formulas could be changed to include a combination of factors that allocate a larger share of federal aid to those states with relatively greater program needs and fewer resources. expressed uncertainty about being able to continue officer funding after the grant expired and about their ability to provide the required 25-percent match. However, community groups and local government representatives we interviewed generally supported community policing in their neighborhoods. Monitoring is an important tool for Justice to use in ensuring that law enforcement jurisdictions funded by COPS grants comply with federal program requirements. The Community Policing Act requires that each COPS Office program, project, or activity contain a monitoring component developed pursuant to guidelines established by the Attorney General. In addition, the COPS program regulations specify that each grant is to contain a monitoring component, including periodic financial and programmatic reporting and, in appropriate circumstances, on-site reviews. The regulations state that the guidelines for monitoring are to be issued by the COPS Office. COPS Office grant-monitoring activities during the first 2-1/2 years of the program were limited. Final COPS Office monitoring guidance had not been issued as of June 1997. Information on activities and accomplishments for COPS-funded programs was not consistently collected or reviewed. Site visits and telephone monitoring by grant advisers did not systematically take place. COPS Office officials said that monitoring efforts were limited due to a lack of grant adviser staff and an early program focus on processing applications to get officers on the street. According to a COPS Office official, as of July 1997, the COPS Office had about 155 total staff positions, up from about 130 positions that it had when the office was established. Seventy of these positions were for grant administration, including processing grant applications, responding to questions from grantees, and monitoring grantee performance. The remaining positions were for staff who worked in various other areas, including training; technical assistance; administration; and public, intergovernmental, and congressional liaison. According to the COPS Office, in January 1997, it began taking steps to increase the level of its monitoring. It developed monitoring guidelines, revised reporting forms, piloted on-site monitoring visits, and initiated telephone monitoring of grantees’ activities. process of hiring up to this level. In commenting on our draft report, COPS officials also noted that they were recruiting for more than 30 staff positions in a new monitoring component to be exclusively devoted to overseeing grant compliance activities. COPS Office officials also said that some efforts were under way to review compliance with requirements of the Community Policing Act that grants be used to supplement, not supplant, local funding. In previous work, we reported that enforcing such provisions of grant programs was difficult for federal agencies due to problems in ascertaining state and local spending intentions. According to the COPS Office Assistant Director of Grant Administration, the COPS Office’s approach to achieving compliance with the nonsupplantation provision was to receive accounts of potential violations from grantees or other sources and then to work with grantees to bring them into compliance, not to abruptly terminate grants or otherwise penalize grantees. COPS Office grant advisers attempted to work with grantees to develop mutually acceptable plans for corrective actions. Also, in our 1997 report on grant design, our synthesis of literature on the fiscal impact of grants suggested that each additional federal grant dollar resulted in about 40 cents of added spending on the aided activity. This means that the fiscal impact of the remaining 60 cents was to free up state or local funds that otherwise would have been spent on that activity for other programs or tax relief. In April 1997, COPS Office officials said that they were discussing ways to encourage grantees to sustain hiring levels achieved under the grants, in light of the language of the Community Policing Act regarding the continuation of these increased hiring levels after the conclusion of federal support. Law enforcement agencies in small communities were awarded most of the COPS grants for fiscal years 1995 and 1996. Our work showed that 6,588 grants—49 percent of the total 13,396 grants awarded—were awarded to law enforcement agencies serving communities with populations of fewer than 10,000. Eighty-three percent—11,173 grants—of the total grants awarded went to agencies serving populations of fewer than 50,000. Large cities—with populations of over 1 million—were awarded about 1 percent of the grants, but these grants made up over 23 percent—about $612 million—of the total grant dollars awarded. About 50 percent of the grant funds were awarded to law enforcement agencies serving populations of 150,000 or less, and about 50 percent of the grant funds were awarded to law enforcement agencies serving populations exceeding 150,000, as the Community Policing Act required. In commenting on our draft report, the COPS Office noted that these distributions were not surprising given that the vast majority of police departments nationwide are also relatively small. The COPS Office also noted that the Community Policing Act requires that the level of assistance given to large and small agencies be equal. Of the grants awarded in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, special law enforcement agencies, such as those serving Native American communities, universities and colleges, and mass transit passengers, were awarded 329 hiring grants. This number was less than 3 percent of the 11,434 hiring grants awarded during the 2-year period. As of the end of fiscal year 1996, after 2 years of operation, the COPS Office had issued award letters to 8,803 communities for 13,396 grants totaling about $2.6 billion. Eighty-six percent of these grant dollars were to be used to hire additional law enforcement officers. Other grant funds were to be used to buy new technology and equipment; hire support personnel; and/or pay law enforcement officers overtime, train officers in community policing, and develop innovative prevention programs, including domestic violence prevention, youth firearms reduction, and antigang initiatives. As of June 1997, a total of 30,155 law enforcement officer positions funded by COPS grants were estimated by the COPS Office to be on the street. COPS Office estimates of the numbers of new community policing officers on the street were based on three funding sources: (1) officers on board as a result of COPS hiring grants; (2) officers redeployed to community policing as a result of time savings achieved through technology and equipment purchases, hiring of civilian personnel, and/or law enforcement officers’ overtime; and (3) officers funded under the Police Hiring Supplement Program, which was in place before the COPS grant program. According to COPS Office officials, the office’s first systematic attempt to estimate the progress toward the goal of 100,000 new community policing officers on the street was a telephone survey of grantees done between September and December, 1996. COPS Office staff contacted 8,360 grantees to inquire about their progress in hiring officers and getting them on the street. According to a COPS Office official, a follow-up survey, which estimated 30,155 law enforcement officer positions to be on the street, was done between late March and June, 1997. The official said that this survey was contracted out because the earlier in-house survey had been extremely time consuming. The official said that, as of May 1997, the office was in the process of selecting a contractor to do three additional surveys during fiscal year 1998. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. Again, I wish to emphasize that my statement is based primarily on a report issued at about the mid-point of the COPS program implementation, and that facts and circumstances relating to the program would likely have changed since then. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have. Contacts and Acknowledgment For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Weldon McPhail and Dennise R. Stickley. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. 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Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the implementation of the Community Policing Act, focusing on statutory requirements for implementing the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants. GAO noted that: (1) the Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act authorizes $8.8 billion to be used from fiscal years (FY) 1995 to 2000 to enhance public safety; (2) it has the goals of adding 100,000 officer positions, funded by grants, to the streets of communities nationwide and promoting community policing; (3) among other things, the act required that half the grants go to law enforcement agencies serving populations of 150,000 or less; (4) the Attorney General created the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services to administer community policing grants; (5) at the end of FY 1997, GAO reported on the Department of Justice's implementation of the act and progress toward achieving program goals; (6) GAO found that grants were not targeted to law enforcement agencies on the basis of which agency had the greatest need for assistance, but rather to agencies that met COPS program criteria; (7) previous work had shown that overall, the higher crime rate, the more likely a jurisdiction was to apply for a COPS grant; (8) the primary reasons contacted jurisdictions chose not to apply for a grant were cost related; (9) GAO reported that the COPS Office provided limited monitoring to assure compliance with the act during the period reviewed; (10) COPS officials said they were taking steps to increase the level of monitoring; (11) the majority of the 13,396 grants awarded in FY 1995 and FY 1996 went to law enforcement agencies serving populations of fewer than 50,000; (12) communities with populations of over 1 million were awarded less than 1 percent of the grants, although they were awarded over 23 percent of the total grant dollars; and (13) as of June 1997, the COPS Office estimated that a total of 30,155 law enforcement officer positions funded by COPS grants were on the streets.

Congressional interest in oil spill legislation has historically waxed and waned. Recent oil spills led some Members of the 112 th Congress to express an increased level of interest in oil spill legislation. On April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred at the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in 11 fatalities. The incident disabled the facility and led to a full evacuation before the platform sank into the Gulf on April 22, 2010. A significant release of oil at the sea floor was soon discovered. According to the National Incident Command's Flow Rate Technical Group estimate, the well released approximately 206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels) of oil before it was contained July 15, 2010. The 2010 Gulf oil spill and two pipeline spills—an Enbridge pipeline in Michigan (2010) and an ExxonMobil pipeline in Montana (2011) —continued to generate some interest in a variety of oil spill-related issues. This report identifies legislation that addresses oil spill-related issues. For this report, oil spill-related issues include oil spill policy matters that concern prevention, preparedness, response, liability and compensation, and Gulf of Mexico restoration. In the context of this report, oil spill issues do not generally include matters pertaining to offshore leasing and drilling. For the most part, the underlying statutes for these oil spill-related provisions are found in either the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA) and its amendments, or the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) and its amendments. Table 1 provides a list of acronyms used in the report. Table 2 identifies enacted oil spill legislation. Table 3 (House proposals) and Table 4 (Senate proposals) provide a snapshot of oil spill-related bills in the 112 th Congress, many of which were (at least in part) offered in response to issues raised by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Some of the bills are similar (if not identical) to proposals from the 111 th Congress. (See Text Box below.) Other bills reflect recommendations by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. The 112 th Congress enacted two statutes with oil spill-related provisions. First, on January 3, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-90 (the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011), which includes, among other provisions, the following: increases the maximum amount of civil penalties for violations of safety requirements; authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to require the installation of automatic and remote-controlled shutoff valves on newly constructed transmission pipelines; directs the Secretary of Transportation to submit a report analyzing leak detection systems and issues involved in requiring them. Based on this analysis (and after a review period by Congress), the Secretary of Transportation may issue leak detection requirements; and requires the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to review whether current regulations are sufficient to regulate pipelines transmitting "diluted bitumen," and analyze whether such oil presents an increased risk of release. Second, on July 6, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-141 (MAP-21). That act included a subtitle referred to as the RESTORE Act. A detailed summary of that act is provided below. The bills included in the following tables below are not an exhaustive list of bills that may have some impact on oil spill policy. For example, some Members offered proposals that sought to spur offshore oil exploration and development. As highlighted below, one enacted bill included such a provision and several other such bills passed the House: P.L. 112-74 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (signed December 23, 2011), included a provision that amends the Clean Air Act (CAA), transferring air emission authority in the OCS off Alaska's north coast from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the Department of the Interior (DOI). H.R. 1230 (passed the House May 5, 2011) would have directed the DOI Secretary to conduct four oil and gas lease sales—three in the Gulf of Mexico and one off the coast of Virginia—within specific time frames. H.R. 1229 (passed the House May 11, 2011) would have amended the permit process time frame and change the venue for judicial review. H.R. 1231 (passed the House May 12, 2011) would have directed the DOI Secretary to make certain areas of OCS available for leasing based on estimates of oil and gas resources. H.R. 2021 (passed the House June 22, 2011) would have amended the CAA to modify the definition of OCS source, to exclude counting support vessel emissions, and to eliminate Environmental Appeal Board authority over exploration permits. In contrast, some Members introduced bills that would have prohibited oil and gas development in particular areas. The focus of these proposals generally involves environmental protection, particularly oil spill prevention. As such, these latter proposals are included in the tables below, but the former proposals are not. The bills identified in the tables are listed in (descending) order by bill number. The RESTORE Act establishes the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund in the General Treasury. Eighty percent of any administrative and civil Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 311 penalties paid by responsible parties in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill provide the revenues for the fund. Amounts in the fund will be available for expenditure without further appropriation. The act directs the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate implementing regulations concerning trust fund deposits and expenditures. Based on this and other provisions, the act appears to give the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to determine how much money from the trust fund should be expended each fiscal year. In the provisions of the act that concern fund distributions, the act includes the phrase: "Of the total amounts made available in any fiscal year from the Trust Fund …" Another section gives the Secretary authority to stop expending funds to particular entities (e.g., states), if the Secretary determines funds are not being used for prescribed activities. The amount of revenue that would be available to finance the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund is uncertain. Some identified responsible parties, including BP, have entered in civil and/or criminal settlements with the federal government (see Text Box below). However, BP has not resolved its potential CWA civil penalties, which, as discussed below, could be substantial. CWA Section 311 authorizes certain civil judicial penalties to the owner, operator, or person in charge of a vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility for violations of that provision. A civil judicial penalty applies to a violation of the CWA prohibition on discharging oil into navigable waters of the United States. The monetary penalty for this violation may be up to $37,500 per day of violation, or up to $1,100 per barrel discharged. If the violation is deemed a result of gross negligence or willful misconduct, the penalty is not less than $140,000 for the violation, nor more than $4,300 per barrel discharged. No such negligence determination has been made in connection with the 2010 oil spill. According to the most recent estimate from the federal government, the 2010 oil spill resulted in a discharge of approximately 206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels) in the Gulf of Mexico. However, the responsible parties are reportedly disputing this estimate. Moreover, an estimated 17% of the 4.9 million barrels did not enter the Gulf environment, but was directly recovered from the wellhead by BP. It is unknown whether this portion of the oil will be counted in a potential CWA penalty determination. The $1,100 to $4,300 per-barrel range is the basis of the oft-cited judicial penalty range for the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill: $4.5 billion to $21.5 billion. The low end of this range is achieved by multiplying 4.1 million barrels (amount of discharge after removing the 17% directly captured by BP) by $1,100/ barrel. The upper end of the range is achieved by multiplying 4.9 million barrels (total discharge amount) by the maximum penalty of $4,300/barrel, which presumes a determination of either gross negligence or willful misconduct. In addition, when determining the amount of the judicial penalty, CWA Section 311(b)(8) states that "the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, the Secretary [of Homeland Security], or the court, as the case may be," must consider the following factors: 1. the seriousness of the violation or violations, 2. the economic benefit to the violator, if any, resulting from the violation, 3. the degree of culpability involved, 4. any other penalty for the same incident, 5. any history of prior violations, 6. the nature, extent, and degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize or mitigate the effects of the discharge, 7. the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and 8. any other matters as justice may require. Therefore, the judicial civil penalty for the incident could be less than the low end of the above range ($4.5 billion), even if gross negligence or willful misconduct is determined. The act distributes monies from the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund to various entities through multiple processes. All of the funds—not counting authorized administrative activities—would support activities in one or more of the five Gulf of Mexico states. The majority of the funds (65%) is allocated directly to the states (or political subdivisions), with certain conditions. The different fund allotments and their conditions are discussed below and illustrated in Figure 1 . The largest portion of the fund (35%) is divided equally among the five Gulf of Mexico states: Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. The act has further requirements for specific distributions to political subdivisions in Florida and Louisiana. In Florida, 75% of its share will be distributed to the "8 disproportionately affected counties." In Louisiana, 30% of its share goes to individual parishes based on a statutory formula. The act stipulates that the state (or county) funding must be applied toward one or more of the following 11 activities: 1. Restoration and protection of the natural resources, ecosystems, fisheries, marine and wildlife habitats, beaches, and coastal wetlands of the Gulf Coast region. 2. Mitigation of damage to fish, wildlife, and natural resources. 3. Implementation of a federally approved marine, coastal, or comprehensive conservation management plan, including fisheries monitoring. 4. Workforce development and job creation. 5. Improvements to or on state parks located in coastal areas affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 6. Infrastructure projects benefitting the economy or ecological resources, including port infrastructure. 7. Coastal flood protection and related infrastructure. 8. Planning assistance. 9. Administrative costs (limited to not more than 3% of a state's allotment). 10. Promotion of tourism in the Gulf Coast Region, including recreational fishing. 11. Promotion of the consumption of seafood harvested from the Gulf Coast Region. To receive its share of funds, a state must meet several conditions, including a certification (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) that, among other things, funds are applied to one of the above activities and activities are selected through public input. In addition, states must submit a multiyear implementation plan, documenting funded activities. The act distributes 30% of its trust fund monies to a newly created Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council. The Council is composed of high-level officials from six federal agencies and the governor (or his/her designee) from each of the five Gulf states. Based on its Comprehensive Plan, the Council will finance ecosystem restoration activities in the Gulf Coast region. The act directs the Council to disburse 30% of the trust fund monies to the five Gulf states. The Council is to develop a distribution formula based on criteria listed in the act. In general, the criteria involve a measure of shoreline impact; oiled shoreline distance from the Deepwater Horizon rig; and coastal population. CRS is not aware of an authoritative source that has estimated how much each state would receive under these criteria. To receive funding, each state must submit a plan for approval to the Council. State plans must document how funding will support one or more of the 11 categories listed above. However, only 25% of a state's funding can be used to support infrastructure projects in categories 6 and 7 above. The act establishes the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Science, Observation, Monitoring, and Technology (GCERSOMT) program, funded by 2.5% of monies in the trust fund. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Administrator will implement the program, which will support marine research projects that pertain to species in the Gulf of Mexico. The act disburses 2.5% of monies in the trust fund to the five Gulf states to establish—through a competitive grant program—"centers of excellence." The centers would be nongovernmental entities (including public or private institutions) in the Gulf Coast Region. Finally, interest earned by the trust fund would be distributed as follows: 50% would fund the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council, so it can "carry out the Comprehensive Plan." 25% would provide additional funding for the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Science, Observation, Monitoring, and Technology program mentioned above. 25% would provide additional funding for the centers of excellence research grants mentioned above.

Recent oil spills, including the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, generated an increased level of interest in oil spill legislation during the 112th Congress. This report identifies enacted and proposed legislation from the 112th Congress that pertains to oil spill-related issues. For this report, oil spill-related issues include oil spill policy matters that concern prevention, preparedness, response, liability and compensation, and Gulf of Mexico restoration. In the context of this report, oil spill issues do not generally include matters pertaining to offshore leasing and drilling. The 112th Congress enacted two statutes that contain oil spill-related provisions. On January 3, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-90 (the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011), which increases civil penalties for violating safety requirements and requires automatic and remote-controlled shutoff valves on newly constructed transmission pipelines; directs the Department of Transportation to analyze leak detection systems, and after a review by Congress, issue requirements based on this analysis; and requires the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to review whether current regulations are sufficient to regulate pipelines transmitting "diluted bitumen," and analyze whether such oil presents an increased risk of release. On July 6, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-141 (MAP-21), which includes a subtitle referred to as the RESTORE Act. The RESTORE Act establishes the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund in the General Treasury. Eighty percent of any administrative and civil Clean Water Act Section 311 penalties paid by responsible parties in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill will provide the revenues for the fund. Amounts in the fund will be available for expenditure without further appropriation. The RESTORE Act distributes monies to various entities through multiple processes: 35% divided equally among the five Gulf of Mexico states to be applied toward one or more of 11 designated activities; 30% provided to a newly created Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council to finance ecosystem restoration activities in the Gulf Coast region; 30% disbursed by the Council to the five Gulf states, based on specific criteria: shoreline impact; oiled shoreline distance from the Deepwater Horizon rig; and coastal population. Each state must submit a plan for approval, documenting how funding will support one or more of the 11 designated activities; and 5% to support marine research and related purposes.

The United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile comprises nine nuclear weapons types, all of which were designed during the Cold War. Two of these systems—the B61 and the W76—are currently being refurbished to extend their useful lives for up to 30 years through NNSA’s Life Extension Program. In May 2008, we reported that, over the past few years, NNSA and DOD have considered a variety of scenarios for the future composition of the nuclear stockpile that would be based on different stockpile sizes and the degree to which the stockpile would incorporate new RRW designs. For example, NNSA and DOD have considered how large the stockpile needs to be in order to maintain a sufficiently robust and responsive manufacturing infrastructure to respond to future global geopolitical events. In addition, NNSA and DOD have considered the number of warheads that will need to be either refurbished or replaced in the coming decades. However, NNSA and DOD have not issued requirements defining the size and composition of the future stockpile. We discussed one effect of this lack of clear stockpile requirements in our May 2008 report on plutonium pit manufacturing. Specifically, we found that in October 2006, NNSA proposed building a new, consolidated plutonium center at an existing DOE site that would be able to manufacture pits at a production capacity of 125 pits per year. However, by December 2007, NNSA stated that instead of building a new, consolidated plutonium center, its preferred action was to upgrade the existing pit production building at LANL to produce up to 80 pits per year. Although DOD officials agreed to support NNSA’s plan, these officials also stated that future changes to stockpile size, military requirements, and risk factors may ultimately lead to a revised, larger rate of production. This uncertainty has delayed NNSA in issuing final plans for its future pit manufacturing capability. Once a decision is made about the size and composition of the stockpile, NNSA should develop accurate estimates of the costs of transforming the nuclear weapons complex. In September 2007, a contractor provided NNSA with a range of cost estimates for over 10 different Complex Transformation alternatives. For example, the contractor estimated that the cost of NNSA’s preferred action would be approximately $79 billion over the period 2007 through 2060. This option was also determined to be the least expensive. In contrast, the contractor’s estimate for a consolidated nuclear production center—another alternative that would consolidate plutonium, uranium, and weapons assembly and disassembly at one site—totaled $80 billion over the same period. Although these estimates differ by only $1 billion over 53 years, they are based on significantly different assumptions. Specifically, NNSA’s preferred action assumes a manufacturing capacity of up to 80 pits per year, and the alternative for a consolidated nuclear production center assumes a capacity of 125 pits per year. In addition, the contractor cautioned that because its cost analysis was not based on any specific conceptual designs for facilities such as the consolidated nuclear production center, it had not developed cost estimates for specific projects. As a result, the contractor stated that its estimates should not be used to predict a budget-level project cost. Historically, NNSA has had difficulty developing realistic, defensible cost estimates, especially for large, complex projects. For example, in March 2007, we found that 8 of the 12 major construction projects that DOE and NNSA were managing had exceeded their initial cost estimates. One project, the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility nearing completion at the Y-12 Plant, has exceeded its original cost estimate by over 100 percent, or almost $300 million. We reported that the reasons for this cost increase included poor management and contractor oversight. In addition, NNSA’s cost estimate for constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility has more than doubled—from $838 million to over $2 billion—since our April 2006 testimony. This revised cost estimate is so uncertain that NNSA did not include any annual cost estimates beyond fiscal year 2009 in its fiscal year 2009 budget request to the Congress. Finally, the preliminary results of our ongoing review of NNSA’s Life Extension Program for this Subcommittee show that NNSA’s cost estimate for refurbishing each B61 nuclear bomb has doubled since 2002. NNSA does not expect to issue a record of decision on Complex Transformation until later this year. As a result, we do not know the ultimate decision that NNSA will make—whether to modernize existing sites in the weapons complex or consolidate operations at new facilities. We expect that once NNSA makes this decision, NNSA will put forward a transformation plan with specific milestones to implement its decision. Without such a plan, NNSA will have no way to evaluate its progress, and the Congress will have no way to hold NNSA accountable. However, over the past decade, we have repeatedly documented problems with NNSA’s process for planning and managing its activities. For example, in a December 2000 report, we found that NNSA needed to improve its planning process so that there were linkages between individual plans across the Stockpile Stewardship Program and that the milestones contained in NNSA’s plans were reflected in contractors’ performance criteria and evaluations. However, in February 2006, we reported similar problems with how NNSA is managing the implementation and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Specifically, we found that NNSA planning documents did not contain clear, consistent milestones or a comprehensive list of the scientific research being conducted across the weapons complex in support of NNSA’s Primary and Secondary Assessment Technologies programs. These programs are responsible for setting the requirements for the computer codes and experimental data needed to assess and certify the safety and reliability of nuclear warheads. We also found that NNSA had not established adequate performance measures to determine the progress of the weapons laboratories in developing and implementing this new methodology. As we noted in July 2003, one of the key practices for successfully transforming an organization is to ensure that top leadership sets the direction, pace, and tone for the transformation. One of the key problems that NNSA has experienced has been its inability to build an organization with clear lines of authority and responsibility. We also reported in January 2004 that NNSA, as a result of reorganizations, has shown that it can move from what was often called a “dysfunctional bureaucracy” to an organization with clearer lines of authority and responsibility. In this regard, we stated in our April 2006 testimony that NNSA’s proposed Office of Transformation needed to be vested with the necessary authority and resources to set priorities, make timely decisions, and move quickly to implement those decisions. It was our view that the Office of Transformation should (1) report directly to the Administrator of NNSA; (2) be given sufficient authority to conduct its studies and implement its recommendations; and (3) be held accountable for creating real change within the weapons complex. In 2006, NNSA created an Office of Transformation to oversee its Complex Transformation efforts. This office has been involved in overseeing early activities associated with Complex Transformation, such as the issuance of the December 2007 draft report on the potential environmental impacts of alternative Complex Transformation actions. However, the Office of Transformation does not report directly to the Administrator of NNSA. Rather, the Office reports to the head of NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs. In this respect, we are concerned that the Office of Transformation may not have sufficient authority to set transformation priorities for all of NNSA, specifically as they affect nuclear nonproliferation programs. Because NNSA’s ultimate decision on the path forward for Complex Transformation has not yet been made, it remains to be seen whether the office has sufficient authority to enforce transformation decisions or whether it will be held accountable within NNSA for these decisions. Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512- 3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Ryan T. Coles, Assistant Director; Allison Bawden; Jason Holliday; Leland Cogliani; Marc Castellano; and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key contributions to this testimony. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. This published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Over the past several years, a serious effort has begun to comprehensively reevaluate how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what the nation's approach should be for transforming its aging nuclear weapons complex. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for overseeing this weapons complex, which comprises three nuclear weapons design laboratories, four production plants, and the Nevada Test Site. In December 2007, NNSA issued a draft report on potential environmental impacts of alternative actions to transform the nuclear weapons complex, which NNSA refers to as Complex Transformation. NNSA's preferred action is to establish a number of "distributed centers of excellence" at sites within the existing nuclear weapons complex, including the Los Alamos National Laboratory for plutonium capabilities, the Y-12 Plant for uranium capabilities, and the Pantex Plant for weapons assembly, disassembly, and high explosives manufacturing. NNSA would continue to operate these facilities to maintain and refurbish the existing nuclear weapons stockpile as it makes the transition to a smaller, more responsive infrastructure. GAO was asked to discuss NNSA's Complex Transformation proposal. This testimony is based on previous GAO work. Transforming the nuclear weapons complex will be a daunting task. In April 2006 testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, House Committee on Appropriations, GAO identified four actions that, in its view, were critical to successfully achieving the transformation of the complex. On the basis of completed and ongoing GAO work on NNSA's management of the nuclear weapons complex, GAO remains concerned about NNSA's and the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to carefully and fully implement these four actions. For this reason, GAO believes that the Congress must remain vigilant in its oversight of Complex Transformation. Specifically, NNSA and DOD have not established clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear weapons stockpile. While NNSA and DOD have considered a variety of scenarios for the future composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile, no requirements have been issued. It is GAO's view that NNSA will not be able to develop accurate cost estimates or plans for Complex Transformation until stockpile requirements are known. Further, recent GAO work found that the absence of stockpile requirements is affecting NNSA's plans for manufacturing a critical nuclear weapon component. NNSA has had difficulty developing realistic cost estimates for large, complex projects. In September 2007, a contractor provided NNSA with a range of cost estimates for over 10 different Complex Transformation alternatives. However, the contractor stated that (1) its analysis was based on rough order-of-magnitude estimates and (2) NNSA should not use its cost estimates to predict budget-level project costs. In addition, in March 2007 GAO reported that 8 of 12 major construction projects being managed by DOE and NNSA had exceeded their initial cost estimates. NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear, realistic milestones. GAO expects that once NNSA decides the path forward for Complex Transformation later this year, NNSA will put forward such a plan. However, GAO has repeatedly documented problems with NNSA's ability to implement its plans. For example, in February 2006 GAO reported problems with the planning documents that NNSA was using to manage the implementation of its new approach for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Successful transformation requires strong leadership. In 2006, NNSA created an Office of Transformation to oversee its Complex Transformation activities. However, GAO is concerned that the Office of Transformation may not have sufficient authority to set transformation priorities for all of NNSA, specifically as they affect nuclear nonproliferation programs.

Before 1961, no prior authorization was required for defense appropriations, except for construction funds. In 1959, the Armed Services Committees attached a rider to the construction authorization ( P.L. 86-149 ) to req uire prior authorization of appropriations to procure planes, missiles, and ships, beginning in 1961. The committees hoped thereby to recapture a share of the control over defense programs exercised by the Appropriations Committees alone. Congress oversees the defense budget primarily through two yearly bills: the defense authorization and defense appropriations bills. Table 2 and Table 4 present the Department of Defense (DOD) authorization and appropriations bills from 1970 to 2018. The authorization bill establishes and organizes the agencies responsible for national defense, sets policies for the department, and authorizes the appropriations of funds in accordance with 10 U.S.C. §114. The appropriations bill provides budget authority for military departments and defense agencies to draw funds from the Treasury. Ideally, the authorization-appropriations process would proceed in an orderly sequence with each step of the process generating a part of the information trail. All of these steps would be documented in the Congressional Record as well as in many other official documents of Congress, in private publications, such as Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report and United States Code Congressional and Administrative News (USCCAN), and on Congress.gov. Data in Table 1 and Table 3 are mostly from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac . These tables reflect an earlier authorization-appropriations process from 1961 to 1969. In the simplest case, the process begins with the President submitting his budget proposal (initially formulated by DOD and formally submitted by the President through the Office of Management and Budget) to the defense authorizing and appropriations committees. Then, for example, for the defense authorization bill, hearings are held by the appropriate House committees and subcommittees. The bill is marked up and an authorization bill is reported out, usually with a written, numbered report. This bill is debated in the House, amended or not as the case may be, and passed by the House with the vote noted in the Congressional Record . This bill would then be sent to the Senate, debated, and passed. However, the Senate can amend the House bill or report out its own bill, debate, amend, and pass it. If the House and Senate versions differ, the stage is set for reconciling differences. This may be accomplished by a conference committee appointed by the leadership of each chamber. This committee then negotiates a compromise bill that is reported to both houses. Votes on the conference agreement are then taken in both chambers. If passed, it is sent to the President for his consideration and signature. Ideally, after the authorization bill is passed, the appropriations bill goes through this same process. Although conceptually a sequential process, authorization and appropriations bills can be considered at the same time or even passed in reverse order. Legislative text―and the associated bill number―come together for consideration on the floor in a variety of ways. For instance, the Senate can report out a bill, and then substitute the text of the Senate bill for the text of the bill passed by the House while retaining the House bill number. The House can also use this procedure. A Senate or House bill can also have part of the other chamber's bill inserted into it, or can be so heavily amended that it is unclear whether the underlying text originated in the Senate or House bill. Other events can occur to render the tracking of a bill and its contents difficult. Bills are sometimes reported out without an accompanying committee report to provide context for the legislative language. Voice votes or unanimous consent agreements may be granted instead of recorded votes, rendering it impossible to determine which Member voted for or against the bill or amendments offered during floor consideration. In addition, there may be times when a fiscal year ends without the enactment of some appropriations bills. Under those circumstances, Congress usually passes a continuing resolution (CR), which grants a temporary extension of budget authority for a specified period of time and purpose. CRs also typically specify that the funds provided may be used only for activities funded in the previous fiscal year. For more information on the components of a CR and the defense budget, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices , by James V. Saturno and Jessica Tollestrup. There are several types of votes: voice votes, teller votes, division votes, and unanimous consent votes, but only when there is a recorded vote will there be a vote number and vote tally in the Congressional Record . The section below is based on "Methods of Voting in the House and Senate: Putting Members' Positions on the Record," from the Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Congress , 6th ed. (2008), pp. 582-583. Division vote—those in favor or opposed stand, and the chair takes a head count: only vote totals are announced and there is no record of how individual Members voted. Recorded vote—Members vote electronically, each recorded vote is given a sequential number, and vote totals plus how each Member voted are recorded in the Congressional Record . Teller vote—an older method in which Members were counted as they passed between chair-appointed tellers for the "ayes" and "noes"; only vote totals are announced and there is no record of how individual Members voted. Unanimous consent vote—usually reserved for noncontroversial legislation. Voice vote—the presiding officer calls for the "ayes" and then the "noes," Members shout in chorus on one side or the other, and the chair decides the result. For more information on the process, see CRS In Focus IF10515, Defense Primer: The NDAA Process , by Valerie Heitshusen and Brendan W. McGarry; CRS Report RS20371, Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process , by Bill Heniff Jr.; and CRS Report R42388, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction , coordinated by James V. Saturno.

The passage of the Department of Defense (DOD) authorization and appropriations bills through Congress often does not follow the course laid out in textbooks on legislative procedure. Tracking DOD authorization or appropriation bills can be confusing and time-consuming. This has been particularly true in recent years, when continuing resolutions (CRs) containing the DOD and other appropriation bills have been enacted in lieu of the 12 regular appropriations bills for the entire U.S. government. This report is a research aid that lists the DOD authorization bills (Table 1 and Table 2) and appropriations bills (Table 3 and Table 4) for FY1961-FY2019. This report includes all the pertinent information on the passage of these bills through the legislative process: bill numbers, report numbers, dates reported and passed, recorded vote numbers and vote tallies, dates of passage of the conference reports with their numbers and votes, vetoes, substitutions, dates of final passage, and public law numbers. Significant definitions are also included. This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants. For information on current defense authorization and appropriations, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table: FY2019.

Fast-track is an expedited procedure for congressional consideration of certain trade agreements. This process is tied to the President's authority provided by Congress to enter into trade agreements to reduce U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers with other countries. The fast-track authority provides that Congress will consider trade agreement implementing bills within mandatory deadlines, with a limitation on debate, and without amendment, as long as the President meets prescribed requirements set out by law. Under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-316), Congress delegated renewable authority to the President to negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions. The Trade Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-618 ) expanded this authority to include negotiations of nontariff trade barriers, but required more extensive reporting and consultations between Congress and the President during trade negotiations. This act also had a provision under which Congress would consider implementing bills for trade agreements under expedited congressional procedures, known as fast-track. Table 1 shows how Congress renewed fast-track authority on particular dates. In the years following the expiration of fast-track authority in 1994, there were several legislative proposals to reauthorize the trade authority procedures; these bills, including H.R. 2621 in the 105 th Congress, did not pass. In the 107 th Congress, several legislative proposals on trade promotion authority (TPA) were considered. The original House version of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act ( H.R. 3005 ) passed by one vote on December 6, 2001 (215-214). Another bill, H.R. 3009 , was amended several times in the House and the Senate to include additional trade issues. Following House and Senate negotiations and agreement to the conference report for H.R. 3009 , the President signed H.R. 3009 , as P.L. 107-210 , the Trade Act of 2002, on August 6, 2002. This major piece of trade legislation has the TPA provisions in Title XXI, Section 210l, as the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. TPA procedures apply to implementing bills for trade agreements entered into before July 1, 2007. Although TPA expired on July 1, 2007, four proposed U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) were signed in time to be considered by Congress under TPA procedures in the 110 th Congress; the U.S. FTAs were negotiated separately with the countries of Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. The implementing legislation for the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement was passed by Congress and signed by the President on December 14, 2007 ( P.L. 110-138 ). Also in the 110 th Congress, H.R. 5724 was introduced as implementing legislation for the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. On April 10, 2008, the House passed H.Res. 1092 , relating to H.R. 5724 ; this resolution provided a rule that disallowed the use of time limitations for consideration of the implementing bill. No further legislative action on H.R. 5724 occurred in the 110 th Congress. In the 111 th Congress, no legislation for the three proposed U.S. trade agreements (with the countries of Colombia, Panama, and South Korea) was introduced. The fate of the three FTAs is uncertain in the 112 th Congress. More detailed information on congressional and executive procedures for TPA and free trade agreements can be found in the "Resources for Additional Information," at the end of this report. In Table 1 , some of the listed bills focus solely on fast-track trade negotiating authority or TPA. Other bills are major landmarks of trade legislation , of which fast-track is only one of many trade provisions. These major trade acts, in boldface, include the Trade Act of 1974, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, and the Trade Act of 2002. Congress has applied fast-track legislative procedures to approve several reciprocal bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Table 2 lists the uses of fast-track procedures in the implementation of trade agreements from 1979 to the present. The table does not include the implementing legislation for the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement ( H.R. 2603 enacted as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001); Congress did not consider this bill under fast-track procedures. In the 108 th Congress, implementing legislation for free trade agreements was passed under fast-track procedures on four separate bills: H.R. 2738 , the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed on September 3, 2003 ( P.L. 108-77 ). On the same day, H.R. 2739 , the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed into law ( P.L. 108-78 ). H.R. 4759 , the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement Act, was signed by the President on August 3, 2004 ( P.L. 108-286 ). On August 17, 2004, H.R. 4842 , the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed into law ( P.L. 108-302 ). In the 109 th Congress, implementing legislation for three free trade agreements was passed under fast-track procedures on three separate bills: H.R. 3045 , the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (CAFTA-DR), was signed by the President on August 2, 2005 ( P.L. 109-53 ). H.R. 4340 , the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed into law on January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). H.R. 5684 , the U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, was signed into law on September 26, 2006 (P.L. 109-283). Although TPA expired on July 1, 2007, four proposed FTAs (with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea) were signed in time to be considered by Congress under TPA procedures in the 110 th Congress. H.R. 3688 , the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, was passed by the House on November 8, 2007, and by the Senate on December 4, 2007. This bill was signed into law on December 14, 2007 (P.L. 110-138). In the 110 th Congress, H.R. 5724 was introduced to implement the proposed U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. H.Res. 1092 was introduced as a rule change for consideration of H.R. 5724 only; this resolution disallowed the use of time limitations for consideration of the implementing bill under fast-track procedures. H.Res. 1092 passed the House on April 10, 2008 (224-195). No further legislative action on H.R. 5724 occurred in the 110 th Congress. In the 111 th Congress, no implementing legislation for the three proposed FTAs (with the countries of South Korea, Colombia, and Panama) was introduced. In the 112 th Congress, the fate of the three proposed FTAs is uncertain. CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31356, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report 97-896, Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than as Treaties , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R41544, Trade Promotion Authority and the Korea Free Trade Agreement , by [author name scrubbed]. Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) website, with a section on "Trade Agreements" discussing the status of U.S. trade agreements and negotiations, at http://www.ustr.gov/ trade-agreements/ , and information on "Free Trade Agreements" at http://www.ustr.gov/ trade-agreements/ free-trade-agreements/ .

This report profiles significant legislation, including floor votes, that authorized the use of presidential Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)—previously known as fast-track trade negotiating authority—since its inception in 1974. The report also includes a list of floor votes since 1979 on implementing legislation for trade agreements that were passed under TPA fast-track procedures. Although TPA expired on July 1, 2007, four free trade agreements (FTAs) were signed in time to be considered under TPA expedited procedures in the 110th Congress. The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act was passed by Congress (H.R. 3688) and signed into law as P.L. 110-138 on December 14, 2007. The legislative future of three proposed U.S FTAs (with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea) is uncertain. For further discussions of TPA or fast-track legislative activity, the report lists CRS reports and Internet resources. This report will be updated as events warrant in the 112th Congress.

As of December 23, 2011, Congress completed action on and the President signed into law all 12 of the regular appropriations bills for FY2012, which began on October 1, 2011. Regular appropriations bills were consolidated into two laws, P.L. 112-55 and P.L. 112-74 . In addition, Congress enacted supplemental FY2012 funding for disaster relief activities in P.L. 112-77 . This report, consisting primarily of a table showing proposed and enacted discretionary appropriations by bill title, is intended to allow for broad comparison between the House and Senate FY2012 proposals, the Administration's FY2012 request, and the FY2011 and FY2012 enacted appropriations. FY2012. For detailed information and CRS analysis specific to each individual appropriations bill, use the report links on the CRS Appropriations Status Table, at http://www.crs.gov/Pages/AppropriationsStatusTable.aspx?source=QuickLinks . Table 1 displays discretionary appropriations as provided in proposed and enacted FY2012 appropriations legislation, by bill title, together with the appropriations enacted for FY2011. In most cases, totals are provided for both new discretionary budget authority as well as budget authority net of rescissions of prior year funding. Footnotes attached to each section heading note the legislation the data in that section is drawn from. As noted above, the figures do not necessarily reflect all budget scoring adjustments and adjustments allowable under the Budget Control Act of 2011. Readers should be aware that the numbers in this table reflect, to a great extent, the appropriations conventions and assumptions of each individual subcommittee and that these conventions and assumptions are not always comparable across subcommittees. Security spending is listed only for proposals in which it was specifically designated, excluding most House proposals, which were drafted and saw committee action prior to enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011 on August 2, 2011.

This report presents an overview of proposed and enacted FY2012 appropriations legislation. The report consists primarily of a table showing discretionary appropriations, by bill title, for each of the proposed and enacted appropriations bills, together with the comparable figures enacted for FY2011. The product is intended to allow for broad comparison between the House and Senate FY2012 proposals, the Administration's FY2012 request, and the FY2011 and FY2012 enacted appropriations. The figures do not necessarily reflect budget scorekeeping adjustments allowable under the Budget Control Act. With action now completed on FY2012 appropriations, there will be no further updates to this report.

As of December 2004, IRS classified approximately $7.7 billion in delinquent tax debt as potentially available for private debt collection— $5.5 billion in low-priority work and $2.2 billion that was not likely to be assigned to IRS employees for collection. In the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Congress authorized IRS to contract with private sector debt collection companies to collect federal tax debts. Based on this authority, IRS awarded contracts in March 2006 to three PCAs for tax collection services. IRS began referring taxpayer cases to PCAs in September 2006. Because of legal restrictions, PCAs can only take certain defined steps to collect tax debts—including locating taxpayers, requesting full payment of the tax debt or offering taxpayers installment agreements if full payments cannot be made, and obtaining financial information from taxpayers. PCAs have limited authorities and are not allowed to adjust the amount of tax debts or to use enforcement powers to collect the debts, which IRS believes are inherently governmental functions to be performed only by IRS employees. Additionally, PCAs do not actually collect the debts, but instruct taxpayers to forward payments to IRS. PCAs are paid on a fee-for- service basis ranging from 21 percent to 24 percent of the debt collected based on the balance of the account at the time of referral. IRS only referred those cases in which the taxpayer had not disputed the debt (e.g., taxpayers who filed form 1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ and owe a balance) and delinquency exists for one or more tax periods. Under the IRS policy and procedures guide, PCAs are required, within 10 calendar days of receiving delinquent account information from IRS, to send a taxpayer notification letter to an address provided by IRS. This letter states that the taxpayer’s account has been placed with an IRS contractor for collection. According to IRS guidance, no sooner than 2 days after the PCA sends the notification letter, PCA employees may attempt to contact the taxpayer by telephone. However, to comply with 26 U.S.C. § 6103—which establishes a taxpayer’s right to privacy of tax information—PCA employees must not disclose any tax information until they are certain the person with whom they are speaking is the taxpayer. When a PCA employee makes a call to a taxpayer and reaches an answering machine, the only information the employee may leave on a recording is his or her name (no pseudonyms), company name, telephone number, the name of the taxpayer the PCA is attempting to reach, and the fact that the PCA is calling about a debt (i.e., rather than specifically a tax debt). In August 2006, IRS began working with a consulting company to develop and administer a taxpayer survey for PCA contacts. On November 27, 2006, the consulting company began administering the survey. Under guidance issued by IRS, PCAs were instructed to invite every right party contact to take the survey. If the contacts agreed to take the survey, they were transferred to the automated survey line. For the first 3 months of survey administration, the consulting company was required to issue overall satisfaction scores every month, followed by a quarterly report containing responses to all survey questions with information subdivided by each PCA. According to IRS, early in 2007, IRS did not execute the option to renew one of the PCA contracts. As of the date of this testimony, only two of the PCAs we reviewed are now under contract with IRS. According to the PCAs, 37,030 tax debt cases were referred by IRS from September 2006 through February 2007. In addition, we were informed that the survey was not offered until November 27, 2006—almost 3 full months after PCAs began to contact taxpayers. PCAs reported a total number of 13,630 right party contacts from September 2006 through February 2007, with 6,793 of these contacts made after the survey was available. Because PCAs began calling taxpayers in September 2006 before the survey was available, about 50 percent of all right party contacts identified during the period of our review were not eligible to take the survey. According to the consulting company, the validity of the survey was based on the key underlying assumption that all right party contacts would be offered a chance to take the survey. Although IRS instructed the PCAs to offer the survey to all right party contacts, we could not obtain information on how many of the 6,793 contacts were offered the survey. One PCA reported that it offered the survey to 999 right party contacts and made 2,694 right party contacts during this period. Officials at this PCA told us that from November 27, 2006, through February 13, 2007, taxpayers were randomly selected to take the survey using a structured method that offered the survey to every first or third contact during a specified time of day. The second PCA told us that it offered the survey to all right party contacts, but it did not keep any records to substantiate this claim. The third PCA told us that the survey was offered to all right party contacts, unless the PCA representative was aware that the contact was driving, if the contact had stated that he or she needed to get off the phone, or the contact said he or she was late for something. This PCA also did not have records regarding how many right party contacts were offered the survey, but an official noted that they were implementing procedures to track this information in the future. See table 1 for a summary of the PCA approaches to offering the survey during the period of our review. Beginning in early April 2007, IRS officials reemphasized the need for PCAs to offer the survey to all right party contacts and to keep records in this regard. These instructions have been incorporated in additional guidance for the PCAs. The consulting company that administered the survey provided us with records indicating that of those offered the survey, 1,572 right party contacts agreed to be transferred to the automated survey system from November 27, 2006, through February 28, 2007. Of these, records further indicate that 1,011 individuals completed the survey. A consulting company representative told us that the company was not aware, until several months after the survey was first offered, that the PCAs had used differing methodologies for offering the survey and that not all right party contacts were offered it. Table 2 provides summary information on the data we gathered from IRS, the PCAs, and the consulting company. We also made several related observations during the course of our work: PCAs were given some information about taxpayers with delinquent debt, including the taxpayers’ name, Social Security numbers, and last known addresses per IRS records. According to IRS, it did not provide PCAs with telephone numbers for the taxpayers as a matter of policy. As a result, in attempting to contact taxpayers by telephone, PCA representatives tried to determine the taxpayers’ phone numbers through electronic searches, for example, through the Lexis-Nexis database. PCAs told us that they made a total of 252,173 outbound connected telephone calls from September 2006 through February 2007 in an attempt to resolve the 37,030 cases referred by IRS. PCAs indicated that 89,781 calls—or about 36 percent of all connected outbound calls—resulted in messages left on answering machines, voice mail, or with third parties. In an attempt to make contact with the right party, PCAs may have contacted a substantial number of taxpayers who were not part of the 37,030 cases referred to PCAs by IRS—these taxpayers represent a potentially large group of incorrect contacts. Incorrect contacts were not offered the survey. Examples of individuals who were not offered the survey would include individuals who refused to provide personal information to the PCAs and individuals who provided personal information but were not authenticated as part of the 37,030 IRS referrals. The overall satisfaction rating reported by the consulting company, and quoted by IRS, represents the answer to 1 question on a 20-question automated survey. The question was “Everything considered, whether you agree or disagree with the final outcome, rate your overall satisfaction with the service you received during this call.” Respondents were allowed to rate their satisfaction on a scale of one to five—with one being “very dissatisfied” and five being “very satisfied.” Of the survey questions, 15 related to customer satisfaction; the other questions were to gather more information about the respondents themselves. Those respondents who completed the entire survey had their results counted by the consulting company. Satisfaction ratings for other survey questions ranged from 81 percent (ease of understanding letters received from PCAs) to 98 percent (courtesy of PCA representatives). Officials at IRS and the consulting company confirmed that some right party contacts were offered (and may have taken) the survey more than once because they had multiple discussions with a PCA representative. Thus, some of the 1,011 right party contacts who completed the survey may represent duplicate respondents. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at this time. For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. Key contributors to this testimony were John Ryan, Assistant Director; Bruce Causseaux, Jennifer Costello, Heather Hill, Wilfred Holloway, Jason Kelly, and Andrew McIntosh. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Every year the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not collect tens of billions of dollars in delinquent taxes. In 2004, Congress authorized IRS to use private collection agencies (PCA) to help collect some of these debts. To ensure that taxpayers are treated properly and that the program achieves the desired results, IRS contracted with a consulting company to perform a survey of right party contacts--those individuals who confirmed their identity and tax debt to PCAs over the telephone. The consulting company reported overall taxpayer satisfaction ratings from 94 to 96 percent for contacts made from November 2006 through February 2007. At the request of the Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, GAO attempted to obtain, for the period September 2006 through February 2007, the number of tax debt cases IRS referred to PCAs, right party contacts who were offered the taxpayer survey, and right party contacts who took the survey. GAO was also asked to report any other key observations related to the PCA program and taxpayer survey. To perform this work, GAO collected information and interviewed officials from IRS, the consulting group that administered the survey, and the PCAs. According to the PCAs, 37,030 tax debt cases were referred to them by IRS from September 2006 through February 2007. PCAs reported making contact with, and authenticating the identity of, 13,630 right party contacts. Of these, 6,793 were eligible to take the taxpayer survey which did not start until the end of November 2006. According to the consulting company, the validity of the survey was based on the key underlying assumption that all right party contacts would be offered a chance to take the survey. However, GAO could not determine the number of right party contacts offered the survey because not all PCAs kept records on who was offered it. Further, the three PCAs used different methods to determine which right party contacts were offered the survey. The consulting company that administered the survey told GAO that between November 27, 2006, and February 28, 2007, 1,572 of the individuals offered the survey, agreed to take the survey, and 1,011 of these individuals completed the survey. A consulting company representative told GAO that the company was not aware, until several months after the survey was first offered, that the PCAs used differing methodologies for offering the survey and that not all right party contacts were offered an opportunity to complete the survey. According to IRS, beginning in April 2007, PCAs began offering the survey to all right party contacts. Among other key observations, IRS advised GAO that they did not provide the PCAs with taxpayer telephone contact information for referred cases. As a result, in attempting to contact taxpayers by telephone, PCA representatives tried to determine the taxpayers' phone numbers through electronic searches. PCA representatives told GAO that they made a total of 252,173 outbound connected telephone calls from September 2006 through February 2007 in an attempt to make contact with the 37,030 tax debt cases IRS referred. PCAs did not offer the survey to incorrect contacts, such as individuals who provided personal information but were not authenticated as right party contacts.

the University of California had inadequate work controls at one of its laboratory facilities, resulting in eight workers being exposed to airborne plutonium and five of those workers receiving detectable intakes of plutonium. This was identified as one of the 10 worst radiological intake events in the United States in over 40 years. DOE assessed, but cannot collect, a penalty of $605,000 for these violations. University of Chicago had violated the radiation protection and quality assurance rules, leading to worker contamination and violations of controls intended to prevent an uncontrolled nuclear reaction from occurring. DOE assessed, but cannot collect, a penalty of $110,000 for these violations. DOE has cited two other reasons for continuing the exemption, but as we indicated in our 1999 report, we did not think either reason was valid: DOE said that contract provisions are a better mechanism than civil penalties for holding nonprofit contractors accountable for safe nuclear practices. We certainly agree that contract mechanisms are an important tool for holding contractors accountable, whether they earn a profit or not. However, since 1990 we have described DOE’s contracting practices as being at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Similarly, in November 2000, the Department’s Inspector General identified contract administration as one of the most significant management challenges facing the Department. We have noted that, recently, DOE has been more aggressive in reducing contractor fees for poor performance in a number of areas. However, having a separate nuclear safety enforcement program provides DOE with an additional tool to use when needed to ensure that safe nuclear practices are followed. Eliminating the exemption enjoyed by the nonprofit contractors would strengthen this tool. DOE said that its current approach of exempting nonprofit educational institutions is consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) treatment of nonprofit organizations because DOE issues notices of violation to nonprofit contractors without collecting penalties but can apply financial incentives or disincentives through the contract. However, NRC can and does impose monetary penalties for violations of safety requirements, without regard to the profit-making status of the organization. NRC sets lower penalty amounts for nonprofit organizations than for- profit organizations. The Secretary could do the same, but does not currently take this approach. Furthermore, both NRC and other regulatory agencies have assessed and collected penalties or additional administrative costs from some of the same organizations that DOE exempts from payment. For example, the University of California has made payments to states for violating environmental laws in California and New Mexico because of activities at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. The enforcement program appears to be a useful and important tool for ensuring safe nuclear practices. Our 1999 review of the enforcement program found that, although it needed to be strengthened, the enforcement program complemented other contract mechanisms DOE had to help ensure safe nuclear practices. Advantages of the program include its relatively objective and independent review process, a follow-up mechanism to ensure that contractors take corrective action, and the practice of making information readily available to the contractor community and the public. Modifications to H.R. 723 Could Help Clarify and Strengthen the Penalty Provisions H.R. 723 eliminates both the exemption from paying the penalties provided by statute and the exemption allowed at the Secretary’s discretion. While addressing the main problems we discussed in our 1999 report, we have several observations about clarifications needed to the proposed bill. The “discretionary fee” referred to in the bill is unclear. H.R. 723, while eliminating the exemption, limits the amount of civil penalties that can be imposed on nonprofit contractors. This limit is the amount of "discretionary fees" paid to the contractor under the contract under which the violation occurs. The meaning of the term “discretionary fee” is unclear and might be interpreted to mean all or only a portion of the fee paid. In general, the total fee—that is, the amount that exceeds the contractor’s reimbursable costs—under DOE’s management and operating contracts consists of a base fee amount and an incentive fee amount. The base fee is set in the contract. The amount of the available incentive fee paid to the contractor is determined by the contracting officer on the basis of the contractor’s performance. Since the base fee is a set amount, and the incentive fee is determined at the contracting officer's discretion, the term “discretionary fee” may be interpreted to refer only to the incentive fee and to exclude the base fee amount. However, an alternate interpretation also is possible. Certain DOE contracts contain a provision known as the “Conditional Payment of Fee, Profit, Or Incentives” clause. Under this contract provision, on the basis of the contractor’s performance, a contractor’s entire fee, including the base fee, may be reduced at the discretion of the contracting officer. Thus, in contracts that contain this clause, the term “discretionary fee” might be read to include a base fee. If the Congress intends to have the entire fee earned be subject to penalties, we suggest that the bill language be revised to replace the term “discretionary fee” with “total amount of fees.” If, on the other hand, the Congress wants to limit the amount of fee that would be subject to penalties to the performance or incentive amount, and exclude the base fee amount, we suggest that the bill be revised to replace the term “discretionary fee” with “performance or incentive fee.” Limiting the amount of any payment for penalties made by tax-exempt contractors to the amount of the incentive fee could have unintended effects. Several potential consequences could arise by focusing only on the contractor’s incentive fee. Specifically: Contractors would be affected in an inconsistent way. Two of the nonprofit contractors—University Research Associates at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory and Princeton University—do not receive an incentive fee (they do receive a base fee). Therefore, depending on the interpretation of the term “discretionary fee” as discussed above, limiting payment to the amount of the incentive fee could exempt these two contractors from paying any penalty for violating nuclear safety requirements. Enforcement of nuclear safety violations would differ from enforcement of security violations. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 established a system of civil monetary penalties for violations of DOE regulations regarding the safeguarding and security of restricted data. The legislation contained no exemption for nonprofit contractors but limited the amount of any payment for penalties made by certain nonprofit contractors to the total fees paid to the contractor in that fiscal year. In contrast, these same contractors could have only a portion of their fee (the “discretionary fee”) at risk for violations of nuclear safety requirements. It is not clear why limitations on the enforcement of nuclear safety requirements should be different than existing limitations on the enforcement of security requirements. Disincentives could be created if the Congress decides to limit the penalty payment to the amount of the incentive fee. We are concerned that contractors might try to shift more of their fee to a base or fixed fee and away from an incentive fee, in order to minimize their exposure to any financial liability. Such an action would have the effect of undermining the purpose of the penalty and DOE’s overall emphasis on performance-based contracting. In fact, recent negotiations between DOE and the University of California to extend the laboratory contracts illustrate this issue. According to the DOE contracting officer, of the total fee available to the University of California, more of the fee was shifted from incentive fee to base fee during recent negotiations because of the increased liability expected from the civil penalties associated with security violations. If a nonprofit contractor’s entire fee was subject to the civil penalty, the Secretary has discretion that should ensure that no nonprofit contractor’s assets are at risk because of having to pay the civil penalty. This is because the Secretary has considerable latitude to adjust the amount of any civil penalty to meet the circumstances of any specific situation. The Secretary can consider factors such as the contractor’s ability to pay and the effect of the penalty on the contractor’s ability to do business. Preferential treatment would be expanded to all tax-exempt contractors. Under the existing law, in addition to the seven contractors exempted by name in the statute, the Secretary was given the authority to exempt nonprofit educational institutions. H.R. 723 takes a somewhat different approach by exempting all tax-exempt nonprofit contractors whether or not they are educational institutions. This provision would actually reduce the liability faced by some contractors. For example, Brookhaven Science Associates, the contractor at Brookhaven National Laboratory, is currently subject to paying civil penalties for nuclear safety violations regardless of any fee paid because, although it is a nonprofit organization, it is not an educational institution. Under the provisions of H.R. 723, however, Brookhaven Science Associates would be able to limit its payments for civil penalties. This change would result in a more consistent application of civil penalties among nonprofit contractors. Some contractors might not be subject to the penalty provisions until many years in the future. As currently written, H.R. 723 would not apply to any violation occurring under a contract entered into before the date of the enactment of the act. Thus, contractors would have to enter into a new contract with DOE before this provision takes effect. For some contractors that could be a considerable period of time. The University of California, for example, recently negotiated a 4-year extension of its contract with DOE. It is possible, therefore, that if H.R. 723 is enacted in 2001, the University of California might not have to pay a civil penalty for any violation of nuclear safety occurring through 2005. In contrast, when the Congress set up the civil penalties in 1988, it did not require that new contracts be entered into before contractors were subject to the penalty provisions. Instead, the penalty provisions applied to the existing contracts. In reviewing the fairness of this issue as DOE prepared its implementing regulations, in 1991 DOE stated in the Federal Register that a contractor’s obligation to comply with nuclear safety requirements and its liability for penalties for violations of the requirements are independent of any contractual arrangements and cannot be modified or eliminated by the operation of a contract. Thus, DOE considered it appropriate to apply the penalties to the contracts existing at the time.

This testimony discusses GAO's views on H.R. 723, a bill that would modify the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by changing how the Department of Energy (DOE) treats nonprofit contractors who violate DOE's nuclear safety requirements. Currently, nonprofit contractors are exempted from paying civil penalties that DOE assesses under the act. H.R. 723 would remove that exemption. GAO supports eliminating the exemption because the primary reason for instituting it no longer exists. The exemption was enacted in 1988 at the same time the civil monetary penalty was established. The purpose of the exemption was to ensure that the nonprofit contractors operating DOE laboratories who were being reimbursed only for their costs, would not have their assets at risk for violating nuclear safety requirements. However, virtually all of DOE's nonprofit contractors have an opportunity to earn a fee in addition to payments for allowable costs. This fee could be used to pay the civil monetary penalties. GAO found that DOE's nuclear safety enforcement program appears to be a useful and important tool for ensuring safe nuclear practices.

An automatic annual Social Security benefit increase is intended to reflect the rise in the cost of living over a one-year period. The Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), updated monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), is the measure that can trigger a benefit increase. The Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is based on the growth in the index from the highest third calendar quarter average CPI-W recorded (most often, from the previous year) to the average CPI-W for the third calendar quarter of the current year. If the CPI-W triggers a COLA, the COLA becomes effective in December of the current year and is payable in January of the following year. (Social Security payments always reflect the benefits due for the preceding month.) A COLA trigger mechanism was first adopted in P.L. 92-603, the Social Security Amendments of 1972, and triggered COLAs were first payable in 1975. Prior to 1975, Congress sporadically approved COLAs through the adoption of legislation. On October 11, 2018, the Social Security Administration (SSA) announced that a 2.8% Social Security COLA would be paid in January 2019. The BLS release of the September 2018 CPI-W on that day made possible the comparison of the two July-September sets of CPI-W data needed to compute the COLA (one for 2017 and another for 2016). Table 1 shows how the determination for a January 2019 COLA is computed under procedures set forth in Section 215(i) of the Social Security Act. Since automatic Social Security benefit COLAs began in 1975, there have been three years in which no COLA was payable: 2010, 2011, and 2016. The Social Security Act specifies that a COLA is payable automatically if the average CPI-W for the third quarter of the current year is higher than the highest average CPI-W for the third quarter of past years, which is called the "cost-of-living computation quarter." From 1975, when this provision became effective, to 2008, a new cost-of-living computation quarter was established in each subsequent year, which triggered the payment of a COLA each year. If the average CPI-W for the third quarter of the current year is equal to or less than the average CPI-W for the cost-of-living computation quarter, no COLA is payable. For example, the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2009 was less than the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2008 (211.001 and 215.495, respectively). As a result, an automatic COLA in January 2010 was not triggered and the third quarter of 2008 remained the cost-of-living computation quarter (i.e., the benchmark) used to determine if a COLA would be payable in January 2011. Though the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2010 (214.136) was greater than the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2009, it did not exceed the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2008. The third quarter of 2008 remained the cost-of-living computation quarter for at least one more year and a COLA was not payable in January 2011. When the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2011 (223.233) exceeded that for 2008, a 2012 COLA was triggered and the third quarter of 2011 became the cost-of-living computation quarter. New cost-of-living computation quarters were subsequently established in each year from 2012 to 2014, when the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2012, 2013, and 2014 exceeded that for the third quarter of each preceding year. Similarly, since the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2015 (233.278) did not exceed that of 2014 (234.242), no COLA was paid in January 2016. Thus, for the COLA payable beginning in January 2017, the cost-of-living computation benchmark quarter remained the third quarter of 2014 where it was compared with the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2016. See Table 2 for a recent history of average CPI-W performance for the third calendar quarter, and how that has affected changes to the cost-of-living computation quarter and the triggering of COLAs in some years. Social Security benefit amounts cannot be reduced if the CPI-W decreases between the measuring periods. If the performance of the CPI-W does not trigger a COLA, benefits remain the same (prior to deductions for Medicare Part B and Part D premiums). The absence of a COLA increase (or a very small increase) may impact certain Medicare Part B enrollees. For Medicare Part B enrollees who have their Part B premiums withheld from their monthly Social Security benefits, a hold-harmless provision in the Social Security Act (§1839[f]) ensures that their net benefits will not decrease as a result of an increase in the Part B premium. In most years, the hold-harmless provision has little impact; however, in a year in which there is a small or no increase in the Social Security COLA and a Part B premium increase, the hold-harmless provision may apply to a much larger number of people. For example, as a result of a 0% Social Security COLA in 2016 and a 0.3% COLA in 2017, an estimated 70% of Medicare beneficiaries were protected by this provision in those years and their premiums were reduced so that their Social Security benefits, net of the Medicare premium, would not decline. As a result of the relatively higher 2.0% Social Security COLA in 2018, the hold-harmless provision was not as broadly applicable in that year, and the percentage of Medicare Part B enrollees held harmless in 2018 declined to 28%. The Medicare trustees project that 2019 Medicare Part B premiums will increase by about $1.50 per month—from $134.00 per month in 2018 to about $135.50 in 2019. Under this scenario, the 2019 2.8% Social Security COLA would likely result in a further reduction in the number of Medicare Part B enrollees held harmless. In most cases, the dollar amount of the increase in enrollees' Social Security benefits, for both those who were and were not held harmless in 2018, would be more than sufficient to cover their 2019 Part B premium increases. Thus, it is likely that many of those held harmless in 2018 will not be held harmless in 2019 and will return to paying the normal standard premium amount. The actual 2019 Medicare premiums will likely be announced later in 2018 and could be higher or lower than projected. Regardless of the size (or absence) of a COLA, beneficiaries may see a net reduction in Social Security benefits as a result of increases in their Medicare Part D premiums or changes in their Medicare Part D plan selections. Social Security COLAs trigger increases in other programs. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and railroad retirement "tier 1" benefits (equivalent to a Social Security benefit) are increased by the same percentage as the Social Security COLA or are held constant when a COLA is not paid to Social Security beneficiaries. Railroad retirement "tier 2" benefits (equivalent to a private pension) are increased by an amount equivalent to 32.5% of the Social Security COLA. (If no COLA is paid to Social Security beneficiaries, then the railroad retirement tier 2 benefits are not increased.) Veterans' pension benefits often are increased in the same amount as Social Security, but legislation must be passed annually for this purpose. Although COLAs under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the federal military retirement system are not triggered by the Social Security COLA, these programs use the same measuring period and formula for determining their COLAs. The COLA for recipients of Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) benefits equals the Social Security COLA if inflation is 2% or less, but is lower than the Social Security COLA otherwise. Some Social Security program elements, like the taxable earnings base , the retirement earnings test (RET) exempt amounts , and the substantial gainful activity (SGA) earnings level for the blind (which applies to Social Security disability beneficiaries), are indexed to wages, as opposed to prices, but increase only when a COLA is payable. Although changes to those three elements are based on growth in national average wages (rather than changes in prices ), these elements can be increased only when a COLA is payable. If a COLA is payable, then these amounts increase by the percentage that the national average wage index has increased. The taxable earnings base, the RET exempt amounts, and the SGA for the blind were unchanged in 2010, 2011, and 2016 when no COLA was payable. For example, had there been a COLA trigger in 2015, the taxable earnings base would have increased from $118,500 in 2015 to $122,700 in 2016. Because there was no COLA trigger in 2015, the base instead remained unchanged. With the 0.3% COLA announced in 2016, the taxable earnings base increased in 2017 as well. Similar to how the COLA's reference period is calculated, the increase in the taxable earnings base is calculated on the increase in the average wage index from 2013 to 2015 (about 7.2%). Table 3 shows the history of Social Security COLAs since the automatic COLAs began in 1975. Table 4 provides a comprehensive summary of all ad-hoc legislative cost-of-living adjustments to Social Security benefits before automatic adjustments began in July 1975. The first increase occurred in October 1950, 10 years after Social Security benefits were first issued in 1940. At that time, Social Security benefits were increased by 77%. After 1950, smaller increases were granted by separate legislation at irregular intervals. Table 4 shows the percentage increases and the dates from which these increases were paid. As noted, in 1974 the increase occurred in two steps: an increase of 7% was paid from April 1974 until June 1974; and an increase of 11% was paid from July 1974 onward. Both increases used February 1974 as the base level. Authorization for the automatic benefit increase beginning in 1975 appears as part of P.L. 92-336.

To compensate for the effects of inflation, Social Security recipients usually receive an annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). According to parameters outlined in the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 415(i)), a 2.8% COLA is payable in January 2019. For a retired worker receiving the average monthly benefit amount of $1,422, the COLA will result in a $39 increase in Social Security benefits (after final rounding down to the nearest dollar for a total of $1,461). Social Security COLAs are based on changes in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), updated monthly by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The COLA equals the growth, if any, in the index from the highest third calendar quarter average CPI-W recorded (most often, from the previous year) to the average CPI-W for the third calendar quarter of the current year. The COLA becomes effective in December of the current year and is payable in January of the following year. (Social Security payments always reflect the benefits due for the preceding month.) If there is no percentage increase in the CPI-W between the measuring periods, no COLA is payable. No COLA was payable in January 2010, January 2011, or in January 2016. The January 2019 COLA will also be applied to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and railroad retirement "tier 1" benefits, among other changes in the Social Security program. Although COLAs under the federal Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the federal military retirement program are not triggered directly by the Social Security COLA, these programs use the same measuring period and formula for computing their COLAs. As a result, their recipients will receive a similar COLA payable in 2019.

Once in the constitutional wings, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment today stands center stage. More than 50 takings cases have been decided by the Supreme Court since it launched the modern era of takings jurisprudence in 1978. No debate on the proper balance between private property rights and conflicting societal needs is complete without noting the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause states: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Until the late 19 th century, this clause was applied by the Supreme Court only to condemnation : the formal exercise by government of its eminent domain power to take property coercively, upon payment of just compensation to the property owner. In such condemnation suits, there is no issue as to whether the property is "taken" in the Fifth Amendment sense; the government concedes as much by filing the action. The only question, typically, is what constitutes "just compensation." Beginning in the 1870s, the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to a different use of the Takings Clause. When the sovereign appropriated or caused a physical invasion of property, as when a government dam flooded private land, the Court found that the property had been taken just as surely as if the sovereign had formally condemned. Therefore, it said, the property owner should be allowed to vindicate his constitutional right to compensation in a suit against the government. In contrast with condemnation actions, then, such takings actions have the property owner sue government rather than vice-versa; hence the synonym " inverse condemnation actions ." The key issue in takings actions is usually whether, given all the circumstances, the impact of the government action on a particular property amounts to a taking in the constitutional sense. Only if a taking is found does the question of just compensation arise. In 1922, in the most historically important taking decision, the Supreme Court extended the availability of takings actions from government appropriations and physical invasions of property, as described above, to the mere regulation of property use. This critical expansion of takings jurisprudence to "regulatory takings" acknowledged that purely regulatory interferences with property rights can have economic and other consequences for property owners as significant as appropriations and physical invasions. The regulatory taking concept opened up vast new legal possibilities for property owners, and underlies many of the Supreme Court's takings decisions from the 1970s on. The ascendancy of the regulatory taking concept since the 1970s is hardly surprising. Starting with the advent of comprehensive zoning in the early 20 th century, federal, state, and local regulation of private land use has become pervasive. Beyond comprehensive zoning, the past 60 years have seen explosive growth in the use of historic preservation restrictions, open-space zoning, dedication and exaction conditions on building permits, nature preserves, wildlife habitat preservation, wetlands and coastal zone controls, mining restrictions, and so on. Regulation of non-real-estate property has also proliferated. In the Supreme Court, the appointment of several conservative Justices since the 1970s has prompted a new scrutiny of government conduct vis-à-vis the private property owner. As a result of these factors, the Court since the late 1970s has turned its attention toward the takings issue with vigor. Through the 1980s and 1990s, property owner plaintiffs scored several major victories; by and large, the substantive doctrine of takings shifted to the right. In 2000-2005, however, the Court's decisions moved the analytical framework in a more government-friendly direction. The pendulum may yet be swinging again: the four takings cases decided by the Court during its 2012-2013 and 2014-2015 terms were all decided in favor of the property owner, though mostly as to narrow issues. * * * * * This report compiles only Supreme Court decisions addressing issues with special relevance to takings (inverse condemnation) actions, not those on formal condemnation or property valuation. Thus the headline-grabbing Supreme Court opinion in Kelo v. City of New London (2005), principally a formal condemnation case, is not included here. On the other hand, a scattering of substantive due process decisions is interspersed where they have been cited by the Court as authority in its takings decisions. In the interest of brevity, we mention no dissenting opinions, and almost no concurrences. Thus, the report does not reveal the closely divided nature of some Supreme Court takings opinions. The reader desiring a more analytical discussion of inverse condemnation law should consult CRS Report RS20741, The Constitutional Law of Property Rights "Takings": An Introduction , also prepared by [author name scrubbed]. In 1978, the Supreme Court ushered in the modern era of regulatory takings law by attempting to inject some coherence into the ad hoc analyses that had characterized its decisions before then. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City , infra page 10, the Court declared that whether a regulatory taking has occurred in a given case is influenced by three principal factors: the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with distinct (in most later decisions, "reasonable") investment-backed expectations, and the "character" of the government action. After Penn Central , ad hocery in judicial taking determinations emphatically still remains, but arguably is confined within tighter bounds. The Supreme Court's many takings decisions since Penn Central have developed the jurisprudence in each of its main areas: ripeness, takings criteria, and remedy. As for takings criteria, the Court announced several "per se taking" rules in the two decades after Penn Central — see, for example, Loretto , infra page 9, and Lucas , infra page 7. Decisions since 2000, however, have extolled the multifactor, case-by-case approach of that decision— see Palazzolo , infra page 5; Tahoe-Sierra , infra page 5; and Lingle , infra page 5. In Lingle , the Court summed up the four types of takings claims it now recognizes, in addition to those based on outright government appropriations: a plaintiff seeking to challenge a government regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property may ... alleg[e] a "physical" taking, a Lucas -type "total regulatory taking," a Penn Central taking, or a land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan . The principle that government may "take" property in the Fifth Amendment sense merely through regulatory restriction of property use—that is, without physical invasion or formal appropriation of the property—was announced in 1922. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon , the redoubtable Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote for the Supreme Court that a state law prohibiting coal mining that might cause surface subsidence in certain areas was a taking of the mining company's mineral estate. The first steps taken by this infant "regulatory taking" doctrine, however, were unsteady ones. Aside from making clear that regulatory takings occur only with the most severe of property impacts, the Court's opinions during this period display little in the way of principled decision-making. Moreover, the Court refused at times to part with its long-standing substantive due-process approach to testing property-use restrictions, vacillating between the two theories. The 1870s marked the Supreme Court's first clear acknowledgment that the Takings Clause is not only a constraint on the government's formal exercise of eminent domain, but the basis as well for suits by property owners challenging government conduct not attended by such formal exercise. However, until 1922 the Court believed such "inverse condemnation" suits to be confined to government appropriations or physical invasions of property. Cases involving the impacts of government water projects (flooding, reduced access, etc.) were typical. When cases involving mere restrictions on the use of property reached the Court, they were tested under due process, scope of the police power, or ultra vires theories.

This report is a reverse chronological listing of U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing claims that a government entity has "taken" private property, as that term is used in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Takings Clause states: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." A scattering of related, substantive due process decisions is also included. Under the Takings Clause, courts allow two distinct types of suit. Condemnation (also "formal condemnation") occurs when a government or private entity formally invokes its power of eminent domain by filing suit to take a specified property, upon payment to the owner of just compensation. By contrast, a taking action is a suit by a property holder against the government, claiming that government conduct has effectively taken the property notwithstanding that the government has not filed a formal condemnation suit. Because it is the procedural reverse of a condemnation action, a taking action is often called an "inverse condemnation" action. A typical taking action complains of severe regulation of land use, though the Takings Clause reaches all species of property, real and personal, tangible and intangible. The taking action generally demands that the government compensate the property owner, just as when government formally exercises eminent domain. Finding the line between government interferences with property that are takings and those that are not has occupied the Supreme Court in most of the 100-plus decisions compiled here. The Supreme Court's decisions in these takings actions reach back to 1870, and are divided in this report into three periods. The modern period, 1978 to the present, has seen the Court settle into a taxonomy of four fundamental types of takings—total regulatory takings, partial regulatory takings, physical takings, and exaction takings. The Court in this period also has sought to develop criteria for these four types, and to set out ripeness standards and clarify the required remedy. In the preceding period, 1922 to 1978, the Court first announced the regulatory taking concept—the notion that government regulation alone, without appropriation or physical invasion of property, may be a taking if sufficiently severe. During this time, however, it proffered little by way of regulatory takings criteria, continuing rather its earlier focus on appropriations and physical occupations. In the earliest period of takings law, 1870 to 1922, the Court saw the Takings Clause as protecting property owners only from appropriations and physical invasions, two forms of government interference with property seen by the Court as most functionally similar to an outright condemnation of property. During this infancy of takings law, regulatory restrictions were tested under other, non-takings theories, such as whether they were within a state's police power, and were generally upheld. The four takings cases decided by the Supreme Court during its 2012-2013 and 2014-2015 terms attest to the Court's continuing interest in the takings issue.

The tens of thousands of individuals who responded to the September 11, 2001, attack on the WTC experienced the emotional trauma of the disaster and were exposed to a noxious mixture of dust, debris, smoke, and potentially toxic contaminants, such as pulverized concrete, fibrous glass, particulate matter, and asbestos. A wide variety of health effects have been experienced by responders to the WTC attack, including injuries and respiratory conditions such as sinusitis, asthma, and a new syndrome called WTC cough, which consists of persistent coughing accompanied by severe respiratory symptoms. Commonly reported mental health effects among responders and other affected individuals included symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety. Behavioral health effects such as alcohol and tobacco use have also been reported. There are six key programs that currently receive federal funding to provide voluntary health screening, monitoring, or treatment at no cost to responders. The six WTC health programs, shown in table 1, are (1) the FDNY WTC Medical Monitoring and Treatment Program; (2) the New York/New Jersey (NY/NJ) WTC Consortium, which comprises five clinical centers in the NY/NJ area; (3) the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program; (4) the WTC Health Registry; (5) Project COPE; and (6) the Police Organization Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA) program. The programs vary in aspects such as the HHS administering agency or component responsible for administering the funding; the implementing agency, component, or organization responsible for providing program services; eligibility requirements; and services. The WTC health programs that are providing screening and monitoring are tracking thousands of individuals who were affected by the WTC disaster. As of June 2007, the FDNY WTC program had screened about 14,500 responders and had conducted follow-up examinations for about 13,500 of these responders, while the NY/NJ WTC Consortium had screened about 20,000 responders and had conducted follow-up examinations for about 8,000 of these responders. Some of the responders include nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area. As of June 2007, the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program had screened 1,305 federal responders and referred 281 responders for employee assistance program services or specialty diagnostic services. In addition, the WTC Health Registry, a monitoring program that consists of periodic surveys of self-reported health status and related studies but does not provide in- person screening or monitoring, collected baseline health data from over 71,000 people who enrolled in the registry. In the winter of 2006, the registry began its first adult follow-up survey, and as of June 2007 over 36,000 individuals had completed the follow-up survey. In addition to providing medical examinations, FDNY’s WTC program and the NY/NJ WTC Consortium have collected information for use in scientific research to better understand the health effects of the WTC attack and other disasters. The WTC Health Registry is also collecting information to assess the long-term public health consequences of the disaster. In February 2006, the Secretary of HHS designated the Director of NIOSH to take the lead in ensuring that the WTC health programs are well coordinated, and in September 2006 the Secretary established the WTC Task Force to advise him on federal policies and funding issues related to responders’ health conditions. The chair of the task force is HHS’s Assistant Secretary for Health, and the vice chair is the Director of NIOSH. NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area, although it has taken steps toward expanding the availability of these services. Initially, NIOSH made two efforts to provide screening and monitoring services for these responders, the exact number of whom is unknown. The first effort began in late 2002 when NIOSH awarded a contract for about $306,000 to the Mount Sinai School of Medicine to provide screening services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area and directed it to establish a subcontract with AOEC. AOEC then subcontracted with 32 of its member clinics across the country to provide screening services. From February 2003 to July 2004, the 32 AOEC member clinics screened 588 nonfederal responders nationwide. AOEC experienced challenges in providing these screening services. For example, many nonfederal responders did not enroll in the program because they did not live near an AOEC clinic, and the administration of the program required substantial coordination among AOEC, AOEC member clinics, and Mount Sinai. Mount Sinai’s subcontract with AOEC ended in July 2004, and from August 2004 until June 2005 NIOSH did not fund any organization to provide services to nonfederal responders outside the NYC metropolitan area. During this period, NIOSH focused on providing screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders in the NYC metropolitan area. In June 2005, NIOSH began its second effort by awarding $776,000 to the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Data and Coordination Center (DCC) to provide both screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area. In June 2006, NIOSH awarded an additional $788,000 to DCC to provide screening and monitoring services for these responders. NIOSH officials told us that they assigned DCC the task of providing screening and monitoring services to nonfederal responders outside the NYC metropolitan area because the task was consistent with DCC’s responsibilities for the NY/NJ WTC Consortium, which include data monitoring and coordination. DCC, however, had difficulty establishing a network of providers that could serve nonfederal responders residing throughout the country—ultimately contracting with only 10 clinics in seven states to provide screening and monitoring services. DCC officials said that as of June 2007 the 10 clinics were monitoring 180 responders. In early 2006, NIOSH began exploring how to establish a national program that would expand the network of providers to provide screening and monitoring services, as well as treatment services, for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area. According to NIOSH, there have been several challenges involved in expanding a network of providers to screen and monitor nonfederal responders nationwide. These include establishing contracts with clinics that have the occupational health expertise to provide services nationwide, establishing patient data transfer systems that comply with applicable privacy laws, navigating the institutional review board process for a large provider network, and establishing payment systems with clinics participating in a national network of providers. On March 15, 2007, NIOSH issued a formal request for information from organizations that have an interest in and the capability of developing a national program for responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area. In this request, NIOSH described the scope of a national program as offering screening, monitoring, and treatment services to about 3,000 nonfederal responders through a national network of occupational health facilities. NIOSH also specified that the program’s facilities should be located within reasonable driving distance to responders and that participating facilities must provide copies of examination records to DCC. In May 2007, NIOSH approved a request from DCC to redirect about $125,000 from the June 2006 award to establish a contract with a company to provide screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area. Subsequently, DCC contracted with QTC Management, Inc., one of the four organizations that had responded to NIOSH’s request for information. DCC’s contract with QTC does not include treatment services, and NIOSH officials are still exploring how to provide and pay for treatment services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area. QTC has a network of providers in all 50 states and the District of Columbia and can use internal medicine and occupational medicine doctors in its network to provide these services. In addition, DCC and QTC have agreed that QTC will identify and subcontract with providers outside of its network to screen and monitor nonfederal responders who do not reside within 25 miles of a QTC provider. In June 2007, NIOSH awarded $800,600 to DCC for coordinating the provision of screening and monitoring examinations, and QTC was to receive a portion of this award from DCC to provide about 1,000 screening and monitoring examinations through May 2008. According to a NIOSH official, QTC’s providers began conducting screening examinations in summer 2007. Screening and monitoring the health of the people who responded to the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center are critical for identifying health effects already experienced by responders or those that may emerge in the future. In addition, collecting and analyzing information produced by screening and monitoring responders can give health care providers information that could help them better diagnose and treat responders and others who experience similar health effects. While many responders have been able to obtain screening and follow-up physical and mental health examinations through the federally funded WTC health programs, other responders may not always find these services available. Specifically, many responders who reside outside the NYC metropolitan area have not been able to obtain screening and monitoring services because available services are too distant. Moreover, HHS has repeatedly interrupted its efforts to provide services outside the NYC area, resulting in periods when no such services were available. HHS continues to fund and coordinate the WTC health programs and has key federal responsibility for ensuring the availability of services to responders. HHS and its agencies have taken steps to move toward providing screening and monitoring services to nonfederal responders living outside of the NYC area. However, these efforts are not complete, and the stop-and-start history of the department’s efforts to serve these responders does not provide assurance that the latest efforts to extend screening and monitoring services to them will be successful and will be sustained over time. Therefore we recommended in July 2007 that the Secretary of HHS take expeditious action to ensure that health screening and monitoring services are available to all people who responded to the attack on the WTC, regardless of where they reside. As of January 2008, the department has not responded to this recommendation. Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time. For further information about this testimony, please contact Cynthia A. Bascetta at (202) 512-7114 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Helene F. Toiv, Assistant Director; Hernan Bozzolo; Frederick Caison; Anne Dievler; Anne Hopewell; and Roseanne Price made key contributions to this statement. September 11: Improvements Needed in Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring Services for Responders. GAO-07-1229T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2007. September 11: HHS Needs to Ensure the Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring for All Responders. GAO-07-892. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2007. September 11: HHS Has Screened Additional Federal Responders for World Trade Center Health Effects, but Plans for Awarding Funds for Treatment Are Incomplete. GAO-06-1092T. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2006. September 11: Monitoring of World Trade Center Health Effects Has Progressed, but Program for Federal Responders Lags Behind. GAO-06-481T. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2006. September 11: Monitoring of World Trade Center Health Effects Has Progressed, but Not for Federal Responders. GAO-05-1020T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2005. September 11: Health Effects in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack. GAO-04-1068T. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2004. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Six years after the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), concerns persist about health effects experienced by WTC responders and the availability of health care services for those affected. Several federally funded programs provide screening, monitoring, or treatment services to responders. GAO has previously reported on the progress made and implementation problems faced by these WTC health programs. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's testimony, September 11: Improvements Needed in Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring Services for Responders ( GAO-07-1229T , Sept. 10, 2007), which updated GAO's report, September 11: HHS Needs to Ensure the Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring for All Responders ( GAO-07-892 , July 23, 2007). In this testimony, GAO discusses efforts by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to provide services for nonfederal responders residing outside the New York City (NYC) area. For the July 2007 report, GAO reviewed program documents and interviewed Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials, grantees, and others. GAO updated selected information in August and September 2007 and conducted work for this statement in January 2008. In July 2007, following a reexamination of the status of the WTC health programs, GAO recommended that the Secretary of HHS take expeditious action to ensure that health screening and monitoring services are available to all people who responded to the WTC attack, regardless of where they reside. As of January 2008, the department has not responded to this recommendation. As GAO testified in September 2007, NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC area, although it has taken steps toward expanding the availability of these services. In late 2002, NIOSH arranged for a network of occupational health clinics to provide screening services. This effort ended in July 2004, and until June 2005 NIOSH did not fund screening or monitoring services for nonfederal responders outside the NYC area. In June 2005, NIOSH funded the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Data and Coordination Center (DCC) to provide screening and monitoring services; however, DCC had difficulty establishing a nationwide network of providers and contracted with only 10 clinics in seven states. In 2006, NIOSH began to explore other options for providing these services, and in 2007 it took steps toward expanding the provider network.

RS21283 -- Homeland Security: Intelligence Support Updated February 23, 2004 Better intelligence is held by many observers to be a crucial factor in preventing terrorist attacks. Concerns have been expressed that no single agency or office in the federal government prior to September 11, 2001 was in aposition to "connect the dots" between diffuse bits of information that might have provided clues to the plannedattacks. Testimony before the two intelligence committees' Joint Inquiry on the September 11 attacks indicated thatsignificant information in the possession of intelligence and law enforcement agencies was not fully shared withother agencies and that intelligence on potential terrorist threats against the United States was not fully exploited. For many years, the sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information was circumscribed by administrative policies and statutory prohibitions. Beginning in the early 1990s, however, much effort has gone intoimprovinginteragency coordination. (1) After the September 11attacks, a number of statutory obstacles were addressed by the USA-Patriot Act of 2001 and other legislation. (2) Nevertheless, there had been no one place where theanalyticaleffort is centered; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was designed to remedy that perceived deficiencyas is the Terrorist Threat Integration Center announced by the President in his January 2003 State of the Unionaddress. The Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-296 ), signed on November 25, 2002 established within DHS a Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) headed by an Under Secretary for Information Analysisand Infrastructure Protection (appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate) with anAssistant Secretary of Information Analysis (appointed by the President). The legislation, especially theInformation Analysis section, seeks to promote close ties between intelligence analysts and those responsible forassessing vulnerabilities of key U.S. infrastructure. The bill envisions an intelligence entity focused on receivingandanalyzing information (3) from other governmentagencies and using it to provide warning of terrorist attacks on the homeland to other federal agencies and to stateand local officials, and for addressing vulnerabilities that terroristscould exploit. DHS is not intended to duplicate the collection effort of intelligence agencies; it will not have its own agents, satellites, or signals intercept sites. Major intelligence agencies are not transferred to the DHS, although some DHSelements, including Customs and the Coast Guard, will continue to collect information that is crucial to analyzingterrorist threats. The legislation establishing DHS envisioned an information analysis element with the responsibility for acquiring and reviewing information from the agencies of the Intelligence Community, from law enforcementagencies, stateand local government agencies, and unclassified publicly available information (known as open source informationor "osint") from books, periodicals, pamphlets, the Internet, media, etc. The legislation is explicit that, "Except asotherwise directed by the President, the Secretary [of DHS] shall have such access as the Secretary considersnecessary to all information, including reports, assessments, analyses, and unevaluated intelligence relating to threatsofterrorism against the United States and to other areas of responsibility assigned by the Secretary, and to allinformation concerning infrastructures or other vulnerabilities of the United States to terrorism, whether or not suchinformation has been analyzed, that may be collected, possessed, or prepared by any agency of the FederalGovernment." (4) DHS analysts are charged with using this information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats; producing comprehensive vulnerability assessments of key resources and infrastructure; identifying prioritiesforprotective and support measures by DHS, by other agencies of the federal government, state and local governmentagencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. They are to disseminate information to assist in thedeterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the U.S. The intelligence element isalso charged with recommending measures necessary for protecting key resources and critical infrastructure incoordination with other federal agencies. DHS is responsible for ensuring that any material received is protected from unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only for the performance of official duties. (This provision addresses a concern that sensitivepersonalinformation made available to DHS analysts could be misused.) As is the case for other federal agencies that handleclassified materials, intelligence information is to be transmitted, retained, and disseminated in accordance withpolicies established under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to protect intelligence sourcesand methods and similar authorities of the Attorney General concerning sensitive law enforcement information. (5) Despite enactment of the Homeland Security Act, it is clear that significant concerns persisted within the executive branch about the new department's ability to analyze intelligence and law enforcement information. Mediaaccounts suggest that these concerns center on DHS' status as a new and untested agency and the potential risksinvolved in forwarding "raw" intelligence to the DHS intelligence component. (6) Another concern is that a new entity,rather than long-established intelligence and law enforcement agencies, would be relied on to produce all-sourceintelligence relating to the most serious threats facing the country. DHS Role in the Intelligence Community. The U.S. Intelligence Community consists of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and some 14 other agencies; (7) it providesinformation in various forms to the White House and other federal agencies (as well as to Congress). In addition,law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also collect information for use in thefederal government. (8) Within the IntelligenceCommunity, priorities for collection (and to some extent for analysis) are established by the DCI, (9) based in practice on inter-agency discussions. Being"at the table" when prioritiesare discussed, it is widely believed, helps ensure equitable allocations of limited collection resources. The Homeland Security Act makes the DHS information analysis element a member of the Intelligence Community, thus giving DHS a formal role when intelligence collection and analysis priorities are being addressed. DHSofficials have indicated that the new Department is actively participating in the process of setting priorities. The Question of "Raw" Intelligence. There has been discussion in the media whether DHS will have access to "raw" intelligence or only to finished analytical products, but thesereports may reflect uncertainty regarding the definition of "raw" intelligence. A satellite photograph standing byitself might be considered "raw" data, but it would be useless unless something were known about where and whenitwas taken. Thus, satellite imagery supplied to DHS would under almost any circumstances have to include someanalysis. The same would apply to signals intercepts. Reports from human agents present special challenges. Someassessment of the reliability of the source would have to be provided, but information that would identify a specificindividual is normally retained within a very small circle of intelligence officials so as to reduce the risk ofunauthorized disclosure and harm to the source. The issue of the extent and nature of information forwarded to DHS has proved to be difficult. Reviewing copies of summary reports prepared by existing agencies is seen by some observers as inadequate for the task ofputtingtogether a meaningful picture of terrorist capabilities and intentions and providing timely warning. On the otherhand, there is a need to ensure that DHS would not be inundated with vast quantities of data and that highly sensitiveinformation is not given wider dissemination than absolutely necessary. Analytical Quality. The key test for homeland security will of course be the quality of the analytical product -- whether terrorist groups can be identified and timely warning givenof plans for attacks on the U.S. A critical need exists for trained personnel. The types of information that have tobe analyzed come from disparate sources and require a variety of analytical skills that are not in plentiful supply. Academic institutions prepare significant numbers of linguists and area specialists, but training in the inner workingsof clandestine terrorist entities is less often undertaken. Analysts with law enforcement backgrounds may not beattuned to the foreign environments from which terrorist groups emerge. In July 2003 DHS had only some 53analysts and liaison officials with plans to increase this number to about 150. (10) President Bush, in his State of the Union address delivered on January 28, 2003, called for the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) that would merge and analyze all threat information in a singlelocation under the direction of the DCI. According to Administration spokesmen, TTIC will eventually encompassCIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) and the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, along with elements of otheragencies, including DOD and DHS. TTIC's stated responsibilities are to "integrate terrorist-related informationcollected domestically and abroad" and to provide "terrorist threat assessments for our national leadership." (11) OnMay 1, 2003, TTIC began operations at CIA Headquarters under the leadership of John O. Brennan, who hadpreviously served as the CIA's Deputy Executive Director. By July 2003, it consisted of some 100 analysts andliaisonofficials with plans to increase to 300 by May 2004. (12) TTIC appears to be designed to assume at least some of the functions intended for DHS' information analysis division. Representative Cox, chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, has welcomed theestablishment of TTIC, while noting that "The establishment of the Center in no way reduces the statutoryobligations of the Department [of Homeland Security] to build its own analytic capability. (13) " Making the DCI responsiblefor TTIC will facilitate its ability to use highly sensitive classified information and TTIC can expand upon therelationships that have evolved in the CTC that was established in CIA's Operations Directorate in the mid-1980s. According to testimony by Administration officials to the Senate Government Affairs Committee on February 26,2003, TTIC will in effect function as an information analysis center for DHS and DHS will require a smallernumber of analysts with less extensive responsibilities. Subsequent Administration testimony indicates that DHSwill receive much of the same intelligence data from other agencies and will undertake analysis. A key distinctionisthat DHS is not responsible for information relating to threats to U.S. interests overseas. (14) In FY2004, funds were appropriated for 206 intelligence analysts in IAIP;the Administration requested 225 for FY2005. Some observers express concern that the DCI's role in the TTIC -- responsibility for the analysis of domestically collected information and for maintaining "an up-to-date database of known and suspected terrorists that will beaccessible to federal and non-federal officials and entities," (15) -- may run counter to the statutory provision that excludes the CIA from "law enforcement orinternal security functions." (16) There are alsoquestions abouttransferring the FBI's Counterterrorism Division to the DCI. Some express concern about how the TTIC under theDCI will coordinate with state and local officials and with private industry as contemplated in provisions of theHouse-passed version of the FY2004 intelligence authorization bill ( H.R. 2417 ). The relationship between DHS and TTIC is also a continuing concern to Members of Congress. Some may consider modifications of the Homeland Security Act that could affect the analytical efforts of DHS. (17) Section 359 of theIntelligence Authorization Act for FY2004 ( P.L. 108-177 ) requires that the President report on the operations ofIAIP and TTIC by May 1, 2004. The report, which is to be unclassified (with the option of a classified annex), asksfor a delineation of the responsibilities of IAIP and TTIC and an assessment of whether areas of overlap, if any,"represent an inefficient utilization of resources." The President is asked to "explain the basis for the establishmentand operation of the Center [TTIC] as a 'joint venture' of participating agencies rather than as an element of theDirectorate [IAIP]...." The report is also to assess the "practical impact, if any, of the operations of the Center[TTIC]on individual liberties and privacy." Legislation creating a homeland security department recognized the crucial importance of intelligence. It proposed an analytical office within DHS that would draw upon the information gathering resources of othergovernmentagencies and of the private sector. It envisioned the DHS information analysis entity working closely with otherDHS offices, other federal agencies, state and local officials, and the private sector to devise strategies to protectU.S.vulnerabilities and to provide warning of specific attacks. The Administration appears to prefer a modification to the approach originally envisioned in the legislation that created DHS. TTIC, under the direction of the DCI, will provide the integrative analytical effort that the draftersofhomeland security legislation and others in Congress have felt to be essential in light of breakdowns incommunication that occurred prior to September 11, 2001. Whether TTIC is consistent with the intent of Congressin passingthe Homeland Security Act and whether it is ultimately the best place for the integrative effort is current a matterof discussion in Congress. Regardless of where the integrative effort is ultimately located, the task will remainfundamentally the same. Pulling together vast amounts of data from a wide variety of sources concerning terroristgroups, analyzing them, and reporting threat warnings in time to prevent attacks is and will remain a dauntingchallenge.

Legislation establishing a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (P.L. 107-296) included provisions for an information analysis element within the new department. It did not transferto DHS existing government intelligence and law enforcement agencies but envisioned an analytical office utilizingthe products of other agencies -- both unevaluated information and finished reports -- to provide warning ofterrorist attacks, assessments of vulnerability, and recommendations for remedial actions at federal, state, and locallevels, and by the private sector. In January 2003, the Administration announced its intention to establish a newTerrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to undertake many of the tasks envisioned for the DHS informationalanalysis element, known as Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), but some Members ofCongress argue that TTIC cannot be a substitute for a DHS analytical effort. This report examines differentapproaches to improving the information analysis function and the sharing of information among federal agencies.It willbe updated as circumstances warrant.

Countries can take varying approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Since energy use is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions, policies designed to increase energy efficiency or induce a switch to less greenhouse-gas-intensive fuels, such as from coal to natural gas, can reduce emissions in the short term. In the long term, however, major technology changes will be needed to establish a less carbon- intensive energy infrastructure. To that end, a U.S. policy to mitigate climate change may require facilities to achieve specified reductions or employ a market-based mechanism, such as establishing a price on emissions. Several bills to implement emissions pricing in the United States have been introduced in the 110th and 111th Congresses. These bills have included both cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals. Some of the proposed legislation also include measures intended to limit potentially adverse impacts on the international competitiveness of domestic firms. Estimating the effects of domestic emissions pricing for industries in the United States is complex. For example, if the United States were to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, production costs could rise for many industries and could cause output, profits, or employment to fall. However, the magnitude of these potential effects is likely to depend on the greenhouse gas intensity of industry output and on the domestic emissions price, which is not yet known, among other factors. Additionally, if U.S. climate policy was more stringent than in other countries, some domestic industries could experience a loss in international competitiveness. Within these industries, adverse competitiveness effects could arise through an increase in imports, a decrease in exports, or both. For regulated sources, greenhouse gas emissions pricing would increase the cost of releasing greenhouse gases. As a result, it would encourage some of these sources to reduce their emissions, compared with business- as-usual. Under domestic emissions pricing, production costs for regulated sources could rise as they either take action to reduce their emissions or pay for the greenhouse gases they release. Cost increases are likely to be larger for production that is relatively greenhouse gas-intensive, where greenhouse gas intensity refers to emissions per unit of output. Cost increases may reduce industry profits, or they may be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. To the extent that cost increases are passed on to consumers, they could demand fewer goods, and industry output could fall. While emissions pricing would likely cause production costs to rise for certain industries, the extent of this rise and the resulting impact on industry output are less certain due to a number of factors. For example, the U.S. emissions price and the emissions price in other countries are key variables that will help to determine the impact of emissions pricing on domestic industries. However, future emission prices are currently unknown. Additionally, to the extent that emissions pricing encourages technological change that reduces greenhouse gas intensity, potential adverse effects of emissions pricing on profits or output could be mitigated for U.S. industries. Several studies by U.S. agencies and experts have used models of the economy to simulate the effects of emissions pricing policy on output and related economic outcomes. These models generally find that emissions pricing will cause output, profits, or employment to decline in sectors that are described as energy intensive, compared with business-as-usual. In general, these studies conclude that these declines are likely to be greater for these industries, as compared with other sectors in the economy. However, some research suggests that not every industry is likely to suffer adverse effects from emissions pricing. For example, a long-run model estimated by Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih (2008) predicts that some U.S. sectors, such as services, may experience growth in the long run as a result of domestic emissions pricing. This growth would likely be due to changes in consumption patterns in favor of goods and services that are relatively less greenhouse gas-intensive. Potential international competitiveness effects depend in part on the stringency of U.S. climate policy relative to other countries. For example, if domestic greenhouse gas emissions pricing were to make emissions more expensive in the United States than in other countries, production costs for domestic industries would likely increase relative to their international competitors, potentially disadvantaging industries in the United States. As a result, some domestic production could shift abroad, through changes in consumption or investment patterns, to countries where greenhouse gas emissions are less stringently regulated. For example, consumers may substitute some goods made in other countries for some goods made domestically. Similarly, investment patterns could shift more strongly in favor of new capacity in countries where greenhouse gas emissions are regulated less stringently than in the United States. Stakeholders and experts have identified two criteria, among others, that are important in determining potential vulnerability to adverse competitiveness effects: trade intensity and energy intensity. Trade intensity is important because international competitiveness effects arise from changes in trade patterns. For example, if climate policy in the United States were more stringent than in other countries, international competition could limit the ability of domestic firms to pass increases in costs through to consumers. Energy intensity is important because the combustion of fossil fuels for energy is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions, which may increase production costs under emissions pricing. Legislation passed in June 2009 by the House of Representatives, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009), uses the criteria of trade intensity and energy intensity or greenhouse gas intensity, among others, to determine eligibility for the Emission Allowance Rebate Program, which is part of the legislation. H.R. 2454 specifies how to calculate the two criteria. Trade intensity is defined as the ratio of the sum of the value of imports and exports within an industry to the sum of the value of shipments and imports within the industry. Energy intensity is defined as the industry’s cost of purchased electricity and fuel costs, or energy expenditures, divided by the value of shipments of the industry. Reducing carbon emissions in the United States could result in carbon leakage through two potential mechanisms. First, if domestic production were to shift abroad to countries where greenhouse gas emissions are not regulated, emissions in these countries could grow faster than expected otherwise. Through this mechanism, some of the expected benefits of reducing emissions domestically could be offset by faster growth in emissions elsewhere, according to Aldy and Pizer (2009). Second, carbon leakage may also arise from changes in world prices that are brought about by domestic emissions pricing. For example, U.S. emissions pricing could cause domestic demand for oil to fall. Because the United States is a relatively large consumer of oil worldwide, the world price of oil could fall when the U.S. demand for oil drops. The quantity of oil consumed by other countries would rise in response, increasing greenhouse gas emissions from the rest of the world. These price effects may be a more important source of carbon leakage than the trade effects previously described. Two key indicators of potential vulnerability to adverse competitiveness effects are an industry’s energy intensity and trade intensity. Proposed U.S. legislation specifies that (1) either an energy intensity or greenhouse gas intensity of 5 percent or greater; and (2) a trade intensity of 15 percent or greater be used as criteria to identify industries for which trade measures or rebates would apply. Since data on greenhouse gas intensity are less complete, we focused our analysis on industry energy intensity. Most of the industries that meet these criteria fall under 4 industry categories: primary metals, nonmetallic minerals, paper, and chemicals. However, there is significant variation in specified vulnerability characteristics among different product groups (“sub-industries”). Although our report examined the four industry categories, figures 1 through 4 or the following pages illustrate the variation among different sub-industries within the primary metals industry, as well as information on the type of energy used and location of import and export markets. The data shown in these figures are for the latest year available. As shown by sub-industry examples in figure 1, energy and trade intensities differ within primary metals. For example, primary aluminum meets the vulnerability criteria with an energy intensity of 24 percent and a trade intensity of 62 percent. Ferrous metal foundries meets the energy intensity criteria, but not the trade intensity criteria. Steel manufacturing—products made from purchased steel—and aluminum products fall short of both vulnerability criteria. Iron and steel mills has an energy intensity of 7 percent and a trade intensity of 35 percent and is by far the largest sub-industry example, with a 2007 value of output of over $93 billion. The energy and trade intensity for all primary metal products is denoted by the “x” in figure 1. Among the primary metals sub-industry examples shown in figure 2, the types of energy used also vary. Iron and steel mills uses the greatest share of coal and coke, and steel manufacturing and ferrous metal foundries uses the greatest proportion of natural gas. Since coal is more carbon- intensive than natural gas, sub-industries that rely more heavily on coal could also be more vulnerable to competitiveness effects. The carbon intensity of electricity, used heavily in the production of aluminum, will also vary on the basis of the source of energy used to generate it and the market conditions where it is sold. Data shown for “aluminum” include primary aluminum and aluminum products, and net electricity is the sum of net transfers plus purchases and generation minus quantities sold. Industry vulnerability may further vary depending on the share of trade with countries that do not have carbon pricing. To illustrate this variability, figure 3 provides data on the share of imports by source, since imports exceed exports in each of the primary metals examples. As shown, while primary aluminum is among the most trade-intensive, the majority of imports are from Canada, an Annex I country with agreed emission reduction targets. For iron and steel mills, over one-third of imports are from the European Union and other Annex I countries, not including Canada (“EU plus”). However, for iron and steel mills, almost 30 percent of imports are also from the non-Annex I countries of China, Mexico, and Brazil. While less trade-intensive, steel manufacturing and aluminum products each has greater than one-third of imports from China alone. As shown in figure 4, adverse competitiveness effects from emissions pricing could increase the already growing share of Chinese imports that exists in some of the sub-industries. Among the examples, iron and steel mills, steel manufacturing, and aluminum products exhibit a growing trade reliance on Chinese imports since 2002. This trend has largely been driven by lower labor and capital costs in China, and, according to representatives from the steel industry, China has recently been producing 50 percent of the world’s steel. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee on some of the issues addressed in our report on the subject of climate change trade measures. I would be happy to answer any questions from you or other members of the Committee. For further information about this statement, please contact Loren Yager at (202) 512-4347 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Christine Broderick (Assistant Director), Etana Finkler, Kendall Helm, Jeremy Latimer, Maria Mercado, and Ardith Spence. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Countries can take varying approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Since energy use is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions, policies designed to increase energy efficiency or induce a switch to less greenhouse-gas-intensive fuels, such as from coal to natural gas, can reduce emissions in the short term. In the long term, however, major technology changes will be needed to establish a less carbon-intensive energy infrastructure. To that end, a U.S. policy to mitigate climate change may require facilities to achieve specified reductions or employ a market-based mechanism, such as establishing a price on emissions. Several bills to implement emissions pricing in the United States have been introduced in the 110th and 111th Congresses. These bills have included both cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals. Some of the proposed legislation also include measures intended to limit potentially adverse impacts on the international competitiveness of domestic firms. Estimating the potential effects of domestic emissions pricing for industries in the United States is complex. If the United States were to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, production costs could rise for certain industries and could cause output, profits, or employment to fall. Within these industries, some of these adverse effects could arise through an increase in imports, a decrease in exports, or both. However, the magnitude of these potential effects is likely to depend on the greenhouse gas intensity of industry output and on the domestic emissions price, which is not yet known, among other factors. Estimates of adverse competitiveness effects are generally larger for industries that are both relatively energy- and trade-intensive. In 2007, these industries accounted for about 4.5 percent of domestic output. Estimates of the effects vary because of key assumptions required by economic models. For example, models generally assume a price for U.S. carbon emissions, but do not assume a similar price by other nations. In addition, the models generally do not incorporate all policy provisions, such as legislative proposals related to trade measures and rebates that are based on levels of production. Proposed legislation suggests that industries vulnerable to competitiveness effects should be considered differently. Industries for which competitiveness measures would apply are identified on the basis of their energy and trade intensity. Most of the industries that meet these criteria are in primary metals, nonmetallic minerals, paper, and chemicals, although significant variation exists for product groups (sub-industries) within each industry. Additional variation arises on the basis of the type of energy used and the extent to which foreign competitors' greenhouse gas emissions are regulated. To illustrate variability in characteristics that make industries vulnerable to competitiveness effects, we include illustrations of sub-industries within primary metals that meet both the energy and trade intensity criteria; examples that met only one criterion; and examples that met neither, but had significant imports from countries without greenhouse gas pricing.

Research on former foster youth is limited and most of the studies on outcomes for these youth face methodological challenges. For example, they include brief follow-up periods; have low response rates, non-representative samples, and small sample sizes; and do not follow youth prior to exit from foster care. Few studies include comparison groups to gauge how well these youth are transitioning to adulthood in relation to their peers in the foster care population or general population. However, two studies—the Northwest Foster Care Alumni Study and the Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster Youth—have tracked outcomes for a sample of youth across several domains, either prospectively (following youth in care and as they age out and beyond) or retrospectively (examining current outcomes for young adults who were in care at least a few years ago), and compared these outcomes to other groups of youth, either those who aged out and/or youth in the general population. Nonetheless, these studies focus only on youth who were in foster care in four states. The 1999 law ( P.L. 106-169 ) authorizing the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP) required that HHS develop a data system to capture the characteristics and experiences of certain current and former foster youth across the country. The law directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to consult with state and local public officials responsible for administering independent living and other child welfare programs, child welfare advocates, Members of Congress, youth service providers, and researchers to (1) "develop outcome measures (including measures of educational attainment, high school diploma, avoidance of dependency, homelessness, non-marital childbirth, incarceration, and high risk behaviors) that can be used to assess the performances of States in operating independent living programs"; and (2) identify the data needed to track the number and characteristics of children receiving independent living services, the type of services provided, and state performance on the measures. In response to these requirements, HHS created the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD). The final rule establishing the NYTD became effective April 28, 2008, and it required states to report data to HHS on youth beginning in FY2011. This report provides summary and detailed data for FY2011 through FY2013. HHS uses NYTD to engage in two data reporting activities. First, states report information twice each fiscal year on eligible youth who currently receive independent living services regardless of whether they continue to remain in foster care, were in foster care in another state, or received child welfare services through an Indian tribe or privately operated foster care program. These youth are known as served youth . Independent living services refer to the supports that youth receive—such as academic assistance and career preparation services—to assist them as they transition to adulthood. Second, states report information on foster youth on or about their 17 th birthday, two years later on or about their 19 th birthday, and again on or about their 21 st birthday. In this second group, foster youth at age 17 are known as the baseline youth, and at ages 19 and 21 they are known as the follow-up youth (and are also referred to as tracked youth in this report). These current and former foster youth are tracked regardless of whether they receive independent living services at ages 17, 19, and 21. States may track a sample of youth who participated in the outcomes collection at age 17 to reduce the data collection burden. Information is to be collected on a new group of foster youth at age 17 every three years. Table 1 includes an overview of data on the served youth who received an independent living service and the type of services they received for each of FY2011 through FY2013. The number of youth receiving an independent living service in each of those years ranged from about 97,500 to nearly 102,000. Across all three years, youth were 18 years old, on average, and more than half were female (51% to 52%). The largest share of youth were white (41%-42%) followed by black (29%-31%) and Hispanic youth (19%). About 7 out of 10 youth were in foster care when they reported receiving a service. Youth generally had less than a 12 th grade level of education, and about one out of five received special education instruction during a given fiscal year. In addition, nearly one out of five had been adjudicated delinquent, meaning that a court has found the youth guilty of committing a delinquent act. Among the most frequently received services in most of the three years were academic support to assist the youth with completing high school or obtaining a general equivalency degree (GED), such as academic counseling and literacy training; career preparation services that focus on developing a youth's ability to find, apply for, and retain appropriate employment, including vocational and career assessments and job seeking and job placement support; and an independent living needs assessment to identify the youth's basic skills, emotional and social capabilities, strengths, and needs to match the youth with appropriate independent living services (see Figure 1 ). About 60% of youth received three or more independent living services. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics and outcomes of the 19-year-old follow-up youth in FY2013. These youth—part of the follow-up population—were initially surveyed in FY2011 (at "baseline") when they were 17 years of age. The table displays information for the entire surveyed group of 19-year-olds (youth overall) as well as four sub-categories of these youth: those who were in foster care and those who were not, and those who had received at least one independent living service and those who had not. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Most of the 19-year-old youth who were in foster care also received at least one independent living service. Therefore, the data for these two groups are similar. In total, 7,536 youth participated in the survey at age 19 (this is compared to 15,597 who participated at age 17). Those who did not participate had declined to participate, were considered to be on runaway or missing status; could not be otherwise located; were incapacitated or incarcerated; or were deceased. Figure 2 includes data on selected outcomes for youth in foster care and those who are no longer in foster care. Slightly more than half of the 19-year-old youth participants were male. The largest share of youth were white (42%), followed by black (31%) and Hispanic (19%) youth. Youth were asked about their outcomes across six areas—financial self-sufficiency, educational (academic or vocational) training, positive connections with adults, homelessness, high-risk behaviors, and access to health insurance. About one-third of youth were working full-time and/or part-time at age 19; however, youth in foster care were more likely to be working part-time and youth not in foster care or not receiving any independent living service were slightly more likely to be working full-time. Approximately 30% of youth had completed an apprenticeship, internship, or other type of on-the-job training in the past year. (For comparison, approximately 13% of these youth were working full-time and/or part-time and 20% had completed employment-related skills training when they were surveyed at age 17). The 19-year-old youth were about equally likely to receive Social Security benefits, either Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) (12% to 14%), regardless of foster care status or receipt of independent living services. (About the same share of these youth was receiving Social Security at age 17.) Youth not receiving any independent living services were slightly less likely to report receiving other ongoing financial support (11% versus 13%-17%). Youth who were in foster care at age 19 did not qualify for public supports such as financial assistance, food assistance, and public housing. The other groups of 19-year-old youth—those not in care, those receiving at least one independent living service (and not in care), and youth not receiving any independent living services (and not in care)—were equally likely to receive such public supports. Overall, youth were most likely to have a high school diploma (56%) or its equivalent. Educational outcomes were notably distinct for follow-up youth at age 19 depending on whether or not they were in foster care or whether they received an independent living service. Youth who were in foster care at age 19 and/or who received at least one independent living service were also slightly more likely to have a high school diploma or equivalent than those youth who were not in care or had not received at least one independent living service (58%-60% versus 52%-53%). Overall, 54% of youth were enrolled in school at age 19, which could include high school, college, or vocational school. Among youth in foster care, 70% were currently enrolled. This is compared to 44%-62% of youth in the other three subgroups (youth not in care, youth receiving at least one independent living service, and youth not receiving at least one such service). (Also for comparison, when these youth were age 17, almost all (93%) were attending school and 8% had obtained a high school diploma or its equivalent.) Almost all youth at age 19—regardless of foster care status or receipt of independent living services—said that they had a positive connection to an adult who could serve in a mentoring or substitute parent role, including a relative, former foster parent, birth parent, or older member of the community. (Nearly all youth had reported the same when they were surveyed at age 17.) Most of the 19-year-old youth had not experienced homelessness in their lifetime, and youth in foster care were much less likely to report being homeless than the other groups (11% versus 18%-24%). (This is compared to 16% of youth overall when they were surveyed at age 17.) Youth in care at age 19 were also less likely to report having been incarcerated (14% versus 20%-29%). About the same share of youth (13%-17%) self-referred or were referred for an alcohol or drug abuse assessment or counseling during the fiscal year, regardless of foster care or independent living status. Youth in care and/or receiving at least one independent living service were slightly less likely to report that they had ever given birth to, or fathered, any children (9%-10% versus 13%-14%). In general, nearly 9 out of 10 youth had Medicaid or some other health insurance at age 19 (about the same share of youth had health insurance coverage at age 17). Youth in care and/or youth receiving at least one independent living service were more likely to report having health insurance (95%-99%), compared to youth not in care nor receiving independent living services (74%-88%). Most youth in care or receiving at least one independent living service received Medicaid coverage (81%-85%). About the same share of youth (14% to 17%), regardless of foster care status or their receipt of independent living services, had other health insurance. Among youth who had health insurance, youth receiving at least one independent living service and/or not in foster care were slightly more likely than youth in foster care and/or not receiving any independent living services to have insurance coverage for at least some prescription drugs (77%-78% versus 70%-72%).

Congress has long been concerned with the well-being of older youth in foster care and those who have recently emancipated from care without going to a permanent home. Research on this population is fairly limited, and the few studies that are available have focused on youth who live in a small number of states. This research has generally found that youth who spend time in foster care during their teenage years tend to have difficulty as they enter adulthood and beyond. The Chafee Foster Care Independence Act (P.L. 106-169), enacted in 1999, specified that state child welfare agencies provide additional supports to youth transitioning from foster care under the newly created Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP). The law also directed the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers child welfare programs, to consult with stakeholders to develop a national data system on the number, characteristics, and outcomes of current and former foster youth. In response to these requirements, HHS created the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD) under a final rule promulgated in 2008. The rule requires that each state child welfare agency commence collecting and reporting the data beginning in FY2011 (October 1, 2010). This report provides summary and detailed data about current and former foster youth, as reported by states to HHS via the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD). Data are available on two sets of youth. First, states report information each fiscal year on eligible youth who currently receive independent living services regardless of whether they continue to remain in foster care, were in foster care in another state, or received child welfare services through an Indian tribe or privately operated foster care program. These youth are known as served youth. Data on served youth are intended to show how many youth received independent living services. Second, states report information on foster youth on or about their 17th birthday, on or about their 19th birthday, and on or about their 21st birthday. This reported information is based primarily on data collected through surveys of the youth. In this second group, foster youth at age 17 are known as the baseline youth, and at ages 19 and 21 they are known as the follow-up youth. Data from the tracked population of youth are intended to show education, work, health, and other outcomes of youth who were in foster care at age 17. These current and former foster youth are tracked regardless of whether they receive independent living services at ages 17, 19, and 21. As noted, states began reporting NYTD data to HHS for served and baseline youth in FY2011. The data in this report include those for served youth in FY2011 through FY2013 and for follow-up youth for FY2013. Between 97,000 and 102,000 youth received an independent living service in each of FY2011 through FY2013. The median age of these youth was 18. In each of the three years, the most common independent living services they received were academic support, career preparation, and education about housing and home management. Approximately 7,500 follow-up youth were surveyed about their outcomes at age 19. About one-third of youth were working full-time and/or part-time. Just over half (54%) were enrolled in school. Almost all of the youth had a positive connection with an adult who could serve in a mentoring or substitute parent role. Most youth had not experienced homelessness or incarceration in their lifetimes. The majority of youth had Medicaid or some other health insurance. However, youth who were no longer in foster care tended to have more negative outcomes on certain indicators. For example, youth in foster care were much less likely to report ever having been homeless compared to youth who left care (11% versus 24%). Likewise, they were less likely to report having ever been incarcerated compared to these same peers (14% versus 29%).

A major issue in the upcoming farm bill debate is likely to be funding for conservation programs. Current authorization for mandatory funding for most of these programs, under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107 - 171 ), expires at the end of FY2007. Mandatory funding means that the amount authorized by Congress is available unless limited to smaller amounts in the appropriations process; if appropriators do not act, the amount that was authorized is provided to the program. These mandatory funds are provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation, a financing institution for many agriculture programs, including commodity programs and export subsidies. While most conservation programs currently are authorized using mandatory funding, discretionary funding is used for six conservation programs. For discretionary programs, appropriators decide how much funding to provide each year in the annual agriculture appropriations bill, subject to any maximum limit set in law. Conservation program advocates prefer mandatory funding over discretionary funding. They believe that it is generally easier to protect authorized mandatory funding levels from reductions during the appropriations process than to secure appropriations each year. However, since FY2002, Congress has limited funding for some of the mandatory programs each year below authorized levels in annual appropriations acts. Advocates for these programs decry these limitations as significant changes from the intent of the farm bill, which compromise the programs' ability to provide the anticipated magnitude of benefits to producers and the environment. Others, including those interested in reducing agricultural expenditures or in spending the funds for other agricultural purposes, counter that, even with these reductions, overall funding has grown substantially. Congress provided mandatory funding for selected conservation programs for the first time in the 1996 farm bill ( P.L. 104 - 127 ). Prior to 1996, all conservation programs had been funded as discretionary programs. Conservation program advocates viewed mandatory funding as a much more desirable approach, and Congress agreed, enacting provisions that moved some conservation programs from discretionary to mandatory funding. Some advocates viewed this change in funding as a major achievement in the 1996 farm bill. Amounts authorized for these programs at the time may seem modest when compared with today's levels. Programs funded with mandatory funding, and their authorized levels under the 1996 law, included the following: Conservation Reserve Program (a maximum of 36.4 million acres at any time through FY2002, with no dollar amount specified); Wetland Reserve Program (a maximum of 975,000 acres at any time through FY2002, with no dollar amount specified); Environmental Quality Incentives Program ($130 million in FY1996, and $200 million annually thereafter through FY2002); Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (a total of $50 million between FY1996 and FY2002); Farmland Protection Program (a total of $35 million with no time span specified); and Conservation Farm Option ($7.5 million in FY1997, increasing each year to a high of $62.5 million in FY2002). The 2002 farm bill greatly expanded mandatory funding for conservation, authorizing the annual funding levels shown in Table 1 . Mandatory funding was provided both for expiring programs that were reauthorized and for new programs created in the legislation. The increase in authorized funding levels was widely endorsed for many reasons. Conservation supporters had long been seeking higher funding levels, and this was another significant step in that effort. An argument that proved particularly persuasive in this farm bill debate was documentation of large backlogs of interested and eligible producers who were unable to enroll because of a lack of funds. Demand to participate in some of the programs exceeded the available program dollars several times over, and some Members reasoned that higher funding was warranted to satisfy this demand. Funding for FY2002 is not included in Table 1 , as the FY2002 appropriations legislation was enacted on November 28, 2001, six months before the 2002 farm bill. Program funding decisions had to be based on prior legislation. Indeed, by the time this farm bill was enacted, the FY2003 appropriations process was well along. However, the 2002 farm bill did authorize money in FY2002 for several mandatory programs. In each year since FY2002, annual agriculture appropriations acts have capped funding for some of the mandatory conservation programs below authorized levels. The programs that are limited and the amounts of the limitations change from year to year. One program, the Wetland Reserve Program, has been capped in enrolled acres, which appropriators translate into savings based on average enrollment costs. Table 1 compares the authorized spending level for each of the programs with the amount that Congress actually provided through the appropriations process. It does not include any mandatory conservation programs enacted since the 2002 farm bill, including the Conservation Reserve Program Technical Assistance Account (enacted in P.L. 108 - 498 ), the Healthy Forest Reserve (enacted in P.L. 108 - 148 ), and the Emergency Forestry Conservation Reserve Program (enacted in P.L. 109 - 148 ). Many of the spending reductions originate in the Administration's budget request. Since the farm bill states that the Secretary "shall" spend the authorized amounts for each program each year, Congress must act to limit spending to a lesser amount. The mix of programs and amounts of reduction in the Administration request have varied from year to year. Congress has concurred with the Administration request some years for some programs. Starting in FY2003, the requested reductions in mandatory funding below the authorized levels (shown in the table), are as follows: In FY2003, the request was submitted before the farm bill was enacted, and did not include any requests to reduce funding levels. In FY2004, the request was to limit the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) to 200,000 acres ($250 million), limit the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) to $850 million, limit the Ground and Surface Water Program (GSWP) to $51 million, limit the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP) to $42 million, limit the Farmland Protection Program (FPP) to $112 million, limit the Conservation Security Program (CSP) to $19 million, and eliminate funding for the Watershed Rehabilitation and Agricultural Management Assistance (AMA) Programs. In FY2005, the request was to limit the WRP to 200,000 acres ($295 million), EQIP to $985 million, WHIP to $59 million, FPP to $120 million, and CSP to $209 million, and eliminate funding for the Watershed Rehabilitation and AMA Programs. In FY2006, the request was to limit the WRP to 200,000 acres ($321 million), EQIP to $1.0 billion, WHIP to $60 million, FPP to $84 million, Biomass Research and Development to $12 million, and CSP to $274 million, and eliminate funding for the Watershed Rehabilitation and AMA Programs. In FY2007, the request is to limit EQIP to $1.0 billion, GSWP to $51 million, WHIP to $55 million, FPP to $50 million, Biomass Research and Development to $12 million, and CSP to $342 million, and eliminate funding for the Watershed Rehabilitation and AMA Programs. While Congress has reduced funding for some mandatory conservation programs, either in support of an Administration request or on its own, the reductions did not exceed 10% of the total until FY2005. However, the gap between authorized levels and actual amounts continues to grow. As a percentage, this gap has grown from 2.4% of the total authorized amount in FY2003 to 12.7% in FY2006. Even with these changes, however, actual total funding has risen almost $720 million over the same four-year time period, which is an increase of almost 25% from the FY2003 authorization. Reductions have not been uniform among programs. The largest mandatory program, the CRP, has not been limited in any way by appropriators since the 2002 farm bill was enacted. The second-largest program, EQIP, has absorbed the largest reductions from authorized levels, totaling $396 million between FY2003 and FY2006. Funding for a third program, the CSP, has been amended four times since 2002. As initially enacted, it was the first true conservation entitlement program; that is, any individual who met the eligibility requirements would be accepted into the program. Congress has capped CSP and then repeatedly reduced the cap to fund other activities, usually disaster assistance. More generally, the table shows that reductions have varied from year to year and program to program since 2002. At one extreme, the Watershed Rehabilitation Program has received no mandatory funding in any year (it is one of the five conservation programs authorized to receive discretionary appropriations as well, and those have been provided), and at the other extreme, the CRP has not been limited in any way. Some of the programs have unusual characteristics that affect how they are treated for budget purposes, as noted in the table footnotes. For example, the Grasslands Reserve and Klamath River Basin Programs each have a total authorized level that is not subdivided by fiscal year in the authorizing legislation. For those programs, the amount that was spent each year (not the remaining lifetime authorization) is included for purposes of calculating the percentage by which funding is reduced. As a result of the many variations in how these programs are authorized (some in acres and others in dollars, and some as a total amount and others by year), there are several alternative ways to calculate the annual and total reduction from the authorized level. However, all of these calculations lead to the same general set of observations. First, overall funding for the suite of mandatory agriculture conservation programs has been reduced each year. Second, the magnitude by which this suite of programs is being reduced has been growing each year. Third, these reductions may still be significant to current or potential beneficiaries of those program. Fourth, even with the reductions, overall funding for the group of mandatory programs has continued to rise. Finally, funding for the discretionary agricultural conservation programs varies more from year to year, with much larger percentage reductions than the mandatory programs in some years. Greater variation in funding for discretionary programs supports the view of conservation proponents that using the mandatory approach has been a more successful and predictable approach to conservation program funding in recent years. (For more information on each of these programs, CRS Report RL32940, Agriculture Conservation Programs: A Scorecard , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] (pdf).) When considering whether reductions in mandatory funding for conservation programs compromise the conservation effort, three points are relevant. First, a measure of how conservation funding is viewed in relation to other agriculture funding was provided in the FY2006 reconciliation process, which required the agriculture committees to reduce total USDA mandatory program funding by $3.0 billion over five years, including a reduction of $176 million in FY2006. Conservation provided $934 million of those savings, with no reductions for FY2006. This amount is about 25% of the total reduction that was enacted, $3.7 billion over five years. The savings came from lowering caps on spending for CSP and EQIP in future years (which also required authorizing them beyond FY2007), and eliminating unspent funds for the Watershed Rehabilitation Program carried over from earlier years. Part of the debate was whether conservation is being asked to bear a disproportionate share of these reductions. (For more information, see CRS Report RS22086, Agriculture and FY2006 Budget Reconciliation , by [author name scrubbed] .) Second, it appears highly likely that reductions to mandatory program spending at the current scale will continue. Reductions have been in every administration request and annual appropriations bill since FY2003. It is less certain, however, whether these reductions will continue to grow as a percentage of the total. Future change will depend on both congressional support for conservation specifically, and broader pressures that influence overall federal spending. It is likely that the affected programs and the magnitude of the reductions will continue to vary from year to year, making it difficult to forecast the future based on the past. Third, supporters of conservation programs may look for ways to address the challenge of spending reductions in the next farm bill. However, several broader forces may make it difficult to authorize higher funding levels or to protect current funding levels for these conservation programs. One force may be broad efforts to control federal spending. A second force may be competition among various agriculture constituencies for limited funds; the FY2006 reconciliation process provided an indication of how Congress will treat conservation when it must make decisions based on this competition. A third force may be limits on the capacity of federal conservation agencies, at current staffing levels and with the current approaches, to plan and install all the conservation practices that additional funding would support, and it seems likely that increasing staff levels in federal agencies to provide more conservation will not be an option.

The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 authorized large increases in mandatory funding for several agricultural conservation programs. Most of these programs expire in FY2007, and the 110th Congress is likely to address future funding levels in a farm bill. Since FY2002, Congress has acted, through the appropriations process, to limit funding for some of these programs below authorized levels. It limited total funding for all the programs to 97.6% of the authorized total in FY2003, and the percentage declined annually to 87.3% in FY2006. Program supporters decry these growing limitations as reductions that compromise the intent of the farm bill. Others counter that, even with the limitations, overall conservation funding has grown substantially, from almost $3.1 billion in FY2003 to almost $3.8 billion in FY2006. This report reviews the funding history of the programs since the 2002 farm bill was enacted. It will be updated periodically.

On April 12, 2006, U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman and Peruvian Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism Alfredo Ferrero Diez Canseco signed the proposed U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA). The labor chapter of the PTPA includes enforceable International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards in addition to specific obligations on domestic labor law enforcement and a labor cooperation and capacity building mechanism. Despite the June 30, 2007 expiration of presidential "fast track" or "trade promotion authority" (provided by the Trade Act of 2002 , P.L. 107 - 210 ) to negotiate agreements that Congress then considers on an expedited basis—without amendment and under limited debate—Congress passed PTPA implementing legislation, the President signed it, and it became law as P.L. 110 - 138 on December 14, 2007. It went into effect February 1, 2009. On May 10, 2007, after much negotiation, Congress and the Administration announced a "New Trade Policy for America." Pending U.S. trade agreements would be amended to incorporate "key Democratic priorities" relating to such issues as labor, the environment, access to medicine, port security, and government procurement that would "spread the benefits of globalization here and abroad by raising standards." The release also announced that "this policy clears the way for broad, bipartisan congressional support" for pending FTAs . Key concepts in the new trade-labor policy include, for FTAs, fully enforceable provisions: (1) incorporating ILO core labor standards as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (henceforth referred to as the ILO Declaration ); and (2) prohibiting FTA countries from weakening laws relating to ILO core labor standards in order to attract trade or investment. They also include (3) new limitations on "prosecutorial" and "enforcement" discretion, so that FTA countries cannot defend failure to enforce laws related to the ILO core labor standards on the basis of resource limitations or decisions to prioritize other enforcement issues; and (4) the same mechanisms/penalties for settling labor, environment, and all other FTA obligations. The Administration released the "final text" of the Peru FTA incorporating these concepts on June 25, 2007. On June 27, 2007, Peru's congress approved the FTA-related amendments. Other FTA language previously agreed to by both countries also includes procedural guarantees to help ensure that workers and employers would have fair, equitable, and transparent access to labor tribunals. Both parties would ensure that (1) workers have appropriate access to tribunals for the enforcement of each party's labor laws; (2) the proceedings before such tribunals are fair, equitable, and transparent; (3) the tribunals' final decisions are in writing and made publicly available; (4) parties to the proceedings have the right to seek review and possible correction of final decisions; (5) tribunals conducting or reviewing the proceedings are impartial and independent; (6) parties to the proceedings could seek remedies such as penalties or temporary workplace closures to ensure the enforcement of their rights under labor laws; and (7) public awareness of domestic labor laws is promoted through public availability of information and encouraging public education regarding labor laws. In addition, the agreement would require that the United States and Peru establish a Labor Affairs Council (Labor Council) comprised of cabinet-level or equivalent representatives to oversee implementation of the labor obligations, including the activities of the Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism. The Labor Council would meet within the first year after the date of entry into force of the agreement and as often as necessary thereafter. Government representatives of the two countries would work together to establish priorities in specific cooperative and capacity-building activities. The Labor Council would establish guidelines, prepare reports, provide public communication, and be responsible for cooperating with the parties' points of contact. Finally, the two parties agreed that cooperation on labor issues plays an important role in advancing labor commitments, including those embodied in the 1998 ILO Declaration and a 1999 ILO convention on the worst forms of child labor (including child trafficking, or the use of children in armed conflict, drug trafficking, or pornography). They would establish a Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism to develop and pursue bilateral or regional cooperation activities on labor-related issues. Such initiatives would be aimed at establishing and strengthening alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for labor disputes. Peruvian President Alan Garcia took office for a five-year term at the end of July 2006, replacing outgoing president, Alejandro Toledo. President Toledo presided over a period in which Peru was one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America, largely due to growth in the mining and export sectors. In spite of the recent economic growth, over half of Peruvians live in poverty and a large portion of the population is underemployed. Unemployment and underemployment levels total 64.5% nationwide. Peru's labor market is relatively small compared with that of the United States. In 2005, the labor force of Peru comprised nine million workers, compared to 151 million workers in the United States. Recorded unemployment in Peru was 7.2% and labor cost per hour was $1.48 in 2005. In comparison, the United States had a recorded unemployment rate of 4.7% and an hourly labor cost of $24.42. The economic sector in Peru with the highest employment is wholesale/retail trade and repair services, followed by manufacturing. During the regime of former President Alberto Fujimori (1990 to 2000), the government implemented a radical economic reform program to control hyperinflation and bring economic stability to the country. Part of the program included a wide-ranging privatization plan and a relaxation of foreign investment restrictions to help increase foreign investment. Existing labor laws were relaxed significantly during this time. In recent years, however, Peru has made much progress in strengthening labor protections by implementing labor law reform and protecting workers' rights. In 2002, Peru ratified the two ILO conventions on the abolition of child labor. In 2003, the government reduced the number of workers needed to establish a union, eliminated prohibitions on workers that kept them from joining unions during their probationary period, and limited the power of the labor authority to cancel a union's registration. In July 2004, the government published regulations to strengthen labor inspections and broaden labor inspectors' powers to allow easier access to firms, improved inspectors' ability to impose sanctions, and increase the levels of fines. Peru has ratified 71 ILO conventions, including all eight core conventions on workers' rights. The ILO has stated that Peru has satisfactorily amended its laws to improve labor standards in certain areas related to freedom of association and protection of the right to organize. However, some critics argue that Peru has had some problems in the observance of the ILO core labor standards and that improvements must be made in Peru's legislation on collective bargaining. The proposed PTPA was negotiated under the trade promotion authority in the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107 - 210 ) as were seven other trade agreements approved by Congress: the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), plus agreements with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman; and several agreements that are still pending (Colombia, Panama, and South Korea.) While many provisions of the free trade agreements (FTAs) are similar, the Peru TPA was the first to incorporate provisions reflecting the new congressional-administration trade policy. In addition, each of the eight agreements has some unique provisions. For the PTPA, unique labor provisions include some new reporting requirements and cooperative and trade-capacity building activities. Proponents and opponents typically cite the following strengths and weaknesses of the labor provisions of the PTPA. Supporters argue that the PTPA reinforces Peru's labor reforms in 2003, 2004, and 2005. In addition, enforceable ILO core labor standards in the body of the agreement overlay and reinforce Peru's long-term ratification of 71 ILO labor conventions including all eight ILO core labor standards—two in each of the following categories: (1) the right to organize and bargain collectively (ILO Convention (C) 87 in 1960 and C98 in 1964); (2) freedom from forced or compulsory labor (C29 and C105, both in 1960); (3) prohibitions against child labor (C138 and C182, both in 2002); and (4) prohibitions against employment discrimination (C100 in 1960 and C111 in 1970). Proponents point out that "key Democratic priorities" include fully enforceable ILO core labor standards and the same dispute resolution procedures that were available for commercial disputes. The PTPA would go beyond protections afforded Peru under the Andean Trade Preference Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA, P.L. 107 - 210 ) and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP, P.L. 98 - 573 , as amended), which set, for benefits eligibility, the lower standard of " providing or taking steps to provide " workers "internationally recognized worker rights." Critics argue that, with enforceable ILO core labor standards in the language of the agreement, the main issues at this point are Peru's adoption of new labor laws and enforceability. They argue that recent Peruvian labor reforms have not reversed the weakening of labor laws during the Fujimori administration, and that both ILO reports and the 2005 State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices document the failure of Peru's compliance with U.S. internationally recognized worker rights and ILO core labor standards. Such "failures" include (1) the lack of basic protection of the right to organize for (a) large numbers of workers "casually" employed as temporary or contract workers (and therefore not permitted to join labor unions of permanent workers) and (b) the 60% of all Peruvian workers in the largely unregulated informal sector; (2) reports of forced or compulsory labor practices, particularly involving indigenous families in remote areas, in violation of Peru's laws; (3) violations of child labor laws—an estimated one-fourth of all children between 6 and 17 years of age are employed, mostly in the informal sector including some in prostitution and narcotics production; and (4) non-compliance with minimum wage guideline s, in that roughly half the workforce earned the minimum wage or below, many of them in the informal sector. Before the new PTPA language was released, some observers noted that the United States has ratified only two ILO conventions, while Peru has ratified all eight. In addition, the United States has some laws that may not totally conform with language of ILO conventions. A possible example is some state laws that permit employment-without-pay for prisoners. Consequently, they express concern that including enforceable ILO core labor standards into trade agreements could subject the entire U.S. labor code to challenges by trading partners. This issue is addressed by language in the PTPA that (a) restricts the application of the PTPA provisions to trade-related matters and (b) incorporates only the principles of the four basic ILO rights listed in the ILO Declaration and quoted on p. 4, footnote 2, rather than the detailed language of the specific eight conventions. The proposed PTPA is unlikely to impact the aggregate employment level in the United States: U.S.-Peru trade accounts for only 0.3% of total U.S. merchandise trade (2005). However, it could impact jobs in specific industries. According to a report by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), the largest U.S. employment gain (1%) is projected in wheat production. Declines are projected in metals (gold, copper, and aluminum), rice production, and miscellaneous crops (cut flowers, live plants, and seeds) which could "lose" up to 0.2% of their employment, displaced by imports. For Peru, various estimates of job "gains" range from less than 20,000 to 700,000. On the other hand, some labor groups argue that U.S. exports of basic grains could adversely affect the livelihoods of subsistence farmers in Peru, where agriculture is the main source of jobs. The Peruvian Congress voted 79-14 to approve the PTPA in June 2006 and it approved a set of amendments tied to the FTA on June 27, 2007. Gaining passage of a PTPA was a high priority for the government of Peru. Peruvian President Alan García Perez met with President Bush on October 10, 2006, and again on April 23, 2007, to discuss the free trade agreement. After the April 2007 meeting, President García said about the agreement, "It is vital for our country. It is fundamental to continue this path of growth and social redistribution that we have started in my country." House Democratic leaders had indicated they would not take up implementing legislation until after Peru changed its laws to comply with new labor (and other) provisions added to the PTPA. Peru is implementing its new labor obligations under the agreement through a series of "supreme decrees" issued by President Garcia. Peru had agreed to issue supreme decrees covering five areas: time-limited contracts, subcontracting, the right to strike, anti-union discrimination, and safeguarding the right to strike. The House passed the Peru TPA implementing legislation, H.R. 3688 , on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132; the Senate passed it on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18; and President Bush signed it into law as P.L. 110 - 138 on December 14, 2007. Issues included how a PTPA might affect workers in both countries, and Peru's commitments to reforms, alleviating poverty, and enforcement. Some Peruvian policymakers believe that maintaining confidence in the bilateral trade environment with the United States is the key to the long-term stability of the region. While the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable strongly supported the Peru TPA, the AFL-CIO neither supported nor opposed it because the AFL-CIO has labor unions on both sides of the issue. Change To Win labor coalition, comprised of labor unions that formerly belonged to the AFL, urged Congress to oppose the PTPA.

On April 12, 2006, the United States and Peru signed the proposed U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA). On June 25, 2007, the Administration released a revised text with new labor, environment, and other provisions. This "final text" language reflected a Congress-Administration "New Trade Policy for America" announced on May 10 that incorporated key Democratic priorities. Supporters of the agreement argue that Peru has ratified all eight International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards and that the PTPA would reinforce Peru's labor reform measures of recent years. Critics are concerned about the potential for enforcement of the standards. Peru PTA implementing legislation (H.R. 3688) passed the House on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132; passed the Senate on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18; and was signed by President Bush on December 14 (P.L. 110-138). It went into effect on February 1, 2009. See also CRS Report RL34108, U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33864, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Renewal: Core Labor Standards Issues, by [author name scrubbed].

RS21683 -- Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003 November 28, 2003 Expanded eligibility to exclude gain from the sale of a principal residence (sec. 101). Under section 121 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), an eligible taxpayer may exclude fromgross incomeup to $250,000 ($500,000 if married filing jointly) of the gain realized from the sale of his or her principal residence. One eligibilityrequirement is that the taxpayer must have used the property as a principal residence for at least two of the five yearspreceding thedate of sale. The Act amends section 121 so that a taxpayer may elect to suspend the five-year period for up to tenyears during thetime that the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse is on qualified official extended duty. (1) Qualified duty is serving for more than 90days or an indefinite period at a duty station that is at least 50 miles from the residence or while residing underorders in Governmentquarters. The new rule applies to sales and exchanges made after May 6, 1997. Since taxpayers are generally unableto amendreturns more than three years after the original filing date or two years after the tax was paid, (2) the Act grants taxpayers one year tofile for a refund even though it may otherwise be barred. The one-year period began on November 11, 2003. Exclusion of the military death benefit from gross income (sec. 102). Under IRC� 134, qualified military benefits are excluded from gross income. The exclusion is limited to benefits that (1) aremade on accountof the taxpayer's status or service as a member of the Armed Forces and (2) were excusable on September 9, 1986. Any benefitincrease after September 9, 1986 is included in income, unless it is a cost-of-living adjustment or similar increase. The death gratuitypayment made to the survivors of members of the Armed Forces who die while on active duty is a qualified militarybenefit. (3) Thepayment was $3,000 on September 9, 1986 and it was later increased to $6,000. Thus, prior to the Act, the $3,000increase wasincluded in income. The Act makes two changes related to the death gratuity payment. First, the benefit is increased from $6,000 to $12,000. Second,the entire payment, including any future increases, is excluded from gross income. The changes apply for all deathsoccurring afterSeptember 10, 2001. Exclusion of payments made to offset the negative effect of base closure on housing values (sec.103). Under the Homeowners Assistance Program found in 42 U.S.C. � 3374, the Department of Defensemay offerpayments to members of the Armed Forces whose housing values have decreased due to military base realignmentor closure. Priorto the Act, such payments did not qualify for exclusion from gross income. The Act amends IRC � 132 so thatpayments made afterNovember 11, 2003 are nontaxable fringe benefits, subject to limitation by 42 U.S.C. � 3374(c). Expanded eligibility for tax-related deadline extensions (sec. 104). Under IRC �7508(a), individuals serving in a Presidentially-declared combat zone are allowed extra time to complete a varietyof tax-relatedactivities, including filing returns and paying taxes. The Act expands the group of taxpayers eligible for theextensions to individualsserving in a contingency operation as determined under 10 U.S.C. � 101(a)(13). Examples of contingency operationsincludeoperations where members of the Armed Forces are or may become involved in hostilities against a foreign enemyand operationsduring national emergencies that require the call up of members of the Armed Forces. The new rule applies for anyperiod forperforming an act that did not expire before November 11, 2003. Expanded eligibility for tax-exempt status for military organizations (sec. 105). Under IRC � 501, military organizations may qualify for tax-exempt status if (1) at least 75% of the members arepast or presentmembers of the Armed Forces and (2) substantially all of the other members are cadets or spouses, widows, orwidowers of past orpresent members of the Armed Forces or of cadets. The Act eases the "substantially all" requirement by allowingancestors or linealdescendants of past or present members of the Armed Forces or of cadets to be included. The change applies totaxable years afterNovember 11, 2003. Clarification of treatment of dependent care assistance programs (sec.106). Thetax treatment of payments made to members of the Armed Forces under dependent care assistance programs hasbeen unclear. TheAct amends IRC � 134 to make it clear that these payments are subject to exclusion as a qualified military benefit. Thus, if apayment meets the qualifications in section 134, it may be excluded from income. The change applies for taxableyears afterDecember 31, 2002. Tax favored status for distributions to military academy attendees from education savings accounts(sec. 107). Under IRC � 530(d), a portion of a distribution made from a Coverdell education savingsaccount thatexceeds the taxpayer's educational expenses is included in gross income and penalized by an additional tax. TheAct exemptsdistributions made to attendees of military academies from the additional tax. The exemption is limited to theattendee's "advancededucation costs" that are described in 10 U.S.C. � 2005(e)(3). The change applies for taxable years after December31, 2002. Deduction for overnight travel expenses of National Guard and Reserve members (sec.109). Prior to the Act, overnight travel expenses of National Guard and Reserve members weredeductible only bytaxpayers who itemized their deductions, subject to the limitation on miscellaneous itemized deductions. The Actcreates anabove-the-line deduction for these expenses. The expenses are limited to the general Federal per diem rate and mustbe incurredwhile the reservist is serving more than 100 miles from home. (4) The change applies to expenses paid or incurred after December 31,2002. Suspension of tax-exempt status for terrorist organizations (sec. 108). The Actsuspends the tax-exempt status or the application for such status for any organization that is either (1) designateda terroristorganization by executive order or under authority found in the Immigration and Nationality Act, the InternationalEmergencyEconomic Powers Act, or the United Nations Participation Act or (2) designated by executive order as supportingterrorism orengaging in terrorist activity. No deduction is allowed for any contribution to the organization during thesuspension. Thesuspension lasts until the designation is rescinded under the authority by which it was made. No challenges to thesuspension,designation, or denial of a deduction are allowed in any proceeding concerning the tax liability of the organizationor anothertaxpayer. The new rules apply to all designations, whether made before, on or after November 11, 2003. Tax relief for astronauts killed in the line of duty (sec. 110). The Act provides taxrelief to astronauts who die in the line of duty after December 31, 2002. (5) First, astronauts are not subject to the income tax in theyear of death and in earlier years beginning with the taxable year prior to that in which the mortal injury occurred. (6) If the taxliability for those years, disregarding the exemption, is less than $10,000, then the taxpayer is treated as having madea tax paymentin the final taxable year that is equal to $10,000 less the liability. Further, the Act excludes employee death benefitpayments fromthe astronaut's income (7) and applies reduced estatetax rates to the astronaut's estate. (8) Extension of customs user fees (sec. 201). The authorization for the customs userfees found in 19 U.S.C. � 58c(j)(3) is extended from March 31, 2004 to March 1, 2005.

The Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, H.R. 3365, became P.L.108-121 on November 11, 2003. The Act provides various types of tax relief to members of the Armed Forces. Additionally, theAct suspends the tax-exempt status of organizations involved in terrorist activities, offers tax relief to astronautswho die in the lineof duty, and extends the authorization for certain customs user fees.

At the time of our visits, we observed instances of noncompliance with ICE’s medical care standards at 3 of the 23 facilities we visited. However, these instances did not show a pervasive or persistent pattern of noncompliance across the facilities like we those identified with the telephone system. Detention facilities that we visited ranged from those with small clinics with contract staff to facilities with on-site medical staff, diagnostic equipment such as X-ray machines, and dental equipment. Medical service providers include general medical, dental, and mental health care providers that are licensed by state and local authorities. Some medical services are provided by the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), while other medical service providers may work on a contractual basis. At the San Diego Correctional Facility in California, an adult detention facility, ICE reviewers that we accompanied cited PHS staff for failing to administer the mandatory 14-day physical exam to approximately 260 detainees. PHS staff said the problem at San Diego was due to inadequate training on the medical records system and technical errors in the records system. At the Casa de San Juan Family Shelter in California, we found that the facility staff did not administer medical screenings immediately upon admission, as required in ICE medical care standards. At the Cowlitz County Juvenile Detention Center in Washington state, we found that no medical screening was performed at admission and first aid kits were not available, as required. Officials at some facilities told us that meeting the specialized medical and mental health needs of detainees can be challenging. Some also cited difficulties they had experienced in obtaining ICE approval for outside nonroutine medical and mental health care as also presenting problems in caring for detainees. On the other hand, we observed instances where detainees were receiving specialized medical care at the facilities we visited. For example, at the Krome facility in Florida we observed one detainee sleeping with the assistance of special breathing equipment (C- PAP machine) to address what we were told was a sleep apnea condition. At the Hampton Roads Regional jail in Virginia we observed a detainee receiving treatment from a kidney dialysis machine. Again, assessing the quality of care and ICE’s decision—making process for approval of nonroutine medical procedures were outside the scope of our review. We reviewed the most recently available ICE annual inspection reports for 20 of the 23 detention facilities that we visited. With the exception of the San Diego facility in California, the reports covered a different time period than that of our review. The 20 inspection reports showed that ICE reviewers had identified a total of 59 instances of noncompliance, 4 of which involved medical care. According to ICE policy, all adult, juvenile, and family detention facilities are required to be inspected at 12-month intervals to determine that they are in compliance with detention standards and to take corrective actions if necessary. As of November 30, 2006, according to ICE data, ICE had reviewed approximately 90 percent of detention facilities within the prescribed 12-month interval. Subsequent to each annual inspection, a compliance rating report is to be prepared and sent to the Director of the Office of Detention and Removal or his representative within 14 days. The Director of the Office of Detention and Removal has 21 days to transmit the report to the field office directors and affected suboffices. Facilities receive one of five final ratings in their compliance report—superior, good, acceptable, deficient, or at risk. ICE officials reported that as of June 1, 2007, 16 facilities were rated “superior,” 60 facilities were rated “good,” 190 facilities were rated “acceptable,” 4 facilities were rated “deficient,” and no facilities were rated “at risk.” ICE officials stated that this information reflects completed reviews, and some reviews are currently in process and pending completion. Therefore, ICE could not provide information on the most current ratings for some facilities. Four inspection reports disclosed instances of noncompliance with medical care standards. The Wakulla County Sheriffs Office in Florida had sick call request forms that were available only in English whereas the population was largely Spanish speaking. The Cowlitz County Juvenile Detention Facility in Washington state did not maintain the alien juvenile medical records on-site. The San Diego Correctional facility staff, in addition to the deficiencies noted earlier in this statement, failed to obtain informed consent from the detainee when prescribing psychiatric medication. Finally, the Broward Transitional Center in Florida did not have medical staff on-site to screen detainees arriving after 5 p.m. and did not have a properly locked medical cabinet. We did not determine whether these deficiencies were subsequently addressed as required. Our review of available grievance data obtained from facilities and discussions with facility management showed that the types of grievances at the facilities we visited typically included the lack of timely response to requests for medical treatment, missing property, high commissary prices, poor quality or insufficient quantity of food, high telephone costs, problems with telephones, and questions concerning detention case management issues. ICE’s detainee grievance standard states that facilities shall establish and implement procedures for informal and formal resolution of detainee grievances. Four of the 23 facilities we visited did not comply with all aspects of ICE’s detainee grievance standards. Specifically, Casa de San Juan Family Shelter in San Diego did not provide a handbook to those aliens in its facility, the Cowlitz County Juvenile Detention Center in Washington state did not include grievance procedures in its handbook, Wakulla County Sheriff’s Office in Florida did not have a log, and the Elizabeth Detention Center in New Jersey did not record all grievances that we observed in their facility files. The primary mechanism for detainees to file external complaints is directly with the OIG, either in writing or by phone using the DHS OIG complaint hotline. Detainees may also file complaints with the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), which has statutory responsibility for investigating complaints alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties. In addition, detainees may file complaints through the Joint Intake Center (JIC), which is operated continuously by both ICE and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel, and is responsible for receiving, classifying, and routing all misconduct allegations involving ICE and CBP employees, including those pertaining to detainee treatment. ICE officials told us that if the JIC were to receive an allegation from a detainee, it would be referred to the OIG. OIG may investigate the complaint or refer it to CRCL or DHS components such as the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for review and possible action. In turn, CRCL or OPR may retain the complaint or refer it to other DHS offices, including ICE Office of Detention and Removal (DRO), for possible action. Further, detainees may also file complaints with nongovernmental organizations such as ABA and UNHCR. These external organizations said they generally forward detainee complaints to DHS components for review and possible action. The following discussion highlights the detainee complaints related to medical care issues where such information is available. We did not independently assess the merits of detainee complaints. Of the approximately 1,700 detainee complaints in the OIG database that were filed in fiscal years 2003 through 2006, OIG investigated 173 and referred the others to other DHS components. Our review of approximately 750 detainee complaints in the OIG database from fiscal years 2005 through 2006 showed that about 11 percent involved issues relating to medical treatment, such as a detainees alleging that they were denied access to specialized medical care. OPR stated that in fiscal years 2003 through 2006, they had received 409 allegations concerning the treatment of detainees. Seven of these allegations were found to be substantiated, 26 unfounded, and 65 unsubstantiated. Four of the seven substantiated cases involved employee misconduct, resulting in four terminations. According to OPR officials, three cases were still being adjudicated and the nature of the allegations was not provided. Additionally, 200 of the allegations were classified by OPR as either information only to facility management, requiring no further action, or were referred to facility management for action, requiring a response. CRCL also receives complaints referred from the OIG, nongovernmental organizations, and members of the public. Officials stated that from the period March 2003 to August 2006 they received 46 complaints related to the treatment of detainees, although the nature of the complaints was not identified. Of these 46 complaints, 14 were closed, 11 were referred to ICE OPR, 12 were retained for investigation, and 9 were pending decision about disposition. We could not determine the number of cases referred to DRO or their disposition. On the basis of a limited review of DRO’s complaints database and discussions with ICE officials knowledgeable about the database, we concluded that DRO’s complaint database was not sufficiently reliable for audit purposes. We recommended that ICE develop a formal tracking system to ensure that all detainee complaints referred to DRO are reviewed and the disposition, including any corrective action, is recorded for later examination. We reviewed 37 detention monitoring reports compiled by UNHCR from the period 1993 to 2006. These reports were based on UNHCR’s site visits and its discussions with ICE officials, facility staff, and detainee interviews, especially with asylum seekers. Eighteen of the 37 UNHCR reports cited concerns related to medical care, such as detainee allegations that jail staff were unresponsive to requests for medical assistance and UNHCR’s concern about the shortage of mental health staff. While American Bar Association officials informed us that they do not keep statistics regarding complaints, they compiled a list for us of common detainee complaints received through correspondence. This list indicated that of the 1,032 complaints it received from January 2003 to February 2007, 39 involved medical access issues such as a detainee alleging denial of necessary medication and regular visits with a psychiatrist, allegations of delays in processing sick call requests, and allegations of a facility not providing prescribed medications. Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you or the members of the subcommittee have. For further information on this testimony, please contact Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. In addition to the contact named above, William Crocker III, Assistant Director; Minty Abraham; Frances Cook; Robert Lowthian; and Vickie Miller made key contributions to this statement. 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In fiscal year 2007, Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained over 311,000 aliens, with an average daily population of over 30,000 and an average length of stay of about 37 days in one of approximately 300 facilities. The care and treatment of aliens while in detention is a significant challenge to ICE, as concerns continue to be raised by members of Congress and advocacy groups about the treatment of the growing number of aliens while in ICE's custody. This testimony focuses on (1) the extent to which 23 facilities complied with medical care standards, (2) deficiencies found during ICE's annual compliance inspection reviews, and (3) the types of complaints filed by alien detainees about detention conditions. This testimony is based on GAO's July 2007 report evaluating, among other things, the extent to which 23 facilities complied with aspects of eight of ICE's 38 National Detention Standards. This report did not address quality of care issues. At the time of its visits, GAO observed instances of noncompliance with ICE's medical care standards at 3 of the 23 facilities visited. These instances related to staff not administering a mandatory 14-day physical exam to approximately 260 detainees, not administering medical screenings immediately upon admission, and first aid kits not being available as required. However, these instances did not show a pervasive or persistent pattern of noncompliance across all 23 facilities. Officials at some facilities told GAO that meeting the specialized medical and mental health needs of detainees had been challenging, citing difficulties they had experienced in obtaining ICE approval for outside nonroutine medical and mental health care. On the other hand, GAO observed instances where detainees were receiving specialized care at the facilities visited. At the time of its study, GAO reviewed the most recently available ICE annual inspection reports for 20 of the 23 detention facilities that it visited; these reports showed that ICE reviewers had identified a total of 59 instances of noncompliance with National Detention Standards, 4 of which involved medical care. One facility had sick call request forms that were available only in English whereas the population was largely Spanish speaking. Another did not maintain alien medical records on-site. One facility's staff failed to obtain informed consent from the detainee when prescribing psychiatric medication. Finally, another facility did not have medical staff on-site to screen detainees arriving after 5 p.m. and did not have a properly locked medical cabinet. GAO did not determine whether these instances of noncompliance were subsequently corrected as required. The types of grievances at the facilities GAO visited typically included the lack of timely response to requests for medical treatment, missing property, high commissary prices, poor food quality and insufficient food quantity, high telephone costs, problems with telephones, and questions concerning detention case management issues. ICE's detainee grievance standard states that facilities shall establish and implement procedures for informal and formal resolution of detainee grievances. Four of the 23 facilities GAO visited did not comply with all aspects of ICE's detainee grievance standards. For example, one facility did not properly log all grievances that GAO found in their facility files. Detainee complaints may also be filed with several governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The primary way for detainees to file complaints is to contact the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). About 11 percent of detainee complaints to the OIG between 2005 and 2006 involved medical treatment issues. However, we found that the OIG complaint hotline 1-800 number was blocked or otherwise restricted at 12 of the facilities we tested. OIG investigates the most serious complaints and refers the remainder to other DHS components. GAO could not determine the number of cases referred to ICE's Detention Removal Office and concluded that ICE's detainee complaint database was not sufficiently reliable.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which is an agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce, tracks major economic indicators, most notably gross domestic product (GDP). Other BEA indicators include items such as personal income and outlays, and corporate profits. These indicators together comprise what are known as BEA's " National Economic Accounts ," or "National Income and Product Accounts" (NIPA). Gross Domestic Product is a comprehensive measure of U.S. economic output. It measures the value of the goods and services produced by the U.S. economy in a given time period and includes total spending by consumers total investment by businesses total spending by government net exports (exports minus imports) Current GDP News Release Historical and Detailed NIPA Interactive Tables A Primer on GDP and the National Income and Product Accounts Personal income is a measure of income received by individuals from wages, salaries, dividends, interest, and other forms. Personal outlays consist of personal consumption of goods and services and also include transfer payments. The components include disposable income (total personal income minus personal current taxes) transfer receipts (payments by governments and businesses to individuals and nonprofit institutions serving individuals) consumption expenditures (goods and services purchased by persons) savings Current Personal Income and Outlays News Release Historical and Detailed NIPA Interactive Tables The Census Bureau reports on household income data that are collected from several major surveys and programs. Guidance on the differences between these sources of income data can be found on the bureau's website. Two of these data sources are described below. The Census Bureau's annual American Community Survey (ACS) collects income data from a sample of the U.S. population, including median household data, data on income distribution, and the poverty rate. Data can cover one or five years. One-year estimates are more current but use a smaller sample size. Five-year estimates are less current but use larger sample sizes and are considered more reliable. The following are examples of commonly requested ACS data: U.S. Median Income in the Past 12 Months from the 2017 ACS 1-Year EstimatesU.S. Income Distribution for Households and Families in the Past 12 Months from the 2017 ACS 1-Year Estimates Another program, the Current Population Survey (CPS), is a survey conducted by the Census for Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and provides estimates on income, poverty, and health insurance coverage. Inflation is the overall increase in the prices of goods and services in the economy. A frequently cited measure of inflation is the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is a BLS program that tracks changes in the prices paid by urban consumers for a representative basket of goods and services. The information provided by BLS goes beyond just CPI and includes producer prices, import/export prices, and employment cost trends. Overview of BLS Statistics on Inflation and Prices The Consumer Price Index program produces monthly data on changes in the prices paid by urban consumers for a representative basket of goods and services. Current CPI News ReleaseCurrent CPI Tables (from the current news release) Historical CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U)CPI Databases The Producer Price Indexes (PPIs) measure the average change over time in the selling prices received by domestic producers for their output. Current PPI News ReleaseCurrent PPI Tables (from the current news release) Historical and Detailed Tables The International Price Program (IPP) produces Import/Export Price Indexes (MXP), which contain data on changes in the prices of nonmilitary goods and services traded between the United States and the rest of the world. Current MXP ReleaseCurrent MXP Tables (from the current news release) Historical and Detailed Tables Employment Cost Trends (ECT) produce quarterly indexes measuring change over time in labor costs and quarterly data measuring level of average costs per hour worked. Current ECT News ReleaseCurrent ECT Tables (from the current news release) Historical and Detailed Tables Few economic indicators are as closely watched as measures of employment. In its monthly news release, BLS provides national totals of the number of employed and unemployed. This release includes the results from both a household survey and a business establishment survey. These data are presented as both seasonally and not seasonally adjusted. Current Monthly News Release—Employment SituationEmployment Statistics Tables (from the current news release) Historical Labor Force Data (household survey) Historical Establishment-Based Data BLS also provides tables showing different characteristics of employed and unemployed persons, and persons not in the labor force. These statistics are available on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Historical data are also available. Labor Force Statistics Tables—Survey of HouseholdsLabor Force Statistics Tables—Survey of Business Establishments Labor productivity relates output to the labor hours used in the production of that output. Two BLS programs produce labor productivity and costs (LPC) measures for sectors of the U.S. economy. Current News Release—Productivity and CostsLPC Tables The value of a U.S. dollar relative to foreign currencies is determined in foreign exchange markets, and its value affects prices and economic activity in the United States. The Federal Reserve provides a brief overview on how the foreign exchange value of the dollar relates to Federal Reserve policy. Measures the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar versus various currencies and indices. Current ReleaseHistorical Releases A collection of interest rates provided by the Federal Reserve, current to today's market. Daily RatesWeekly, Monthly and Historical Rates (from the Data Download Program) Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions by Federal Reserve District (The Beige Book)Economic Data ReleasesFederal Reserve Bank of St. Louis "FRED" Economic Data U.S. Economy at a GlanceCurrent Releases U.S. Economy at a GlanceDatabases, Tables, and Calculators by Subject Current Economic Indicator Releases Economic Indicators Since 1948 Data Release Dates Schedules of News Releases Economic Indicator Release Schedule Economic Indicators Calendar Federal Receipts and Outlays (yearly) Federal Debt (monthly) Money Stock Measures (weekly) Consumer Credit (current release) Interest rates (daily) New Residential Construction (monthly) Advance Monthly Retail Trade Report (monthly) Wholesale Trade: Sales and Inventories (monthly) A statistic that, combined with others, shows the relative health of the economy. Real gross domestic product (GDP). Other important indicators include reports on personal income and employment. Several agencies release data, including the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of the Census, and the Office of Management and Budget. The frequencies with which data are released vary by agency and type of economic indicator. See " Economic Indicator Release Dates " (in " Related Resources ") for details. A change in the trend of the economy (from expansion to recession, for example) is often announced only after several months of data are released. A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. Between trough and peak, the economy is in an expansion. Expansion is the normal state of the economy; most recessions are brief and they have been rare in recent decades. Recessions are dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a private research institute. A popular definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth, but recessions are not officially defined by the NBER using this definition. Additional Information from NBER: U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contraction (Recessions)Most recent recession (December 2007-June 2009) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis—GlossaryFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco—Glossary of Economic TermsThe Economist—Economic Terms A-ZOxford Reference—A Dictionary of Economics CRS In Focus IF10408, Introduction to U.S. Economy: GDP and Economic Growth , by Jeffrey M. Stupak and Mark P. Keightley CRS In Focus IF10477, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Inflation , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10557, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Productivity , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10411, Introduction to U.S. Economy: The Business Cycle and Growth , by Jeffrey M. Stupak, CRS In Focus IF10443, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Unemployment , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10501, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Personal Income , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10963, Introduction to U.S. Economy: Personal Saving , by Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS In Focus IF10569, U.S. Economy in a Global Context , by Jane G. Gravelle CRS Report R44543, Slow Growth in the Current U.S. Economic Expansion , by Mark P. Keightley, Marc Labonte, and Jeffrey M. Stupak CRS Report R44705, The U.S. Income Distribution: Trends and Issues , by Sarah A. Donovan, Marc Labonte, and Joseph Dalaker CRS Report RL30344, Inflation: Causes, Costs, and Current Status , by Marc Labonte CRS Report RL30354, Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve: Current Policy and Conditions , by Marc Labonte

An understanding of economic indicators and their significance is seen as essential to the formulation of economic policies. These indicators, or statistics, provide snapshots of an economy's health as well as starting points for economic analysis. This report contains a list of selected authoritative U.S. government sources of economic indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP), income, inflation, and labor force (including employment and unemployment) statistics. Additional content includes related resources, frequently asked questions (FAQs), and links to external glossaries.

Recent high energy prices, concerns over energy security, and the desire to promote rural business and to reduce air pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions have sparked congressional interest in promoting greater use of alternatives to petroleum fuels. Biofuels—transportation fuels produced from plant and animal materials—have attracted particular interest. Ethanol and biodiesel, the two most widely used biofuels, receive significant federal support in the form of tax incentives, loan and grant programs, and regulatory programs. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. 109-58 ) established a renewable fuel standard (RFS). This initial RFS required the increasing use of renewable fuel in gasoline, starting at 4.0 billion gallons in 2006 and increasing to 7.5 billion gallons in 2012. However, the RFS was significantly expanded on December 19, 2007, when President Bush signed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA). Instead of requiring 5.4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2008, the new law requires 9.0 billion gallons. Further, the 2007 law requires that the RFS be expanded to 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel by 2022, as compared to an estimated 8.6 billion gallons under EPAct. Although this is not an explicit ethanol mandate, it is expected that much of this requirement will be met using corn-based ethanol. The U.S. ethanol industry expanded rapidly in response to EPAct, outpacing the required growth in the earlier RFS and leading some proponents of corn-based ethanol to support an increase in the mandated levels of the RFS. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill, P.L. 110-246 ) promotes the development of cellulosic ethanol production through new tax credits, reduces slightly the blender's tax credit for corn-derived ethanol beginning in 2009, and continues the tariff on imported ethanol. It also expands research on agricultural renewable energy and encourages infrastructure development needed for cellulosic ethanol production. During the final months of the farm bill debate, both food and fuel prices increased dramatically, and the role of corn-based ethanol in food price inflation became the subject of intense debate. Because of the rapid expansion of U.S. corn ethanol capacity—as of December 2008, existing capacity was an estimated at 10.4 billion gallons per year, while an additional 1.8 billion gallons was under construction —some are concerned that the United States will soon reach the limit of ethanol that can be produced from corn. Critics of corn-based ethanol argue that the industry does not need continued government support, and that current corn demand for ethanol is putting a strain on corn and other grain markets, leading to increases in other commodity prices, such as livestock feed, which then leads to higher dairy and meat prices. Critics also argue that the environmental costs of corn-based ethanol may outweigh the benefits. Proponents of corn-based ethanol production assert that increased acreage and upward-trending yields will enable corn producers to satisfy the demand for corn for feed, fuel, and exports. Advanced biofuels based on non-food feedstocks are generating much interest. Feedstocks that could be grown on marginal land with reduced inputs compared with corn would solve the food versus fuel issue, it has been argued. However, biofuels that rely on other sources of biomass, including agricultural wastes, municipal solid waste, and dedicated non-food energy crops such as perennial grasses, fast-growing trees, and algae are still years from commercial production. Nonetheless, this interest has led to proposals to support and/or mandate biofuels produced from feedstocks other than corn starch through explicit requirements, research, development and extension funding, and/or tax incentives. Non-corn biofuels could include fuels produced from cellulosic material (such as perennial grasses), ethanol produced from sugarcane or beets, and biodiesel or renewable diesel produced from vegetable or animal oils. Under EISA, eligible corn-based ethanol production is capped at 15 billion gallons beginning in 2015. Starting in 2009, the RFS will require that an increasing amount of the mandate be met through the use of "advanced biofuels"—biofuels produced from feedstocks other than corn starch. Currently, cellulosic ethanol is not produced on a commercial scale. As of July 2008, there was one commercial-scale refinery under construction, with two demonstration-scale plants and three pilot-scale plants completed. Industry sources expect commercial production of cellulosic ethanol to begin in 2010 or 2011. In January 2009, USDA announced funding for a cellulosic biofuels plant under the Biorefinery Program with projected output of 20 million gallons annually, beginning in 2010. The RFS mandates cellulosic ethanol production of 100 million gallons in 2010. For more information on cellulosic ethanol, see CRS Report RL34738, Cellulosic Biofuels: Analysis of Policy Issues for Congress , by Tom Capehart. The following table provides a side-by-side comparison of biofuels-related provisions in EISA with the enacted farm bill—the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008. President Bush signed EISA on December 19, 2007, and the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 became law on June 18, 2008, after President Bush's veto was overridden by both the Senate and the House. Both bills cover a wide range of energy and agricultural topics in addition to biofuels. The table is organized in the same order as EISA, followed by provisions that are exclusively in the enacted farm bill. Key biofuels-related provisions of EISA and the 2008 farm bill include: a major expansion of the renewable fuel standard (RFS) established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ) [EISA]; expansion and/or modification of tax credits for ethanol [farm bill]; grants and loan guarantees for biofuels (especially cellulosic) research, development, deployment, and production [EISA, farm bill]; studies of the potential for ethanol pipeline transportation, expanded biofuel use, market and environmental impacts of increased biofuel use, and the effects of biodiesel on engines [EISA, farm bill]; expansion of biofuel feedstock availability [farm bill]; reauthorization of biofuels research and development at the U.S. Department of Energy [EISA] and the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency [farm bill]; and reduction of the blender tax credit for corn-based ethanol, a new production tax credit for cellulosic ethanol, and continuation of the import duty on ethanol [farm bill].

The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140), also known as the 2007 energy bill, significantly expands existing programs to promote biofuels. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246), also known as the 2008 farm bill, contains a distinct energy title (Title IX) that covers a wide range of energy and agricultural topics with extensive attention to biofuels, including corn-starch based ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and biodiesel. Research provisions relating to renewable energy are found in Title VII and tax provisions are found in Title XV of the farm bill. Key biofuels-related provisions of EISA and the 2008 farm bill include: a major expansion of the renewable fuel standard (RFS) established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) [EISA]; expansion and/or modification of tax credits for ethanol [farm bill]; grants and loan guarantees for biofuels (especially cellulosic) research, development, deployment, and production [EISA, farm bill]; studies of the potential for ethanol pipeline transportation, expanded biofuel use, market and environmental impacts of increased biofuel use, and the effects of biodiesel on engines [EISA, farm bill]; expansion of biofuel feedstock availability [farm bill]; reauthorization of biofuels research and development at the U.S. Department of Energy [EISA] and the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency [farm bill]; and reduction of the blender tax credit for corn-based ethanol, a new production tax credit for cellulosic ethanol, and continuation of the import duty on ethanol [farm bill]. This report includes information from CRS Report RL34130, Renewable Energy Policy in the 2008 Farm Bill, by Tom Capehart, and CRS Report RL34136, Biofuels Provisions in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140), H.R. 3221, and H.R. 6: A Side-by-Side Comparison, by [author name scrubbed].

Center-left presidential candidate Alvaro Colom of the National Union for Hope (UNE) defeated General Otto Pérez Molina of the right-wing Patriot Party (PP) in the November 4, 2007 run-off elections, which were considered free and fair. Voter turnout fell to under 50%, down from nearly 60% in the September 9 first round of voting, as anticipated by many observers who note that Guatemalan voters are often more interested in local races. Colom received 52.8% of the run-off vote to Pérez Molina's 47.2%. President-elect Colom will take office on January 14, 2008. After his victory, President-elect Colom told a local radio station that he plans "to convert Guatemala into a social democratic country with a Mayan face." Voting patterns reflected the country's urban-rural divide. Pérez Molina defeated Colom in Guatemala City and its surrounding areas, where 25% of Guatemalan voters reside. Colom dominated the countryside and won in 20 of the nation's 21 departments. Colom's party, UNE, gained seats in the country's National Assembly, winning 48 of the legislative body's 158 seats. Since his party does not have a majority in the legislature, Colom's success will likely depend on his ability to forge alliance with other parties. Guatemala held general elections on September 9, 2007, the third wave of democratic elections since the end of its 36-year civil conflict in which an estimated 200,000 people were killed. The current President, Óscar Berger, of the Grand National Alliance (GANA), was barred from seeking reelection by a constitutional prohibition. Both the European Union and the Organization of American States sent electoral observers to monitor the elections. Although the electoral campaigns were marred by violence, both missions expressed satisfaction that the elections were relatively free and fair and that voter turnout was largely unimpeded. Rural voting increased due to an increased number of polling stations. However, there were irregularities such as the burning of one polling station in El Cerinal, southeast of Guatemala City. The missions also expressed concern about the lack of information available in Mayan languages as well as the low number of women elected to Congress. The UNE won 48 seats, increasing its representation by one third. GANA came in second with 37 seats, followed by PP with 30 seats. The FRG's position in congress was decreased from 29 to 15 seats. Former President Efraín Ríos Montt was elected to a four-year term in congress, granting him immunity from prosecution on genocide charges he faces in Spain until the end of his term. While the UNE gained a significant increase in its representation in the National Assembly, it controls less than one-third of seats, meaning that President-elect Colom will have to negotiate with other parties in the 158-seat legislature to pass his agenda. President Óscar Berger won the November 2003 elections and took office on January 14, 2004. During Berger's presidency, the Guatemalan economy has expanded, but drug trafficking and organized crime have overwhelmed the country's weak institutions. Guatemala's GDP grew by 4.6% in 2006, the highest rate since 1998, helped by increased remittances; high prices for primary exports, such as sugar and cardamom; and increased investor confidence due in part to implementation of the U.S. Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Under Berger's leadership, the legislature passed a law against organized crime and secured legislative approval of the creation of an International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Because of GANA's minority presence in Congress, however, Berger has struggled to secure timely passage of needed tax reforms, and the 2007 budget. Some assert that his government has not made significant progress on implementation of reforms agreed upon in the 1996 peace accords. The Guatemalan peace accords were signed in 1996, but required reforms were not fully implemented and security forces were not purged, leaving intact the institutional framework through which organized crime has infiltrated the political process. Murders have increased, reaching 6,033 in 2006, higher than any single year during the civil conflict. The murder rate is disproportionately high in Guatemala City, eastern departments, and along the Mexican border. The root problem lies in the lack of employment and educational opportunities; many youth search for other means of living, including gangs and organized crime. The majority of violence is attributed to drug trafficking and organized crime, with nearly 90% of cocaine heading for the United States passing through Central America. The infiltration of security forces by organized crime was highlighted earlier this year after the murder of three Salvadoran deputies and their driver. The four police officers accused of the crime were assassinated while in prison. This situation led to the resignation of several high-ranking security officials. All levels of the 2007 electoral campaigns were affected by political violence, making this election the bloodiest in Guatemala's history since 1985. In the period leading up to the September 9 general election there were 119 violent acts resulting in 51 deaths, including the murders of candidate's relatives and party activists. The torture and killing of one candidate's 14-year-old daughter highlighted the brutality of the campaigns. This was not an isolated incident with two other candidates' sons killed, bringing the number of relatives killed to six. The UNE party, of front runner 'lvaro Colom, suffered the most losses with 18 murders, followed by the ruling party GANA with 7 murders. Violence appeared to lessen in the period between the first and second round of voting. During that time five political candidates and supporters were killed. Among those killed was Aura Salazar, a close advisor of Pérez Molina. Colom's campaign strategist, José Carlos Marroquín, resigned in October reportedly due to threats from organized crime groups. Prosecuting murders is rare in Guatemala, and to date it is not clear who is responsible for many of them or what role, if any, organized crime and drug traffickers played in the campaign violence. Three-time presidential candidate 'lvaro Colom moderated his leftist platform over the last two elections and ran as a center-left candidate for the UNE. Colom studied industrial engineering at the University of San Carlos before becoming a businessman and eventually a politician. He has held an array of positions, including Vice Minister of Economy in 1991, director of the National Foundation for Peace, from 1991 to 1997, and executive director of the Presidential Office of Legal Assistance and Land Conflict Resolution in 1997. In 1999, he ran for president under the New National Alliance (ANN), a faction of the leftist Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG), a former guerrilla group that was assimilated into the political process by the 1996 Peace Accords. In 2003, Colom ran on the ticket of UNE, softening his leftist rhetoric, and contested Óscar Berger in a second round of voting. Colom now identifies himself as a moderate social democrat like President Lula da Silva of Brazil. He also supports the more radical policies of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia, but states that he does not see their reforms as the route for Guatemala. During the campaign, President-elect Colom stated that he would focus his policies on social development and expanding education. Colom indicated he would create a social dialogue, cooperating with other parties in the Guatemalan Congress to tackle the pressing issues that Guatemala is currently facing. 'lvaro Colom called for a holistic approach to curb the country's rampant violence, crime, delinquent youth, and impunity. He promised to prioritize security within 100 days of taking office, along with strengthening the supreme court in order to put an end to impunity. Colom took a "zero tolerance" stance on corruption and organized crime, which previously led to the dismissal of one UNE congressman, Manuel Castillo, due to alleged drug trafficking links. Castillo was also recently linked to the murders of three Salvadoran deputies and their drivers and the subsequent murders of four accused police officers. The Castillo case and an allegation made by Rolando Morales, a member of UNE and president of the congress in 2004, that Colom's wife took US$1.5 million from the congressional budget to fund a company controlled by her sister, has raised suspicion among his critics about Colom's integrity and possible connections to organized crime. Otto Pérez Molina, a retired general and former head of military intelligence, campaigned as the "General of Peace," emphasizing his role as a military representative during peace negotiations in the 1990s. Pérez Molina founded the Patriot Party in 2001, which, in 2003, joined together with the National Solidarity Party and Reformer Movement to form the Grand National Alliance (GANA), currently the ruling party. Pérez Molina was originally selected for GANA's ticket, but he and the PP subsequently left the alliance. PP backed Pérez Molina in the 2007 presidential race. The focus of Pérez Molina's campaign was his hardline or "iron fist" security policy. He wanted to put more soldiers on the streets in the capital city in order to quell the violence. He also advocated the professionalization of the army and national police with the hopes of weeding out corruption. Pérez Molina's hardline rhetoric appealed to many because of the continued increase in violence across the country. Human rights groups, however, were concerned that Pérez Molina's policies and his alleged involvement in human rights violations would impede the country's reconciliation with its violent history. Pérez Molina has been implicated in a number of human rights abuses taking place during his time in the military, including being linked to the 1994 murder of a judge and the 1996 murder of a guerrilla leader. Pérez Molina viewed security as a necessity for the rest of his platform which included education, health, and economic and rural development. He planned to decentralize education to allow for local governments to have more control, increase the coverage of the health system and industrialize agriculture to help fight rural poverty. Pérez Molina supported extensive legal and constitutional reforms but through a national constituent assembly rather than through the Guatemalan legislature. Impunity and violence are two of the biggest issues facing the new president. Guatemala has one of the highest murder rates in Latin America due to institutional weaknesses and infiltration of security forces by organized crime. Very few murders are investigated and even fewer are prosecuted. The past two administrations have struggled to get approval of a joint commission, with the United Nations, that would investigate clandestine groups working within the government and security forces. The establishment of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, known by its Spanish acronym CICIG, has been one of President Berger's successes. The opposition to CICIG came mainly from the Guatemalan Revolutionary Front (FRG) citing that CICIG was a violation of Guatemala's sovereignty. Both Colom and Pérez Molina, as well as their parties, were vocal supporters of the international commission. However, two members of the UNE, 'lvaro Colom's party, voted against CICIG in the Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations. This was an embarrassment for Colom and his party and resulted in the suspension of one of the deputies. On August 16, a law was passed that formally established CICIG for the next two years. CICIG has been praised by human rights groups and the international community. Concerns persist, however, the Guatemalan executive branch will decide which cases will be investigated and the commission will not be able to investigate crimes retroactively, such as war crimes committed during the civil war. The approval of CICIG prompted the U.S. House and Senate to approve Foreign Military Financing for Guatemala in FY2008, pending Department of State certification that certain human rights conditions have been met. Both presidential candidates are likely to support continued cooperation with the international community to fight impunity and violence in Guatemala. The United States and Guatemala have traditionally had close relations. U.S. interest in Guatemala lies in consolidating democracy, securing human rights, establishing security, and promoting trade. U.S. immigration policy has been a point of tension. President Bush visited Guatemala in March 2007 to express support for greater cooperation on counternarcotics and youth gangs. The United States' immigration policy has been a growing source of tension since tighter U.S. border security has led to increased deportation of Guatemalan nationals. As of July 24, 2007, 12,445 Guatemalans had been deported from the United States with the total for 2007 expected to reach 24,000. This number grew from 11,000 in 2005 and 18,306 in 2006. The surge in deportations has strained reintegration programs. Guatemala maintains that deportations have added to gang related problems. Guatemala has an estimated 1.2 million nationals living in the United States, nearly 60% illegally. They sent back $3.61 billion in remittances in 2006, equal to 10% of the country's GDP. Since immigration is a bipartisan issue in Guatemala, both Colom and Pérez Molina are expected to continue to appeal to the U.S. Government to revise its immigration policies.

Alvaro Colom, of the center-left Nation Union of Hope (UNE) party, defeated right-wing candidate Otto Pérez Molina of the Patriot Party, in November 4, 2007 run-off elections. President-elect Colom will take office on January 14, 2008. No single presidential candidate won a majority of votes in the first round held on September 9, 2007, in which congressional and mayoral races were also held. The dominant issue in the campaign was security, and the 2007 election campaigns were the most violent since the return to democracy in 1985, with 56 candidates, activists, and family members killed. Since no party won a majority in Congress, the next president will have to build coalitions to achieve his legislative agenda. U.S. interests in Guatemala include consolidating democracy, securing human rights, establishing security and promoting trade, though U.S. immigration policy has been a point of tension in bilateral relations.

When Senator Leahy introduced S. 618 in the 110 th Congress, with the co-sponsorship of Senators Specter, Lott, Reid, and Landrieu, he did so by first noting that the insurance industry "has operated largely beyond the reach of federal antitrust laws for more than six decades." Concerned primarily by the manner in which insurers operating in the Gulf Coast region after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had been interpreting their policy-related responsibilities, he stated that "[i]f there ever was, there is no longer any justification to exempt the insurance industry from federal government oversight." H.R. 1081 , an identical bill, was introduced on the same day by Representative DeFazio, with similar, bi-partisan co-sponsorship (Representatives Taylor, Melancon, Alexander, and Jones of North Carolina). Both bills remained in their respective Judiciary Committees (the Senate Judiciary Committee did, however, hold hearings on S. 618 ); neither the House Committee on Energy and Commerce nor the Committee on Financial Services, where the House bill had been referred "for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned," reported H.R. 1081 . Similar legislation may be introduced in the 111 th Congress. Currently, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) declares that the antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law." Since virtually all states regulate the insurance industry, the effect is to immunize "the business of insurance" from application of the federal antitrust laws. Both bills would have removed the "to the extent ..." language so that the federal antitrust laws would have been applicable to the "business of insurance." The single exception to the blanket application of federal antitrust law to the "business of insurance," is, however, that both bills would have specified that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, "as it relates to areas other than unfair methods of competition" would continue to be applicable to the "business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law." Both measures would have deleted 15 U.S.C. § 1013, in which the 79 th Congress (1) made the antitrust laws inapplicable to the "business of insurance" until June 30, 1948; but (2) specified, at the same time, that the antitrust laws would nevertheless be applicable to boycotts, coercion, or intimidation, or agreements to create or further those activities. In addition, they would each have restored the authority of the Federal Trade Commission, pursuant to its 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) powers, to investigate the insurance industry; that authority was removed in 1980 by Section 5 of P.L. 96-252 , "Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Improvements Act of 1980," except to the extent that such studies were specifically requested by Congress. Lastly, each would have permitted the Department of Justice and the FTC to "issue joint statements of their antitrust enforcement policies regarding joint activities in the business of insurance." The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the issue entitled "The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Antitrust Immunity: Good for Consumers?" on March 7, 2007. No hearings to consider the issue were held by any of the other committees involved. Competitors in many industries have an economic incentive to cooperate in ways, such as creating cartels or price-fixing, that could result in general inefficiency and, ultimately, harm to the consumer. This possible consumer harm is one of the underlying reasons for the antitrust laws. Due to the specific economics of the insurance industry, however, cooperation among insurers may very well result in greater efficiencies and, possibly, lower prices for consumers. Insurance depends critically on insurers possessing a large quantity of information to allow them to judge and price risks accurately. In a theoretical world of perfect information and competition, every consumer would pay a premium that covered his risk, and the resulting overall amount paid by consumers would be the lowest possible amount that would cover the aggregate losses to the group as a whole. If insurers can pool their information, the resulting rates can more accurately reflect risk and thus be lower for consumers as a whole, although some individual consumers may pay higher rates. Small insurers particularly benefit from information sharing, as they do not have a large volume of information of their own to analyze. The theoretically perfect world, however, assumes competition between insurers that would serve to reduce premium rates; too much cooperation between insurers could dampen this competition, reducing the consumer benefit that comes from allowing insurers to share information. Insurer cooperation and information sharing revolves around advisory organizations, also known as ratings bureaus. Some form of these organizations has existed for nearly as long as insurance has existed in the United States. At their most basic form, they gather data from the various insurers, aggregate and analyze this data, and provide the aggregated data back to the insurers for use in setting future rates. In practice, they have done, and continue to do, a good deal more than this. Historically, rating bureaus formulated final rates that insurers might charge for particular policies and in some cases required participating insurers to use the bureau's suggested rates. Having a central organization create insurance rates, whether mandatory or not, raised serious antitrust concerns. By the early 1990s, the main advisory organizations had ceased publishing fully formed rates. Advisory organizations continue, however, to collect, aggregate, and analyze data, providing not only historical loss data but also estimates of future loss data and future insurer expense data. Some maintain that this estimation of future data, known as "trending" raises antitrust concerns similar to those inherent in the creation of final rates. Another primary activity of advisory organizations is the creation and filing of insurance policy forms. Insurance policy forms are complex legal documents, and, as controversies over insurance coverage for New York's World Trade Center and for buildings damaged in Hurricane Katrina have shown, many millions of dollars may ride on the interpretation of a handful of words. Joint creation of these forms allows for the sharing of the legal talent needed to create the forms, and, some would argue, promotes comparison shopping by consumers by reducing the confusion that could result from multiple policy forms being offered by different companies. Since the states generally require the filing of policy forms for state approval, using a jointly created form that has already been filed with the states significantly reduces the regulatory burden on a single insurer. The uniformity of policy forms, however, also may reduce consumer choice. If one were shopping for a particular policy feature that was not a part of the standard form, it might be impossible, or very costly, to find an insurance policy that would meet this particular need. Further industry cooperation, both through the advisory organizations and other state-created mechanisms, occurs in state residual market mechanisms and state guaranty funds. Residual market mechanisms are often created to insure availability of insurance that is legally mandated, such as workers compensation or auto insurance. While such mechanisms differ significantly between states, they may have advisory organizations administering them or require some other joint action by insurers, such as splitting up high-risk insureds who are unable to find insurance in the regular market; such "splitting" might be considered market allocation. State guaranty funds are intended to protect the policyholders in the case of insurer insolvency. In general, states require insurers to join these associations, which may open the possibility of challenges alleging unfair collaboration or collusion. If McCarran-Ferguson antitrust protection for "the business of insurance" is, in fact, curtailed or abolished, many lawsuits challenging some of these insurer practices as violations of the federal antitrust laws are likely. If all of the cited examples of cooperation were found to be in violation, it would necessitate major changes in the operation of insurers, particularly small insurers which do not have large pools of information from their own experience. Should additional data be unavailable to small insurers in some way, it would, ironically, likely spur further consolidation in the insurance industry as small insurers merge in order to gain the competitive advantage of additional information. This outcome, however, is only one of a range of possibilities. It is also possible that many of the cooperative activities that insurers engage in would be found to be permissible under the "state action" doctrine. Given the possibility of numerous, perhaps lengthy, lawsuits to clarify which practices of insurers are antitrust violations, and of significant upheaval in the insurance industry, Congress might take note of its solution to another litigation-related problem that arose more than 20 years ago. Congress was confronted then with the concerns of municipalities facing antitrust suits on account of certain activities. The prospect of treble-damage antitrust liability in suits brought against municipalities—challenging, e.g. , municipal designation of an "authorized" taxicab company, operation of an airport, or the awarding of cable television franchises—was unsettling to municipalities even though defendants were often found not liable. Many municipalities voiced concerns about expenditures of both time and tax dollars (read, in the insurance context, "costs often translated into increased insurance premiums") during hearings or in other communications to Congress. In response, Congress enacted the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, which, inter alia , prescribes that No damages, interest on damages, costs or attorney's fees may be recovered under ... (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c) in any claim against a person based on any official action directed by a local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity. Subsequent to the enactment of the Local Government Act, the number of challenges to municipal activity significantly abated. While inserting a similar provision into any bill to limit the antitrust exemption provided by McCarran-Ferguson would reduce the financial incentive to file suit for insurer antitrust violations, the absence of private damages does not remove the authority of the courts to issue injunctive relief when an antitrust violation by insurers is found. In fact, inasmuch as courts also retain jurisdiction over an injunction, oversight to insure that an injunction is followed, and contempt-of-court citations if it is not, would remain possibilities. Another possible solution that has been part of past legislation is inclusion of some form of "safe harbor" provisions specifically protecting cooperation that might be pro-consumer, e.g. , the sharing of historical loss information that is essential to the viability of small companies. A " Provided that " clause could be inserted in the provision making the antitrust laws applicable to the "business of insurance" to clarify that information sharing is permitted—at least under certain circumstances and conditions. Similar provisions were included in, for example, S. 84 , introduced by Senator Metzenbaum in the 103 rd Congress to repeal McCarran-Ferguson's antitrust exemption. The clause might also include, as did the measures that addressed cooperative research and production joint ventures, a limitation to single damages for successful challenges to certain kinds of conduct deemed necessary.

Identical, bipartisan bills, S. 618 and H.R. 1081, that would have eliminated the antitrust exemption for the "business of insurance" in the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015), in force since 1945, were introduced in the 110th Congress, and similar legislation may be introduced in the 111th Congress. The impact of S. 618 and H.R. 1081, had they been enacted, is unclear. They would each have amended 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) to make the antitrust laws and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act "as it relates to unfair methods of competition" specifically applicable to such business. The FTC Act, "as it relates to areas other than unfair competition" (emphasis added) would, however, have continued to apply to the "business of insurance" "to the extent that [it] is not regulated by State law." Due largely to the importance of information sharing to insurers, the insurance industry in the past has cooperated in a variety of ways, including sharing loss information, jointly developing policy forms and rates, operating residual market mechanisms, and participating in state guaranty funds. Some forms of cooperation, particularly joint rate making and mandatory advisory rates, have already been curtailed because of antitrust concerns. Other forms of industry cooperation, however, might be considered illegal under federal antitrust laws if legislation such as S. 618 or H.R. 1081 were to be enacted. The precise impact of such bills on the insurance industry would depend critically on future court decisions. The cooperation that insurance companies currently undertake might be judged legally permissible, however, even notwithstanding any deletion of the antitrust exemption for "the business of insurance," under the "state action" doctrine. That doctrine immunizes from the federal antitrust laws actions by public or private entities that are legislatively mandated or authorized by the states. Similarly, before this area of law were settled, however, it would arguably involve numerous lawsuits. This report will be updated as events warrant.

The United States imports substantial amounts of food. In 1993, the value of food imports from countries other than Canada amounted to about $21 billion. Similarly, the value of Canadian food imports from countries other than the United States totaled about $3.2 billion. The United States and Canada are concerned about imported foods since these foods are produced and processed under unknown conditions. Each country has several federal agencies that regulate and monitor the safety of imported foods. In the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the federal agency responsible for overseeing the safety of most domestic and imported food products, including fish and seafood. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for ensuring the safety of domestic and imported meat and poultry products. In general, Health Canada establishes the standards for food safety and has overall responsibility for ensuring that all food sold in Canada meets federal health and safety standards. Health Canada shares responsibility for inspections with Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, which is responsible for inspecting meat, poultry, fruits, vegetables, dairy products, and eggs, and with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, which is responsible for inspecting fish and seafood. The two countries’ systems and standards for ensuring the safety of imported foods are similar. For meat and poultry, both FSIS and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada certify that foreign countries’ processing and inspection systems are equivalent to the respective U.S. and Canadian domestic systems, then supplement that certification with inspections of foreign plants and spot checks of imports. For other foods, the two countries generally exercise control by selectively inspecting imports as they enter the country, although FDA and Fisheries and Oceans Canada inspect some foreign plants as well. The United States and Canada each inspect a limited amount of imported foods. The countries determine which foods to inspect on the basis of factors such as experience with the products and producers and their resources. In the United States, FSIS samples and examines about 15 percent of the meat and poultry imported from countries other than Canada. FDA samples and analyzes, on average, less than 2 percent of all other imported foods; inspection rates are higher for high-risk foods, such as seafood and low-acid canned foods, and those with a significant history of violations. In Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada inspects about 20 percent of the imported meat and poultry and lesser amounts of other foods. Fisheries and Oceans Canada inspects, on average, about 17 percent of the imported seafood. In both countries, foods that do not pass inspection may be conditioned, destroyed, or reexported at the discretion of the importer with one exception—meat rejected by Canada cannot be conditioned. Some imported products, such as those with a history of violations, are detained automatically when they enter either the United States or Canada; inspectors must specifically determine that these foods comply with applicable standards. Other products are inspected according to a sampling plan determined by such factors as the risk of contamination. Recent international events are smoothing the way for increased trade in foods. Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the world’s nations are moving toward equivalent food safety standards that are expected to facilitate trade and thus increase food imports into the United States and Canada. Furthermore, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) promises to lessen customs restrictions on trade between the United States and Canada, making it easier for foods imported into one country to pass into the other. Finally, U.S. and Canadian efforts under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA are helping harmonize the two countries’ food safety standards, making it easier for the two countries to share information and to rely on each other’s food safety information. Recognizing the value of sharing information about imported foods, the United States and Canada have, over time, developed an ad hoc system for communicating selected information about unsafe food imports. Agency-to-agency arrangements have been established between (1) FSIS and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada for meat and poultry products, (2) FDA and Fisheries and Oceans Canada for fish and seafood products, and (3) FDA and Health Canada for all other food products. In addition, some officials communicate with one another at the regional level. For example, FDA officials in Blaine, Washington, work closely with officials of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, located about 40 miles away in Vancouver, Canada. Table 1 describes selected regional and agency-to-agency arrangements for sharing information on potentially unsafe imports, foods rejected as unsafe, and inspections of foreign plants. Opportunities exist for improving the current U.S.-Canada information-sharing system in two areas: (1) shipments of unsafe foods refused at one country’s port of entry and (2) inspections of foreign food-processing plants. In addition, although each country inspects some foreign plants that export to it, the two countries do not maximize the use of limited resources by coordinating inspections of plants that export to both countries. While the current ad hoc system alerts each country to some problems with unsafe imported foods detected by the other, it does not ensure that all relevant information is exchanged. Neither the United States nor Canada informs the other country of refused shipments being returned to the country of origin, even though those shipments could be rerouted once they leave port. Furthermore, the two countries do not always notify each other about shipments rejected at their respective borders that are then sent directly to the other country. For example, in 1993 the Canadian government notified U.S. officials about rejected shipments in 25 of 37 instances. Similar information on U.S. notifications to Canada was not available because the U.S. agencies do not consistently document this information. The United States is even less systematic in notifying Canada of such refused shipments, in part because FDA officials, unlike their Canadian counterparts, usually do not know where the shipments are going until they have left the country. The U.S. Customs Service, which is responsible for ensuring that rejected shipments of food leave the United States, generally does not notify FDA until after the shipments have left. Even when U.S. officials are notified of problem shipments, their follow-up is sporadic. For example, for the 25 rejected shipments that Canadian officials reported to the United States in 1993, the United States traced 11 shipments and part of another, while 13 shipments and part of another remained unaccounted for. FSIS was responsible for eight of the unaccounted-for shipments. FSIS either did not track or did not document its tracking of these shipments. FDA, which was responsible for the remaining unaccounted-for shipments, could not track them because it either could not identify the port of entry or had no record of the Canadian notification. Officials from FDA and FSIS cited scarce resources as their reason for not putting more emphasis on tracking each rejected shipment. For details on Canada’s tracking of shipments rejected by the United States, see the accompanying OAG report. The United States and Canada have an opportunity to build on each other’s information about foreign food-processing plants that ship products to North America. Although both countries inspect these plants, they share little information on the results of those inspections or recurring problems with the plants. For meat-processing plants, where most U.S. foreign inspections occur, the only inspection information shared is FSIS’ required annual list of plants that have been certified and decertified. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada receives a copy of this published list. However, neither FSIS nor Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada asks for or provides the results of its inspections to its counterpart agency. For foreign seafood-processing plants, FDA and Fisheries and Oceans Canada began, in February 1994, to discuss sharing the results of their inspections annually. To date, FDA has provided a list of the foreign plants it has inspected and the results to Fisheries and Oceans Canada. A more routine exchange of information would enable both countries to learn where duplication is occurring or coverage is lacking and help them identify problem plants for future inspections. Additional information about each country’s experiences in inspecting foreign plants could, in turn, enable the United States and Canada to maximize scarce inspection resources by coordinating such inspections. For example, between 1991 and 1993, FSIS and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada inspected the same meat and poultry plants 103 times—6 percent of the United States’ annual inspections and 76 percent of Canada’s inspections. During the same period, FDA and Fisheries and Oceans Canada inspected five of the same tuna-processing plants—3 percent of FDA’s inspections of low-acid canned food plants and 33 percent of Fisheries and Oceans Canada’s inspections. At the same time, many foreign food-processing plants were not inspected by either country. For example, in 1991, 1992, and 1993, neither FSIS nor Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada inspected 300 (on average) of the 750 foreign meat-processing plants certified to export to the United States. For the same period, neither country inspected over 35,000 of the estimated 36,000 processing plants that export seafood or low-acid canned food to the United States. The disparity between the way the United States covers meat-processing plants and other food-production plants in foreign countries occurs largely because of the way U.S. laws divide responsibility and resources for inspecting such plants between FSIS and FDA. For example, FSIS, which oversees approximately 750 foreign plants certified to export to the United States, spent $2.5 million to inspect foreign plants in fiscal year 1993. FDA, which spent about $300,000 to inspect foreign plants in the same period, is responsible for the safety of all other imported foods, including high-risk foods, from over 36,000 foreign plants. U.S. and Canadian officials acknowledge the need to avoid duplicating effort and to enhance coverage by sharing inspection results. According to officials from both governments, the two nations would have to establish that their foreign inspection systems were comparable before they could fully depend on the results of each other’s foreign inspections. The domestic inspection programs for meat and poultry in both countries are considered to be equivalent. Therefore, U.S. agency officials believe that the two countries’ systems for inspecting all foods are probably similar enough so that the United States and Canada could use each other’s inspection results when planning upcoming inspections in order to target their resources more efficiently and effectively. As the border between the United States and Canada becomes more open, the two countries are becoming increasingly aware of the value of cooperating fully to ensure that unsafe food does not enter either country and of making better use of each country’s limited resources. Agencies and some agency officials have taken actions on their own to establish informal cross-border arrangements to share information about unsafe imported foods. We believe these efforts are commendable. By notifying each other about rejected shipments and making each other aware of which processing plants have passed or failed inspection, the United States and Canada could build on the current system and better ensure that unsafe food does not enter either country. Furthermore, inspection coverage of foreign food-processing plants could be more comprehensive if the two countries coordinated inspections. To better ensure the safety of imported foods and to make better use of limited resources, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and of Health and Human Services take the lead in developing, in concert with their Canadian counterparts and to the extent necessary with the U.S. Customs Service, a more comprehensive system for sharing crucial information on and coordinating activities for unsafe imported foods. As part of this comprehensive system, the agencies should consider coordinating U.S. and Canadian inspections of foreign food-processing plants. While developing a comprehensive bilateral system will take some time, there are shorter-term steps that U.S. agencies could take to tighten control over unsafe food that has been rejected by one country and routed to the other. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and of Health and Human Services direct that FSIS and FDA ensure that available information on rejected shipments being sent to Canada is transmitted to the Canadian government and that information from the Canadian government on such shipments being sent to the United States is consistently followed up. We discussed a draft of this report with FSIS’ Director, Review and Assessment Programs, and FDA’s Director, Division of Import Operations Policy. They generally agreed with the information we presented, and we incorporated their suggestions where appropriate. In developing information for this report, we spoke with and obtained documentation from FDA and FSIS officials at headquarters and at selected regional and port sites in the states of Washington, California, and New York. We provided relevant parts of this information to our counterpart OAG team. In turn, we received from the OAG team information from officials at Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Health Canada in headquarters and corresponding regional locations. We conducted our review between November 1993 and October 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees; interested Members of Congress; the Canadian Parliament; the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services; the Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration; the Acting Administrator, Food Safety and Inspection Service; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. Robert A. Robinson, Associate Director Edward M. Zadjura, Assistant Director Karla J. Springer, Project Leader Keith W. Oleson, Adviser Marci D. Kramer, Evaluator Donya Fernandez, Evaluator Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, Communications Analyst The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 6015 Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (301) 258-4066. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. 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GAO reviewed how the United States and Canada share information on and coordinate activities for shipments of unsafe imported foods, focusing on whether opportunities exist to make better use of limited inspection resources and thereby increase the likelihood that unsafe imported foods would be stopped from entering the United States and Canada. GAO found that: (1) U.S. and Canadian food safety officials share information through generally informal agency-to-agency exchanges and cross-border contacts at ports of entry; (2) U.S.-Canadian information sharing efforts focus primarily on shipments of potentially unsafe foods, food shipments refused at one port of entry that may be rerouted to the other port, and inspections of foreign food-processing plants; (3) opportunities exist for the United States and Canada to develop a more comprehensive system for sharing information about shipments of unsafe foods and inspections of foreign food-processing plants and for coordinating these inspections; and (4) improvements in U.S. and Canadian information sharing efforts would enable the two nations to better target their limited inspection resources.

Concerns about the safety of Presidents have existed throughout the history of the Republic, beginning with George Washington in 1794, when he led troops against the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania. The intervening years have witnessed a variety of incidents of actual and potential harm to Presidents (as well as immediate family members and other high-ranking officials). These situations extend to illegal entries onto the White House grounds and the White House itself; violence and conflict near the President's residence or where he was visiting; unauthorized aircraft flying near the White House and, in one instance, a plane crashing into the building; schemes to use airplanes to attack the White House; other threats of attack, including bombings and armed assaults; feared kidnapping and hostage-taking; assassination plots; as well as immediate, direct assaults against Presidents. In addition to incumbents, Presidents-elect and candidates for the office have been subject to assaults or threats. This report identifies assassinations of and other direct assaults against Presidents, Presidents-elect, and candidates for the office of President. There have been 15 such attacks (against 14 individuals), with five resulting in death. The first incident occurred in 1835, involving President Andrew Jackson, when an attacker's pistol misfired. The most recent occurred in 2005, when a would-be assassin in Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia, tossed a grenade (which did not explode) at the platform where President George W. Bush and the Georgian President were speaking. The tally of victims reveals the following: Of the 43 individuals serving as President, 10 (or about 23%) have been subject to actual or attempted assassinations. Four of these 10 incumbents—Abraham Lincoln, James A. Garfield, William McKinley, and John F. Kennedy—were slain. Four of the seven most recent Presidents have been targets of assaults: Gerald R. Ford (twice in 1975), Ronald W. Reagan (in a near-fatal shooting in 1981), William J. Clinton (when the White House was fired upon in 1994), and George W. Bush (when an attacker tossed a grenade, which did not explode, towards him and the President of Georgia at a public gathering in Tbilisi in 2005). Two others who served as President were attacked, either as a President-elect (Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933) or as a presidential candidate (Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, when he was seeking the presidency after being out of office for nearly four years). Two other presidential candidates—Robert F. Kennedy, who was killed in 1968, and George C. Wallace, who was seriously wounded in 1972—were also victims, during the primaries. In only one of these 15 incidents (the Lincoln assassination) was a broad conspiracy proven, although such contentions have arisen on other occasions. Only one other incident involved more than one participant (the 1950 assault on Blair House, the temporary residence of President Harry S Truman); but no evidence of other conspirators emerged from the subsequent investigation or prosecution. Of the 15 direct assaults, 11 relied upon pistols, two on automatic weapons, one on a rifle, and one on a grenade. All but two of the attacks (both against Gerald Ford) were committed by men. All but one of the 15 assaults occurred within the United States. The following table identifies the direct assaults on Presidents, Presidents-elect, and candidates for the office of President. It specifies the date when the assault occurred, the victim, his political party affiliation, the length of his administration at the time of the attack or whether he was then a candidate or President-elect, the location of the attack, its method and result, and the name of the assailant, along with the professed or alleged reason for the attack (if known).

Direct assaults against Presidents, Presidents-elect, and candidates have occurred on 15 separate occasions, with five resulting in death. Ten incumbents (about 23% of the 43 individuals to serve in the office), including four of the seven most recent Presidents, have been victims or targets. Four of the 10 (and one candidate) died as a result of the attacks. This report identifies these incidents and provides information about what happened, when, where, and, if known, why. The report will be updated and revised if developments require.

Federal lawmakers view many financial businesses as having an important role in the U.S. economy, and therefore warrant providing these businesses protection for their individual account holders against loss, should the firms fail. Such protections exist both to protect the individuals from risks they probably could not discern for themselves and to protect the economy against the effects of financial panics when failures occur. Panics, the attendant collapses of wealth, and severe consequences for the economy occurred before Congress created federal deposit insurance in 1934. Prior to the enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343 ), government policy protected customers of depository institutions—banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions—in full for accounts up to $100,000 and up to $250,000 for retirement accounts. Although the enactment of EESA on September 23, 2008, immediately raised the maximum deposit insurance to $250,000, retirement accounts remain at $250,000 until December 31, 2009. Since then, Congress and the President enacted the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (HFSTHA; P.L. 111-22 ), extending both the EESA increases and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) $30 billion borrowing authority from the U.S. Treasury to as much as $500 billion until 2013. Because of the wording of P.L. 111-22 , after 2013, it is possible that deposit insurance protection could revert back to the $100,000 and $250,000 for retirement accounts. Other institutions such as insurance companies, securities broker/dealers, and many pension funds receive government or government-sponsored guarantees on specified accounts. This report provides a summary of the major features of financial institutions' customer protection systems, reflecting safety-net provisions legislated over time, usually in reaction to specific financial collapses. Besides these explicit guarantees, regulatory bodies can attempt the rescue of failing financial enterprises, using many tools authorized by laws and regulations and often implemented in the background. Such tools include liquidity lending, arranging memoranda of understanding, issuing cease-and-desist orders against risky practices, and arranging mergers of weak entities into stronger institutions. If the entire financial economy seems threatened by pending collapse of either a sizeable financial institution that is "too big to fail" or many financial businesses collectively, the Federal Reserve (Fed) can step in as the lender of last resort to avert serious adverse consequences for the economy (e.g., use of the Fed's liberal bank liquidity policy immediately after the 911 attacks, and currently the subprime meltdown led to failures of institutions once believed to be too big to fail—Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG—all of which were or are being assisted by the federal government). Moreover, Congress may have to provide emergency funding when parts of the federal safety net are under severe pressure. The cleanup of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, required appropriated funds plus a new deposit insurance fund and regulator. A more recent example is the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which provided $700 billion to purchase distressed assets, and has been used to make direct capital investments in troubled financial institutions. An important conceptual distinction between support structures is who ultimately pays for the protection. Lawmakers originally created federal deposit insurance using a "user fee" model of insurance, in which the government owned and operated each insurance system and charged member banks for its use. Following the banking failures of the late 1980s ─ early 1990s, legislation moved deposit protection part way toward an alternative "mutual" model, in which the burden of financing the system falls more clearly on the banking industry. Mutual institutions are owned by their customers, such as saving associations' depositors and insurance companies' policyholders. As a result, some analysts now claim that the banking industry "owns" the deposit insurance fund (DIF) in mutual mode. However, when the FDIC begins to draw on its credit line at the U.S. Treasury, which it has never done before, the use of the credit line would move the system back to the user fee model as the banks would have to pay their FDIC assessments as well as pay back the borrowed funds to the federal government, which owns and operates the DIF. The ultimate guarantor of deposit insurance is the economic power of the federal government, particularly the power to tax. History has shown that deposit guarantees by governments beneath the federal level have universally been inadequate to prevent panics, runs, and severe economic damage when called upon. Industry-sponsored and state-level programs have contained the collapses of their covered entities only if the damages have been small. The troubled pension benefit arrangement remains mainly in user fee mode. Credit union share insurance, in contrast, more nearly follows the mutual model. Likewise, state insurance company guaranty and federally sponsored securities investor protection arrangements follow the mutual model. However, in the current financial crisis, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) has joined the FDIC in accepting an increased line of credit from the U.S. Treasury to resolve failing corporate credit unions and restoring the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF). Corporate credit unions are owned by retail or natural credit unions. Corporate credit unions operate as wholesale credit unions providing financing, investments, and clearing services for natural credit unions. It was the corporate credit unions that suffered most of the industry's losses in the current subprime foreclosure turmoil. Consequently, like the FDIC, when the NCUA uses its U.S. Treasury credit line to stabilize the NCUSIF, it too would move closer to the user fee mode. The following tabulation lists the major elements and components of these safety nets. Table 1 compares account protection at depository institutions. Table 2 does the same for the non-depository supports. Readers may obtain further analysis of each system via the websites of the administering agencies noted. On October 23, 2008, in the midst of the current financial crisis, the FDIC announced its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee program to help unfreeze the U.S. short-term credit markets. At the time, financial institutions were not lending to each other, especially in the commercial paper market, which was almost completely frozen. The two-part program temporarily guarantees all new senior unsecured debt and fully guarantees funds in certain non-interest bearing accounts at FDIC-insured institutions issued between October 14, 2008, and June 30, 2009, with guarantees expiring no later than June 30, 2012. The FDIC expects these guarantees would restore the necessary confidence for investors to begin investing in obligations of depository institutions. Evidence suggests that these short-term markets returned to normal after the TLG program was implemented. The second part of the FDIC's TLG program is to guarantee 100% of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts held in insured depository institutions until December 31, 2009. This addresses the concern that many small business accounts, such as payroll accounts, frequently exceed the current maximum deposit insurance limit of $250,000. The TLG program is being paid for by additional fees placed on depository institutions that use these guarantees, not taxpayers.

After the onset of the current financial crisis and economic contraction, the 111th Congress increased some of the long-standing provisions that protect account holders from risk. Specifically, provisions in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) and the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (HFSTHA; P.L. 111-22) increased account holders' protection. Both laws raised the maximum deposit account insurance to $250,000, and the HFSTHA extended the higher level of risk protection until 2013. Lawmakers have long recognized the importance of protecting some forms of financial savings from risk. Such provisions apply to deposits in banks and thrift institutions and credit union "shares." Remedial and other safety net features also cover insurance contracts, certain securities accounts, and even defined-benefit pensions. Questions over how to fund and guarantee Social Security, along with the troubles of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, have renewed interest in these arrangements. This report portrays the salient features and legislation of account protection provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), state insurance guaranty funds, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. It provides a discussion of the FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLG) , which extends unlimited temporary deposit guarantees to certain depositors and debt held in insured depository institutions. Overall, the report provides a summary of the major federal risk protections for account holders. This report will be updated as appropriate.

GSA estimated that federal agencies spent about $1.6 billion during fiscal year 2009 purchasing office supplies from more than 239,000 vendors. Federal agencies can use a variety of different approaches to purchase office supplies. For relatively small purchases, generally up to $3,000, authorized personnel can use their government purchase cards. For larger purchases, agencies may use other procedures under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, such as awarding a contract or establishing blanket purchase agreements. Alternatively, agencies can use the Federal Supply Schedule program (schedules program), a simplified process for procuring office supplies where GSA awards contracts to multiple vendors for a wide range of commercially available goods and services to take advantage of price discounts equal to those that vendors offer their “most favored customers.” The schedules program can leverage the government’s significant aggregate buying power. In addition, agencies can make office supply purchases under GSA’s new initiative, the OS II program. The OS II program is an outgrowth of an earlier attempt by GSA to offer agencies a simplified process for fulfilling their repetitive supply needs while obtaining prices that are lower than vendors’ schedule prices. By July 2010, GSA had awarded 15 blanket purchase agreementswhich went to small businesses. competitively to support the OS II initiative, 13 of For its study, GSA reviewed office supply purchases in 14 categories of mostly consumable office supplies, ranging from paper and writing instruments to calendars and filing supplies. The report did not include non-consumable items such as office furniture and computers because they are not part of the standard industry definition of office supplies. The GSA report estimated that during fiscal year 2009, the 10 agencies the highest spending on office supplies accounted for about $1.3 billion, or about 81 percent, of the total $1.6 billion spent governmentwide in the 14 categories of office supplies. Further, it stated that about 58 percent of office supply purchases were made outside of the GSA schedules program, mostly at retail stores. Additionally, GSA reported that agencies paid an average of 75 percent more (a price premium) than schedule prices and 86 percent more than OS II prices, for their retail purchases. Departments of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, State, Health and Human Services, Justice, Commerce, and Agriculture. While the GSA report acknowledged some limitations with the data, we identified additional data and other limitations that lead us to question the magnitude of some of GSA’s reported price premiums. We were not able to fully quantify the impact of these limitations. Additionally, other agencies questioned the study’s specific findings related to price premiums, but their own studies of price premiums support GSA’s conclusion that better prices can be obtained through consolidated, leveraged purchasing. Since purchasing of office supplies is highly decentralized, GSA obtained data for its study from multiple disparate sources, such as the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation, the Department of Defense (DOD) electronic mall, and purchase card data from commercial banks. To determine the amount of funds spent on office supplies and to conduct related analyses, GSA had to sort through about 7 million purchase transactions involving over 12 million items. The agency took steps to clean the data prior to using them. For example, it removed duplicate purchases and items that did not meet its definition of office supplies. The GSA study noted that the estimated amount of funds and related calculations were to be considered sound and reliable estimates derived from rigorous data analysis techniques. We also identified additional data and other limitations in GSA’s study, including: GSA may not have been able to properly control for purchases of different quantities of the same item. Because there is no consistency in how part numbers are assigned, manufacturers may assign the same part number to both individual items and to packages of items in some cases. GSA tried to exclude transactions that had large variations in retail prices for apparently identical items to control for these occurrences. However, when we reviewed data for 10 items within the writing instruments category, we found that retail prices for 6 of the 10 items varied by more than 300 percent, such as Rollerball pens, which ranged from $9.96 to $44.96. Two different formulas were used for calculating price premium estimates. However, the study only described one of these specific formulas. The use of the unreported formula did not have a substantial impact on the retail price premium calculations for most categories of office supplies or the overall conclusions of the study, but the GSA report could have been more complete had it fully disclosed all the formulas used for all categories of office supplies. GSA did not identify or collect any data about price comparisons conducted by the purchase cardholders. GSA concluded that purchase cardholders compared costs at some level prior to making a purchase based on its interviews with senior-level acquisition officials. While these officials may have had a broad understanding of agency procurement policies and practices, they were not representative of the approximately 270,000 credit cardholders making purchasing decisions. GSA officials said that given the reporting time frame for the study, they did not have the resources or time needed to survey a representative sample of the 270,000 purchase cardholders. Additionally, officials from the Departments of Air Force, Army, Navy, and Homeland Security believed that the price premiums reported by GSA when buying outside the GSA schedule were overstated based upon their own studies. For example, the Air Force determined that the OS II blanket purchase agreements could save about 7 percent in a study of the 125 most commonly purchased items. However, these agencies agreed with GSA’s overall conclusion that better prices can be obtained through leveraged buys and that prices available through the new OS II blanket purchase agreements were better than the prices available from their existing agency blanket purchase agreements. According to initial available data, GSA’s OS II blanket purchase agreements have produced savings. The OS II initiative, more so than past efforts, is demonstrating that leveraged buying can produce greater savings and has provided improvements for managing ongoing and future strategic sourcing initiatives. GSA is using a combination of agency and vendor involvement to identify key requirements and cost drivers, increase the ease of use, and obtain the data necessary to manage the program. On the basis of the sales data provided by OS II vendors, GSA estimates the federal government saved $39.2 million between June 2010 and March 2012 by using the 15 blanket purchase agreements established for this program. These savings were estimated by comparing the lowest prices of a set—or market basket—of over 400 items available on GSA’s schedules program contracts before OS II with prices and discounts being paid for the same items on the OS II blanket purchase agreements. Importantly, and unlike GSA’s report, GSA’s conclusions about savings realized under OS II are based on data from vendors—which they are required to collect and provide in the normal course of business—and not on data collected after the fact from sources not designed to produce information needed to estimate savings. GSA’s comparison of the market basket of best schedule prices against the OS II blanket purchase agreement vendors’ prices found that prices offered by OS II vendors were an average of 8 percent lower. The average savings, however, is expected to fluctuate somewhat as the OS II initiative continues to be implemented and the mix of vendors, products, and agencies changes. For example, GSA found that savings, as a percentage, declined slightly as agencies with historically strong office supplies management programs increased their use of OS II. Conversely, they expect the savings percentage to increase as agencies without strong office supplies management programs increase their use. In addition to the savings from the blanket purchase agreements, GSA representatives told us that they are also seeing prices decrease on schedules program contracts as vendors that were not selected for the OS II program react to the additional price competition created by the OS II initiative. The agency decided to extend the OS II blanket purchase agreements for an additional year after negotiating additional price discounts of about 3.9 percent on average with 13 of the 15 vendors in the program. The blanket purchase agreements also include tiered discounts, which apply when specific sales volume thresholds are met. Sales realized by 5 of the vendors reached the first tier discount level as of April 2012, and the vendors have since adjusted their prices to provide the corresponding price discounts. GSA anticipates that additional vendors will reach sales volumes that exceed the first tier discount threshold in the first option year, which will trigger additional discounts. An additional benefit of OS II may be lower contract management costs, as agencies can rely on GSA to administer the program instead of their own staffs. While this may create some additional burden for GSA, officials believe the overall government costs to administer office supply purchases should decrease. GSA has incorporated a range of activities representative of a strategic procurement approach into the OS II initiative. These activities range from obtaining a better picture of spending on services, to taking an enterprisewide approach, to developing new ways of doing business. They also involve supply chain management activities. All of these activities involve some level of centralized oversight and management. GSA is capturing lessons learned from OS II and is attempting to incorporate these lessons into other strategic sourcing initiatives. GSA obtained commitments from agencies and helped set goals for discounts to let businesses know that the agencies were serious in their commitment to the blanket purchase agreements. This also helped GSA determine the number of blanket purchase agreements that would be awarded. As part of the overall strategy, a GSA commodity council identified five overarching goals, in addition to savings, for the OS II initiative. These goals and the methods used to address them are in table 1. Several new business practices have been incorporated in the OS II program to meet the goals. For example, to meet the capture data goal, GSA is collecting data on purchases and vendor performance that are assimilated and tracked through dashboards, which are high-level indicators of overall program performance. The dashboard information is used by the GSA team members responsible for oversight to ensure that the vendors are meeting terms and conditions of the blanket purchase agreements and that the program is meeting overall goals. The information is also shared with agencies using OS II. Our review of GSA’s OS II vendor files found that GSA has taken a more active role in oversight and is holding the vendors accountable for performance. For example, GSA has issued Letters of Concern to four vendors and has issued one Cure Notice to a vendor. These letters and notices are used to inform vendors that the agency has identified a problem with the vendor’s compliance. To support the OS II management responsibilities, GSA charges a 2 percent management fee, which is incorporated into the vendors’ prices. This fee, which is higher than the 0.75 percent fee normally charged on GSA schedules program sales, covers the additional program costs, such as the cost of the six officials responsible for administering the 15 blanket purchase agreements, as well as their contractor support. In addition, to increase savings and ease of use, OS II includes a point of sale discount, under which blanket purchase agreement prices are automatically charged whenever a government purchase card is used for an item covered by the blanket purchase agreement rather than having the buyers ask for a discount. Additionally, purchases are automatically tax exempt if the purchases are made using a government purchase card. State sales taxes were identified by GSA’s report as costing the federal agencies at least $7 million dollars in fiscal year 2009. GSA’s experience with OS II is being applied to other strategic sourcing initiatives. For example, GSA set up a commodity council for the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative Second Generation Domestic Delivery Services II program. The council helped identify program requirements and provide input on how the program operates. GSA’s office supplies report contained some data and other limitations, but it showed that federal agencies were not using a consistent approach in both where and how they bought office supplies and often paid a price premium as a result of these practices. The magnitude of the price premium may be debatable, but other agencies that have conducted studies came to the same basic conclusion about the savings potential from leveraged buying. The GSA study helped set the course for a more strategic approach to buying office supplies—an approach that provides data to oversee the performance of vendors, monitor prices, and estimate savings. Additional savings are expected as more government agencies participate in the OS II initiative and further leverage the government’s buying power. Chairman Mulvaney, Ranking Member Chu, and the Members of the Subcommittee on Contracting and Workforce, this completes my prepared statement. I am happy to answer any questions you have. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

The GSA estimated that federal agencies spent about $1.6 billion during fiscal year 2009 purchasing office supplies from more than 239,000 vendors. Concerned that federal agencies may not be getting the best prices available, Congress directed GSA to study office supply purchases by the 10 largest federal agencies. GSA delivered the results of its study in November 2010. The study also discussed GSA’s efforts to implement an initiative focused on leveraging the government’s buying power to realize savings when buying office supplies, known as OS II. Congress directed GAO to assess the GSA study, with particular attention to the potential for savings. This testimony is based on the findings and conclusions of GAO’s December 2011 report, G AO-12-178, and focuses on (1) the support for the findings and conclusions in GSA’s study, and (2) how GSA's new office supply contracts support the goal of leveraging the government’s buying power to achieve savings. In 2010, the General Services Administration’s (GSA) pricing study found that during fiscal year 2009, the 10 largest federal agencies accounted for about $1.3 billion, or about 81 percent, of the total $1.6 billion spent governmentwide in 14 categories of office supplies. About 58 percent of their office supply purchases were made outside of the GSA schedules program—a simplified process to take advantage of price discounts equal to those that vendors offer “most favored customers.” Most of these purchases were made at retail stores. GSA also reported that agencies paid an average of 75 percent more (a price premium) than schedule prices for their retail purchases and 86 percent more compared to Office Supplies II (OS II) prices. While the GSA acknowledged some limitations with the study data, we identified additional data and other limitations that lead us to question the magnitude of some of GSA’s reported price premiums and assertions. More specifically, we determined that the study may not have properly controlled for quantities, used two different formulas to calculate price premium estimates, and relied on interviews with senior level acquisition officials instead of purchasers to determine whether buyers compared prices before making purchases. We were not able to fully quantify the impact of these limitations. Additionally, other agencies questioned the study’s specific findings related to price premiums, but their own studies of price premiums support GSA’s conclusion that better prices can be obtained through consolidated, leveraged purchasing. Available data show that the OS II initiative has produced savings of $39.2 million from June 2010 through March 2012. According to GSA, the OS II initiative is demonstrating that leveraged buying can produce greater savings and has provided improvements for managing ongoing and future strategic sourcing initiatives. For example, GSA reports that OS II allowed it to negotiate discounts with vendors who were selected for the initiative. As governmentwide sales surpass certain targets, additional discounts are applied to purchase prices. Further, OS II has spurred competition among schedule vendors that were not selected for OS II, resulting in decreased schedule prices. The initiative is also expected to lower governmentwide supply costs through more centralized contract management. Another key aspect of the initiative is that participating vendors provide sales and other information to GSA to help monitor prices, savings, and vendor performance. Finally, GSA is capturing lessons learned from OS II and is attempting to incorporate these lessons into other strategic sourcing initiatives. GAO did not make any recommendations in its report, and is not making any in this testimony.

Short selling was best described by Daniel Drew, the Gilded Age speculator and robber baron: "He that sells what isn't his'n, must buy it back or go to prison." Short sellers borrow shares from a broker, sell them, and make a profit if the share price subsequently drops, allowing them to buy back the same number of shares for less money. In other words, short selling is a bet that the price of a stock will fall. Short sellers have always been unpopular on Wall Street. Like skeletons at the feast, they seem to stand against rising share values, expanding wealth, and national prosperity. However, most market participants recognize that they provide a valuable service to the extent that they identify companies and industries that are overvalued by investors in the grip of irrational exuberance. They may also provide a curb against manipulators who spread false news or otherwise attempt to artificially boost a stock price. By bringing such valuations down to earth, short selling can prevent economically wasteful over-allocation of resources to firms and sectors. Another persistent complaint against short sellers is that they cause artificial price volatility. A form of manipulation common in the 19 th century was the "bear raid"—a gang of speculators would sell a stock short, causing the price to drop. They would follow with another wave of short sales, depressing the price still further, and so on, until the stock's price was driven to the floor. In the 1930s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a regulation to prevent bear raiding. The "uptick rule" stated that a short sale may occur only if the last price movement in a stock's price was upward. This prevents short sellers from piling onto a falling stock and setting off a downward price spiral. In the words of a standard securities law textbook, the tick test (and related rules) "seem pretty well to have taken the caffeine out of the short sale." In 2007, the SEC concluded that growth in the market made the rule unnecessary, and it was repealed. However, in recent years, complaints about manipulative short selling have reappeared. Many shareholders and officers of smaller firms have identified "naked" short selling as a source of price manipulation and have criticized the SEC's enforcement record. At the same time, the SEC has identified short selling in connection with spreading rumors as an abuse that may raise fears about the solvency of the target firm and cut off its access to credit, potentially leading to the destruction of the firm, as was the case with Bear Stearns in March 2008. A short sale always involves the sale of shares that the seller does not own. The buyer, however, expects to receive real shares. Where do those shares come from? Normally, they are borrowed by the broker from another investor or from a brokerage's own account. This is usually not difficult to do if the shares are issued by a large company, where millions of shares change hands daily and where many shares are not registered to the actual owners, but are held in "street name," that is, in the broker's account. With smaller corporations, however, the number of shares in circulation may be limited, and brokers may find it difficult to locate shares to deliver to the buyer in a short sale transaction. When shares are not located to "cover" a short sale, the short position is said to be naked. If shares are not found by the time the transaction must be settled, there is a "failure to deliver" shares to the buyer. If it occurs sporadically and on a small scale, naked short selling does not raise serious manipulation concerns. However, when the number of shares sold short represents a significant fraction of all shares outstanding, there may be a strong impact on the share price. In such cases, when naked short selling creates a virtually unlimited quantity of shares, a market based on supply and demand can be seriously distorted. The SEC notes that "naked short sellers enjoy greater leverage than if they were required to borrow securities and deliver within a reasonable time period, and they may use this additional leverage to engage in trading activities that deliberately depress the price of a security." Opponents of naked short selling also charge that by permitting short sales to occur when there is no possibility of actually delivering shares to the buyers, brokers and dealers accommodate manipulation. When naked short selling drives prices down, holders of the stock understandably feel cheated. They do not believe the stock is overvalued; they are not selling; but the price drops anyway. It is important to note that naked short selling is not always evidence of intent to manipulate prices. Under certain circumstances, a market maker may engage in naked short selling to stabilize the market. For example, assume that there is a sudden flurry of buy orders for a stock. The market maker may judge the buying interest to be temporary and not justified by any real news about the company's prospects. It may be the result of a questionable press release or a rumor in an Internet chat room. The market maker may choose to sell short to avoid what in its view would be an unjustified run-up in the stock's price. In this situation, naked short selling by the market maker may protect investors against manipulation. It is also worth noting that while restrictions on short selling discourage certain forms of manipulation, they may encourage or facilitate others. Manipulations that involve artificially inflating stock prices are probably more common than techniques (like naked shorting) that seek to depress them. Rumors, false press releases, and unexpected purchases may all cause sudden run-ups of stock prices, which may be followed (in the classic "pump-and-dump" fraud) by sudden collapse, as the manipulators sell their shares to the unwary. Without short selling as a counterweight, the magnitude and duration of such fraudulent run-ups are likely to be greater Until July 2008, the SEC viewed the problem of naked shorting as largely confined to smaller firms, particularly small-capitalization "penny" stocks listed on the Nasdaq bulletin board market (OTCBB). In these companies, the bulk of outstanding shares may be owned by corporate insiders or by securities dealers who act as market makers, so that relatively few shares are available for purchase on the open market. This means that transactions have a proportionately greater impact on the stock price than do trades of the same size in the shares of a larger company, making manipulation easier. In addition to OTCBB stocks, however, smaller companies listed on the exchanges or the Nasdaq national market were also seen as vulnerable to short selling abuse. After several years of deliberation, the SEC in 2004 adopted rules designed to control abusive naked short selling. Regulation SHO took effect on January 3, 2005. The new regulation replaced existing exchange and Nasdaq rules with a uniform national standard. Under Regulation SHO, a broker may not accept a short sale order from a customer, or effect a short sale for its own account, unless it has either borrowed the security, or made a bona fide arrangement to borrow it; or has reasonable grounds to believe that it can locate the security, borrow it, and deliver it to the buyer by the date delivery is due; and has documented compliance with the above. The appearance of a stock on an exchange's "easy to borrow" list constituted reasonable grounds for believing that the stock can be located. Stocks on such lists tend to be highly capitalized, with large numbers of shares in circulation. If a broker executes a short sale, and then fails to deliver shares to the purchaser, further restrictions on short selling may come into force. If the "fail to deliver" position is 10,000 shares or more, for five consecutive trading days, and the position amounts to at least 0.5% of total shares outstanding, the stock becomes a threshold security . The exchanges and Nasdaq are now required to publish daily lists of threshold securities. Regulation SHO specifies that if a fail to deliver position in a threshold security persists for 13 trading days, the broker (or the broker's clearing house) must close the short position by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity. After the 13 days have elapsed, the broker may not accept any more short sale orders until the fail to deliver position is closed by purchasing securities. The rules include exemptions for market makers engaged in bona fide market-making activities, and for certain transactions between brokers. The adoption of Regulation SHO did not put an end to investor complaints about naked short selling. Complaints were heard that the SEC did not enforce the rules vigorously enough and that some brokers evaded the 13-day requirement by passing fail-to-deliver positions from one firm to another. The SEC staff has monitored the incidence of fail to delivers after the effective date of Regulation SHO, and, in July 2006, Chairman Cox reported that the rule "appears to be significantly reducing fails to deliver without disruption to the markets." Nevertheless, some further amendments to Regulation SHO were considered. In July 2006, the SEC proposed rules to close two "loopholes" in Regulation SHO, which it called responsible for the persistence of fail to deliver positions in certain stocks. Under the proposed rules, the current exemption for options market makers would be restricted. Second, a "grandfather" provision in the original rule—which exempted short positions that had been established before a stock was placed on the threshold securities list from the requirement that fail to deliver positions be closed out after 13 consecutive trading days—would be eliminated. In August 2007, the SEC adopted the proposed rule abolishing the grandfather provision. When a stock goes onto the threshold list, all short positions in the stock will be subject to the 13-day close-out requirement. The SEC did not adopt the proposal relating to options market makers. As financial companies came under pressure from tight credit markets in late 2007 and 2008, concerns emerged about manipulative short sellers spreading rumors about firms' creditworthiness and liquidity. Despite regulators' assurances that Bear Stearns, a leading investment bank, had adequate capital and liquidity reserves, the firm was destroyed in March 2008 by the equivalent of a bank run: market participants, fearing that the firm might not be able to meet its obligations, refused to extend credit on any terms. The Federal Reserve was forced to arrange a hasty merger with JP Morgan Chase, which acquired Bear Stearns on condition that the Fed purchase $29 billion of risky mortgage assets. All large financial firms finance their operations by issuing short-term debt, which must be continually refinanced, or rolled over. Thus, they are vulnerable to "nonbank runs"—they cannot survive long if markets lose confidence and become unwilling to provide new funds. In July 2008, share prices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant government-sponsored enterprises that hold about $1.5 trillion in mortgage-backed assets, plunged, and fears arose that they might go the way of Bear Stearns. On July 15, the SEC issued an emergency order banning naked short sales of the shares of Fannie, Freddie, and 17 other large financial institutions. Under the terms of the order, no short sale of the stock of any of the 19 listed firms may occur unless the seller has actually borrowed (or arranged to borrow) the stock and delivers the stock to the buyer on the regular settlement date. The SEC explained the rationale for its unusual action: False rumors can lead to a loss of confidence in our markets. Such loss of confidence can lead to panic selling, which may be further exacerbated by "naked" short selling. As a result, the prices of securities may artificially and unnecessarily decline well below the price level that would have resulted from the normal price discovery process. If significant financial institutions are involved, this chain of events can threaten disruption of our markets. The events preceding the sale of The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. are illustrative of the market impact of rumors. During the week of March 10, 2008, rumors spread about liquidity problems at Bear Stearns, which eroded investor confidence in the firm. As Bear Stearns' stock price fell, its counterparties became concerned, and a crisis of confidence occurred late in the week. In particular, counterparties to Bear Stearns were unwilling to make secured funding available to Bear Stearns on customary terms. In light of the potentially systemic consequences of a failure of Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve took emergency action. The SEC's intervention has been criticized by some who believe that financial stocks had been battered not by false rumors, but by realistic assessments of firms' underlying financial weakness. Short selling, in this view, is simply market discipline at work. One view is that the SEC's objective of raising financial stock prices itself amounts to market manipulation. The SEC's original order, issued on July 15, was extended through August 12, 2008. On September 18, 2008, as financial stocks continued to plunge, the SEC issued another, much more sweeping emergency order. All short selling (naked or not) of the shares of more than 700 financial firms was banned. The rationale was the same as for the earlier action: whatever benefits short selling might provide in terms of price efficiency were far outweighed by the possible damage to the financial system and the economy if major firms were swept away by panic. The emergency order expired October 8, 2008. On October 1, 2008, in addition to extending the short sale ban announced on September 18, the SEC adopted a "interim final" rule that in effect banned naked short selling in all stocks. This order, in the form of an interim final rule, requires that when a failure to deliver shares within the normal three-day settlement period occurs, the seller's broker must immediately purchase or borrow securities and close out the fail to deliver position by no later than the beginning of trading on the next business day. Failure to comply means that the broker cannot sell that stock short either for its own account or for customers, unless the shares are not only located but also pre-borrowed. Failure to deliver shares also exposes brokers to fines and other sanctions. The SEC also adopted Rule 10b-21, a naked short selling anti-fraud rule, covering short sellers who deceive broker-dealers or any other market participants about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement. The rule makes clear that such persons are violating the law when they fail to deliver. On July 27, 2009, the SEC made the interim rule permanent. In addition, the SEC announced that it was working with the stock markets to improve disclosure about short selling. Information on the amount of short selling of individual stock will be made public on a daily basis. After one month, details of specific short trades will be made public, but without identifying the individual short sellers.

Short sellers borrow stock, sell it, and hope to profit if they can buy back the same number of shares later at a lower price. A short sale is a bet that a stock's price will fall. A short sale is said to be "naked" if the broker does not in fact borrow shares to deliver to the buyer. When executed on a large scale, naked short sales can constitute a large portion of total shares outstanding, and can put serious downward pressure on a stock's price. Critics of the practice characterize it as a form of illegal price manipulation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2004 adopted Regulation SHO, a set of rules designed to control short selling abuses, focusing on small-capitalization stocks where the number of shares held by the public was relatively small. Until the current financial crisis, the SEC did not view short selling of large, blue-chip stocks as a problem. In July 2008, however, the SEC temporarily banned naked short sales of the stock of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 17 other large financial institutions. On September 18, 2008, the SEC banned all short selling of the shares of more than 700 financial companies in an emergency action that expired on October 8, 2008. On October 1, 2008, the SEC adopted an interim rule requiring short sellers' brokers to actually borrow shares to deliver to buyers, within one day after the expiration the normal three-day settlement time frame. The rule was made permanent on July 27, 2009, and it applies to all stocks. This report will be updated as events warrant.

As parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must grant immediate and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the products of other Members with respect to customs duties and import charges, internal taxes and regulations, and other trade-related matters. Thus, whenever a WTO Member accords a benefit to a product of one country, whether it is a WTO Member or not, the Member must accord the same treatment to the like product of all other WTO Members. Free trade agreements (FTAs) are inconsistent with this obligation because of the favorable treatment granted by FTA parties to each other's goods. FTAs, however, have generally been viewed as vehicles of trade liberalization; therefore, the GATT contains an exception for such agreements. Article XXIV of the GATT requires that parties must notify the WTO of these agreements, which are then subject to WTO review. The exception applies both to completed FTAs as well as to the interim agreements leading to their formation. The increasing number of regional agreements and the substantial amount of trade covered by them led GATT parties to try to strengthen the existing multilateral discipline during the GATT Uruguay Round. GATT parties have never expressly disapproved an FTA, despite misgivings about the consistency of particular provisions with GATT requirements. The Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV (the 1994 Understanding) attempts to increase multilateral surveillance over regional trade arrangements by "clarifying the criteria and procedures for the assessment of new or enlarged agreements, and improving the transparency of all XXIV agreements." In 1996, WTO Members created the permanent Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), which conducts reviews of new and existing FTAs and studies the overall impact of such agreements on the world trading system. Further improvement in this area is also a part of the negotiating mandate for the WTO Doha Round. On December 14, 2006, the WTO General Council established a new transparency mechanism for FTAs which, among other things, provides for early notification of FTA negotiations. To comply with Article XXIV, FTAs must meet four fundamental requirements: (1) duties and other restrictive commercial regulations must be eliminated; (2) substantially all trade must be covered; (3) external tariffs and commercial regulations—that is, measures applicable to nonparties—may not be higher or more restrictive than those in effect before the FTA or interim agreement was formed; and (4) interim agreements must contain a plan and schedule to achieve these goals within a reasonable period of time. Even though the GATT requires that FTAs eliminate tariffs and restrictive regulations, it allows FTA parties to apply tariffs, restrictions, and GATT-inconsistent measures imposed under specified GATT articles, "where necessary." WTO Members entering into an FTA or an interim agreement must promptly notify the WTO and provide information that will enable reports and recommendations to be made to WTO Members. FTA agreements have traditionally been examined by ad hoc working parties that prepare reports on their findings and present them to WTO Members for consideration. The 1994 Understanding provides that working parties will report to the WTO Council on Trade in Goods, which will make appropriate recommendations to WTO Members. Under Article XXIV, paragraph 10, WTO Members may, by a two-thirds vote, approve proposals that do not fully comply with Article XXIV, providing they lead to the formation of an FTA as contemplated by the Article. Parties to a noncomplying agreement may also seek a waiver of obligations under Article IX of the WTO Agreement, which allows waivers in "exceptional circumstances" if agreed to by three-fourths of WTO Members. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which also contains a general MFN obligation, provides an exception for trade liberalizing regional service agreements, so long as barriers and other restrictions on trade in services be eliminated immediately or within a reasonable time frame and, the agreement provides substantial sectoral coverage. In addition, nonparties must not be subject to higher or more restrictive trade in services barriers as a result of the agreement. Finally, parties to the agreement must notify the Council for Trade in Services of the existence of such an agreement and, if implementing on a time frame, report periodically to the Council. The GATS also contains an exception for agreements establishing full integration of the parties' labor markets, provided that the agreements exempt citizens of parties from residency and work permit requirements. One of the most problematic aspects of Article XXIV, particularly as it applies to the exclusion of economic sectors from FTAs, is the meaning of the term "substantially all trade." The term has not been defined either by GATT Parties acting jointly or by GATT working parties, whose reports have tended to be inconclusive. The 1994 Understanding does not expressly define the term; however, the preamble states that the trade expansion to which regional agreements contribute "is increased if the elimination between the constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, and diminished if any major sector is excluded." In examining whether FTAs comply with this obligation, working parties have taken into account both quantitative and qualitative factors. The working parties did express concerns regarding the exclusion of certain agricultural trade in the U.S. FTAs with Israel and Canada, but neither panel recommended the disapproval of the FTAs, and both reports were subsequently adopted. Article XIX of the GATT, as expanded upon in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, allows parties to impose temporary restrictions on imports in the event of import surges. Article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement states the general rule that a WTO Member "may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has determined ... that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products." Article XIX is not listed as an FTA exception in Article XXIV, paragraph 8(b), and the Safeguards Agreement leaves open the question of the relationship of safeguards to FTAs. WTO Members have expressed differing views on the subject, arguing that (1) safeguards may not be imposed against FTA partners because such measures are not exempted in paragraph 8(b); (2) safeguards must be applied on an MFN basis, in part because of the requirement in Article 2.2 of the Safeguards Agreement that a safeguard "be applied to a product being imported irrespective of source"; and (3) safeguards are allowed among FTA parties so long as third-party rights are not infringed. While not ruling on the relationship of Article XXIV to the imposition of safeguards, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have identified a requirement of "parallelism" in the Safeguards Agreement dictating that if serious injury were to be based on all imports, including those from the FTA, the safeguards should apply to the same imports. For example, in the WTO challenge to the now-removed safeguard on steel imports imposed by the United States in March 2002, the panel, as upheld by the Appellate Body, faulted the United States for including the imports of affected products from U.S. FTA partners in its investigation of whether increased imports were the cause of serious injury, while excluding these countries' imports from the remedial safeguard without providing a "reasoned and adequate" explanation for why the imports covered by the safeguard alone satisfied the requirements for imposing the measure. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as U.S. FTAs with Israel, Canada, Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman and Peru, and the Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), contain safeguards provisions for originating goods. Safeguards provisions are also included in recently signed FTAs with Colombia, Panama and the Republic of Korea, all of which are awaiting approval by Congress. The 1994 Understanding on Article XXIV, at paragraph 12, provides that WTO dispute settlement procedures may be invoked with respect to matters arising under Article XXIV provisions relating to free-trade areas and interim agreements. The provision clarifies that the review provisions of Article XXIV are not the only vehicle for examining the compatibility of FTAs with GATT rules. WTO dispute settlement is also available with respect to all obligations under the GATS. Both the U.S.-Israel FTA and the U.S.-Canada FTA were presented to the GATT Contracting Parties as interim agreements for the formation of a free-trade area. The NAFTA, and FTAs with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, and the DR-CAFTA were submitted both as free trade and services agreements. A draft report on NAFTA was issued for consideration by the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements in September 2000. The United States has also entered into FTAs with Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama and South Korea. While implementing legislation for the FTAs with Oman and Peru has been enacted into public law, neither FTA has yet entered into force. Implementing legislation for the FTA with Colombia was introduced April 8, 2008 ( H.R. 5724 ; S. 2830 ), but expedited legislative procedures that would have applied to the bill were suspended by the House on April 10, 2008 ( H.Res. 1092 ). Implementing bills for the FTAs with Panama and South Korea have not yet been introduced. The Administration has also begun negotiating FTAs with Thailand, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).

World Trade Organization (WTO) members must grant immediate and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the products of other members with respect to tariffs and other trade matters. Free trade agreements (FTAs) are facially inconsistent with this obligation because they grant countries who are party to the agreement more favorable trade benefits than those extended to other trading partners. Due to the prevailing view that such arrangements are trade-enhancing, Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contains a specific exception for FTAs. The growing number of regional trade agreements, however, has made it difficult for the WTO to efficiently monitor the consistency of FTAs with the provided exemption. Negotiations on rules for regional trade agreements are part of the WTO Doha Round; separately, the WTO General Council in December 2006 established a new transparency mechanism for FTAs which provides for early notification by WTO Members of FTA negotiations. The United States is presently a party to nine bilateral or regional trade agreements. While Congress has approved FTAs with Oman and Peru FTAs, these have not yet entered into force. In addition, the Administration has entered into FTAs with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea FTAs, all of which are pending approval by Congress. Implementing legislation for the FTA with Colombia was introduced April 8, 2008 (H.R. 5724, S. 2830), but expedited legislative procedures that would have applied to the House bill were suspended by the House on April 10, 2008 (H.Res. 1092). The Administration has also been involved in FTA negotiations with several other countries, including Thailand, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and the South African Customs Union. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) task forces have been designated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide specialized assistance after buildings or other structures collapse. The task forces work to stabilize damaged structures, locate and extricate victims, identify risks of additional collapses, and meet other needs at disaster sites. Each task force is comprised of at least 70 persons whose skills as unit members include engineering, emergency medicine, canine handling, firefighting, hazardous material handling, communications, logistics, and other areas. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers federal funding for the task forces. Although the USAR task forces are local government entities, they may be considered part of the federal emergency response network as they receive funding, training, and accreditation from the federal government. Congress authorized emergency search and rescue response activities in 1990 as part of an earthquake hazards reduction program, and federal involvement in the urban search and rescue field has increased since the establishment of the task forces in the 1990s. The successful deployment of task forces after the terrorist attacks of 2001, the bombing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, actions taken after Hurricane Katrina, and other disasters appears to have established general support for the task force concept. Most recently, task forces from New York, Virginia, Utah, California, and other states dedicated weeks to the recovery efforts in Haiti after earthquakes destroyed much of the nation's infrastructure. The Obama Administration requested $28 million for the task forces in FY2012, the same amount requested for FY2011. Both the FY2011 and the FY2012 requests are $4.5 million below the $32.5 million appropriated for FY2010 (a reduction in funding of almost 14%). As Congress debates the FY2012 budget it is unclear whether Congress will accept the Administration's proposal. During the course of the debate, several interim continuing resolutions have been introduced and enacted. Generally, continuing resolutions do not provide the same level of budget detail as regular appropriation bills, and USAR is not specifically mentioned in each resolution. However, there may be indications that Congress might provide funding above the Obama Administration request. For example, the continuing resolution H.R. 3082 provided $38 million for USAR task forces. Debate on the FY2012 USAR budget may involve a discussion on the appropriate level of federal financial support for teams that have a shared federal and local government responsibility. In a hearing on the FY2011 budget request, one Member noted that the cost of each team ranges from $1.8 million to $2.2 million per year, with the federal contribution accounting for roughly $1 million of that amount. Given the financial distress many local governments face at the present time, Members may question whether the existing level of federal support is sufficient for FY2012. Some may contend that the task forces, as shared responsibilities that provide assistance on a daily basis to their local jurisdictions, should be funded in large measure by local resources. It may also be noted that the training, equipment, and capabilities of the teams are, in large measure, associated with the federal support that has been provided in past years. The recognition given to the task forces' successful rescue efforts in Haiti, and extensive media coverage of their deployment to Japan, may presage calls for greater reliance on the USAR concept for international crises. The federal role in urban search and rescue efforts has developed slowly over the past decades. Its roots may be traced to congressional enactment of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 to stimulate research and planning related to preparation for, and response to, the devastation of earthquakes. The statute recognized that federal and non-federal entities, both public and private, must exercise responsibilities to reduce losses and disruptions from earthquakes. The primary mandate given to the President in the 1977 statute was to designate responsible agencies to establish and maintain "a coordinated earthquake hazards reduction program," one primarily oriented toward earthquake prediction and mitigation. Objectives that were to be incorporated in the program included "organizing emergency services" and educating the public and state and local officials on "ways to reduce the adverse consequences of an earthquake." Following establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979, Congress amended the 1977 statute to require FEMA to serve as lead agency for the program. More recently, the 108 th Congress transferred that authority to the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the Department of Commerce. The most significant program change relevant to the history of the USAR task forces was the 1980 requirement that the director of FEMA submit an "interagency coordination plan for earthquake hazard mitigation and response " [emphasis added] to Congress. This provision indicates that Congress, perhaps for the first time, authorized federal action and responsibility for disaster response efforts traditionally considered the responsibility of state and local governments. As a consequence of the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989, Congress and FEMA revisited the scope of NEHRP. FEMA established the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System that same year. Also in the aftermath of that earthquake, Congress enacted the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 1990. These amendments to the 1977 statute expanded the federal response authority to include the following charge: develop, and coordinate the execution of, federal interagency plans to respond to an earthquake, with specific plans for each high-risk area which ensure the availability of adequate emergency medical resources, search and rescue personnel and equipment, and emergency broadcast capability. In 2004, the 108 th Congress further amended the 1977 earthquake hazards act. The amendment required that the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness and Response, who also served as the director of FEMA, develop and coordinate the National Response Plan and support state and local plans "to ensure the availability of adequate emergency medical resources, search and rescue personnel and equipment, and emergency broadcast capability." The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 authorizes the FEMA Administrator to "lead the nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to ... the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents." In addition, the statute established in FEMA the Urban Search and Rescue Response System. Under this authority the FEMA Administrator, and his designees, coordinate the activities of USAR task forces when called to service. As indicated earlier in the report, in addition to domestic applications, USAR task force teams have also been deployed for international disasters. In 2010, four rescue teams were deployed to Haiti and in 2011 two task force teams were deployed to Japan. The assessments of search and rescue work performed in Haiti appear to be positive. However, rescue efforts by the task force teams in Japan were unable to locate survivors due to the sheer devastation of the event. DHS generally activates up to three task forces located closest to a disaster in the United States, if it requires the assistance of USAR task forces. Task forces must be able to deploy all personnel and equipment within six hours of activation, and must be able to sustain themselves for the first 72 hours of operations. Each task force must include a wide range of emergency response capabilities, a requirement that calls upon each task force member to complete a significant amount of training, and must consist of a deployable roster of at least 70 fully trained individuals. DHS has established a goal for each position on the task force to be staffed to ensure that each position has at least two alternates in reserve. Task force members must hold the following specialist skills: technical search, rescue, emergency medicine, structural engineering, logistics, communications, canine search, and hazardous materials handling. A task force must continue training and evaluation to maintain the accreditation status received from DHS. Members commonly work in 12-hour shifts. Task forces are supported by Incident Support Teams (ISTs), which provide technical assistance to state and local emergency managers, coordinate the activities of multiple task forces, and provide logistical support. Task forces remain on-site until the Incident Commander determines that no victims could possibly remain alive. Comprehensive information on USAR funding is not readily available, although some data have been published. Federal funding for the activities of the task forces in responding to catastrophes is provided through the Disaster Relief Fund administered by FEMA. In general, host employers of task force members (generally units of local government) serve as the primary source of funds for the task forces. The federal government provides funding for costs incurred when they are activated by FEMA. Federal funding to prepare, equip, and maintain USAR teams is provided through FEMA's Management and Administration account. Some historical information is available on funds Congress appropriates to ensure that the supplies and capabilities of the task forces are maintained. In FY1998 and FY1999 roughly $4 million in federal funding was provided to the teams. In FY2001, FEMA allocated approximately $6.4 million to the USAR program for training and equipment, which was distributed to the task forces based on need. According to program officials, state and local governments expected to pay 80% of the long-term costs associated with sponsoring a USAR task force. In FY2001, FEMA also allocated $3 million for upgrading six task forces to weapons of mass destruction capability (WMD). This new capability was meant to enable the task forces to search collapsed structures in an environment with chemical, biological, or radiological contamination. Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, USAR task forces received federal funds to cover costs associated with responding to the World Trade Center and Pentagon sites. Out of its discretionary funds in the emergency supplemental appropriation ( P.L. 107-38 ), the Administration allocated funds to the task forces. Congress also allocated roughly $32.4 million to the USAR program in FY2002 supplemental appropriations ( P.L. 107-206 ). For FY2003, Congress provided $60 million for the 28 existing task forces. The conference report accompanying the appropriation bill ( P.L. 108-7 ) stated that the funds could be used for operational costs, equipment, and, training. The report also emphasized readiness for operating in an environment contaminated by a weapon of mass destruction. In similar fashion, Congress appropriated another $60 million for the task forces in FY2004. President Bush did not request funding in FY2005 for the task forces, but Congress appropriated $30 million for the teams in the FY2005 appropriations legislation for homeland security. In recent years (FY2009 and FY2010) Congress has appropriated roughly $32 million for the USAR task forces and administration of the system. Twenty-eight task forces have been established throughout the United States, as shown in the following map. Members of Congress might elect to consider the following issues as they consider the emergency response needs of communities. The deployment of USAR teams to Haiti and Japan may also present opportunities for modifying existing USAR practices or reconsidering priorities. Some may contend USAR deployments should be increased to reduce the number of lives lost in an incident. A counterargument, however, would be that increased deployments, even if limited to domestic incidents, would require the establishment of more task forces. The increased number of teams might dilute the available funding to train, equip, and manage the task force network. Another potential implication would be that state and local governments might begin to perceive USAR as the primary entity responsible for search and rescue efforts. As a result, state and local governments may eliminate or minimize their own search and rescue programs. Another potential concern is that in the past five years the State and Local Programs account has been the subject of proposed funding reductions and program eliminations. Should these proposals be accepted, USAR teams may not receive adequate funding to sustain their operations. Furthermore, other state and local programs that rely on the same funding source would have to compete with USAR for scarce resources and funding. Members of Congress may consider several options with regard to this issue during the 112 th Congress: (1) adopt language in the appropriations legislation for DHS that directs the department to establish additional task forces, whether in specified states or at the discretion of DHS officials; (2) consider legislation that statutorily establishes USAR task forces, such as H.R. 119 , which as introduced in the 111 th Congress. The USAR task forces have developed over time through administrative actions taken by FEMA (now DHS) in response to the general authority provided by Congress in the earthquake statute discussed above. Since the role of the task forces has evolved, Members of Congress might elect to consider legislation that specifies attributes of the task forces, identifies requirements, and establishes permanent funding accounts. Examples of measures authorizing the establishment of a USAR response system include two bills introduced—but not acted upon—in the 111 th Congress are H.R. 706 and Section 105 of H.R. 3377 . Funding for USAR task forces, like other aspects of homeland security, could be increased to ensure that sufficient equipment (and reserves) are available to task forces. Congress might consider legislation (such as S. 930 , considered in the 108 th Congress but not acted upon) that would require the Secretary of DHS to provide grants to task forces to ensure that operational, administrative, and training costs continue to be met. Others may argue, however, that federal support and involvement in task forces should be minimized, as the federal need for USAR task forces occurs relatively infrequently, and task forces primarily serve local government purposes. Congress may wish to debate how USAR task forces fit into the broader scope of federal disaster response efforts. A report issued by the General Accounting Office prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001 identified 24 types of teams, administered by eight federal agencies, capable of responding to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The extent to which USAR task forces duplicate the capabilities and authorities of other federal response teams might be considered. The allocation of five USAR task forces to Haiti after earthquakes destroyed much of the capital city and other parts of the nation in January 2010 arguably demonstrated the best use of the USAR capabilities. Lives were saved and local and international burdens were shared. Funds for the work of the task forces in Haiti were provided by the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Deployments to other countries may help save lives, reduce human suffering, and foster goodwill between the United States and other countries. However, some may question whether USAR forces should be deployed to foreign countries on the grounds that overseas deployments may limit the number of teams and equipment available for domestic incidents. According to the FEMA Administrator, discussions are underway with the head of USAID to determine whether additional teams should be deemed qualified for international crises. If USAR continues to be used for international response efforts, Congress may wish to appropriate funds for USAR from multiple sources through regular order appropriations. Congress may also contemplate limiting their use to domestic incidents, or limiting the number of USAR teams that can be deployed overseas at one time.

Since the early 1990s, Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Task Forces have been certified, trained, and funded by the federal government. Twenty-eight task forces are located in 19 states. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials may call out the task force (or forces) in closest proximity to the disaster to help locate and extricate victims from collapsed buildings and structures. The task forces represent a partnership involving federal, local government, and private sector experts. Most recently, USAR teams received extensive media coverage for their missions to Haiti after the earthquakes of early 2010, and Japan after the earthquake and tsunami in the spring of 2011. This report will be updated as events warrant.

RS21311 -- U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force Updated April 11, 2003 During the summer and fall of 2002, the question of the possible use of "preemptive" military force by the United States to defend its security was raised byPresident Bush and members of his Administration, including possible use of such force against Iraq. Inmid-September 2002, the Bush Administrationpublished The National Security Strategy of the United States which explicitly states that the UnitedStates is prepared to use preemptive military force toprevent U.S. enemies from using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against it or its friends or allies (1) The following analysis reviews the historical recordregarding the uses of U.S. military force in a preemptive manner. It examines and comments on military actionstaken by the United States that could bereasonably interpreted as preemptive in nature. For purposes of this analysis a preemptive use of military force isconsidered to be the taking of military actionby the United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumed military attack oruse of force by that nation against the United States. Thedeployment of U.S. military forces in support of U.S. foreign policy, without their engaging in combat, is not deemed to be a preemptive use of military force. Preemptive use of military force is also deemed to be an action addressed at a specific and imminentmilitary threat, requiring timely action (2) By contrast, a "preventive war" would be a significant use of military force against a nation as a "preventive"action, to forestall a presumed military threat fromthat nation at some point in the future, whether months or years. Such an action would be outside the traditionalparameters of the concept of preemptive use ofmilitary force. It would be a significant expansion of the customary understanding of the elements that define suchan action. However, such an expansiveview of military preemption is contained in the Bush Administration's September 2002 U.S. National Strategydocument, and in related public policystatements by senior Bush Administration officials. Thus, various instances of the use of force that are examinedherein could, using a less stringent definition,be argued by some as examples of preemption by the United States.CRS:Logo: The discussion below is based uponour review of all noteworthy uses ofmilitary force by the United States since establishment of the Republic. Historical overview. The historical record indicates that the United States has never, to date, engaged in apreemptive military attack, as traditionally defined, against another nation. And only once has the United Statesever unilaterally attacked another nationmilitarily prior to its first having been attacked or prior to U.S. citizens or interests firsthaving been attacked. That instance was the Spanish-American War of1898. In that military conflict, the principal goal of United States military action was to compel Spain to grant Cubaits political independence. An act ofCongress, passed in April 1898, just prior to the U.S. declaration of war against Spain, explicitly declared Cuba tobe independent of Spain, demanded thatSpain withdraw its military forces from the island, and authorized the President to use U.S. military force to achievethese ends, if necessary. (3) Spain rejectedthese demands, and an exchange of declarations of war by both countries soon followed thereafter. (4) Although U.S. military actions against Spain werebasedon special U.S. foreign policy considerations, they occurred after war was formally declared, and cannot be fairlycharacterized as preemptive in nature. During the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, preemptive use of military force to destroy Soviet missiles that had beenintroduced into Cuba was very seriously consideredin the early days of the crisis, but the matter was ultimately resolved diplomatically. Although the United Statesdid not use military force "preemptively," it diddeploy military forces as an adjunct to its diplomacy, while reserving its right to take additional military actions asit deemed appropriate. The circumstances surrounding the origins of the Mexican War are somewhat controversial in nature-but the term preemptive attack by the United States doesnot apply to this conflict. During, and immediately following the First World War, the United States, as part ofallied military operations, sent military forcesinto parts of Russia to protect its interests, and to render limited aid to anti-Bolshevik forces during the Russian civilwar. In major military actions since theSecond World War, the President has either obtained congressional authorization for use of military force againstother nations, in advance of using it, or hasdirected military actions abroad on his own initiative in support of multinational operations such as those of theUnited Nations or of mutual securityarrangements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Examples of these actions include participationin the Korean War, the 1990-1991 PersianGulf War, and the Bosnian and Kosovo operations in the 1990s. The use of military force against Iraq in 2003,while controversial within the internationalcommunity, was justified by the United States, the United Kingdom and others, as an action necessary to enforceexisting U.N. Security Council resolutions thatmandated Iraqi disarmament. Yet in all of these varied instances of the use of military force by the United States,such military action was a "response," afterthe fact , and was not preemptive in nature, as traditionally defined. Central American and Caribbean interventions. This is not to say that the United States has not used its militaryto intervene in other nations in support of its foreign policy interests. However, U.S. military interventions,particularly a number of unilateral uses of force inthe Central America and Caribbean areas throughout the 20th century were not preemptive in nature. What led the United States to intervene militarily innations in these areas was not the view that the individual nations were likely to attack the United Statesmilitarily . Rather, these U.S. military interventionswere grounded in the view that they would support the Monroe Doctrine, which opposed interference in the Westernhemisphere by outside nations. U.S.policy was driven by the belief that if stable governments existed in Caribbean states and Central America, then itwas less likely that foreign countries wouldattempt to protect their nationals or their economic interests through their use of military force against one or moreof these nations. Consequently, the United States, in the early part of the 20th century, established through treaties with the Dominican Republic (in 1907) (5) and withHaiti (in1915) (6) , the right for the United States to collect anddisperse customs income received by these nations, as well as the right to protect the Receiver General ofcustoms and his assistants in the performance of his duties. This effectively created U.S. protectorates for thesecountries until these arrangements wereterminated during the Administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Intermittent domestic insurrectionsagainst the national governments in bothcountries led the U.S. to utilize American military forces to restore order in Haiti from 1915-1934 and in theDominican Republic from 1916-1924. But thepurpose of these interventions, buttressed by the treaties with the United States, was to help maintain or restorepolitical stability, and thus eliminate thepotential for foreign military intervention in contravention of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Similar concerns about foreign intervention in a politically unstable Nicaragua led the United States in 1912 to accept the request of its then President AdolfoDiaz to intervene militarily to restore political order there. Through the Bryan-Chamorro treaty with Nicaragua in1914, the United States obtained the right toprotect the Panama Canal, and its proprietary rights to any future canal through Nicaragua as well as islands leasedfrom Nicaragua for use as militaryinstallations. This treaty also granted to the United States the right to take any measure needed to carry out thetreaty's purposes. (7) This treaty had the effect ofmaking Nicaragua a quasi-protectorate of the United States. Since political turmoil in the country might threatenthe Panama Canal or U.S. proprietary rights tobuild another canal, the U.S. employed that rationale to justify the intervention and long-term presence of Americanmilitary forces in Nicaragua to maintainpolitical stability in the country. U.S. military forces were permanently withdrawn from Nicaragua in 1933. Apartfrom the above cases, U.S. militaryinterventions in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and in Panama in 1989 were based uponconcerns that U.S. citizens or other U.S. interestswere being harmed by the political instability in these countries at the time U.S. intervention occurred. While U.S.military interventions in Central Americaand Caribbean nations were controversial, after reviewing the context in which they occurred, it is fair to say thatnone of them involved the use of "preemptive" military force by the United States. (8) Covert action. Although the use of preemptive force by the United States is generally associated with the overt use of U.S. military forces, it is important to note that the United States has also utilized "covert action" by U.S.government personnel in efforts to influencepolitical and military outcomes in other nations. The public record indicates that the United States has used this formof intervention to prevent some groups orpolitical figures from gaining or maintaining political power to the detriment of U.S. interests and those of friendlynations. For example, the use of "covertaction" was widely reported to have been successfully employed to effect changes in the governments of Iran in1953, and in Guatemala in 1954. Its use failedin the case of Cuba in 1961. The general approach in the use of a "covert action" is reportedly to support localpolitical and military/paramilitary forces ingaining or maintaining political control in a nation, so that U.S. or its allies interests will not be threatened. Noneof these activities has reportedly involvedsignificant numbers of U.S. military forces because by their very nature "covert actions" are efforts to advance anoutcome without drawing direct attention tothe United States in the process of doing so. (9) Suchprevious clandestine operations by U.S. personnel could arguably have constituted efforts at preemptiveaction to forestall unwanted political or military developments in other nations. But given their presumptive limitedscale compared to those of majorconventional military operations, and also that they were not used to preempt an imminent military attack on theUnited States, it seems more appropriate toview U.S."covert actions" as adjuncts to more extensive U.S. military actions in support of U.S. foreign policy. Assuch, these U.S. "covert actions" do notappear to be true case examples of the use of preemptive military force by the United States. Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The one significant, well documented, case of note, where preemptive militaryaction was seriously contemplated by the United States, but ultimately not used, was the Cuban missile crisis ofOctober 1962. When the United States learnedfrom spy-plane photographs that the Soviet Union was secretly introducing nuclear-capable, intermediate-rangeballistic missiles into Cuba, missiles that couldthreaten a large portion of the eastern United States, President John F. Kennedy had to determine if the prudentcourse of action was to use U.S. military airstrikes in an effort to destroy the missile sites before they became operational, and before the Soviets or the Cubansbecame aware that the U.S. knew they werebeing installed. While the military preemption option was seriously considered, after extensive debate among hisadvisors on the implications of such anaction, President Kennedy undertook a measured but firm approach to the crisis that utilized a U.S. naval"quarantine" of the island of Cuba to prevent receiptof additional missile shipments from the Soviet Union as well as military supplies and material for the existingmissile sites, while a diplomatic solution wasaggressively pursued. At the same time, the U.S. reserved the right to employ the full range of military actionsshould diplomacy fail. This approach wassuccessful, and the crisis was peacefully resolved. (10) Iraq War of 2003. In the case of the Iraq War of 2003, the United States has used significant military forceagainst that nation even though the U.S. was not attacked first by Iraq. Various public speeches made by the BushAdministration during the summer and fallof 2003 noted that the United States was prepared to engage in "preemptive" military action against unfriendlynations in advance of their becoming an"imminent" military threat to the U.S. In September 2002, the Bush Administration published The NationalSecurity Strategy of the United States of America which explicitly states that the United States is prepared to use preemptive military force to prevent enemies of theUnited States from using weapons of massdestruction (WMD) against it or its allies and friends. The timing of the release of this strategy document, togetherwith statements of senior BushAdministration officials regarding the potential threat to the U.S. that Iraq's WMD program posed, led to speculationthat Iraq could be the first case where theexpansive approach to use of preemptive military force would be applied. Subsequently, the Bush Administrationsought and obtained passage of U.N. SecurityCouncil Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, which, among other things, noted that Iraq was still in materialbreach of its obligations under prior U.N.Security Council resolutions to destroy and not to seek to obtain various proscribed weapons and capabilities. UNSCR 1441 further noted that "seriousconsequences" would result from failure of Iraq to comply unconditionally with its obligations contained in the U.N.Resolutions. (11) When President Bush launched U.S. military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003, he stated he was doing so, with coalition forces, to enforce existing UNSecurity Council Resolutions that had been violated by Iraq since the Gulf War of 1990-1991--Security CouncilResolutions that expressly contemplated theuse of force should Iraq not comply with them--and also to protect the security of the U.S. In a March 19, 2003report to Congress on the issue, President Bush noted his conclusion and determination that further diplomatic efforts to enforce the U.N. imposed obligation thatIraq destroy its WMD would not succeed,thus requiring the use of military force to achieve Iraqi disarmament. The President did not explicitly characterizehis military action as an implementation ofthe expansive concept of preemptive use of military force against rogue states with WMD contained in his NationalSecurity Strategy document of September2002. (12) However, as U.S. military action wasjustified to protect the security of the United States from a prospective , but not imminent threat of military actionby Iraq, it could be argued that, measured against the traditional concept of preemptive use of military force, thiswas an act of "preventive war"by the UnitedStates.

This report reviews the historical record regarding the uses of U.S. military force ina "preemptive" manner, anissue that emerged during public debates prior to the use of U.S. military force against Iraq in 2003. It examinesand comments on military actions taken by theUnited States that could be reasonably interpreted as preemptive in nature. For purposes of this analysis apreemptive use of military force is considered to bethe taking of military action by the United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumedimminent military attack or use of force by thatnation against the United States. The deployment of U.S. military forces in support of U.S. foreign policy, withouttheir engaging in combat, is not deemed tobe a preemptive use of military force. This review includes all noteworthy uses of military force by the UnitedStates since the establishment of the Republic. A listing of such instances can be found in CRS Report RL32170, Instances of Use of United States ArmedForces Abroad, 1798-2003. For an analysis ofinternational law and preemptive force see CRS Report RS21314, International Law and the Preemptive Useof Force Against Iraq. This report will be updatedif significant events warrant.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. Title I-A is the largest program in the ESEA, funded at $14.4 billion for FY2015. Title I-A is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The ESEA was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) on December 10, 2015. The ESSA made few changes to the Title I-A formulas. Changes to the Title I-A formulas under the ESSA will take effect beginning in FY2017. This report provides final FY2015 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. For a general overview of the Title I-A formulas see CRS Report R44164, ESEA Title I-A Formulas: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]. For a more detailed discussion of the Title I-A formulas, see CRS Report RL34721, Elementary and Secondary Education Act: An Analytical Review of the Allocation Formulas , by [author name scrubbed]. Under Title I-A, funds are allocated to LEAs via state educational agencies (SEAs) using four different allocation formulas specified in statute: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Annual appropriations bills specify portions of each year's Title I-A appropriation to be allocated to LEAs and states under each of these formulas. In FY2015, about 45% of Title I-A appropriations were allocated through the Basic Grants formula, 9% through the Concentration Grants formula, and 23% through each of the Targeted Grants and EFIG formulas. Once funds reach LEAs, the amounts allocated under the four formulas are combined and used jointly. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "formula child count," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. These maximum grants are then reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas. Under three of the formulas—Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grants—funds are initially calculated at the LEA level. State grants are the total of allocations for all LEAs in the state, adjusted for state minimum grant provisions. Under EFIG, grants are first calculated for each state overall and then are subsequently suballocated to LEAs within the state using a different formula. Final FY2015 grants included in this report were calculated by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The percentage share of funds allocated under each of the Title I-A formulas was calculated by CRS for each state by dividing the total grant received by the total amount allocated under each respective formula. Table 1 provides each state's grant amount and percentage share of funds allocated under each of the Title I-A formulas for FY2015. Total Title I-A grants, calculated by summing the state level grant for each of the four formulas, are also shown in Table 1 . Overall, California received the largest total Title I-A grant amount ($1.7 billion) and, as a result, the largest percentage share (11.81%) of Title I-A grants. Wyoming received the smallest total Title I-A grant amount ($33.1 million) and, as a result, the smallest percentage share (0.23%) of Title I-A grants. In general, grant amounts for states vary among formulas due to the different allocation amounts for the formulas. For example, the Basic Grant formula receives a greater share of overall Title I-A appropriations than the Concentration Grant formula, so states generally receive higher estimated grant amounts under the Basic Grant formula than under the Concentration Grant formula. Among states, Title I-A grant amounts and the percentage shares of funds vary due to the different characteristics of each state. For example, Texas has a much larger population of children included in the formula calculations than North Carolina and, therefore, receives a higher estimated grant amount and larger share of Title I-A funds. Within a state, the percentage share of funds allocated may vary by formula, as certain formulas are more favorable to certain types of states (e.g., EFIG is generally more favorable to states with comparatively equal levels of spending per pupil among their LEAs). If a state's share of a given Title I-A formula exceeds its share of overall Title I-A funds, this is generally an indication that this particular formula is more favorable to the state than formulas for which the state's share of funds is below its overall share of Title I-A funds. For example, New York and Nevada received a substantially higher percentage share of Targeted Grants than of their overall Title I-A funds, indicating that the Targeted Grant formula is more favorable to them than other Title I-A formulas may be. At the same time, both states received a smaller percentage share of Basic Grants than of their overall Title I-A funds, indicating that the Basic Grant formula is less favorable to them than other Title I-A formulas may be. In states that receive a minimum grant under all four formulas (North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont), the shares under the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas are greater than under the Basic or Concentration Grant formulas, due to higher state minimums under these formulas. All states receiving a minimum grant under any of the four Title I-A formulas are denoted with an asterisk (*) in Table 1 .

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and is funded at $14.4 billion for FY2015. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others. This report provides final FY2015 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2015 Title I-A grant amount ($1.7 billion or 11.81% of total Title I-A grants). Wyoming received the smallest FY2015 Title I-A grant amount ($33.1 million or 0.23% of total Title I-A grants).

Historically, most farm programs have been implemented at the county office level. The current county-based delivery structure originated in the 1930s, when the first agricultural acts established farm support programs. At that time, more than one-fourth of all Americans engaged in farming, and the lack of an extensive communication and transportation network limited the geographic boundaries that could be effectively served by a single field office. In addition, most farm programs required farmers to visit the local office to learn about and sign up for these programs. FSA staff assisted farmers in completing the administrative requirements, including the necessary paperwork, associated with the programs. Over the last 60 years, the number of farms in the United States has declined significantly, as has the number of people engaged in farming. Improvements in communication and transportation in rural areas have mitigated some of the problems associated with large distances between farmers and program resources. Additionally, two recent legislative changes have significantly affected USDA’s delivery of farm programs. The Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-354, Oct. 13, 1994) directed the Secretary of Agriculture to streamline and reorganize USDA to achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, and economies in its organization and management of programs and activities. In addition, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-127, Apr. 4, 1996) fundamentally changed the federal government’s role in supporting production agriculture by replacing traditional commodity programs and reducing many of the administrative requirements related to the remaining agriculture programs. Prior to the 1996 act, farmers participating in federal commodity programs were restricted to planting certain types and amounts of crops. Following the 1996 act, farmers are expected to plant and market crops by considering market conditions rather than by relying on government programs. As a result of the 1994 act, USDA has closed more than 300 offices, or about 14 percent of the 2,773 offices that were operating at the end of 1994. These closures required the farmers served by those offices to travel to a neighboring county for assistance. In addition to these office closings, USDA reduced FSA’s nonfederal staff from 13,432 in 1995 to 11,399 in 1997, a reduction of 2,033 employees, or about 15 percent. According to the 1998 budget proposal, USDA is scheduled to close 500 additional offices and reduce FSA’s county office staff by an additional 57 percent, from 11,399 employees in 1997 to 4,879 by 2002. The proposal’s estimated savings would total more than $1 billion for the 6 years through 2002. To date, USDA’s reductions in county office staff have been achieved primarily by reducing the staff at larger county offices and by closing or consolidating smaller county offices (those with three or fewer employees). Furthermore, USDA is undertaking an effort to streamline its administrative activities at the state and national level, which may affect the quality of service farmers receive. In December 1997, the Secretary of Agriculture approved a plan that will consolidate a number of administrative activities at headquarters and in state offices. The plan establishes a Support Services Bureau in headquarters and one state administrative support unit in each state. This organization will provide administrative services—including financial management, human resources, services supporting civil rights, information technology, and management services (including procurement)—to field-based agencies. USDA also has contracted for an independent study to examine FSA, the Natural Resources Conservation Service, and the Rural Development mission area for opportunities to improve overall customer service and the efficiency of the delivery system. The results of this study, expected to be completed in October 1998, will be incorporated into the future iterations of FSA’s strategic plan. Despite recent office closings and staff reductions, most farmers continue to be very satisfied with the quality of service they have been receiving from USDA, according to a USDA survey and our discussions with farmers. In USDA’s 1997 national survey, 90 percent of the more than 4,000 respondents said that they were very satisfied with the service they received from their county office and that local staff were responsive to their needs, provided reliable service, and showed empathy towards customers when conducting business. In addition, the participants said that “personalized face-to-face service” was important to them. In fact, when asked to identify alternative ways of doing business with the county office, such as by computer or telephone, nearly 60 percent of the farmers said that they did not want any changes and preferred to continue to conduct most business in person. According to all 60 farmers we spoke with by telephone, the quality of service in late 1997 was the same or better than it was in 1995, despite staff reductions and office closures. These farmers lived in all parts of the nation and had participated in the Conservation Reserve Program, the farm loan programs, and/or the commodity programs. In some cases, these farmers lived in counties in which their local county office had been closed. They stated that the quality of service was high because FSA staff were efficient and knowledgeable. One farmer said that service in the county office was good because the county office employees took the time to become familiar with each farmer’s operation. Farmers we spoke with were particularly pleased with FSA staff’s performance in the following areas: Completing paperwork. FSA staff have historically completed most farmers’ paperwork for the commodity programs for them. FSA staff told us that by completing the paperwork, they reduce the possibility of errors that would occur if farmers completed the paperwork on their own. Many farmers we talked to said that they like having FSA staff fill out their paperwork because it is very complex and they would have difficulty doing it by themselves. Storing and maintaining records. FSA staff maintain farmers’ commodity program records because, according to one FSA county executive director, many farmers like FSA to keep their historical farming records, such as acreage reports, on file in case farm programs change and the information is needed to establish eligibility for the new programs. Reminding farmers about key sign-up dates. FSA uses mail and telephone calls to remind farmers of key dates for enrolling in a program because officials are concerned that some farmers may otherwise forget to sign up. One farmer said that he appreciated receiving postcards from his county office when it was time for him to visit the office. Under the commodity programs, for example, FSA staff reminded farmers 15 days prior to the ending date of a sign-up period that they had not enrolled in the current year’s programs. Providing prompt walk-in service. At most county offices, farmers can visit without an appointment and receive prompt service for commodity programs. This service could range from answering simple questions to filling out a farmer’s paperwork. Farmers like the flexibility of coming into the office when it is convenient for them—when the weather is bad, for instance, without having to make an appointment. In commenting on a draft of this report, FSA officials noted that while the results of USDA’s survey and our discussions with farmers indicate that most farmers are satisfied with the service that they receive, some are not. For example, some small and minority farmers involved in the farm loan programs have criticized USDA recently for not providing adequate service. FSA officials stated that they would like to provide a better level of service for participants in the farm loan programs, but they lack adequately trained staff. As of December 1997, FSA had 2,396 offices and 11,399 county office employees. These office and staffing levels reflect the closing of more than 300 offices and staff reductions of about 15 percent since December 1994. If the 1998 budget proposal to further reduce staffing by an additional 50 percent and to close an additional 500 offices were carried out, FSA would average about two to three employees per office, in comparison with the current average of about five. As we have previously reported, county offices need a minimum of two staff just to conduct the administrative functions for maintaining basic office operations, such as obtaining and managing office space and processing the paperwork for the payroll. As a result, FSA staff in these smaller offices will have less time to provide service to farmers than they did when county offices were staffed more fully. The proposed staffing reductions will result in more county office closures than the 500 proposed, according to FSA officials we interviewed. As FSA closes offices, farmers will have to travel farther and visit offices that serve more farmers. Although they stated that they are still receiving quality service, some farmers we spoke with whose county office had recently closed have already experienced the service impacts associated with these changes. For example, according to one farmer—whose current county office is 45 miles away compared with his former office, which was 10 miles away—the staff at the new office did not have personal knowledge of his specific operations, such as the crops he grows, the farming techniques he uses, and the programs in which he normally participates. FSA officials recognize that additional staff reductions and office closings will reduce the level of personalized service to farmers and require them to accept greater responsibility for program requirements, including completing paperwork. At the same time, officials recognize that the 1996 act places more responsibility on farmers for planting and marketing decisions. In this regard, FSA officials told us that they are beginning to talk with farmers and the various groups involved in farming about the types of services FSA should provide in the future. We met with USDA officials, including the Associate Administrator for the Farm Service Agency, the Deputy Administrator for Farm Programs, and the Deputy Administrator for Farm Loan Programs. USDA generally agreed with the information presented in the report. In their comments, however, the officials noted that the services provided to farmers vary among the USDA programs. For example, Farm Service Agency officials stated that because the staff for the farm loan programs are not located in each county, these staff are not able to provide the same level of service that farmers participating in the traditional commodity programs received, such as having their paperwork filled out for them. Furthermore, these officials stated that some small and minority farmers have recently criticized USDA for not providing adequate service. We made changes to the report to reflect these concerns. In addition, USDA provided technical and clarifying comments that we incorporated as appropriate. To determine farmers’ opinions of the quality of service FSA provides in county offices, we reviewed selected aspects of the results of USDA’s National Customer Service Survey of farmers in 1997. Specifically, we analyzed and summarized responses on (1) the services that matter the most to farmers and (2) farmers’ general satisfaction with services provided by USDA’s service centers. This survey included over 4,000 farmers nationwide who participated in various farm programs. To verify and update these results, we obtained a database from USDA of the names, location, and phone numbers of farmers who had previously completed a USDA customer service survey. We judgmentally selected 90 farmers who had participated in the Conservation Reserve Program, the farm loan programs, and/or the Acreage Reduction Program in 1995. We were able to contact 60 of these farmers across the nation by telephone to obtain information on the quality of service in FSA county offices in 1997 compared with the quality of service in 1995. Some of these farmers lived in counties in which the local county office had been closed. We also visited FSA officials at headquarters and FSA state and county office officials in eight states to discuss the quality of service farmers currently receive. The offices we visited were located in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Washington State. In most of these county offices, we met with the county executive director, agricultural credit manager, and farmers from the FSA county committee. We also met with the state executive director in six states and members of the state committee in two states. We conducted our work from October 1997 through April 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will provide copies to the House and Senate Committees on Agriculture; other interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Agriculture; and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others on request. Please call me at (202) 512-5138 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Major contributors to this report were Ronald E. Maxon, Jr.; Fred Light; Renee D. McGhee-Lenart; Paul Pansini; Carol Herrnstadt Shulman; and Janice M. Turner. Robert A. Robinson Director, Food and Agriculture Issues The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. 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Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the impact of actual and proposed staff reductions and office closings by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) on the quality of service to farmers. GAO noted that: (1) FSA's staff reductions and office closures to date do not appear to have affected the quality of service provided to farmers; (2) according to the Department of Agriculture's 1997 customer survey and GAO's recent discussions with farmers and FSA officials, most farmers are highly satisfied with the service they receive from their local office of FSA; (3) farmers are still generally able to receive prompt service when they walk into their county office and have FSA staff complete most of their required paperwork; (4) if FSA's staffing continues to be reduced and county offices are closed, however, the traditional level of service provided to farmers is likely to decrease; and (5) among other things, farmers will be required to accept greater responsibility for program requirements, including completing paperwork; with less assistance from agency staff, however, this change is consistent with changes in the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, which reduces federal controls over production and places more responsibility on farmers for planting and marketing decisions.

Although judicial nominations sometimes do not receive Senate confirmation, they historically have been heavily outnumbered by judicial nominations which the Senate has confirmed. For example, according to the most recent CRS data, of the 2,927 nominees to Article III circuit and district court judgeships between the start of the 79 th Congress in 1945 and the end of the first session of the 113 th Congress on January 3, 2014, only 287 nominees (or approximately 10% of the total number of nominees in this period) failed to be confirmed by the Senate. Even smaller has been the number of lower court nominations which received unfavorable votes by the Senate Judiciary Committee or rejection votes by the full Senate. More often than not, when a circuit or district court nominee lacks key Senate support (such as the support of one or both home state Senators), the Judiciary Committee simply has declined to consider or act on the nomination. Neither the Judiciary Committee nor the full Senate is compelled to act on nominations which come before it, and nominations that receive no action are eventually returned to, or withdrawn by, the President. The vast majority of unconfirmed nominees from 1945 through 2013—approximately 90%—failed to receive a committee vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The procedural route for a circuit or district court nomination is as follows: Once the President has submitted such a nomination to the Senate, it is almost invariably referred to the Judiciary Committee. The committee may then hold a hearing on the nomination. After the hearing, the committee has several options: (1) it may report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation; (2) it may vote against reporting the nomination; or (3) it may choose to take no action at all. Typically, if the committee votes on a nomination, it votes to report favorably; however, in a very small number of cases, the committee has voted against reporting a nomination, or has voted to report the nomination either unfavorably or without recommendation. If a majority of the committee agrees to any one of the motions to report, the nomination moves to the full Senate. Note that, in the event of a tie vote, the nomination fails to be reported by the committee. Additionally, the nomination remains in committee if the committee votes against reporting, if there is no committee vote on the nomination, or if the committee votes to table the nomination. Once a lower court nomination is reported to the full Senate by the Judiciary Committee, the nomination is listed on the Senate's Executive Calendar, with Senate consideration of the nomination scheduled by the majority leader. If the Senate, when voting on whether to confirm, rejects the nomination (as has happened on rare occasions), it is returned to the President with a resolution of disapproval. If a judicial nomination does not receive a Senate vote, the nomination ultimately will either be withdrawn by the President or returned to the President by the Secretary of the Senate upon a Senate adjournment or recess of more than 30 days. This report identifies, from the 76 th Congress (1939-1941) through the first session of the 113 th Congress (January 3, 2014), 19 U.S. circuit court or district court nominations that received other than a favorable vote from the Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee, or both. Among these 19 nominations were 18 (or all but one of the nominations) on which the Judiciary Committee voted other than to report favorably. The only nomination that did not receive a vote other than to report favorably was that of Ronnie L. White to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The White nomination, as Table 2 shows, was reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee, only to be rejected by the full Senate. Table 1 , below, summarizes the final committee and floor dispositions of these 19 nominations. Each row indicates a possible committee outcome ( report favorably, report without recommendation, report unfavorably , and fail to report ), and each column indicates a possible floor outcome ( confirmed, rejected, returned, and withdrawn ). Each cell provides the total number of circuit and district court nominations receiving the final committee and floor actions as indicated by the corresponding row and column. Totals for final committee and floor dispositions are found in the last column and row, respectively. Table 2 lists the nominations to the circuit courts of appeals (7 in all) and district courts (12 in all) in separate sections. Within the two sections, nominations are arranged chronologically. From left to right, columns one, two, and three identify the Congress, nominee, and court of each nominee. Columns four through seven provide the Judiciary Committee vote on each nomination, stating the type of vote, vote breakdown, and date on which the vote occurred. Column eight provides information concerning the final disposition of the nomination in the Senate. Beyond the scope of this report are U.S. circuit and district court nominations which were reported out of the Judiciary Committee and on which the Senate failed to invoke cloture. For the purposes of this report, such nominations are not considered up-or-down Senate votes to reject a nomination. Table 1 indicates that all seven circuit court nominations accounted for in the table received a committee vote other than to report favorably. Of the seven nominations, the Senate Judiciary Committee failed to adopt motions to report five, resulting in the return of four nominations to the President and the withdrawal of one. The remaining two nominations were reported without recommendation; one was confirmed and one was returned to the President. During the 1939-2013 period, no circuit court nominations were rejected by a vote of the full Senate. Additionally, Table 1 indicates that, of the 12 district court nominations accounted for in the table, four were never reported out of the Judiciary Committee; one of the four nominations was returned, and three were withdrawn by the President. Two district court nominations were reported to the Senate favorably. One, who was confirmed, had initially failed in a Judiciary Committee vote to have his nomination reported (only to have the committee decide, in a later vote, to report the nomination). The other, although reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee, was rejected by the full Senate. Five district court nominations were reported to the Senate unfavorably (all five were rejected by the Senate). One nomination to a district court, which is the most recent listed in Table 2 , was reported to the Senate without recommendation; that nomination was confirmed by the Senate. Note that, as of this writing, this is the only nomination listed in Table 2 in which a vote on a motion to report unfavorably or without recommendation was not first preceded by a vote to report favorably. Table 2 reveals that, from 1939 through 1951, one circuit and six district court nominees received votes from the Senate Judiciary Committee other than to report favorably. In all but one of these seven cases, the committee declined to report favorably after home state Senators, in opposing the nominations, invoked "senatorial courtesy." Floyd H. Roberts, nominated to be U.S. district court judge for the Western District of Virginia, was the first judicial nominee reported unfavorably by the committee and rejected by the Senate within the 1939-2013 time period. The committee adversely reported Roberts in 1939 on the grounds that his nomination was "personally offensive" to the two Virginia Senators. The Senate, in turn, rejected the Roberts nomination by a 9-72 vote. In another case, in 1943, the Judiciary Committee failed, in a 9-9 tie vote, to report the Fifth Circuit Court nomination of James V. Allred, a former Texas governor, after Texas's junior Senator invoked senatorial courtesy. In doing so, the Senator reportedly notified the committee that "this nomination is obnoxious to me." Additionally, in 1950 and 1951, four district court nominations faced opposition from home state Senators invoking senatorial courtesy. The opposing Senators stated that that the nominations to district judgeships in their states were "personally obnoxious" due to the manner in which they were handled by the Truman Administration. The Senators, in each case, had submitted the names of their preferred judicial nominees to the Administration. The President, however, without consulting with the home state Senators, proceeded to submit the names of other nominees—not of the Senators' choosing—to the Senate for consideration. One of the Senators, in objecting to the two judicial nominations in his state, noted it was not the nominees themselves but rather "the manner and method of their selection that made them personally obnoxious." All four nominations were reported adversely and rejected by voice vote in the Senate. From 1952 through 1977, as Table 2 shows, there were no instances in which the Senate Judiciary Committee voted against reporting a circuit or district court nomination or voted to report such a nomination without recommendation or unfavorably. In 1976, however, one nomination, that of William B. Poff, to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, was laid on the table by a 9-0 vote of the Senate Judiciary Committee reportedly due to senatorial courtesy. Since 1978, six circuit and five district court nominees have received votes from the Senate Judiciary Committee other than to report favorably. Two of these nominees (one circuit and one district) were ultimately reported without recommendation and confirmed by the Senate in relatively close roll call votes. One district court nominee was ultimately confirmed by a voice vote after his nomination was reported favorably out of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The successful motion to report favorably occurred, though, after a prior motion to report the nomination favorably failed to gain committee approval. One circuit and two district court nominations were ultimately withdrawn by the nominating President. The four remaining circuit court nominations were returned to the President. The Senate Judiciary Committee failed to report all but one of these nominees to the full Senate. One nominee subsequently received a recess appointment while another was renominated and confirmed by the Senate during a later Congress. Finally, during the 106 th Congress, one district court nomination, that of Ronnie L. White to the Eastern District of Missouri, was reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee but rejected on the floor of the Senate by a 45-54 vote. Senators' objections to these 11 nominations since 1978 rested largely on the perceived ideological orientation of judicial nominees, the professional qualifications of the nominees, or both. For example, Daniel Manion, nominated in 1986 by President Reagan to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, was criticized for lacking "the record of distinction and achievement that was expected of appointees to the courts of appeals," while his supporters "argued that opposition to his nomination was based on his conservative views and his activities with his father," who had co-founded the John Birch Society. Likewise, in 2002, objections to President George W. Bush's nomination of Priscilla R. Owen to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals appeared primarily concerned with her ideological orientation. In Senate Judiciary Committee debate preceding a vote on her nomination, Democratic members of the committee, it was reported, characterized the nominee "as a judicial 'activist' whose opinions were colored by strong anti-abortion and pro-business views, while Republicans defended her as a fair-minded jurist who was given a top rating by the American Bar Association but ran afoul of liberal interest groups." While Owen's two nominations during the 107 th Congress were returned to the President, she was renominated during the next two Congresses (the 108 th and 109 th ), and ultimately was confirmed by the Senate on May 25, 2005. The most recent nomination listed in Table 2 , that of J. Leon Holmes to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, was also opposed by some Senators on ideological grounds. Mr. Holmes had been nominated by President G.W. Bush and had the support of both of Arkansas's Democratic Senators. Concern by opponents of the nomination cited the nominee's past "comments about abortion, women's rights and other topics," while those who supported his nomination emphasized that his comments were made "20-plus years ago" and that regardless of his personal views, the nominee would "abide by the rule of law." Mr. Holmes's nomination was ultimately confirmed by the Senate on July 6, 2004, by a vote of 51-46. Unlike the nominations listed in Table 2 that were considered between 1939 and 1951 (all of which occurred during periods of unified party government), consideration of nominations listed in Table 2 from 1976 through 2013 occurred primarily during periods of divided government. This was the case for 9 of 12 of the nominations during this period that received other than favorable votes by the Judiciary Committee or the full Senate. In particular, all six circuit court nominees in question were nominated by a Republican President (three by Reagan, one by George H.W. Bush, and two by George W. Bush) while Democrats held a majority in the Senate. Of the six district court nominations during this period receiving other than favorable votes in the Judiciary Committee or the full Senate, three (one Ford nominee, one Reagan nominee, and one Clinton nominee) received such votes during periods of divided government. Note, however, that of the 3 nominations (1 circuit and 2 district) that were confirmed during the 1976 to 2013 period (i.e., the Manion, Collins, and Holmes nominations), all were approved by the Senate during periods of unified government. In other words, in each of those three cases, the same party controlled the presidency as well as held the majority in the Senate.

Once a nomination to a U.S. circuit court of appeals or district court judgeship is submitted to the Senate by the President, the Senate almost invariably refers it to the Senate Judiciary Committee. If the Judiciary Committee schedules a vote on a nominee, it usually will vote on a motion to report the nomination favorably. However, the committee could also vote on a motion to report without recommendation, to report unfavorably, or to table the nomination. If the committee votes to report—whether favorably, without recommendation, or unfavorably—the nomination moves to the full Senate. By contrast, the nomination remains in committee if the committee votes against reporting, if there is no committee vote on the nomination, or if the committee votes to table the nomination. Once a nomination is reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, the nomination is listed on the Senate's Executive Calendar, with Senate consideration of the nomination scheduled by the majority leader. On rare occasions, the Senate, when voting on confirmation, has rejected a circuit or district court nomination. In such cases, the nomination is then returned to the President with a resolution of disapproval. Between 1939 and the adjournment sine die of the first session of the 113th Congress on January 3, 2014, 19 U.S. circuit or district court nominations received other than a favorable vote from the full Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee, or both. These 19 nominations represent less than 1.0% of the total circuit and district court nominations during this period. Among these 19 nominations were 7 circuit court nominations and 12 district court nominations. This report lists the votes cast by the Judiciary Committee and the full Senate on each of the 19 nominations and identifies senatorial courtesy, ideological disagreement, and concern over nominees' qualifications as among the circumstances that led to committee consideration of actions other than a favorable report (or other than approval by the full Senate). Beyond the scope of this report are U.S. circuit and district court nominations which were reported out of the Judiciary Committee and on which the Senate failed to invoke cloture. Senate and Senate Judiciary Committee actions on judicial nominations are discussed more generally in CRS Report R43369, U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations During President Obama's First Five Years: Comparative Analysis With Recent Presidents; and CRS Report R42556, Nominations to U.S. Circuit and District Courts by President Obama During the 111th and 112th Congresses.

Recent estimates that the unauthorized (illegally present) alien population in the United States exceeds 11 million has focused renewed attention on this population. The 107 th and 108 th Congresses considered legislation to address one segment of the unauthorized population—aliens who, as children, were brought to live in the United States by their parents or other adults. In a 1982 case, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that prohibited unauthorized alien children from receiving a free public education, making it difficult, if not impossible, for states to deny an elementary or secondary education to such students." Unauthorized aliens who graduate from high school and want to attend college, however, face various obstacles. Among them, a provision enacted in 1996 as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) discourages states and localities from granting unauthorized aliens certain "postsecondary education benefits." This provision (IIRIRA §505) directs that an unauthorized alien— shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident. Although IIRIRA §505 does not refer explicitly to the granting of "in-state" residency status for tuition purposes and some question whether it even covers in-state tuition, the debate surrounding §505 has focused on the provision of in-state tuition rates to unauthorized aliens. The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, also makes unauthorized alien students ineligible for federal student financial aid. In most instances, they are likewise ineligible for state financial aid. Moreover, as unauthorized aliens, they are unable to work legally and are subject to removal from the country regardless of the number of years they have lived in the United States. In the 107 th and 108 th Congresses, legislation was introduced—but not enacted—to provide relief to unauthorized alien students. These bills sought to repeal IIRIRA §505 and, thereby, provide unauthorized students greater access to postsecondary education. These bills also would have enabled certain unauthorized students to adjust to legal permanent resident (LPR) status. Legal permanent residents, sometimes referred to as "green card holders," are able to live and work indefinitely in the United States. In most cases, they are able to apply for U.S. citizenship after five years. The unauthorized student bills introduced in the 107 th and 108 th Congresses were H.R. 1563 , Preserving Educational Opportunities for Immigrant Children Act, introduced in the 107 th Congress and reintroduced as H.R. 84 in the 108 th Congress by Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee; H.R. 1582 , Immigrant Children's Educational Advancement and Dropout Prevention Act, introduced in the 107 th Congress by Representative Luis Gutierrez; H.R. 1918 , Student Adjustment Act, introduced in the 107 th Congress and reintroduced as H.R. 1684 in the 108 th Congress by Representative Chris Cannon; S. 1291 , Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), introduced in the 107 th Congress and reintroduced (in modified form) as S. 1545 in the 108 th Congress by Senator Orrin Hatch; S. 1265 , Children's Adjustment, Relief, and Education Act (CARE Act), introduced in the 107 th Congress by Senator Richard Durbin; and Title III, Subtitle D of S. 8 , Educational Excellence for All Learners Act of 2003, introduced in the 108 th Congress by then-Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle. In the 107 th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported an amended version of S. 1291 , known as the DREAM Act. This amended measure represented a compromise between S. 1291 , as introduced, and S. 1265 . None of the other pending bills saw any action beyond committee referral. ( Appendix A contains a table comparing four unauthorized alien student bills introduced in the 107 th Congress.) In the 108 th Congress, S. 1291 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 107 th Congress, was included as part of S. 8 , an education measure introduced by then-Senate Minority Leader Daschle. In addition, a new version of the DREAM Act ( S. 1545 ) was introduced by Senator Hatch. On November 25, 2003, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 1545 with an amendment. The other unauthorized alien student bills did not see any action beyond committee referrals. Four bills ( H.R. 84 , H.R. 1684 , S. 8 , and S. 1545 , as reported) would have enabled eligible unauthorized students to obtain LPR status through an immigration procedure known as cancellation of removal . (The major features of the bills are compared in Appendix B .) Cancellation of removal is a discretionary form of relief authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, that an alien can apply for while in removal proceedings before an immigration judge. If cancellation of removal is granted, the alien's status is adjusted to that of an LPR. H.R. 84 and H.R. 1684 would have permanently amended the INA to make unauthorized alien students who meet certain requirements eligible for cancellation of removal/adjustment of status, whereas S. 8 and S. 1545 would have established temporary cancellation of removal/adjustment of status authorities separate from the INA. H.R. 1684 , S. 8 , and S. 1545 would have allowed aliens to affirmatively apply for relief without being placed in removal proceedings. Other bills, H.R. 3271 and H.R. 1830 , also would have enabled eligible unauthorized alien students to obtain LPR status, but they would not have done so through a cancellation of removal mechanism. Instead, they would have established a temporary adjustment of status authority. The INA limits the number of aliens who can be granted cancellation of removal/adjustment of status in a fiscal year to 4,000. It, however, contains exceptions for certain groups of aliens. H.R. 1684 would have amended the INA to add an exception to the numerical limitation for aliens granted cancellation of removal/adjustment of status under its terms. No numerical limit would have applied under H.R. 3271 , S. 8 , or S. 1545 . S. 1545 differed from the other bills in that it would have established a two-stage process by which aliens could obtain LPR status. Aliens granted cancellation of removal under the bill would have been adjusted initially to conditional permanent resident status. Such conditional status would have been valid for six years and would have been subject to termination. To have the condition removed and become full-fledged LPRs, the aliens would have had to submit an application during a specified period and meet additional requirements. The other bills would have adjusted all eligible aliens directly to full-fledged LPR status. As detailed in Appendix B , H.R. 84 , H.R. 1684 , H.R. 3271 , S. 8 , and S. 1545 varied in their eligibility criteria. Among these criteria, all five would have required continuous physical presence in the United States for a specified number of years. In the case of S. 8 and S. 1545 , the continuous presence requirement would have had to be satisfied prior to the date of enactment. Under H.R. 84 , H.R. 1684 , and H.R. 3271 , the continuous presence requirement would have needed to be met prior to the date of application for relief. All of the bills except H.R. 84 would have limited relief to aliens meeting specified age requirements. All five bills would have required a showing of good moral character. With respect to educational status, H.R. 1684 and H.R. 3271 would have required prospective beneficiaries to be enrolled at or above the 7 th grade level, or enrolled in, or actively pursuing admission to, an institution of higher education in the United States. S. 8 would have granted LPR status only to individuals with a high school diploma or equivalent credential. Under S. 1545 , in order to obtain conditional LPR status, aliens would have needed to gain admission to an institution of higher education or possess a high school diploma or equivalent credential. H.R. 84 contained no educational requirements. On October 16 and October 23, 2003, the Senate Judiciary Committee marked up S. 1545 . At the October 16 session, the Committee voted in favor of an amendment in the nature of a substitute proposed by Senator Hatch for himself and Senator Durbin. The substitute amended various provisions of S. 1545 , as introduced. Among the substantive amendments were changes to the confidentiality of information section. For example, the bill, as introduced, stated that information furnished by applicants could not be used for any purpose other than to make a determination on the application. The substitute amended this provision to state that information furnished by applicants could not be used to initiate removal proceedings against individuals identified in the application. At the October 23 meeting, the Judiciary Committee considered a set of amendments to S. 1545 offered by Senator Charles Grassley. Two of these amendments were the subject of debate at the markup. The first proposed to amend a provision in the bill allowing aliens who, prior to the date of enactment, met the requirements for both conditional resident status and removal of the condition, to petition for LPR status without first becoming conditional residents. The amendment would have made these aliens subject to the same period of conditional residence as other aliens eligible for relief under the bill. The second amendment proposed to place restrictions on the availability of federal student financial aid to aliens eligible for adjustment to LPR status under the bill. Under the amendment, these aliens would have been eligible only for specified student loan and work-study programs. Among the other amendments in the Grassley package was one that would have required beneficiaries of the bill to be registered in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), the monitoring system for foreign students. The Committee voted, 18-1, to approve the Grassley amendments, and voted, 16-3, to report the bill, as amended. The Committee acted, however, with the understanding that the bill would be subject to further discussion and modification prior to being reported. In S. 1545 , as reported, the Grassley amendment language on federal financial assistance was modified, as described in the next section. The rest of the Grassley amendments were unchanged. Under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, LPRs and certain other eligible noncitizens may receive federal student financial aid. Pell Grants and Stafford loans authorized under Title IV comprise 85% of postsecondary student aid. S. 1545 , as reported, would have placed restrictions on eligibility for higher education assistance for beneficiaries of the bill's adjustment provisions. With respect to assistance provided under Title IV, it would have made aliens who adjust to LPR status under the bill eligible only for student loans, federal work-study programs, and services (such as counseling, tutorial services, and mentoring), subject to the applicable requirements. Thus, aliens adjusting status under S. 1545 would not have been eligible for Pell Grants. H.R. 84 , H.R. 1684 , H.R. 3271 , and S. 8 , as introduced, did not contain restrictions on eligibility for federal student financial aid. An alien who adjusted to LPR status under any of these bills would have been eligible, as an LPR, for federal financial aid under Title IV. H.R. 84 and H.R. 1684 additionally would have extended this eligibility to unauthorized students who had applied for, but not yet been granted, cancellation of removal/adjustment of status. Appendix A. Comparison of Major Provisions of Bills in the 107 th Congress on Unauthorized Alien Students Appendix B. Comparison of Major Provisions of Bills in the 108 th Congress on Unauthorized Alien Students

Unauthorized alien students constitute a subpopulation of the total U.S. unauthorized alien population that is of particular congressional interest. These students receive free public primary and secondary education, but often find it difficult to attend college for financial reasons. A provision enacted as part of a 1996 immigration law prohibits states from granting unauthorized aliens certain postsecondary educational benefits on the basis of state residence, unless equal benefits are made available to all U.S. citizens. This prohibition is commonly understood to apply to the granting of "in-state" residency status for tuition purposes. In addition, unauthorized aliens are not eligible for federal student financial aid. More generally, as unauthorized aliens, they are not legally allowed to work in the United States and are subject to being removed from the country at any time. Bills were introduced in the 107th and 108th Congresses to address the educational and immigration circumstances of unauthorized alien students. Most of these bills had two key components. They would have repealed the 1996 provision. They also would have provided immigration relief to certain unauthorized alien students by enabling them to become legal permanent residents of the United States. In both Congresses, bills known as the DREAM Act (S. 1291 in the 107th Congress; S. 1545 in the 108th Congress) containing both types of provisions were reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee. This report will not be updated.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is the primary source of federal aid to elementary and secondary education. Title I-A is the largest program in the ESEA, funded at $15.5 billion for FY2017. The program is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The ESEA was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) on December 10, 2015. The ESSA made few changes to the Title I-A formulas. These changes took effect in FY2017. This report provides FY2017 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. For a general overview of the Title I-A formulas, see CRS Report R44164, ESEA Title I-A Formulas: In Brief . For a more detailed discussion of the Title I-A formulas, see CRS Report R44461, Allocation of Funds Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act . Under Title I-A, funds are allocated to LEAs via state educational agencies (SEAs) using the four Title I-A formulas. Annual appropriations bills specify portions of each year's Title I-A appropriation to be allocated to LEAs and states under each of the formulas. In FY2017, about 42% of Title I-A appropriations were allocated through the Basic Grants formula, 9% through the Concentration Grants formula, and 25% each through the Targeted Grants and EFIG formulas. Once funds reach LEAs, the amounts allocated under the four formulas are combined and used jointly. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a formula child count , consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an expenditure factor based on state average per-pupil expenditures for public elementary and secondary education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. These maximum grants are then reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas. Under three of the formulas—Basic, Concentration, and Targeted Grants—funds are initially calculated at the LEA level. State grants are the total of allocations for all LEAs in the state, adjusted for state minimum grant provisions. Under EFIG, grants are first calculated for each state overall and then are subsequently suballocated to LEAs within the state using a different formula. FY2017 grants included in this report were calculated by ED. The percentage share of funds allocated under each of the Title I-A formulas was calculated by CRS for each state by dividing the total grant received by the total amount allocated under each respective formula. Table 1 provides each state's grant amount and percentage share of funds allocated under each of the Title I-A formulas for FY2017. Total Title I-A grants, calculated by summing the state level grant for each of the four formulas, are also shown in Table 1 . Overall, California received the largest total Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion) and, as a result, the largest percentage share (12.00%) of Title I-A grants. Vermont received the smallest total Title I-A grant amount ($35.3 million) and, as a result, the smallest percentage share (0.23%) of Title I-A grants. In general, grant amounts for states vary among formulas due to the different allocation amounts for the formulas. For example, the Basic Grant formula receives a greater share of overall Title I-A appropriations than the Concentration Grant formula, so states generally receive higher grant amounts under the Basic Grant formula than under the Concentration Grant formula. Among states, Title I-A grant amounts and the percentage shares of funds vary due to the different characteristics of each state. For example, Texas has a much larger population of children included in the formula calculations than North Carolina and, therefore, receives a higher grant amount and larger share of Title I-A funds. Within a state, the percentage share of funds allocated may vary by formula, as certain formulas are more favorable to certain types of states (e.g., EFIG is generally more favorable to states with comparatively equal levels of spending per pupil among their LEAs). If a state's share of a given Title I-A formula exceeds its share of overall Title I-A funds, this is generally an indication that this particular formula is more favorable to the state than formulas for which the state's share of funds is below its overall share of Title I-A funds. For example, Florida and New York received a substantially higher percentage share of Targeted Grants than of overall Title I-A funds, indicating that the Targeted Grant formula is more favorable to them than other Title I-A formulas may be. At the same time, both states received a smaller percentage share of Basic Grants than of overall Title I-A funds, indicating that the Basic Grant formula is less favorable to them than other Title I-A formulas may be. In the four states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) that receive a minimum grant under all four formulas, the shares received under the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas are greater than under the Basic Grant or Concentration Grant formulas, due to higher state minimums under these formulas. If a state received the minimum grant under a given Title I-A formula, the grant amount is denoted with an asterisk (*) in Table 1 .

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95), is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Title I-A was funded at $15.5 billion for FY2017. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others. This report provides FY2017 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2017 Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion, or 12.00% of total Title I-A grants). Vermont received the smallest FY2017 Title I-A grant amount ($35.3 million, or 0.23% of total Title I-A grants).

In its discussion of strategies for aviation security, the 9/11 Commission recommended that: The TSA [Transportation Security Administration] and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. As a start, each individual selected for special screening should be screened for explosives. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to place high priority on developing and deploying equipment for passenger explosives screening; required TSA, part of DHS, to submit a strategic plan for deploying such equipment; and authorized additional research funding. It also required that passengers who are selected for additional screening be screened for explosives, as an interim measure until all passengers can be screened for explosives. Congressional interest in this topic continues, particularly as the 110 th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 ( H.R. 1 ) would require TSA to issue the strategic plan called for by P.L. 108-458 within seven days of passage and would establish a Checkpoint Screening Security Fund, paid for with fees on airline passengers, to develop and deploy equipment for explosives detection at screening checkpoints. The Improving America's Security Act of 2007 ( S. 4 ) would require DHS to issue the same strategic plan within 90 days of passage and begin its implementation within one year of passage. The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Health, and Iraq Accountability Act, 2007 ( H.R. 1591 , the FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill) would provide an additional $45 million for expansion of checkpoint explosives detection pilot systems. This report discusses the current state of passenger explosives trace detection and related policy issues. Explosives detection for aviation security has been an area of federal concern for many years. Much effort has been focused on direct detection of explosive materials in carry-on and checked luggage, but techniques have also been developed to detect and identify residual traces that may indicate a passenger's recent contact with explosive materials. These techniques use separation and detection technologies, such as mass spectrometry, gas chromatography, chemical luminescence, or ion mobility spectrometry, to measure the chemical properties of vapor or particulate matter collected from passengers or their carry-on luggage. Several technologies have been developed and deployed on a test or pilot basis. Parallel efforts in explosives vapor detection have employed specially trained animals, usually dogs. The effectiveness of chemical trace analysis is highly dependent on three distinct steps: (1) sample collection, (2) sample analysis, and (3) comparison of results with known standards. If any of these steps is suboptimal, the test may fail to detect explosives that are present. When trace analysis is used for passenger screening, additional goals may include nonintrusive or minimally intrusive sample collection, fast sample analysis and identification, and low cost. While no universal solution has yet been achieved, ion mobility spectrometry is most often used in currently deployed equipment. In 2004, TSA began pilot projects to deploy portal trace detection equipment for operational testing and evaluation. In the portal approach, passengers pass through a device like a large doorframe that can collect, analyze, and identify explosive residues on the person's body or clothing. The portal may rely on the passenger's own body heat to volatilize traces of explosive material for detection as a vapor, or it may use puffs of air that can dislodge small particles as an aerosol. Portal deployment is ongoing. One alternative to portals is to collect the chemical sample using a handheld vacuum "wand". Another is to test an object handled by the passenger, such as a boarding pass, for residues transferred from the passenger's hands. In this case, the secondary object is used as the carrier between the passenger and the analyzing equipment. The olfactory ability of dogs is sensitive enough to detect trace amounts of many compounds, but several factors have inhibited the regular use of canines for passenger screening. Dogs trained in explosives detection can generally only work for brief periods, have significant upkeep costs, are unable to communicate the identity of the detected explosives residue, and require a human handler when performing their detection role. In addition, direct contact between dogs and airline passengers raises liability concerns. Direct detection of explosives concealed on passengers in bulk quantities has been another area of federal interest. Technology development efforts in this area include portal systems based on techniques such as x-ray backscatter imaging, millimeter wave energy analysis, and terahertz imaging. As such systems detect only bulk quantities of explosives, they would not raise "nuisance alarms" on passengers who have recently handled explosives for innocuous reasons. Some versions could simultaneously detect other threats, such as nonmetallic weapons. On the other hand, trace detection techniques are also likely to detect bulk quantities of explosives and may alert screening personnel to security concerns about a passenger who has had contact with explosives but is not actually carrying an explosive device when screened. Current deployments for passenger screening are focused on trace detection, and the remainder of this report does not discuss bulk detection. However, many of the policy issues discussed below would apply similarly to bulk detection equipment. Any strategy for deploying and operating passenger explosives detection portals must consider a number of challenges. Organizational challenges include deciding where and how detectors are used, projecting costs, and developing technical and regulatory standards. Operational challenges include maximizing passenger throughput, responding to erroneous and innocuous detections, ensuring passenger acceptance of new procedures, minimizing the potential for intentional disruption of the screening process, and providing for research and development into future generations of detection equipment, including techniques for detecting novel explosives. For security reasons, many technical details of equipment performance are not publicly available, which makes independent analysis of technical performance challenging. An important component of a deployment strategy is identifying where and how passenger explosives detection equipment will be used. Portals could be deployed widely, so that all locations benefit from them, or they could be used only at selected locations, where they can most effectively address and mitigate risk. In any given location, portals could be used as a primary screening technology for all passengers, or as a secondary screening technology for selected passengers only. Widespread deployment and use for primary screening might provide more uniform risk reduction, but would require many more portals and thus increase costs. The total cost of deploying explosives detection equipment for passenger screening is unknown. According to TSA, the portal systems currently being deployed in U.S. airports cost more than $160,000 each. Document scanning systems are somewhat less expensive; according to a 2002 GAO study, similar tabletop systems used for screening carry-on baggage can cost from $20,000 to $65,000. It is possible that technology improvements or bulk purchasing could lower costs. The number of devices required would depend on throughput rates, device reliability and lifetime, and deployment strategy. The United States has more than 400 commercial passenger airports; if equally distributed, several thousand devices might be required, corresponding to a total capital cost for equipment of up to hundreds of millions of dollars. Installation and maintenance costs would be additional. Operating the equipment would require additional screening procedures and might lead to costs for additional screening personnel, or else create indirect costs by increasing passenger wait times. It is unknown whether the personnel limit for TSA screeners, currently set at 45,000 full time equivalent screeners nationwide ( P.L. 108-90 ), could accommodate the potential additional staffing requirements. Standards for the performance of passenger explosives trace detection equipment, procedures for evaluation and certification of the equipment, and regulations for its use are all yet to be established. Regulations and screening procedures have been established for explosives trace detection on luggage. Detection on passengers is a more complicated venture, involving possible privacy concerns, greater difficulty in sampling, and potentially different sensitivity requirements. Nevertheless, the current luggage regulations could be a model for future certification criteria for passenger screening. Procedures will also need to be established for the use of the equipment, such as how an operator should resolve detector alarms to distinguish genuine security threats from false positives and innocuous true positives. When multiplied by the large number of airline passengers each day, even small increases in screening times may be logistically prohibitive. The TSA goal for passenger wait time at airports is less than 10 minutes, and screening systems reportedly operate at a rate between 7 to 10 passengers per minute; additional screening that slows passenger throughput and increases passenger wait time may add to airport congestion and have a detrimental economic impact. A 1996 GAO study stated that throughput goals for portal technologies at that time were equivalent to 6 passengers per minute. According to the same study, non-portal technologies, such as secondary object analysis, had slightly higher throughput goals. The TSA's pilot deployment of passenger explosives trace detection equipment will likely provide useful information on passenger throughput. If no appreciable increase in screening times occurs, then passenger explosives screening may involve few additional direct economic costs beyond those of procuring, deploying, operating, and maintaining the equipment. If passenger throughput is drastically decreased, then alternatives for passenger screening may need to be considered. In between these extremes, it may be possible to moderate the economic impact by adding screening lanes or by using explosives detection equipment only on those passengers who are selected for secondary screening, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission as a possible initial step. A potential complication of explosives trace detection is the accuracy of detector performance. False positives, false negatives, and innocuous true positives are all challenges. If the detection system often detects the presence of an explosive when there actually is none (a false positive) then there will be a high burden in verifying results through additional procedures. Because of the large volume of air passengers, even small false positive rates may be unacceptable. Conversely, if the system fails to detect the presence of an explosive (a false negative) then the potential consequences may be serious. Assuming the system has adequate sensitivity to detect explosives traces in an operational environment, the detection threshold or criteria required for an alarm can generally be adjusted, enabling a tradeoff between false positives and false negatives, but neither can be eliminated entirely; the appropriate balance may be a matter of debate. Innocuous true positives occur when a passenger has been in contact with explosives, but for legitimate reasons. Examples include individuals who take nitroglycerin for medical purposes or individuals in the mining or construction industry who use explosives in their work. Such passengers would be regularly subject to additional security scrutiny. Similar issues arise from the current use of trace detection equipment on some airline passenger carry-on baggage, and innocuous true positives in such cases are generally handled without incident. The impact of innocuous true positives will likely depend on their frequency and on the proportion of passengers subject to explosives trace detection. Some passengers may have personal concerns about the addition of passenger explosives trace detection to the screening process. Issues of privacy may be raised by the connection between innocuous true positives and passenger medical status or field of employment. Also, equipment that uses a vacuum "wand" or puffs of air for sample collection may offend some passengers' sense of propriety or modesty. Passenger reluctance could then increase screening times. Allowing alternative forms of screening, such as within privacy enclosures or through different imaging technology, might mitigate passenger concerns in some cases. Another concern is the possibility that a passenger screening regimen that includes explosives trace detection could be exploited to intentionally disrupt the operation of an airport. The dissemination of trace quantities of an explosive material on commonly touched objects within the airport might lead to many positive detections on passengers. This would make trace detection less effective or ineffective for security screening, and might disrupt airport operations generally until alternative screening procedures, such as enhanced baggage screening by TSA personnel, could be put in place or the contamination source could be identified and eliminated. The DHS and its predecessor agencies have historically been the main funders of research on explosives detection for airport use. (Most of this research has focused on detecting explosives in baggage rather than on passengers.) Several other federal agencies, however, also fund research related to trace explosives detection. These include the Departments of Energy and Justice, the National Institute for Standards and Technology, and the interagency Technical Support Working Group. Much of this research has been dedicated to overcoming technical challenges, such as increasing sensitivity and reducing the time required for sample analysis. A different research challenge is the detection of novel explosives. Detectors are generally designed to look for specific explosives, both to limit the number of false or innocuous positives and to allow a determination of which explosive has been detected. As a result, novel explosives are unlikely to be detected until identifying characteristics and reference standards have been developed and incorporated into equipment designs. Unlike imaging techniques for detecting bulk quantities of explosives, trace analysis provides no opportunity for a human operator to identify a suspicious material based on experience or intuition. Liquid explosives are a novel threat that has been of particular interest since August 2006, when British police disrupted a plot to bomb aircraft using liquids. The DHS is evaluating technologies to detect liquid explosives. Its efforts are mainly focused on bulk detection, such as scanners to test the contents of bottles. Like solid explosives, however, liquids might be found through trace detection, if the trace detection system is designed to look for them.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that Congress and the Transportation Security Administration give priority attention to screening airline passengers for explosives. The key issue for Congress is balancing the costs of mandating passenger explosives detection against other aviation security needs. Passenger explosives screening technologies have been under development for several years and are now being deployed in selected airports. Their technical capabilities are not fully established, and operational and policy issues have not yet been resolved. Critical factors for implementation in airports include reliability, passenger throughput, and passenger privacy concerns. Presuming the successful development and deployment of this technology, certification standards, operational policy, and screening procedures for federal use will need to be established. This topic continues to be of congressional interest, particularly as the 110th Congress reexamines implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations via H.R. 1 and S. 4.

C ongress regularly considers legislative proposals to designate lands using a variety of titles, such as national park, national wildlife refuge, national monument, national conservation area, national recreation area, and many others. Additionally, Congress provides oversight of land designations made by executive branch entities. These congressional and executive land designations may bring few management changes to a site or may involve significant management changes, based on individual designating laws and/or general authorities governing a land system. Often, the designations are applied to federally owned lands (including lands already under federal administration and those that the designating law may authorize for federal acquisition), but some federal designations are conferred on lands that remain nonfederally owned and managed. The designations may authorize federal funding for an area, but they do not always do so. This report addresses questions about which federal title or designation might be appropriate for particular areas. What do the different land titles signify, and how does each type of unit differ? Who has authority to confer each designation? Which agency or nonfederal entity is responsible for managing the land under each designation, and which statutes would govern management decisions? What types of uses would be allowed on the land under each designation, and what uses would be prohibited? The report compares a variety of federal land designations with respect to these factors. It is beyond the scope of this report to assess the benefits or drawbacks of conferring federal designations on lands, although such questions often arise when federal designations are contemplated. For any given area, some stakeholders might favor a federal designation (for example, to bring federal funding to an area, to promote visitation, or to bring new resource protections) and others might oppose one (for example, to forestall the federal government's becoming a stakeholder in regional land use decisions or to preserve federal funds that might be spent on area management for allocation to other priorities). Additional CRS products, cited at the end of this report, explore such questions in greater detail for specific land designations. This report begins by briefly discussing some general factors that Congress may consider when determining which, if any, federal land designations might be suitable for a given area. It then compares selected designations across multiple attributes ( Table 1 ). A primary question for stakeholders often is which federal agency would manage the land under a given designation. Table 1 indicates the federal agency or agencies that have responsibilities for area management under selected designations. It also lists some designations in which lands typically remain in nonfederal management (while receiving technical and/or financial assistance from a federal agency). Four agencies manage almost all federal land in the United States: the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture. These agencies administer their lands under different statutorily defined missions. Both BLM and FS manage most of their lands for sustained yields of multiple uses, including recreation, grazing, timber, mineral production, watershed, wildlife and fish habitat, and conservation. FWS, by contrast, has a dominant-use mission for most of its lands—to conserve plants and animals for the benefit of present and future generations—although other priority uses are provided for if compatible. NPS administers its lands with the dual purpose of preserving valued resources and providing for their enjoyment by the public. Within these broad missions, each agency manages sites with a variety of titles, management provisions, and allowed uses. In some cases, the management framework for an individual site may differ from the overall framework for the agency, depending on the statutory authorities pertaining to the specific site. An area's physical characteristics may suggest certain types of designations over others. For example, specific natural features may suit themselves to some designations, such as national seashore or wild and scenic river. Some features may suggest management by a particular agency—for example, FS in the case of a forest—although in practice Congress has assigned a range of sites to each agency (e.g., agencies other than FS manage many forested areas). If the site consists primarily of built structures with historical, cultural, or commemorative significance, designations such as national historic site or national memorial might be considered. Each agency manages some historic and cultural assets, but many sites with primarily historical and cultural features either are managed by NPS or are federally designated but nonfederally owned and managed. A closely related question concerns the values for which designation is sought. Stakeholders may seek to protect a site's scenic qualities, its flora and fauna, its historical and cultural significance, its recreational opportunities, or combinations of these or other values. Some land designations may indicate the importance Congress places on a particular value—for instance, public recreation in the case of a national recreation area, or history in the case of a national historic site. Additionally, certain values (such as wildlife conservation) may be particularly aligned with the mission of a certain agency (such as FWS). Although the agency missions provide a broad guide, each agency also manages sites whose congressionally established values differ from the overall mission. For example, in national monuments or wilderness areas on BLM or FS lands, certain uses typically associated with these agencies' multiple-use, sustained-yield missions often are restricted or prohibited. Some designations pertain to statutorily defined land systems, whose laws may specify requirements for areas to qualify for the system designation. For example, under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, a water body designated as a wild river is to be free from any impoundments (e.g., dams), among other attributes. Congress could choose to ignore or modify system requirements when designating a new site in the system, but the criteria typically have been given weight when Members contemplate applying a designation. Other designations are not associated with statutorily defined land systems. For example, Congress has established 49 individual national heritage areas (primarily on nonfederal lands) but has not enacted a law defining a system of heritage areas with parameters for area inclusion. Where no law defines qualifying criteria for a particular designation, Congress has often, but not always, followed past precedents when conferring the same designation on a new site. Most federal land designations are made by an act of Congress, but in some cases Congress has authorized executive branch officials, such as the President and the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, to confer specific land designations. For example, under the Antiquities Act of 1906, the President may proclaim national monuments on federally owned land. Individual agencies may establish some protective designations on lands they manage (such as BLM's Areas of Critical Environmental Concern), and the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture may make certain designations on nonfederal lands . Members sometimes choose to work with executive entities to pursue a federal designation for a site rather than introducing legislation to designate the site. Among other reasons, an executive designation may be seen as a faster route to achieve the designation than moving a bill through the legislative process. (Typical timelines for executive designations vary widely, however, and can extend to several years or more.) Alternatively, limitations on executive authorities, such as a lack of federal funding associated with the designation, might make executive designations less attractive in some cases. Some executive designations—especially the President's authority to proclaim national monuments under the Antiquities Act—have been controversial at times, because the designations may restrict previously available uses of public land. Table 1 discusses some of the uses typically permitted or prohibited in different types of designated areas, based on authorities pertaining to the administering agency and/or land system. In general, National Park System lands are among those most strictly protected from uses that may consume or damage resources (sometimes called consumptive uses ), given NPS's mandate to preserve park resources "unimpaired" while providing for their enjoyment by the public. On FWS lands in the National Wildlife Refuge System, wildlife-related activities such as hunting, fishing, and bird-watching are considered priority uses; other uses (motorized recreation, timber cutting, grazing, mineral development) may be allowed to the extent that they are compatible with the mission of the system and the purposes of a specific unit. BLM and FS lands, as discussed, generally allow consumptive uses such as timber production, grazing, and mineral development. Also, some cross-cutting land systems affect certain lands across all four land management agencies. Of these, the Wilderness Act provides the highest level of protection. On designated wilderness lands, commercial activities, motorized uses, roads, structures, and facilities generally are prohibited, and resources are to be preserved "untrammeled" by human presence. Regardless of such general authorities, Congress may decide to allow, limit, or prohibit particular uses in an individual area through site-specific laws. Within all four agencies' lands are units with varying restrictions or allowances of land uses. For example, although hunting typically is prohibited in the National Park System, some individual units, such as many national preserves, allow hunting as authorized or mandated by site-specific laws. Mineral development is allowed on most BLM lands, but new development is prohibited by law or executive action in some BLM areas, such as many national monuments. In contrast to federal lands, Congress has limited authority to control uses of nonfederal land. Accordingly, congressional designations for nonfederal lands typically do not prohibit the nonfederal landowner from engaging in particular land uses, even where the use might adversely affect the values for which the area was designated. However, activities incompatible with the values of a designation—such as modernizing a designated national historic landmark—may lead to a withdrawal of the federal designation; also, federal funds or permits to carry out projects that compromise these values may be restricted. When a federal designation is contemplated for land not already in federal management, Members may consider whether or not the federal government should acquire the land. Many designations involve federal land acquisition, but as shown in Table 1 , under certain designations nonfederal entities typically continue to own and manage the land. Also, for any specific site, Congress may make individual provisions regarding federal land acquisition. Members may weigh, among other issues, the cost and effort to the federal government of acquiring and managing the land; the resources available to state, local, or private owners to maintain and protect the land; potential benefits of federal management (such as ongoing federal funding or a potentially higher public profile for the land if managed as part of a federal system); potential drawbacks of federal management (such as a loss of local control over management decisions or a reduction to the state and local tax base); and stakeholder positions on the size of the federal estate generally. Table 1 , below, compares selected designations used by Congress and the executive branch for federal lands and other areas. The table begins with designations that are common to multiple agencies and then lists designations exclusively or primarily related to an individual agency. The four agencies appear in order of the overall amount of land each agency manages (BLM, then FS, FWS, and NPS). The table provides information on the entity that confers each designation (e.g., Congress, the President, the Interior or Agriculture Secretary); statutory authorities for the designation; the agency or agencies that administer each type of area (also noting designations for which the area typically remains in nonfederal management); selected characteristics of the areas; and examples of each type of area. Designations for nonfederally owned and managed sites are listed according to the agency with administrative responsibility for the designation (e.g., responsibility for evaluating site qualifications and providing technical and/or financial assistance to designated sites). The table reflects a selection of titles that have been used repeatedly for multiple areas. It is not comprehensive. For example, Congress has designated many sites with unique titles (such as "national park for the performing arts" or "national tallgrass prairie") that are not reflected in the table. CRS Report R41658, Commemorative Works in the District of Columbia: Background and Practice , by Jacob R. Straus. CRS Report R41285, Congressionally Designated Special Management Areas in the National Forest System , by Katie Hoover. CRS In Focus IF10585, The Federal Land Management Agencies , by Katie Hoover. CRS Report R43429, Federal Lands and Related Resources: Overview and Selected Issues for the 115th Congress , coordinated by Katie Hoover. CRS Report RL33462, Heritage Areas: Background, Proposals, and Current Issues , by Laura B. Comay and Carol Hardy Vincent. CRS Report R41330, National Monuments and the Antiquities Act , by Carol Hardy Vincent. CRS Report R41816, National Park System: What Do the Different Park Titles Signify? , by Laura B. Comay. CRS Report R43868, The National Trails System: A Brief Overview , by Sandra L. Johnson and Laura B. Comay. CRS Report R42614, The National Wild and Scenic Rivers System: A Brief Overview , by Sandra L. Johnson and Laura B. Comay. CRS Report RL31447, Wilderness: Overview, Management, and Statistics , by Katie Hoover.

This report provides a brief guide to selected titles—such as national park, national wildlife refuge, national monument, national conservation area, national recreation area, and others—that Congress and the executive branch have used to designate certain U.S. lands. These designations primarily apply to federal lands administered by land management agencies, including the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS) in the Department of the Interior and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture. The report also discusses certain designations that Congress and executive branch entities have bestowed on nonfederally managed lands to recognize their national significance. It addresses questions about what the different land titles signify, which entity confers each designation, who manages the land under each designation, which statutes govern management decisions, and what types of uses may be allowed or prohibited on the land. Depending on the authorities governing each land designation, congressional and executive designations may bring few management changes to a site or may involve significant management changes. The designations may authorize new federal funding for an area, but they do not always do so. The report begins by briefly discussing some general factors that Congress may consider when contemplating which, if any, federal designation might be suitable for a given area. It then compares selected designations across multiple attributes.

In the United States, the practice of pharmacy is regulated by state boards of pharmacy, which establish and enforce standards intended to protect the public. State boards of pharmacy also license pharmacists and pharmacies. To legally dispense a prescription drug, a licensed pharmacist working in a licensed pharmacy must be presented a valid prescription from a licensed health care professional. The requirement that drugs be prescribed and dispensed by licensed professionals helps ensure patients receive the proper dose, take the medication correctly, and are informed about warnings, side effects, and other important information about the drug. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), as amended, FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety, effectiveness, and quality of domestic and imported drugs. To gain approval for the U.S. market, a drug manufacturer must demonstrate that a drug is safe and effective, and that the manufacturing methods and controls that will be used in the specific facility where it will be manufactured meet FDA standards. The same drug manufactured in another facility not approved by FDA—such as a foreign- made version of an approved drug—may not be sold legally in the United States. Drugs are subject to other statutory and regulatory standards relating to purity, labeling, manufacturing, and packaging. Failure to meet these standards could result in a drug being considered illegal for sale in the United States. The FDCA requires that drugs be dispensed with labels that include the name of the prescriber, directions for use, and cautionary statements, among other things. A drug is considered misbranded if its labeling or container is misleading, or if the label fails to include required information. Prescription drugs dispensed without a prescription are also considered misbranded. In addition, if a drug is susceptible to deterioration and must, for example, be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment, it must be packaged and labeled in accordance with regulations and manufacturer standards. Drugs must also be handled to prevent adulteration, which may occur, for example, if held under unsanitary conditions leading to possible contamination. FDA-approved drugs manufactured in foreign countries, including those sold over the Internet, are subject to the same requirements as domestic drugs. Further, imported drugs may be denied entry into the United States if they “appear” to be unapproved, adulterated, or misbranded, among other things. While the importation of such drugs may be illegal, FDA has allowed individuals to bring small quantities of certain drugs into the United States for personal use under certain circumstances. We obtained 1 or more samples of 11 of the 13 drugs we targeted, both with and without a patient-provided prescription. Drug samples we received from other foreign pharmacies came from Argentina, Costa Rica, Fiji, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey. Most of the drugs—45 of 68—were obtained without a patient-provided prescription. These included drugs for which physician supervision is of particular importance due to the possibility of severe side effects, such as Accutane, or the high potential for abuse and addiction, such as the narcotic painkiller hydrocodone. (See table 2.) Although most of the samples we received were obtained without a patient-provided prescription, prescription requirements varied. Five U.S. and all 18 Canadian pharmacies from which we obtained drug samples required the patient to provide a prescription. The remaining 24 U.S. pharmacies generally provided a prescription based on a general medical questionnaire filled out online by the patient. Questionnaires requested information on the patient’s physical characteristics, medical history, and condition for which drugs were being purchased. Several pharmacy Web sites indicated that a U.S.-licensed physician reviews the completed questionnaire and issues a prescription. The other foreign Internet pharmacies we ordered from generally had no prescription requirements, and many did not seek information regarding the patient’s medical history or condition. The process for obtaining a drug from many of these pharmacies involved only selecting the desired medication and submitting the necessary billing and shipping information. (See table 3.) None of the 21 prescription drug samples we received from other foreign Internet pharmacies included a dispensing pharmacy label that provided patient instructions for use, and only 6 of these samples came with warning information. Lack of instructions and warnings on these drugs leaves consumers who take them at risk for potentially dangerous drug interactions or side effects from incorrect or inappropriate use. For example, we received 2 samples purporting to be Viagra, a drug used to treat male sexual dysfunction, without any warnings or instructions for use. (See fig. 1.) According to its manufacturer, this drug should not be prescribed for individuals who are currently taking certain heart medications, as it can lower blood pressure to dangerous levels. Additionally, two samples of Roaccutan, a foreign version of Accutane, arrived without any instructions in English. (See fig. 2.) Possible side effects of this drug include birth defects and severe mental disturbances. Compounding the concerns regarding the lack of warnings and patient instructions for use, none of the other foreign pharmacies ensured patients were under the care of a physician by requiring that a prescription be submitted before the order is filled. We observed other evidence of improper handling among 13 of the 21 drug samples we received from other foreign Internet pharmacies. For example, 3 samples of Humulin N were not shipped in accordance with manufacturer handling specifications. Despite the requirement that this drug be stored under temperature-controlled and insulated conditions, the samples we received were shipped in envelopes without insulation. (See fig. 3.) Similarly, 6 samples of other drugs were shipped in unconventional packaging, in some instances with the apparent intention of concealing the actual contents of the package. For example, the sample purporting to be OxyContin was shipped in a plastic compact disc case wrapped in brown packing tape—no other labels or instructions were included, and a sample of Crixivan was shipped inside a sealed aluminum can enclosed in a box labeled “Gold Dye and Stain Remover Wax.” (See fig. 4.) Additionally, 5 samples we received were damaged and included tablets that arrived in punctured blister packs, potentially exposing pills to damaging light or moisture. (See fig. 5.) One drug manufacturer noted that damaged packaging may also compromise the validity of drug expiration dates. Among the 21 drug samples from other foreign pharmacies, manufacturers determined that 19 were not approved for the U.S. market for various reasons, including that the labeling or the facilities in which they were manufactured had not been approved by FDA. For example, the manufacturer of one drug noted that 2 samples we received of that drug were packaged under an alternate name used for the Mexican market. The manufacturer of another drug found that 3 samples we received of that drug were manufactured at a facility unapproved to produce drugs for the U.S. market. In all but 4 instances, however, manufacturers determined that the chemical composition of the samples we received from other foreign Internet pharmacies was comparable to the chemical composition of the drugs we had ordered. Two samples of one drug were found by the manufacturer to be counterfeit and contained a different chemical composition than the drug we had ordered. In both instances the manufacturer reported that samples had less quantity of the active ingredient, and the safety and efficacy of the samples could not be determined. Manufacturers also found 2 additional samples to have a significantly different chemical composition than that of the product we ordered. In contrast to the drug samples received from other foreign Internet pharmacies, all 47 of the prescription drug samples we received from Canadian and U.S. Internet pharmacies included labels from the dispensing pharmacy that generally provided patient instructions for use and 87 percent of these samples (41 of 47) included warning information. Furthermore, all samples were shipped in accordance with special handling requirements, where applicable, and arrived undamaged. Manufacturers reported that 16 of the 18 samples from Canadian Internet pharmacies were unapproved for sale in the United States, citing for example unapproved labeling and packaging. However, the samples were all found to be comparable in chemical composition to the products we ordered. Finally, the manufacturer found that 1 sample of a moisture- sensitive medication from a U.S. Internet pharmacy was inappropriately removed from the sealed manufacturer container and dispensed in a pharmacy bottle. Table 4 summarizes the problems we identified among the 68 samples we received. We observed questionable characteristics and business practices of some of the Internet pharmacies from which we received drugs. We ultimately did not receive six of the orders we placed and paid for, suggesting the potential fraudulent nature of some Internet pharmacies or entities representing themselves as such. The six orders were for Clozaril, Humulin N, and Vicodin, and cost over $700 in total. Five of these orders were placed with non-Canadian foreign pharmacies and one was placed with a pharmacy whose location we could not determine. We followed up with each pharmacy in late April and early May of 2004 to determine the status. Three indicated they would reship the product, but as of June 10, 2004, we had not received the shipments. Three others did not respond to our inquiry. We determined that at least eight of the return addresses included on samples we received from other foreign Internet pharmacies were shipped from locations that raise questions about the entities that provided the samples. For example, we found a shopping mall in Buenos Aires, Argentina, at the return address provided on a sample of Lipitor. Authorities assisting us in locating this address found it impossible to identify which, if any, of the many retail stores mailed the package. The return address for a sample of Celebrex was found to be a business in Cozumel, Mexico, but representatives of that business informed authorities that it had no connection to an Internet pharmacy operation. Finally, the return addresses on samples of Humulin N and Zoloft were found to be private residences in Lahore, Pakistan. Certain practices of Internet pharmacies may render it difficult for consumers to know exactly what they are buying. Some non-Canadian foreign Internet pharmacies appeared to offer U.S. versions of brand name drugs on their Web sites, but attempted to substitute an alternative drug during the order process. In some cases, other foreign pharmacies substituted alternative drugs after the order was placed. For example, one Internet pharmacy advertised brand name Accutane, which we ordered. The sample we received was actually a generic version of the drug made by an overseas manufacturer. About 21 percent of the Internet pharmacies from which we received drugs (14 of 68) were under investigation by regulatory agencies. The reasons for the investigations by DEA and FDA include allegations of selling controlled substances without a prescription; selling adulterated, misbranded, or counterfeit drugs; selling prescription drugs where no doctor-patient relationship exists; smuggling; and mail fraud. The pharmacies under investigation were concentrated among the U.S. pharmacies that did not require a patient-provided prescription (nine) and other foreign (four) pharmacies. One Canadian pharmacy was also included among those under investigation. Consumers can readily obtain many prescription drugs over the Internet without providing a prescription—particularly from certain U.S. and foreign Internet pharmacies outside of Canada. Drugs available include those with special safety restrictions, for which patients should be monitored for side effects, and narcotics, where the potential for abuse is high. For these types of drugs in particular, a prescription and physician supervision can help ensure patient safety. In addition to the lack of prescription requirements, some Internet pharmacies can pose other safety risks for consumers. Many foreign Internet pharmacies outside of Canada dispensed drugs without instructions for patient use, rarely provided warning information, and in four instances provided drugs that were not the authentic products we ordered. Consumers who purchase drugs from foreign Internet pharmacies that are outside of the U.S. regulatory framework may also receive drugs that are unapproved by FDA and manufactured in facilities that the agency has not inspected. Other risks consumers may face were highlighted by the other foreign Internet pharmacies that fraudulently billed us, provided drugs we did not order, and provided false or questionable return addresses. It is notable that we identified these numerous problems despite the relatively small number of drugs we purchased, consistent with problems recently identified by state and federal regulatory agencies. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Marcia Crosse at (202) 512-7119. Other individuals who made key contributions include Randy DiRosa, Margaret Smith, and Corey Houchins-Witt. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

As the demand for and the cost of prescription drugs rise, many consumers have turned to the Internet to purchase them. However, the global nature of the Internet can hinder state and federal efforts to identify and regulate Internet pharmacies to help assure the safety and efficacy of products sold. Recent reports of unapproved and counterfeit drugs sold over the Internet have raised further concerns. This testimony summarizes a GAO report: Internet Pharmacies: Some Pose Safety Risks for Consumers, GAO-04-820 (June 17, 2004). GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which certain drugs can be purchased over the Internet without a prescription; (2) whether the drugs are handled properly, approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and authentic; and (3) the extent to which Internet pharmacies are reliable in their business practices. GAO attempted to purchase up to 10 samples of 13 different drugs, each from a different pharmacy Web site, including sites in the United States, Canada, and other foreign countries. GAO assessed the condition of the samples it received and forwarded the samples to their manufacturers to determine whether they were approved by FDA, safe, and authentic. GAO also confirmed the locations of several Internet pharmacies and undertook measures to examine the reliability of their business practices. GAO obtained most of the prescription drugs it sought from a variety of Internet pharmacy Web sites without providing a prescription. GAO obtained 68 samples of 11 different drugs--each from a different pharmacy Web site in the United States, Canada, or other foreign countries, including Argentina, Costa Rica, Fiji, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey. Five U.S. and all 18 Canadian pharmacy sites from which GAO received samples required a patient-provided prescription, whereas the remaining 24 U.S. and all 21 foreign pharmacy sites outside of Canada provided a prescription based on their own medical questionnaire or had no prescription requirement. Among the drugs GAO obtained without a prescription were those with special safety restrictions and highly addictive narcotic painkillers. GAO identified several problems associated with the handling, FDA-approval status, and authenticity of the 21 samples received from Internet pharmacies located in foreign countries outside of Canada. Fewer problems were identified among pharmacies in Canada and the United States. None of the foreign pharmacies outside of Canada included dispensing pharmacy labels that provide instructions for use, few included warning information, and 13 displayed other problems associated with the handling of the drugs. For example, 3 samples of a drug that should be shipped in a temperature-controlled environment arrived in envelopes without insulation. Manufacturer testing revealed that most of these drug samples were unapproved for the U.S. market because, for example, the labeling or the facilities in which they were manufactured had not been approved by FDA; however, manufacturers found the chemical composition of all but 4 was comparable to the product GAO ordered. Four samples were determined to be counterfeit products or otherwise not comparable to the product GAO ordered. Similar to the samples received from other foreign pharmacies, manufacturers found most of those from Canada to be unapproved for the U.S. market; however, manufacturers determined that the chemical composition of all drug samples obtained from Canada were comparable to the product GAO ordered. Some Internet pharmacies were not reliable in their business practices. Most instances identified involved pharmacies outside of the United States and Canada. GAO did not receive six orders for which it had paid. In addition, GAO found questionable entities located at the return addresses on the packaging of several samples, such as private residences. Finally, 14 of the 68 pharmacy Web sites from which GAO obtained samples were found to be under investigation by regulatory agencies for reasons including selling counterfeit drugs and providing prescription drugs where no valid doctor-patient relationship exists. Nine of these were U.S. sites, 1 a Canadian site, and 4 were other foreign Internet pharmacy sites.

T he Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury (Title I), the Executive Office of the President (EOP; Title II), the judiciary (Title III), the District of Columbia (Title IV), and more than two dozen independent agencies (Title V). The bill typically funds mandatory retirement accounts in Title VI, which also contains additional general provisions applying to the funding provided to agencies through the FSGG bill. Title VII typically contains general provisions applying government-wide. FSGG bills have often also contained provisions relating to U.S. policy toward Cuba. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. This structure has existed in its current form since the 2007 reorganization of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. Although financial services are a major focus of the bills, FSGG appropriations bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are instead funded outside of the appropriations process. President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request on May 23, 2017. The request included a total of $45.2 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $250 million for the CFTC. On July 17, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 3280 , H.Rept. 115-234 ). Total FY2018 funding in the reported bill would have been $42.5 billion, with another $248 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 3268 , H.Rept. 115-232 ). The combined total of $42.7 billion would have been about $2.5 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with most of this difference in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA). Nearly all of H.R. 3280 's text was included as Division D of H.R. 3354 when it was considered by the House of Representatives beginning on September 6, 2017. The bill was amended numerous times, shifting funding among FSGG agencies but not changing the FSGG totals. H.R. 3354 passed on September 14, 2017. The Senate Committee on Appropriations released an FY2018 chairmen's recommended FSGG draft bill along with an explanatory statement on November 20, 2017. Funding in the recommended bill totaled $43.3 billion, about $1.9 billion below the President's FY2018 request with most of this difference in funding for the GSA. With the end of FY2017 approaching and no permanent FY2018 appropriations bills enacted, Congress passed, and the President signed, H.R. 601 / P.L. 115-56 . Division D of this act provided for continuing appropriations through December 8, 2017, generally termed a continuing resolution (CR). P.L. 115-556 provided funding for most FSGG agencies based on the FY2017 funding rate. In addition, the CR contained a number of deviations or "anomalies" from the general formula. The FSGG anomalies focused on decreasing funding related to the presidential transition, which had been increased in FY2017. Four additional CRs were enacted—on December 8, 2017 ( P.L. 115-90 ), December 22, 2017 ( P.L. 115-96 ), January 22, 2018 ( P.L. 115-120 ), and February 8, 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). P.L. 115-123 also included an additional $127 million for the GSA and $1.66 billion for the Small Business Administration (SBA), largely to address disaster costs from hurricanes in 2017. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 1625 , P.L. 115-141 ) was enacted on March 23, 2018. The bill, originally focused on eradication of human trafficking, was amended with the appropriations measure, passed in the House on March 22, 2018, and passed in the Senate on March 23, 2018. The C ongressional Record for March 22, 2018, includes an Explanatory Statement which is to have the same effect as a joint explanatory statement of a conference committee. FSGG appropriations are included in Division E, with the CFTC funded in the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. Additional legislative language affecting financial regulation is in Division S, Titles VIII and IX. FY2018 enacted appropriations in both P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 115-123 totaled $47.7 billion for the FSGG agencies, $2.5 billion above the original request with much of this difference resulting from the emergency funding for the SBA. The GSA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) also had substantial funding differences between requested and enacted amounts. Most of the EAC funding was for grants to states for the election reform program. Table 1 reflects the status of FSGG appropriations measures at key points in the appropriations process. Table 2 lists the broad amounts requested by the President and included in the various FSGG bills, largely by title, and Table 3 details the amounts for the independent agencies. Specific columns in Table 2 and Table 3 are FSGG agencies' enacted amounts for FY2017, the President's FY2018 request, the FY2018 amounts from H.R. 3554 as passed by the House, from the Senate Appropriations chairmen's draft bill, and the enacted amounts combined from P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 115-123 . Although financial services are a focus of the FSGG bill, the bill does not actually include funding for the regulation of much of the financial services industry. Financial services as an industry is often subdivided into banking, insurance, and securities. Federal regulation of the banking industry is divided among the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (generally known as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or CFPB). In addition, credit unions, which operate similarly to many banks, are regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). None of these agencies receives its primary funding through the appropriations process, with only the FDIC inspector general and a small program operated by the NCUA currently funded in the FSGG bill. Insurance generally is regulated at the state level, with some oversight at the holding company level by the Federal Reserve. There is a relatively small Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside the Treasury, which is funded through the Departmental Offices account, but FIO has no regulatory authority. Federal securities regulation is divided between the SEC and the CFTC, both of which are funded through appropriations. The CFTC funding is a relatively straightforward appropriation from the general fund, whereas the SEC funding is provided by the FSGG bill, but then offset through fees collected by the SEC. Although funding for many financial regulatory agencies may not be provided by the FSGG bill, legislative provisions affecting financial regulation in general and some of these agencies specifically have often been included in FSGG bills. H.R. 3280 and H.R. 3354 as passed by the House include many provisions, particularly in Title IX and Title X, that would amend the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and other statutes relating to the regulation of financial institutions and the authority and funding of financial regulators. Many of these provisions were included in other legislation, notably H.R. 10 , which passed the House on June 8, 2017. Of particular interest from the appropriations perspective, H.R. 3280 and H.R. 3354 as passed by the House would bring several financial regulators under the FSGG bill instead of receiving funding from outside of the appropriations process, as is currently the case. P.L. 115-141 included the texts of H.R. 4267 and H.R. 4792 , both of which address small business access to capital. H.R. 4267 was also included in H.R. 10 , but had not been originally included in H.R. 3280 or H.R. 3354 . The texts of H.R. 4267 and H.R. 4792 , however, were not included in the FSGG portion of the bill. Instead they were in Titles VIII and IX in a separate Division S. None of the language bringing financial regulators under the appropriations process was included in the law as enacted. The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations reorganized their subcommittee structures in early 2007. Each chamber created a new Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee. In the House, the jurisdiction of the FSGG Subcommittee is composed primarily of agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies, commonly referred to as TTHUD. In addition, the House FSGG Subcommittee was assigned four independent agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Subcommittee: the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Small Business Administration (SBA). In the Senate, the jurisdiction of the new FSGG Subcommittee is a combination of agencies from the jurisdiction of three previously existing subcommittees. Most of the agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, and Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Subcommittee were assigned to the FSGG subcommittee. In addition, the District of Columbia, which had its own subcommittee in the 109 th Congress, was placed under the purview of the FSGG Subcommittee, as were four independent agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee: the FCC, FTC, SEC, and SBA. As a result of this reorganization, the House and Senate FSGG Subcommittees have nearly identical jurisdictions, except that the CFTC is under the jurisdiction of the FSGG Subcommittee in the Senate and the Agriculture Subcommittee in the House. Table 4 below lists various departments and agencies funded through FSGG appropriations and the names and contact information of the CRS expert(s) on these departments and agencies.

The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request on May 23, 2017. The request included a total of $45.2 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $250 million for the CFTC. The House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 3280, H.Rept. 115-234) on July 17, 2017. Total FY2018 funding in the reported bill would have been $42.5 billion, with another $248 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 3268, H.Rept. 115-232). The combined total of $42.7 billion would have been about $2.5 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with the largest difference in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA). Nearly all of H.R. 3280's text was included as Division D of H.R. 3354, an omnibus appropriations bill, when it was considered by the House of Representatives beginning on September 6, 2017. The bill was amended numerous times, shifting funding among FSGG agencies but not changing the FSGG totals. H.R. 3354 passed on September 14, 2017. The full Senate Committee on Appropriations did not act on an FY2018 FSGG appropriations bill. A draft FY2018 chairmen's recommended FSGG bill along with an explanatory statement was released on November 20, 2017. Funding in the draft bill would have totaled $43.3 billion, about $1.9 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with most of this difference in funding for the GSA. No appropriations bills were passed prior to the start of FY2018. Five separate continuing resolutions (CR) were enacted—on September 8, 2017 (P.L. 115-56), December 8, 2017 (P.L. 115-90), December 22, 2017 (P.L. 115-96), January 22, 2018 (P.L. 115-120), and February 8, 2018 (P.L. 115-123). The CRs generally maintained FSGG funding based on FY2017 levels, with P.L. 115-123 also adding supplemental emergency funding for the GSA ($127 million) and the Small Business Administration (SBA; $1.66 billion) largely to address natural disasters. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625, P.L. 115-141) was enacted on March 23, 2018. FSGG appropriations were included as Division E, with the CFTC funded in the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. FY2018 enacted appropriations in P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 115-123 combined totaled $47.7 billion for the FSGG agencies, $2.5 billion above the original request with much of this difference resulting from the emergency funding for the SBA. Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills do, however, often contain additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies, as was the case with H.R. 3280 and H.R. 3354, which contained several provisions in Title IX and Title X that also appear in H.R. 10, a broad financial regulatory bill passed by the House on June 8, 2017. Although most of these provisions were not ultimately attached, P.L. 115-141 included the texts of H.R. 4267 and H.R. 4792, both of which addressed small business access to capital.

The North Korean Taepo Dong program traces its origins to the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile program of the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, North Korea initiated the development of two ballistic missile programs known to the West as Taepo Dong 1 and Taepo Dong 2. The reported design objectives for the Taepo Dong 1 system were to deliver a 1,000 to 1,500 kg warhead to a range of 1,500 to 2,500 km and for the Taepo Dong 2 to deliver the same warhead to a 4,000 to 8,000 km range. Initial prototypes for both systems were probably manufactured in 1995 or 1996 with a possible initial production run for the Taepo Dong 1 initiated in early 1997 or 1998. Some analysts estimated that North Korea may have produced from one to ten Taepo Dong 1 and one or two Taepo Dong 2 prototypes by the end of 1999. These missiles are not believed to be deployed. North Korea is believed to have had extensive foreign assistance from China, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran throughout the program. Very little was known about the actual program until the August 31, 1998 launch of a Taepo Dong 1 (or Paektusan-1) from the Musudan-ri Launch Facility in North Hamgyong Province, northeast coast of North Korea. The stated objective of this launch was to place North Korea's first satellite into orbit. Initial U.S. intelligence reports postulated that the Taepo Dong 1 SLV was only a two-stage rocket. The first stage fell into international waters 300 km east of Musudan-ri and the second stage flew over the Japanese island of Honshu and fell into the water 330 km away from the Japanese port of Hachinohe for a total distance of approximately 1,646 km. Further analysis of radar tapes reportedly revealed that the Taepo Dong 1 had a small third solid propellant stage (presumably designed to place the satellite into orbit). Some debris from this third stage was believed to have impacted as far as 4,000 km from the launch point. Some analysts believe that if the missile had functioned properly, the Taepo Dong 1 space launch vehicle (SLV) could have achieved a 3,800 to 5,900 km range. North Korean media claimed the satellite entered earth orbit. In order to strike targets from North Korea, a North Korean missile would need to achieve the following ranges: Within possible range of the Taepo Dongs are U.S. military facilities in Guam (3,500 km), Okinawa, and Japan. The Taepo Dong 1 missile (as opposed to the SLV) is believed to be a two-stage missile that uses a No Dong missile derivative as its first stage and SCUD C derivative (called the Hwasong 6) as its second stage. In this configuration, it is estimated that it could deliver a 700 - 1,000 kg warhead to a range of 2,500 km, which could put Japan and Okinawa within range. For the Taepo Dong 1 to achieve greater range its payload would have to be decreased. Some analysts speculated that a reduced-payload configuration could deliver a 200 kg warhead into the U.S. center and a 100 kg warhead to Washington D.C., albeit with poor accuracy. Until a few years ago, the Taepo Dong 2 had not yet been flight tested. (It has also been called the Moksong 2 and the Pekdosan 2.) The Taepo Dong 2 is believed to be a two-stage missile about 35 meters long. The first stage has been said to bear close resemblance to the Chinese CSS-2 and CSS-3 first stage. The second stage is believed to be based on the No Dong missile. The two-stage variant is assessed by some to have a range potential of as much as 3,750 km with a 700 to 1,000 kg payload and, if a third stage were added, some believe that range could be extended to 4,000 to 4,300 km with a full payload. Some analysts further believe that the Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a 700 to 1,000 kg payload as far as 6,700 km. Pyongyang has yet to test the guidance system, and so the missile is believed to be inaccurate. How it might be deployed (i.e., silo or transportable) also remains undetermined, although some have suggested it is a road mobile system. In order to achieve ranges capable of striking Hawaii and targets on the U.S. mainland, some analysts believe that the Taepo Dong 2's payload would need to be reduced to 200 - 300 kg. Some believe the Taepo Dong 2 may be exported to other countries in the future. In June 2006 the Taepo Dong 2 (or Paektusan-2) was observed being assembled and fueled at the Musudan-ri test site along the northeast coast of North Korea. At that time, some observers believed a test was imminent while others expressed caution because considerable technical uncertainty remained. On July 4, 2006, North Korea launched the Taepo Dong 2. The launch was preceded by three shorter-range ballistic missile launches, and then followed by three more. About 40 seconds into the flight, the Taepo Dong 2 failed on its own during the first stage and fell into the Sea of Japan, according to USNORTHCOM (U.S. Northern Command). Causes for the failure were studied, but details were not made public. Japanese sources reported some details of the missile launches, suggesting greater accuracy in their impact areas than other analyses. Others have suggested structural failure of the airframe, or failure of the propulsion or guidance system as the causes. The report also suggested greater Russian engineering support than indicated elsewhere. Some believe initial production of the Taepo Dong 2 may have started in 2005, and that perhaps 20 missiles were built in 2006. In early February 2009, various reports indicated that North Korea was making test preparations for a Taepodong-2 launch by setting up radar and other monitoring equipment around a missile test site along its northeast coast. Secretary of State Clinton said any such test would "be very unhelpful in moving our relationship forward" and that it would violate a 2006 UN Security Council Resolution (Resolution 1718) demanding that North Korea "not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile." Similarly, the South Korean government warned any missile test would "be a serious threat." In late February 2009, North Korea announced that it was preparing to launch a communications satellite, similarly to what it said about the 1998 test. Some experts continue to register some concern over North Korea's level of military spending in relation to its missile program. North Korea may spend as much as 40 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on the military. In 2004, U.S. Forces Korea commander, General Leon J. LaPorte, reportedly stated that North Korea's military investments are primarily in their nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs in order to gain an "asymmetrical" advantage over U.S and South Korean forces. General LaPorte reportedly emphasized his concern over missile development and North Korea's continued development of its nuclear weapons program that could eventually lead to "weaponizing their weapons-grade materials on missiles." North Korea's apparent willingness to devote such a large portion of its GDP to missiles and weapons of mass destruction could be cause for additional concern when viewed in the light of their alleged cooperation with other countries. Evidence suggests that North Korea has had extensive dealings with Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, Yemen, and Libya on ballistic missiles and possibly even nuclear warheads. One particular concern is that Chinese warhead designs, sold to Libya by Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan, might also be in the hands of North Korea, which could help accelerate its efforts to develop long-ranged nuclear ballistic missiles. Some suggest that North Korea's access to these countries' missile and WMD technologies might enable North Korea to advance its long-range nuclear ballistic missile program at a more accelerated rate without having to conduct extensive testing, particularly if they use proven missile designs from other countries. Various reports indicate that North Korea may be developing and deploying at least two new medium to intermediate-range ballistic missile systems. The Japanese Defense Ministry reportedly believes North Korea has about 200 Nodong medium-range missiles. It is not publicly known if North Korea is continuing development of a reported new version of its Taepo Dong ballistic missile, the so-called Taepo Dong X, which might achieve intercontinental ranges. The two new medium to intermediate-range missiles are believed to be based on the decommissioned Soviet R-27 submarine launched ballistic missile. The R-27, which was allegedly acquired from Russia in the 1990s and possibly enhanced with the help of Russian missile specialists, has been called an "excellent choice" on which to base a new missile system. Its 40 year-old, liquid-fueled technology is considered within the technological and industrial capabilities of North Korea and versions of its engines are already used in North Korean SCUDs and No Dongs. Perhaps the greatest advantage of this system, according to some observers, is that the R-27 is a proven design meaning that North Korea may be able to develop and deploy these missiles without having to conduct extensive ground and flight tests. In February 2009, South Korea's Defense Ministry reported that North Korea had deployed a new type of medium-range ballistic with a range estimated at 1,800 miles. This missile is believed to be the same type seen at a military parade in North Korea in 2007. Additional details, such as the name of this missile and how many are deployed have not yet been made public. The land-based version called Musadan or No Dong B is a medium to intermediate-range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 2,500-3,200 km. The North Korean version of this missile is 12 m long—2.4m longer than the R-27—and, although smaller than the No Dong and Taepo Dong 1, it has a greater range than these two missiles. This could put most of East Asia within its range, including U.S. military bases at Guam and Okinawa, although experts point out that the North Korean No Dong 2 missile could also reach Japan and Okinawa. Initial prototypes of the land-based version were reportedly first identified in 2000, and pre-production models and a new transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) were believed to have been completed by mid-2003. The Musadan has not been flight-tested. Although some remain uncertain whether it is deployed, others report that perhaps 15-20 Musadan have been deployed without apparent testing. The North Koreans reportedly began constructing two new missile bases to accommodate the Musadan/No Dong B. One base is near Yangdok-gun and the other is at Sangnam-ni, previously reported as a No Dong and Taepo Dong base. North Korea reportedly constructed administrative and maintenance facilities at these two sites as well as fortified underground tunnels for storing the missiles and TELs. The sea-based version of the R-27 is reportedly either a submarine or ship-mounted system with an estimated range of at least 2,500 km. Russian versions of the R-27 reportedly had both a single nuclear reentry vehicle as well as a version with three reentry vehicles, each with a 200 kiloton (KT) nuclear weapon. It is not known if North Korea possesses reentry vehicles for their versions of the R-27. In any such case, they have not been tested by North Korea There are indications that North Korea may be actively pursuing a sea-based ballistic missile capability, which also could have potential security implications for the United States. In September 1993, the Korean People's Navy (KPN) reportedly purchased 12 decommissioned Russian Foxtrot class and Golf-II class submarines for scrap metal from a Japanese company. The Golf-IIs, which are capable of carrying three SS-N-5 SLBMs, did not have their missiles or electronic firing systems when they were sold to the North Koreans, but they did allegedly retain significant missile launch sub-systems including launch tubes and stabilization systems. Some analysts believe that this technology, in conjunction with the R-27's well-understood design, gives North Korea the capability to develop either a submarine or ship-mounted ballistic missile. Many experts postulate that North Korea does not have the capability to develop a new SLBM on its own and that none of North Korea's other ballistic missiles are easily convertible to SLBMs. North Korea apparently integrated the Golf-IIs missile stabilization and launch technology into a new class of conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines, possibly modified versions of Golf-IIs or Romeo class Russian submarines. It is also possible, according to some observers, that North Korea might attempt to incorporate this launch technology into a merchant ship. It is not known if North Korea has sold or will sell this new system to other countries. Some analysts suggest that Iran might be an ideal candidate for such a system, as it has allegedly researched a sea-based ballistic missile capability in the past. DPRK systems potentially increase the missile threat to the United States. If the new missiles are indeed closely modified versions of the R-27, they are likely more accurate in relative terms and have greater range than other DPRK missiles. Some analysts believe that the sea-launched version could pose the greatest threat by threatening the continental United States. These experts suggest that a North Korean sea-launched missile capability could complicate intelligence collection efforts as well as present challenges for South Korean, Japanese, and U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. Others, however, are skeptical that North Korea can reach the continental United States with the new sea-based version. Anonymous U.S. government officials reportedly stated that North Korea does not presently have a submarine that is capable of transporting a missile within striking distance of the continental United States. These officials also expressed doubt that North Korea had intentions of developing a missile to hide inside a freighter to be used against targets in the United States.

This report briefly reviews North Korea's ballistic missile program. In summer 2007, North Korea tested modern, short-range missiles. In February 2009, South Korea reported the DPRK had deployed a new intermediate-range missile. This report may be updated periodically. Additional information is provided by CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by [author name scrubbed].

Resale price maintenance has been called "vertical price fixing" because it involves entities at different levels of the supply/marketing chain. It generally entails an agreement (via formal contract or otherwise) between a manufacturer and a retailer that the dealer will charge some specific price for the manufacturer's products. As such, the agreement is considered a "conspiracy in restraint of trade" in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The practice, particularly when a floor has been set under permissible resale prices ( minimum RPM), has been considered a per se violation of the antitrust laws since 1911, when the Court decided in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company that such imposition and agreement was not analytically different from an agreement among the dealers themselves to fix their prices, thus depriving consumers of the advantages of competition. Imposition of maximum resale prices (a "ceiling" on permissible resale prices, as opposed to a "floor" below which a price is not permissible) or some other agreement which may affect price but does not require any specific level or term, on the other hand, has more recently been analyzed under the more lenient Rule of Reason standard. Significant inroads in the law of vertical restraints generally were made by three cases decided in the 1970s and 1980s. First, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. , the Court distinguished between vertically imposed price and non-price restraints, specifically overruling a barely 10-year-old, and very contentious case. The Sylvania Court concluded that it was "appropriate," given the "complex" market impact of non-price vertical restraints, to return to the Rule of Reason analysis for evaluating them (433 U.S. at 51, 52, 59). Then, in two dealer-termination cases, the Court further clarified its thinking on the "proper dividing line between" per se vertical price restraints and Rule of Reason non-price restraints. It required the plaintiff in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. to provide evidence of activity on the part of the manufacturer and the non-terminated dealer that "tends to exclude the possibility that [they] were acting independently" (465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)). Finally, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. the Court determined that neither (1) all of those agreements which affect price (because nearly all vertical agreements do), nor (2) all of those which contain the word "price" should be treated as per se violations. Per se illegality should be reserved for only those restraints that include "some [express or implied] agreement on price or price levels" (485 U.S. 717, 719, 728 (1988)). Having distinguished between the proper analysis of vertically imposed price and non-price restraints, the Court, in 1997, imposed further, and more direct, delineations in the law of vertical restraints; in State Oil Co. v. Khan , a unanimous Court acknowledged that although maximum RPM might be used "to disguise arrangements to fix minimum prices, ... we believe such conduct ... can be appropriately recognized and punished under the rule of reason." Notwithstanding that the per se treatment of maximum RPM had been in effect for approximately 30 years, Justice O'Connor noted, the Court had never been confronted with an "unadulterated" maximum RPM arrangement, and so found the "conceptual foundations [of that rule to be] gravely weakened." Continuing the erosion of its precedents in the law of vertical restraints/RPM, a divided (5-4) Court overruled Dr. Miles , the final barrier to the Rule of Reason treatment of minimum RPM. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia (who had authored the Business Electronics opinion, supra , note 1), Thomas and Alito, stated that [v]ertical retail-price agreements have either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending on the circumstances in which they were formed; and the limited empirical evidence available does not suggest [that] efficient uses of the agreements are infrequent or hypothetical. 127 S.Ct. at 2709. Therefore, the opinion continued, [a] per se rule should not be adopted for administrative convenience alone. Such rules can be counterproductive, increasing the antitrust system's total cost by prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage. And a per se rule cannot be justified by the possibility of higher prices absent a further showing of anticompetitive conduct. The antitrust laws primarily are designed to protect interbrand competition from which lower prices can later result. Ibid . In apparent anticipation of its decision to overrule Dr. Miles (notwithstanding the doctrine of precedent known as stare decisis , which counsels that prior judicial precedents generally should not be upset), the opinion devoted a number of pages to presentation of its justifications. After acknowledging that "we do not write on a clean slate, for the decision in Dr. Miles is almost a century old," Justice Kennedy set out the reasons the majority felt it appropriate to abandon stare decisis in this case (127 S.Ct. at 2720). His justifications included first, the fact that even though "concerns about maintaining settled law are strong when the question is one of statutory interpretation," precedents involving the Sherman Act present a lesser compulsion: "The general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act." Second, the Sherman Act has been considered and approached as a common-law statute, and, Just as the common law adapts to modern understanding and greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act's prohibition on 'restraint(s) of trade' evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions. 127 S.Ct. at 2720. Third, it would create a "chronically schizoid statute" to have an evolving rule of reason that takes into account "new circumstances and new wisdom," but leaves an "immovable" per se line that "remains forever fixed where it was." Fourth, there is ample evidence in economic literature that the per se rule is not appropriate for use in any RPM context. Fifth, both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—"the antitrust enforcement agencies with the ability to assess the long-term impacts of resale price maintenance"—have urged that the distinctions between classes of RPM be abandoned. Finally, prior to reviewing its decisions in the cases described in the "Background" portion of this report, as well as others it considered relevant, the Court quoted from a 2000 opinion to note that "we have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings." Addressing PSKS's argument that when Congress repealed the authorization for state Fair Trade Laws it was, essentially, ratifying the per se rule, the Court replied, This is not so. The text of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act [ P.L. 94-145 ] did not codify the rule of per se illegality for vertical price restraints. It rescinded statutory provisions that made them per se legal. Congress once again placed these restraints within the ambit of § 1 of the Sherman Act.... Congress intended § 1 to give courts the ability 'to develop governing principles of law' in the common-law tradition. The Leegin case, therefore, was remanded to the 5 th Circuit, which. in turn, remanded to the district court "for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion" (498 F.3d 486 (5 th Cir. 2007)). The dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, took issue with the majority's justification for "its departure from ordinary considerations of stare decisis ...." (127 S.Ct. at 2725). Although the lawfulness of particular practices is often determined pursuant to the Rule of Reason, they acknowledged, there are some practices whose "likely anticompetitive consequences" are either so serious, with so few possible justifications, or whose justifications are "so difficult to prove [that] this Court has imposed a rule of per se unlawfulness—a rule that instructs courts to find the practice unlawful all (or nearly all) of the time" (127 S.Ct. at 2726). The "upshot" of ample economic evidence that RPM can result and has resulted in increased consumer prices, as well as the other side of the argument—that RPM can be beneficial to consumers —leads Justice Breyer to "ask such questions as, how often are harms or benefits likely to occur? How easy is it to separate the beneficial sheep from the antitrust goats?" (127 S.Ct. at 2729). Moreover, the dissent continued, while it is rational to allow economic discussions to inform antitrust analysis, there is a significant difference between recognizing that economics is a discipline which necessarily contains conflicting views and abandoning the necessity for antitrust law to be administered in such a way as to provide adequate certainty in the "content of rules and precedents" to be applied by the courts and used by "lawyers advising their clients" (127 S.Ct. at 2729). The "special advantages" of a "bright-line rule" they suggested, also might include the potential unfairness and impracticality of pursuing certain potentially criminal offenses (127 S.Ct. at 2731). In its reply to the majority's assertion that the Consumer Goods Pricing Act had not "codified" the per se rule of RPM, but rather, had merely "intended § 1 to give courts the ability 'to develop governing principles of law' in the common-law tradition," the dissent emphasized that Congress did not prohibit this Court from reconsidering the per se rule. But enacting major legislation premised upon the existence of that rule constitutes important public reliance upon that rule. And doing so aware of the relevant arguments constitutes even stronger reliance upon the Court's keeping the rule, at least in the absence of some significant change in respect to those arguments. Finally, the dissent argued, "every relevant factor ... mention[ed]" by Justice Scalia (a member of the Court's majority here), concurring in the judgment of an earlier case decided this Term, Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (127 S.Ct. 2652, 2007 WL 1804336), "argues [here] against overturning Dr. Miles " (127 S.Ct. at 2734). Those reasons are listed and discussed by Justice Breyer at 127 S.Ct. at 2734-2737: First, this case ( Leegin) is statutory, despite the Court's assertion that it is more properly to be considered in the realm of common-law adjudication; therefore, the Court should accord the deference due stare decisis concerning cases involving statutory interpretation. Second, although "the Court does sometimes overrule cases that it decided wrongly only a reasonably short time ago," Dr. Miles is nearly a century old (not to mention that in overruling Dr. Miles this decision also serves to overrule every case that has followed or applied it). Third, there is no credible argument that keeping the per se rule associated with Dr. Miles creates or maintains an "'unworkable' legal regime." Fourth, overruling Dr. Miles "unsettles" the law to a far greater degree than keeping it would. Fifth, the "considerable reliance upon the per se rule" of Dr. Miles that has led to the involvement of property or contract rights in RPM cases "argues against overruling [that case]." Sixth, overruling a "rule of law [that] has become 'embedded' in our 'national culture,'" as has the per se rule for RPM, is both improper and unwise. Accordingly, Justice Breyer concluded: The only safe predicitions to make about today's decision are that it will likely raise the prices of goods at retail and that it will create considerable legal turbulence as lower courts seek to develop workable principles. I do not believe that the majority has shown new or changed conditions sufficient to warrant overruling a decision of such long standing. All ordinary stare decisis considerations indicate the contrary. 127 S.Ct. at 2737.

The plaintiff in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. successfully asked the Supreme Court to soften the longstanding treatment of resale price maintenance (RPM, vertical imposition of direct, minimum price restraints) as a per se (automatic, and not capable of being justified) antitrust offense. RPM had been so analyzed since the Court decided in 1911 that a manufacturer of patent medicines could not lawfully agree with retailers of its products on the prices at which those products would be sold (Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company, 220 U.S. 373). Such agreements, the Court had said in Dr. Miles, constituted both unlawful restraints of trade under the common law, and violations of the Sherman Act's prohibition against "contract[s] or combination[s] ... in restraint of trade" (15 U.S.C. § 1). Leegin's practice of entering into contracts with its retailers of the Brighton line of leather products to set the prices at which the dealers would resell those products was challenged by a discounting retailer whose replacement shipments were terminated; the trial court found a per se violation of section 1 (2004 WL 5254322), and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision (171 Fed.Appx. 464 (2006)). Leegin argued in the Supreme Court that because RPM may sometimes be pro-consumer (might, for example, allow the retailers to profitably provide extra services desired by some consumers), the practice should not be conclusively presumed unreasonable "without elaborate inquiry as to 'its precise harm or business justification for its use.'" Agreeing with Leegin, the Court overruled Dr. Miles, stating that allowing RPM to be analyzed as a Rule of Reason violation (pursuant to which the procompetitive effects of a judicially determined antitrust violation are weighed against the anticompetitive results of the challenged activity) should be allowed: "Notwithstanding the risks of unlawful conduct, it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that [RPM] always tend[s] to restrict competition ...." 551 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2709 (2007), quoting, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). This report will not be updated.

97-736 -- Victims' Rights Amendment in the 106th Congress: Overview of Suggestions to Amend the Constitution Updated January 12, 2001 Arguments put forward in support of an amendment include assertions that: � The criminal justice system is badly tilted in favor of criminal defendants and against victims' interests and a more appropriate balance should be restored; � The shabby treatment afforded victims has chilled their participation in the criminal justice system to the detriment of all; � Society has an obligation to compensate victims; � Existing statutory and state constitutional provisions are wildly disparate in their coverage, resulting in uneven treatment and harmful confusion throughout thecriminal justice system; and � Existing state and federal law is inadequate and likely to remain inadequate Critics argue to the contrary that: � The criminal justice system is not out of balance. The purpose of a criminal trial is to determine the guilt ofan accused by allowing an impartial jury to weighthe government's evidence that a crime has been committed and that the accused committed it, against any evidenceoffered by the defendant; the interests ofvictims do not fit in the equation; their interests are protected by the right to bring a civil suit against the accused,by court-order restitution if the accused isconvicted, and by victim compensation provisions. � If efficacious, a victims rights amendment would generate considerable uncertainty in the law and flood the federal courts with litigation, could be very costly,and would either jeopardize the rights of the accused (probably in a discriminatory manner) or undermine thegovernment's ability to prosecute. � If the mischief possible through a victims rights amendment is avoided, the proposal becomes purely hortatory; the Constitution is no place for commemorativedecorations. � It is inconsistent with the basic notions of federalism. Each of the states, through its legislatures and electorate, has decided how victims rights should beaccommodated within its criminal justice system. These decisions would be made subservient to a uniform standardthat in all likelihood no jurisdiction wouldhave chosen. S.J.Res. 3 and H.J.Res. 64 would have followed the general format favored in the state constitutions. They would have guaranteedvictims a right to notice, to attend, and/or to be heard at various stages of the criminal justice process. The impact of any victims rights amendment depends upon who is considered a victim for purposes of the amendment. S.J.Res. 3 would havecovered "victim[s] of a crime of violence, as these terms may be defined by law." H.J.Res. 64 would haveapplied to "[e]ach individual who is avictim of a crime for which the defendant can be imprisoned for a period of longer than one year or any other crimethat involves violence." The obviousdifference between the two was that the House Resolution would have covered nonviolent felonies, while the Senateproposal would not. Bail At least in theory, a victim's rights might attach upon commission of the offense. Under the proposals in the 106th and most of the state provisions, the rightsattach upon commencement of "proceedings" involving the crime of which the individual is the victim. The mostsignificant of these early proceedings for thevictim would likely be the bail hearing for the accused. Only a few states grant the victim the right to be heard atthe defendant's bail hearing; a few more permitconsultation with the prosecutor prior to the bail hearing. Most allow victims to attend. And virtually all provideeither that victims should be notified of bailhearings or that victims should be notified of the defendant's release on bail. Under existing federal law, victims of alleged acts of interstate domestic violence or interstate violations of a protective order have a right to be heard at federalbail proceedings concerning any danger posed by the defendant. In other federal cases, victims' prerogatives seemto be limited to the right to confer with theprosecutor and notification of and attendance at all public court proceedings. The proposals in the106th would have given victims the right "to be heard, ifpresent, and to submit a written statement at all such proceedings to determine a conditional release from custody.. . ." and to consideration for their safety "indetermination any conditional release from custody." Plea Bargains Negotiated guilty pleas account for over 90% of the criminal convictions obtained. For the victim, a plea bargain may come as an unpleasant surprise, one thatmay jeopardize the victim's prospects for restitution, one that may result in a sentence the victim finds insufficient,and/or one that changes the legal playing fieldso that the victim has become the principal target of prosecution. Some states' victims rights provisions are limitedto notification of the court's acceptance of aplea bargain. More often, however, the states permit the victim to address the court prior to the acceptance of anegotiated guilty plea or to confer with theprosecutor concerning a plea bargain. S.J.Res. 3 and H.J.Res. 64 would have required that victims beallowed to address the courtbefore a plea bargain could be accepted in any state or federal criminal or juvenile proceeding. Speedy Trial The United States Constitution guarantees those accused of a federal crime a speedy trial; the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the rightbinding upon the states, whose constitutions often have a companion provision. The constitutional right isreenforced by statute and rule in the form of speedytrial laws in both the state and federal realms. Until recently, victims had no comparable rights, although theiradvocates contended they had a very real interest inprompt disposition. Most of the states have enacted statutory or constitutional provisions establishing a victim's rightto "prompt" or "timely" disposition of thecase in one form or another. Many have also made efforts to minimize the adverse impact of the delays that dooccur by either providing for employerintercession services and/or by prohibiting employers from penalizing victim/witnesses for attending courtproceedings. And most call for the prompt return of avictim's property, taken for evidentiary purposes, as soon as it is no longer needed. S.J.Res. 3 and H.J.Res. 64 would have entitled victims to consideration of their interests "that any trial be free from unreasonable delay." Courts might well have used the same test for this standard that they have used when testing for unacceptable delayunder the speedy trial and due process clauses:"length of delay, reasons for the delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Trial The Sixth Amendment promises the accused a public trial by an impartial jury. It promises victims little. Their status is, at best, no better than that of any othermember of the general public for Sixth Amendment purposes and, in fact, the Constitution screens the accused'sright to an impartial jury trial from the overexuberance of members of the public. Moreover, victims who are also witnesses are even more likely to be barredfrom the courtroom during trial than membersof the general public. About a third of the states now permit victims to attend all court proceedings regardless ofwhether the victim is scheduled to testify;another group allows witnesses who are victims to attend subject to a showing as to why they should be excluded;a few leave the matter in the discretion of thetrial court; and some have maintained the traditional rule -- witnesses are sequestered whether they are victims ornot. S.J.Res. 3 and H.Res. 64 would have invested victims with the right "to notice of, and not to be excluded from, all public proceedingsrelating to the crime," state and federal, juvenile and adult. They made no explicit provision for instances wherethe victim is also a witness. Nor did they indicatehow unavoidable conflicts between the rights they conveyed and the constitutional rights of the accused (at leastas they exist until ratification) were to beresolved. Sentencing The most prevalent of victims' rights among the states is the right to have victim impact information presented to sentencing authorities. There is, however,tremendous diversity of method among the states. Many call for inclusion in a presentencing report prepared forthe court in one way or another, oftensupplemented by a right to make some form of subsequent presentation as federal law permits. Some are specificas to the information that may be included;some permit the victim to address the court directly; others do not. S.J.Res. 3 and H.J.Res. 6 would have afforded victims the right "to be heard . . . and to submit a written statement at all suchproceedings to determine . . . a sentence." They proposal did not address the question of whether relevancy,repetition, or any other limitation might have beenimposed upon exercise of the right. Experience among the states suggests that enforcement may be the stumbling block for any proposed amendment, since there seem to be few palatablealternatives. It is possible to draft the amendment to the United States Constitution so that victims' rightsenforcement is paramount. Legal proceedingsconducted without honoring victims rights would be rendered null; sentencing hearings rescheduled and conductedanew; plea bargains rejected; trials begunagain; unfaithful public servants exposed to civil and criminal liability; inattentive governmental entities madesubject to claims and court orders. A fewproponents suggest that enforcement should be limited to the equitable powers of the courts. This would appear tohave been the intent with respect to S.J.Res. 3 and H.J.Res. 64 which would have denied victims a cause of action or grounds to interrupta criminal trial and otherwiseleaves crafting of enforcement mechanisms to Congress and the state legislatures. S.J.Res. 3 and H.J.Res. 64 would have conferred legislative authority in two ways. First, they would have empowered Congress todefine the class of victims entitled to claim rights under the amendment. Second, they would have vested Congresswith the authority enforce their provisions"through legislation" but subject to the caveat that in doing so Congress craft exceptions to the rights created by theamendment "only when necessary to achieve acompelling interest." Earlier proposals explicitly recognized a greater state legislative role. The question of the states' legislative powers to implement the victims' rights amendment suggests another question. How much, if any, of existing victims rightslaw would survive an amendment? Under the present state of the law, statutory and state constitutional provisions are confined by the United States Constitution, U.S.Const. Art. VI, cl.2. Whentheir advocates have said nothing in them imperils defendant's rights under the United States Constitution, they areright; nothing could. But an amendment to theUnited States Constitution stands on different footing. It amends the Constitution. Its very purpose is to makeconstitutional that which would otherwise not havebeen constitutionally permissible. It may uniformly subordinate defendants' rights to victims' rights. It may requireany conflicting law or constitution precipe,state or federal, to yield. Even in the absence of a conflict, it may preempt the field, sweeping away all laws,ordinances, precedents, and decisions -- compatibleand incompatible alike -- on any matter touching upon the same subject. It may have none or some of theseconsequences depending upon its language and theintent behind its language. Few advocates have explicitly called for a "king-of-the-hill" victims rights amendment, but the thought seems imbedded in the complaint that existing law lacksuniformity. How else can universal symmetry be accomplished but by implementation of a single standard that fillsin where pre-existing law comes up short andshaves off where its generosity exceeds the standard? Proponents of S.J.Res. 3 and H.J.Res. 64 spokeof both the need to establish aminimum victims' rights standard and the need for uniformity. The principles of construction called into play in the case of a conflict between a victims' rights amendment and rights established elsewhere in the Constitutionare similar those used to resolve federal-state conflicts. Intent of the drafters is paramount. The courts will make every effort to reconcile apparent conflicts between constitutional provisions, but in the face of anunavoidable conflict between a right granted by an adopted victims rights amendment and some other portion ofthe Constitution, the most recently adoptedprovision will prevail. The proposals in the 106th Congress were designed to eliminate the unfair treatment that results because the criminal justice "system . . . permits the defendant'sconstitutional rights always to trump the protections given to victims," yet to do so in a manner that would "not denyor infringe any constitutional right of anyperson accused or convicted of a crime." In instances of unavoidable conflict between victim and defendant rights,this seemed to mean the prosecution mustyield. The text of the two hardly defeated this interpretation with the assurance that the "only the victim or thevictim's lawful representative shall have standingto assert the rights" created by the amendment, since the rights of the accused come not from the victims' rightsamendment but from the Sixth Amendment orsome other source within the Constitution.

Thirty-three states have added a victims rights amendment to their state constitutions. Both the House and SenateJudiciary Committees held hearings on similar proposals in the 106th Congress to amend the UnitedStates Constitution (S.J.Res. 3 introduced bySenator Kyl for himself and Senator Feinstein and H.J.Res. 64 introduced by Representative Chabot). TheSenate Committee initially reported outan amended version of S.J.Res. 3 without a written report, but issued a report prior to floor consideration ofthe reported proposal, S.Rept. 106-254. Neither S.J.Res. 3 nor H.J.Res. 64 were ever brought to a vote on the floor. This is an overview ofthose proposals and is an abbreviatedform of Victims' Rights Amendment: Proposals to Amend the United States Constitution in the 106thCongress, CRS Report RL30525(pdf). Authorities identifiedthere have been omitted here in the interests of brevity

T he Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, better known as Social Security, is administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Survivors Insurance component of OASDI covers insured workers in case of death. When a worker insured by Social Security dies, his or her family may qualify for survivors benefits. At the end of 2017, there were approximately 6 million survivor beneficiaries, representing 9.7% of the total OASDI beneficiary population. Average monthly survivors benefits in December 2017 were $1,151.71. That month, 80.9% of survivor beneficiaries were female (including female children) and 31.8% of survivor beneficiaries were children. Additional data on survivor benefits are provided in Table 1 at the conclusion of this report. The Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271), which created the Social Security program, did not include any provisions for monthly survivors benefits, but did include a lump-sum payment upon the death of a fully insured person over the age of 65. Monthly survivors benefits were established in the Social Security Amendments of 1939 (P.L. 76-379), including those for widows, parents, and children. This was offset by a reduction in the size of the lump-sum death payment, although coverage expanded to both fully or currently insured workers (defined in the " Lump-Sum Death Benefits " section), regardless of age. These changes were made to "afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit" than could be afforded by a single lump-sum payment that did not take into account family size or number of survivors. Coverage for survivors benefits is based on the insurance status of the deceased worker. To become insured for survivors benefits, a worker must have a sufficient work history in covered employment (employment subject to Social Security payroll taxes). A worker can earn up to four Social Security credits each year, based on his or her earnings in a covered job. The number of credits a worker needs to qualify for Survivors Insurance depends on how old the worker is when he or she dies. A worker is fully insured for benefits if he or she has earned at least one credit for each year between age 21 and turning 62, dying, or becoming disabled; a worker is permanently insured if he or she has at least 40 credits (at least 10 years of work). In 2017, 87% of Americans over the age of 20 were fully insured. Spouses, former spouses, children, and parents of fully insured workers are eligible for survivors benefits as long as they meet the other requirements for those benefits. A deceased worker's children and the (former) spouse caring for those children could be eligible for survivors benefits even if the deceased worker was not fully insured―survivors benefits are available to these dependents if the deceased worker was currently insured at the time of death. The deceased worker is currently insured if he or she earned at least six credits during the three years prior to death. Survivors benefits are determined using the same basic formula used to calculate Social Security retirement and disability benefits. Benefits are based on the average lifetime covered earnings of the worker who died, so survivors of higher earners tend to receive higher benefits than survivors of lower earners. However, the benefit formula is progressive, so survivors benefits replace a higher proportion of lower earners' wages than of higher earners' wages. When a person applies for survivors benefits, the deceased worker's basic benefit amount, called the primary insurance amount (PIA), is determined. Each qualifying survivor will receive a percentage of the worker's PIA, depending on the survivor's age and relationship to the deceased worker. Survivors benefits may be subject to reductions based on earnings and family size. If a survivor qualifies for benefits based on both his or her own work record and a spouse's record, the survivor receives the higher amount of the two. Survivors benefits, like all Social Security benefits, are subject to an annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). In most cases, survivors benefits are payable to eligible family members beginning with the deceased beneficiary's month of death, regardless of when the death occurred during the month. Table 1 , at the conclusion of this report, provides data on the various types of survivors benefits. Surviving spouses of fully insured workers must meet an age requirement to be eligible for widow's or widower's benefits. Divorced surviving spouses may also be eligible if they were married to the deceased worker for at least 10 years. Surviving spouses receive 100% of the deceased worker's PIA if they begin to collect survivor benefits at their full retirement age. Widow(er)s may receive reduced widow(er)'s benefits if the benefit is claimed early. The earlier the benefit is claimed, the larger the reduction is. Reduced benefits range from 71.5% of the worker's PIA, if the widow(er) claims at the age of 60, to 100% of the worker's PIA, if the widow(er) claims at full retirement age. If the surviving spouse is receiving Social Security disability benefits, they may begin to receive reduced widow(er)'s benefits as early as 50 years old. Disabled widow(er)s receive 71.5% of the worker's PIA. Widow(er)'s benefits are not paid to spouses or former spouses who remarry before the age of 60 (or aged 50 if disabled). A worker's claiming age affects the widow(er) benefit. If a worker is receiving reduced benefits due to claiming benefits before full retirement age, the widow(er) benefit cannot exceed the worker's reduced benefit amount. For workers entitled (or who would have been entitled) to an increase (or subject to being increased) in their benefit amount due to claiming benefits after full retirement age, their benefits are increased at death to take into account the delayed retirement credits from claiming benefits after full retirement age, thereby increasing the widow(er) benefit. If they are not eligible for widow(er)'s benefits, unmarried surviving spouses of fully or currently insured workers may be entitled to mother's or father's benefits. To qualify, the spouse must care for a child of the deceased worker who is either under the age of 16 or disabled. Divorced spouses may also qualify, regardless of the length of the marriage. Mother's and father's benefits are 75% of the worker's PIA, and may be collected regardless of the age of the mother or father. Surviving children of fully or currently insured workers may be entitled to child's benefits. Child's benefits are paid to unmarried surviving children who are under the age of 18, or under 19 if still in high school. They are also paid to the disabled children of insured workers, regardless of age, as long as the disability occurred before the age of 22. Biological and adoptive children are eligible for survivors benefits, as are children born out of wedlock. Dependent grandchildren and step-children may also qualify for these benefits. Child's benefits are 75% of the worker's PIA. The surviving parents of fully insured workers are eligible for parent's benefits if they are over the age of 62 and were receiving at least half of their support from the deceased worker. Parent's benefits are 82.5% of the worker's PIA if one parent is entitled to benefits and 75% of the worker's PIA (for each parent) if two parents are entitled to benefits. The total survivors benefits paid to an insured worker's family are capped regardless of the number of family members who qualify for benefits. The maximum family benefit is 150% to 188% of the worker's PIA, depending on the amount of the PIA. If the total survivors benefits payable to a worker's family exceed this maximum, each person's benefit will be reduced proportionately. Divorced widow(er) benefits do not count toward the maximum. Survivors benefits may also be reduced for beneficiaries who are working and younger than full retirement age. Survivor beneficiaries younger than full retirement age are subject to a retirement earnings test , wherein their benefits are reduced if their earnings exceed certain limits. The benefits of other family members would not be affected by this reduction. Working in employment not covered by Social Security can also lead to lower benefits. The government pension offset (GPO) affects the benefits of beneficiaries who have worked in non-covered employment. If the survivor receives a government pension based on non-covered work, the GPO will reduce the survivors benefits by two-thirds of the survivor's monthly pension amount. In addition to monthly survivors benefits, a deceased worker's family may be eligible to receive a one-time death benefit of $255. Only one lump-sum death benefit is payable to the family of an insured worker. The lump-sum death benefit is paid to the insured worker's surviving spouse, regardless of age, as long as the spouse meets certain requirements. If no eligible widow or widower exists, the death benefit is paid in equal shares to any children who qualify for child's benefits based on the deceased worker's record. If a worker leaves no eligible spouse or child, the lump-sum death payment will not be paid.

Social Security is formally known as the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. This report focuses on the Survivors Insurance component of Social Security. When workers die, their spouses, former spouses, and dependents may qualify for Social Security survivors benefits. This report describes how a worker becomes covered by Survivors Insurance and outlines the types and amounts of benefits available to survivors and eligibility for those benefits. This report also provides current data on survivor beneficiaries and benefits.

I n general, the Senate's presiding officer does not take the initiative in enforcing Senate rules and precedents. Instead, a Senator may raise a point of order if he or she believes the Senate is taking (or is about to take) an action that violates the rules. In most circumstances, the presiding officer rules on the point of order on advice of the Parliamentarian; that ruling is typically subject to an appeal on which the Senate votes (unless the appeal is tabled or withdrawn). Pursuant to Rule XX, however, in certain circumstances a point of order is not ruled on by the presiding officer but is instead submitted to the Senate for its decision. A point of order that a pending matter (a bill or amendment, for example) violates the U.S. Constitution presents one such circumstance. This report explains Senate rules, precedents, and practices in regard to these constitutional points of order, including an analysis of recent cases in which such a point of order has been raised. This report will be updated as events warrant. The process for raising a constitutional point of order against a pending question does not differ from that for raising other points of order. A Senator seeking to raise a constitutional point of order would simply address the presiding officer at a time when no one else holds the floor. The Senator might say, "Mr. President, I rise to point of order" or simply "Point of order, Mr. President" and then proceed to state and explain the way in which the pending matter violates the Constitution. Raising a constitutional point of order (or any point of order) confers no special recognition rights—unless a unanimous consent (UC) agreement has provided for it being raised, or considered as raised, at a certain time. No Senator can interrupt another Senator without his or her consent for the purposes of raising a point of order. In addition, a Senator loses the floor after he or she has raised the point of order, though the Senator could again seek recognition from the presiding officer once the point of order is submitted. A UC agreement may affect the availability of any point of order when the agreement includes language that prohibits all or certain points of order. In addition, if a UC agreement specifies that a vote on a matter would occur "at a time certain without any intervening action," it would preclude a point of order being raised. Further, if a UC agreement limits the time for debate of a matter, then the point of order can be raised against it only after the debate time has been used or yielded back—except by unanimous consent. This is because if a matter has been guaranteed—by UC—a certain amount of debate or a vote at a time certain, then a new UC agreement is required to allow a point of order before that debate is complete, since the disposition of the point of order could have the effect of making the matter fall. Under current practice and precedents relating to Rule XX, a point of order that a pending matter is unconstitutional is submitted to the Senate for decision rather than ruled upon by the presiding officer. The logic behind the relevant precedents is that while the presiding officer has authority to interpret Senate rules, he or she does not have the authority to interpret the Constitution. While the Senate, in its earliest history, similarly disposed of constitutional points of order through a vote of the body, there were some intervening periods during which practice varied. For an approximately 40-year period in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, these points of order were not submitted for disposition, but instead the proceedings resembled the current practice in the House of Representatives, under which Members are expected to implicitly express their opinion on the constitutionality of a measure by their vote for or against the measure itself. However, the Senate has generally followed its current practice of submitting constitutional points of order since establishing a relevant precedent in 1924. Sustaining the submitted point of order requires an affirmative vote of a majority of Senators voting, assuming a quorum is present. A point of order submitted to the Senate for decision is debatable except when the Senate is operating under cloture. Under most circumstances, accordingly, a cloture process could theoretically be used to end extended debate and force a vote on the point of order. Under some circumstances, statutory provisions may limit debate on points of order; these debate limits would apply equally to a submitted constitutional point of order. While a submitted point of order is generally subject to extended debate, it is also subject to a non-debatable motion to table. The tabling motion could be made at any time after the point of order has been raised unless the Senate had agreed by UC to provide a specific amount of time for debate on the point of order, in which case the tabling motion could not be made until the time has expired or been yielded back. Agreeing to a tabling motion requires a majority of those voting (assuming a quorum is present). If the motion is agreed to, it adversely and permanently disposes of the point of order. Thus, if a Senator makes a motion to table the point of order, a majority of Senators could dispose of the point of order by agreeing to the motion to table. This disposition would have the effect of determining the constitutional point of order not to be well taken. A unanimous consent agreement may affect the debatability of a submitted point of order. For example, if a UC agreement sets a time certain for a vote on the matter on which a point of order is contemplated, then a submitted point of order raised against that matter would be subject to debate only until that time expires. Other language in a UC agreement (e.g., that establishes a specific amount of debate time on a pending amendment and provides for another action immediately upon the disposition of that amendment) may also preclude extended debate on a constitutional point of order raised against that amendment. Constitutional points of order are not common, relative to many other points of order that are more routinely made (e.g., that an amendment violates the Congressional Budget Act or that an amendment to an appropriations bill constitutes legislation). Table 1 presents data on constitutional points of order in the Senate made since 1989 (the start of the 101 st Congress) on which the Senate voted, as identified in the Legislative Information System (LIS) and the Daily Digest . (An examination of references to constitutional points of order in the full text of the Congressional Record for the Congresses in question did not produce any additional examples.) The table does not include any constitutional points of order that were raised but then withdrawn before a Senate vote or those that may have been rendered moot because the underlying matter was withdrawn or otherwise negatively disposed of. Of the cases identified, more than half (11 of 17) were disposed of negatively, either through a direct vote on the point of order or via a successful motion to table; the remaining six points of order were sustained. Five of the six sustained points of order were in relation to an alleged violation of the Origination Clause (Article 1, Section 7, clause 1, which provides that only the House may originate revenue measures). Of the 11 points of order that were not well taken, 10 were raised in relation to other constitutional provisions. The table makes clear that constitutional points of order raised in the 106 th and 107 th Congresses were raised exclusively on the grounds that the pending matter would violate the Origination Clause. In the most recent Congresses (111 th and 113 th ) in which constitutional points of order were raised, however, they were raised only in relation to other provisions of the Constitution. This dominance of points of order on the grounds of other (non-Origination Clause) constitutional provisions is also evident in the Congresses spanning the 1990s. This recent ebb and flow in the constitutional grounds on which such points of order are raised is similar to the historical variation that characterizes previous periods. While the Origination Clause was the primary constitutional provision invoked prior to the 1960s, other constitutional provisions were referenced with almost equal frequency in the subsequent decades. For example, from the 1960s to 1980s, points of order were raised on constitutional grounds such as the ability of the Senate to make its own rules, the process for proposing constitutional amendments, representation and apportionment issues, the line item veto, and the Equal Protection Clause. As noted in the table above, the two most recent decades included points of order raised in relation to the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, questions of congressional apportionment and representation, and the powers afforded to Congress (and reserved to the states), among others.

In general, the Senate's presiding officer does not take the initiative in enforcing Senate rules and precedents. Instead, a Senator may raise a point of order if he or she believes the Senate is taking (or is about to take) an action that violates the rules. In most circumstances, the presiding officer rules on the point of order on advice of the Parliamentarian; that ruling is typically subject to an appeal on which the Senate votes (unless the appeal is tabled or withdrawn). Pursuant to Rule XX, however, in certain circumstances a point of order is not ruled on by the presiding officer but is instead submitted to the Senate for its decision. A point of order that a pending matter (a bill or amendment, for example) violates the U.S. Constitution presents one such circumstance. This report explains Senate rules, precedents, and practices in regard to these constitutional points of order, including an analysis of recent cases in which such a point of order has been raised, and will be updated as events warrant. A Senator can raise a constitutional point of order against any pending matter unless a unanimous consent agreement prohibits points of order or provides for a vote on the pending matter without any intervening action. A unanimous consent agreement may also affect the time at which it is in order to raise a point of order. If a specific amount of debate has been agreed to for the pending matter, the point of order cannot be raised until the time has expired or been yielded back. While past practice has varied, the Senate's rules and precedents currently require a constitutional point of order to be submitted to the Senate for disposition, with a majority of those voting (a quorum being present) required to sustain the point of order. The point of order is debatable, though the time for debate may be subject to limitations under a unanimous consent agreement or under cloture, in some circumstances, pursuant to statutory provisions. The submitted point of order is, however, subject to a non-debatable motion to table. This report identifies 17 constitutional points of order that have been raised and received a Senate vote since 1989. Eleven of these cases were disposed of negatively.

CDC has 13 guidelines for hospitals on infection control and prevention, and in these guidelines CDC recommends almost 1,200 practices for implementation to prevent HAIs and related adverse events. (See table 1.) The guidelines cover such topics as prevention of catheter-associated urinary tract infections, prevention of surgical site infections, and hand hygiene. An example of a recommended practice in the hand hygiene guideline is the recommendation that health care workers decontaminate their hands before having direct contact with patients. Most of the practices are sorted into five categories—from strongly recommended for implementation to not recommended—primarily on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence for each practice. Over 500 practices are strongly recommended. CDC and AHRQ have conducted some activities to promote implementation of recommended practices, such as disseminating the guidelines and providing research funds. However, these steps have not been guided by a prioritization of recommended practices. One factor to consider in prioritization is strength of evidence, as CDC has done. In addition to strength of evidence, an AHRQ study identified other factors to consider in prioritizing recommended practices, such as costs or organizational obstacles. Furthermore, the efforts of the two agencies have not been coordinated. For example, we found that CDC and AHRQ independently examined various aspects of the evidence related to improving hand hygiene compliance, such as the selection of hand hygiene products and health care worker education. Although this could have been an opportunity for coordination, an official from the HHS Office of the Secretary told us that no one within the office is responsible for coordinating infection control activities across HHS. While CDC’s infection control guidelines describe specific clinical practices recommended to reduce HAIs, the infection control standards that CMS and the accrediting organizations require as part of the hospital certification and accreditation processes describe the fundamental components of a hospital’s infection control program. These components include the active prevention, control, and investigation of infections. Examples of standards and corresponding standards interpretations that hospitals must follow include educating hospital personnel about infection control and having infection control policies in place. The standards are far fewer in number than the recommended practices in CDC’s guidelines—for example, CMS’s infection control COP contains two standards. Furthermore, CMS and the accrediting organizations generally do not require that hospitals implement all recommended practices in CDC’s infection control and prevention guidelines. Only the Joint Commission and AOA have standards that require the implementation of certain practices recommended in CDC’s infection control guidelines. For example, the Joint Commission and AOA require hospitals to annually offer influenza vaccinations to health care workers, whereas CMS’s interpretive guidelines, or standards interpretations, are more general, stating that hospitals should adopt policies and procedures based as much as possible on national guidelines that address hospital-staff-related issues, such as evaluating hospital staff immunization status for designated infectious diseases. CMS, the Joint Commission, and AOA assess compliance with their infection control standards through direct observation of hospital activities and review of hospital policy documents during on-site surveys. Multiple HHS programs collect data on HAIs, but limitations in the scope of information they collect and the lack of integration across the databases maintained by these separate programs constrain the utility of the data. Three agencies within HHS—CDC, CMS, and AHRQ—currently collect HAI-related data for a variety of purposes in databases maintained by four separate programs: CDC’s National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) program, CMS’s Medicare Patient Safety Monitoring System (MPSMS), CMS’s Annual Payment Update (APU) program, and AHRQ’s Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP). Each of these databases presents only a partial view of the extent of the HAI problem because each focuses its data collection on selected types of HAIs and collects data from a different subset of hospital patients across the country. (See table 2.) Although officials from the various HHS agencies discuss HAI data collection with each other, we did not find that the agencies were taking steps to integrate any of the existing data by creating linkages across the databases, such as creating common patient identifiers. Creating linkages across the HAI-related databases could enhance the availability of information to better understand where and how HAIs occur. For example, data on surgical infection rates and data on surgical processes of care are collected for some of the same patients in two different databases that are not linked. As a consequence, the potential benefit of using the existing data to monitor the extent to which compliance with the recommended surgical care processes leads to actual improvements in surgical infection rates has not been realized. Although none of the databases collect data on the incidence of HAIs for a nationally representative sample of hospital patients, CDC officials have produced national estimates of HAIs. However, those estimates derive from assumptions and extrapolations that raise questions about the reliability of those estimates. HAIs in hospitals can cause needless suffering and death. Federal authorities and private organizations have undertaken a number of activities to address this serious problem; however, to date, these activities have not gained sufficient traction to be effective. We identified two possible reasons for the lack of effective actions to control HAIs. First, although CDC’s guidelines are an important source for its recommended practices on how to reduce HAIs, the large number of recommended practices and lack of department-level prioritization have hindered efforts to promote their implementation. The guidelines we reviewed contain almost 1,200 recommended practices for hospitals, including over 500 that are strongly recommended—a large number for a hospital trying to implement them. A few of these are required by CMS’s or accrediting organizations’ standards or their standards interpretations, but it is not reasonable to expect CMS or accrediting organizations to require additional practices without prioritization. Although CDC has categorized the practices on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence, there are other factors to consider in developing priorities. For example, work by AHRQ suggests factors such as costs or organizational obstacles that could be considered. The lack of coordinated prioritization may have resulted in duplication of effort by CDC and AHRQ in their reviews of scientific evidence on HAI-related practices. Second, HHS has not effectively used the HAI-related data it has collected through multiple databases across the department to provide a complete picture of the extent of the problem. Limitations in the databases, such as nonrepresentative samples, hinder HHS’s ability to produce reliable national estimates on the frequency of different types of HAIs. In addition, currently collected data on HAIs are not being combined to maximize their utility. HHS has made efforts to use the currently collected data to understand the extent of the problem of HAIs, but the lack of linkages across the various databases results in a lost opportunity to gain a better grasp of the problem of HAIs. HHS has multiple methods to influence hospitals to take more aggressive action to control or prevent HAIs, including issuing guidelines with recommended practices, requiring hospitals to comply with certain standards, releasing data to expand information about the nature of the problem, and soon, using hospital payment methods to encourage the reduction of HAIs. Prioritization of CDC’s many recommended practices can help guide their implementation, and better use of currently collected data on HAIs could help HHS—and hospitals themselves—monitor efforts to reduce HAIs. We concluded that leadership from the Secretary of HHS is currently lacking to do this. Without such leadership, the department is unlikely to be able to effectively leverage its various methods to have a significant effect on the suffering and death caused by HAIs. Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other members of the committee may have at this time. For further information about this statement, please contact Cynthia A. Bascetta at (202) 512-7114 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this statement were Linda T. Kohn, Assistant Director; Shaunessye Curry; Shannon Slawter Legeer; Eric Peterson; and Roseanne Price. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), health-care-associated infections (HAI)--infections that patients acquire while receiving treatment for other conditions--are estimated to be 1 of the top 10 causes of death in the nation. This statement summarizes a report issued in March and released today, Health-Care-Associated Infections in Hospitals: Leadership Needed from HHS to Prioritize Prevention Practices and Improve Data on These Infections (GAO-08-283). In this report, GAO examined (1) CDC's guidelines for hospitals to reduce or prevent HAIs and what HHS does to promote their implementation, (2) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) and hospital accrediting organizations' required standards for hospitals to reduce or prevent HAIs, and (3) HHS programs that collect data related to HAIs and integration of the data across HHS. To conduct the work, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed HHS agency and accrediting organization officials. In its March report, which is summarized in this statement, GAO found CDC has 13 guidelines for hospitals on infection control and prevention, which contain almost 1,200 recommended practices, but activities across HHS to promote implementation of these practices are not guided by a prioritization of the practices. Although most of the practices have been sorted into categories primarily on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence for the practice, other factors to consider in prioritizing, such as costs or organizational obstacles, have not been taken into account. While CDC's guidelines describe specific clinical practices recommended to reduce HAIs, the infection control standards that CMS and the accrediting organizations require of hospitals describe the fundamental components of a hospital's infection control program. The standards are far fewer in number than CDC's recommended practices and generally do not require that hospitals implement all recommended practices in CDC's guidelines. Multiple HHS programs have databases that collect data on HAIs, but limitations in the scope of information collected and a lack of integration across the databases constrain the utility of the data. GAO concluded that the lack of department-level prioritization of CDC's large number of recommended practices has hindered efforts to promote their implementation. GAO noted that a few of CDC's strongly recommended practices were required by CMS or the accrediting organizations but that it was not reasonable to expect CMS or the accrediting organizations to require additional practices without prioritization. GAO also concluded that HHS has not effectively used the HAI-related data it has collected through multiple databases across the department to provide a complete picture of the extent of the problem.

A July 2005 Joint Statement resolved to establish a U.S.-India "global partnership" through increased cooperation on economic issues, on energy and the environment, on democracy and development, on non-proliferation and security, and on high-technology and space. U.S. policy is to isolate Iran and to ensure that its nuclear program is used for purely civilian purposes. India has never shared U.S. assessments of Iran as an aggressive regional power. India-Iran relations have traditionally been positive and, in January 2003, the two countries launched a "strategic partnership" with the signing of the "New Delhi Declaration" and seven other substantive agreements. Indian leaders regularly speak of "civilizational ties" between the two countries, a reference to the interactions of Persian and Indus Valley civilizations over a period of millennia. As U.S. relations with India grow deeper and more expansive in the new century, some in Washington believe that New Delhi's friendship with Tehran could become a significant obstacle to further development of U.S.-India ties. However, India-Iran relations have not evolved into a strategic alliance and are unlikely to derail the further development of a U.S.-India global partnership. At the same time, given a clear Indian interest in maintaining positive ties with Iran, especially in the area of energy commerce, New Delhi is unlikely to abandon its relationship with Tehran, or accept dictation on the topic from external powers. Many in Congress voice concern about India's relations with Iran and their relevance to U.S. interests. Some worry about New Delhi's defense relations with Tehran and have sought to link this with congressional approval of U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation. There are further U.S. concerns that India plans to seek energy resources from Iran, thus benefitting financially a country the United States seeks to isolate. Indian firms have in recent years taken long-term contracts for purchase of Iranian gas and oil, and India supports proposed construction of a pipeline to deliver Iranian natural gas to India through Pakistan. The Bush Administration expresses strong opposition to any pipeline projects involving Iran, but top Indian officials insist the project is in India's national interest. Some analysts believe that geostrategic motives beyond energy security, including great power aspirations, drive India's pursuit of closer relations with Iran. Of immediate interest to some Member of Congress are press reports on Iranian naval ships visiting India's Kochi port for "training." Indian officials downplayed the significance of the port visit, and Secretary Rice challenged the report's veracity, although she did state that, "The United States has made very clear to India that we have concerns about their relationship with Iran." Such concerns include the proposed gas pipeline. Secretary of Energy Sam Bodman, visiting New Delhi in March 2007, reiterated U.S. opposition to the pipeline project. According to the 2006-2007 annual report of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, India's relations with Iran are underlined by historical, civilizational and multifaceted ties. The bilateral cooperation has acquired a strategic dimension flourishing in the fields of energy, trade and commerce, information technology, and transit. During 2006-07, relations with Iran were further strengthened through regular exchanges. Past reports have lauded "further deepening and consolidation of India-Iran ties," with "increased momentum of high-level exchanges" and "institutional linkages between their National Security Councils." Iranian leaders, always looking for new allies to thwart U.S. attempts to isolate Iran, reciprocate New Delhi's favorable view and insist that warming U.S.-India relations will not weaken their own ties with New Delhi. However, there are signs that, following the 2005 launch of a U.S.-India "global partnership" and plans for bilateral civil nuclear cooperation, New Delhi intends to bring its Iran policy into closer alignment with that of the United States. Yet India is home to a sizeable constituency urging resistance to any U.S. pressure that might inhibit New Delhi-Tehran relations or which prioritize relations with the United States in disregard of India's national interests. While top Indian leaders state that friendly New Delhi-Tehran ties will continue concurrent with—or even despite—a growing U.S.-India partnership, some observers see such rhetoric as incompatible with recent developments. The Indian government has made clear that it does not wish to see a new nuclear weapons power in the region and, in this context, it has aligned itself with international efforts to bring Iran's controversial nuclear program into conformity with Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA provisions. At the same time, New Delhi's traditional status as a leader of the "nonaligned movement," its friendly links with Tehran, and a domestic constituency that includes tens of millions of Shiite Muslims, have presented difficulties for Indian policymakers. There are also in New Delhi influential leftist and opposition parties which maintain a high sensitivity toward indications that India is being made a "junior partner" of the United States. These political forces have been critical of proposed U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation and regularly insist that India's closer relations with the United States should not come at the expense of positive ties with Iran. The current Indian National Congress-led coalition government has thus sought to maintain a careful balance between two sometimes conflicting policy objectives. India's main opposition, the Bharatiya Janata Party, has voiced its approval of the present government's policy toward Iran's nuclear program. There were reports in 2005 that India would oppose bringing Iran's nuclear program before the U.N. Security Council and was likely to abstain on relevant IAEA Board votes. However, on September 24, 2005, in what many saw as the first test of India's position, New Delhi did vote with the majority (and the United States) on an IAEA resolution finding Iran in noncompliance with its international obligations. The vote brought waves of criticism from Indian opposition parties and independent analysts who accused New Delhi of betraying a friendly country by "capitulating" to U.S. pressure. In January 2006, the U.S. ambassador to India explicitly linked progress on proposed U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation with India's upcoming IAEA vote, saying if India chose not to side with the United States, he believed the U.S.-India initiative would fail in the Congress. New Delhi rejected any attempts to link the two issues, and opposition and leftist Indian political parties denounced the remarks. Yet, on February 4, 2006, India again voted with the majority in referring Iran to the Security Council, even as it insisted that its vote should not be interpreted as detracting from India's traditionally close relations with Iran. Overt U.S. pressure may have made it more difficult for New Delhi to carry out the policy it had already chosen. Some independent observers saw India's IAEA votes as demonstrating New Delhi's strategic choice to strengthen a partnership with Washington even at the cost of its friendship with Tehran. In July 2006, the House passed legislation ( H.R. 5682 ) to enable proposed U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India. The bill contained non-binding language on securing India's cooperation with U.S. policy toward Iran (an amendment seeking to make such cooperation binding was defeated by a vote of 235-192). The Senate version of enabling legislation ( S. 3709 ) contained no language on Iran. The resulting "Hyde Act," which became P.L. 109-401 in December, preserved the House's "statement of policy" language and added a prerequisite that the President provide to Congress, inter alia , a description of India's efforts to participate in U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. In their explanatory statement ( H.Rept. 109-721 ), congressional conferees called securing India's participation "critical" and they emphasized an "expectation" of India's full cooperation on this matter. In recent years there have been occasional revelations of Indian transfers to Iran of technology that could be useful for Iran's purported weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. These transfers do not appear to be part of an Indian-government-directed policy of assisting Iran's WMD, but could represent unauthorized scientific contacts that have resulted from growing India-Iran energy and diplomatic ties. Some Indian persons have been sanctioned by the Bush Administration under the Iran Non-Proliferation Act (INA, P.L. 106-178 ). According to determinations published in the Federal Register, in 2003 an Indian chemical industry consultancy was sanctioned under the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act ( P.L. 102-484 ). In a September 2004 determination, two Indian nuclear scientists, Dr. Chaudhary Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad, were sanctioned under the INA. The two formerly headed the Nuclear Power Corp. of India and allegedly passed to Iran heavy-water nuclear technology. Surendar denied ever visiting Iran and sanctions against him were ended in December 2005. In that same December determination, two Indian chemical companies were sanctioned under the INA for transfers to Iran. In August 2006, the United States formally sanctioned two additional Indian chemical firms under the INA for sensitive material transactions with Iran. The firms denied any WMD-related transfers and New Delhi later said the sanctions were "not justified." In February 2007, India moved to impose restrictions on nuclear-related exports to Iran in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 of December 2006. India and Iran have established steady but relatively low level defense and military relations since the formation of an Indo-Iran Joint Commission in 1983, three years after the start of the Iran-Iraq war. There is no evidence that India provided any significant military assistance to Iran during that war, which ended in 1988. Iran reportedly received some military advice from Pakistan during the conflict. Following the war, Iran began rebuilding its conventional arsenal with purchases of tanks, combat aircraft, and ships from Russia and China. No major purchases from India were reported during this time. However, Iran reportedly turned to India in 1993 to help develop batteries for the three Kilo-class submarines Iran had bought from Russia. The submarine batteries provided by the Russians were not appropriate for the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, and India had substantial experience operating Kilos in warm water. There have been expectations that Iran-India military ties would further expand under the 2003 "New Delhi Declaration," in which the two countries "decided to explore opportunities for cooperation in defense and agreed areas, including training and exchange of visits." Some experts see this as part of broad strategic cooperation between two powers in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, but the cooperation has generally stalled since it was signed and has not evolved into a noteworthy strategic alliance. Instead, the cooperation appears to represent a manifestation of generally good Indo-Iranian relations and an opportunity to mutually enhance their potential to project power in the region. India had reportedly hoped the Declaration would pave the way for Indian sales to Iran of upgrades of Iran's Russian-made conventional weapons systems. Major new Iran-India deals along these lines have not materialized to date, but Iran reportedly has sought Indian advice on operating Iran's missile boats, refitting Iran's T-72 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and upgrading Iran's MiG-29 fighters. Under the Declaration, the two countries have held some joint naval exercises, most recently in March 2006. The first joint exercises were in March 2003. In March 2007, apparently at Iran's request, the two countries formed a joint working group to implement the 2003 accord, which Iran apparently feels has languished. During a visit of the commander of Iran's regular Navy—the first such high level exchange since 2003—India reportedly deferred specific Iranian requests, such as an exchange of warship engineers. India-Iran commercial relations are dominated by Indian imports of Iranian crude oil, which alone account for some 90% of all Indian imports from Iran each year. The value of all India-Iran trade in the fiscal year ending March 2007 topped $9 billion (by comparison, U.S.-India trade was valued at about $32 billion in 2006). Iran possesses the world's second-largest natural gas reserves, while India is among the world's leading gas importers. With a rapidly growing economy, India is building energy ties to Iran, some of which could conflict with U.S. policy and the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). ISA requires certain sanctions on investments over $20 million in one year in Iran's energy sector. Under a reportedly finalized 25-year, $22 billion deal, the state-owned Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) is to buy 5 million tons of Iranian liquified natural gas (LNG) per year. To implement the arrangement, GAIL is to build an LNG plant in Iran, which Iran does not now have. Some versions of the deal include development by GAIL of Iran's South Pars gas field, which would clearly constitute an investment in Iran's energy sector. India currently buys about 100,000-150,000 barrels per day of Iranian oil, or some 7.5% of Iran's oil exports. It is also widely reported that Indian refineries supply a large part of the refined gasoline that Iran imports. Gasoline is heavily subsidized and sells for about 40 cents per gallon in Iran, and Iranian refining capacity is insufficient to meet demand. The purchase of Iranian petroleum product is not generally considered an ISA violation. A major aspect of the Iran-India energy deals is the proposed construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan, with a possible extension from Pakistan to China. Some of the Indian companies that reportedly might take part in the pipeline project are ONGC, GAIL, Indian Oil Corporation, and Bharat Petroleum Corporation. Iran, India, and Pakistan have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to the $4 billion-$7 billion project, which is tentatively scheduled to begin construction later in 2007 and be completed by 2010. Pakistani President Musharraf said in January 2006 that there is enough demand in Pakistan to make the project feasible, even if India declines to join it. Since January 2007, the three countries have agreed on various outstanding issues, including a pricing formula, and the Indian and Pakistani split of the gas supplies, but talks continue on several unresolved issues, including the pipeline route, security, transportation tariffs, and related issues. During her March 2005 visit to Asia, Secretary of State Rice expressed U.S. concern about the pipeline deal. Other U.S. officials have called the project "unacceptable," but no U.S. official has directly stated that it would be considered a violation of ISA. Successive administrations have considered pipeline projects that include Iran as meeting the definition of "investment" in ISA. India and Iran are tacitly cooperating to secure their mutual interests in Afghanistan. Iran has perceived the Sunni Islamic extremism of the Taliban regime as a threat to Iran's Shiite sect. India saw the Taliban as a manifestation of Islamic extremism that India is battling in Kashmir, and which is held responsible for terrorist attacks in India. India and Iran both supported Afghanistan's minority-dominated "Northern Alliance" against the Taliban during 1996-2001 (in contrast to Pakistan, which supported the Taliban). Both countries also seek to prevent a Taliban return to power and have each given substantial economic aid to the U.S.-backed government in Kabul. India's presence in Afghanistan is viewed by Pakistan as a potential security threat as a policy of "strategic encirclement."

India's growing energy needs and its relatively benign view of Iran's intentions will likely cause policy differences between New Delhi and Washington. India seeks positive ties with Iran and is unlikely to downgrade its relationship with Tehran at the behest of external powers, but it is unlikely that the two will develop a broad and deep strategic alliance. India-Iran relations are also unlikely to derail the further development of close and productive U.S.-India relations on a number of fronts. See also CRS Report RL33529, India-U.S. Relations, and CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. This report will be updated as warranted by events.

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), signed into law on January 8, 2002 ( P.L. 107-110 ), required that all paraprofessionals assigned instructional duties and employed in Title I, Part A-funded schools meet minimum qualifications by January 8, 2006. The NCLB states that paraprofessionals (also known as instructional aides) must have completed two years of college, obtained an associate's degree, or demonstrated content knowledge and an ability to assist in classroom instruction. On June 17, 2005, the Education Department (ED) announced that the paraprofessional deadline would be extended to the end of the 2005-2006 school year to coincide with the related NCLB deadline for highly qualified teachers (HQT). The use of instructional aides in U.S. classrooms has been increasing every year since data on paraprofessionals were first collected by ED's National Center for Education Statistics. Instructional aides accounted for 2.5% of total full-time equivalent instructional staff in 1970, 11.9% in 1980, 16.5% in 2000, and 17.2% in 2009. ED's interim report on NCLB teacher quality implementation revealed that paraprofessionals accounted for about one-third of instructional staff in Title I-A funded schools and districts. Instructional aides are also increasingly handling classroom responsibilities without supervision. ED's final report on NCLB teacher quality implementation indicated that 19% of paraprofessionals spent "at least half of their time working with students in the classroom without a teacher present." Recognition that the quality of instruction in U.S. schools is increasingly affected by the quality of paraprofessional staff has bolstered support for federal instructional aide standards. Prior to the NCLB, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) required only that paraprofessionals possess a high school diploma. This requirement was established in previous ESEA amendments passed under the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-382 ). Legislative proposals establishing higher standards for paraprofessionals were supported by ED under both the Clinton and Bush Administrations, and were eventually enacted under the NCLB. As of the enactment of the NCLB on January 8, 2002, all newly hired Title I paraprofessionals whose duties include instructional support must possess the minimum qualifications prior to employment. That is, they must have completed two years of study at an institution of higher education, obtained an associate's (or higher) degree, or passed a formal state or local academic assessment, demonstrating knowledge of and the ability to assist in instructing reading, writing, and mathematics. Paraprofessionals hired on or before January 8, 2002, who were performing instructional duties in a program supported with Title I funds, were required to meet these requirements by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. The NCLB paraprofessional qualification requirements apply only to Title I paraprofessionals with instructional duties; that is, those who provide one-on-one tutoring if the tutoring is scheduled at a time when a student would not otherwise receive instruction from a teacher; assist with classroom management, such as organizing instructional and other materials; provide assistance in a computer laboratory; conduct parental involvement activities; provide support in a library or media center; act as a translator; or provide instructional services to students under the direct supervision of a teacher. Individuals who work in food services, cafeteria or playground supervision, personal care services, non-instructional computer assistance, and similar positions are not considered paraprofessionals, and do not have to meet these requirements. Also, ESEA Section 1119(e) indicates that paraprofessionals who only serve as translators or who only conduct parental involvement activities must have a secondary school diploma or its equivalent, but do not have to meet additional requirements. Under NCLB, local education agencies (LEAs) must make progress toward meeting their state's annual objectives for teacher quality and student achievement. If a state determines that an LEA has failed to make progress toward meeting those annual objectives for three consecutive years, the LEA is prohibited from using Title I-A funds on any paraprofessional hired after the date of the determination. The most recent non-regulatory guidance on paraprofessionals, issued by ED on March 1, 2004, clarifies a number of questions that have been raised during implementation of the NCLB. The guidance describes various school settings under which paraprofessionals may or may not be required to meet the NCLB rules. The requirements apply to all paraprofessionals employed in a Schoolwide Title I program without regard to whether the position is funded with federal, state, or local funds. In Targeted Assistance Title I programs, only those paraprofessionals paid with Title I funds must meet the requirements (not those paid with state or local funds); however, special education paraprofessionals in targeted assistance programs must meet the requirements even if only part of their pay comes from Title I funds. A paraprofessional who provides services to private school students and is employed by an LEA with Title I funds must meet the NCLB requirements; however, these requirements do not apply to those in the Americorps program, volunteers, or those working in either 21 st Century Community Learning Centers or Head Start programs. LEAs have discretion when it comes to considering who is an "existing" paraprofessional and whether qualified status is "portable." If an LEA laid off a paraprofessional who was initially hired on or before January 8, 2002, the LEA may consider that person an "existing" employee when the individual is subsequently recalled to duty. Also, an LEA may determine that a paraprofessional meets the qualification requirements if the individual was previously determined to meet these requirements by another LEA. The ED guidance clarifies that "two years of study" means the equivalent of two years of full-time study as determined by an "institution of higher education" (IHE)—the definition of an IHE is specified in Section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965. Continuing education credits may count toward the two-year requirement if they are part of an overall training and development program plan and an IHE accepts or translates them to course credits. Section C of the guidance discusses issues related to the assessment of paraprofessionals. The guidance indicates that a state or LEA may develop a paraprofessional knowledge and ability assessment using either a paper and pencil form, a performance evaluation, or some combination of the two. These assessments should gauge content knowledge (e.g., in reading, writing, and math) as well as competence in instruction (which may be assessed through observations). The content knowledge should reflect state academic standards and the skills expected of a child at a given school level. The results of the assessment should establish a candidate's content knowledge and competence in instruction, and target the areas where additional training may be needed. Most states are employing more than one type of written assessment along with performance evaluation. Two of the most common tests are ParaPro (developed by the Educational Testing Service). Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia allow LEAs to use ParaPro for paraprofessional assessment. In addition, 21 states allow LEAs to develop their own assessments. ECS considers 12 states to have established paraprofessional qualifications that exceed federal standards, and identifies 10 states that require paraprofessionals to obtain professional certification. The ECS also identifies 11 states that have professional development programs for paraprofessionals. Section D of the guidance discusses programmatic requirements that pertain to the supervision of paraprofessionals. The guidance points out that ESEA Section 1119(g)(3)(A) stipulates that paraprofessionals who provide instructional support must work under the "direct supervision" of a highly qualified teacher. Further, the guidance states the following: A paraprofessional works under the direct supervision of a teacher if (1) the teacher prepares the lessons and plans the instruction support activities the paraprofessional carries out, and evaluates the achievement of the students with whom the paraprofessional is working, and (2) the paraprofessional works in close and frequent proximity with the teacher. [§200.59(c)(2) of the Title I regulations] As a result, a program staffed entirely by paraprofessionals is not permitted. In addition, the guidance states that the rules regarding direct supervision also apply to paraprofessionals who provide services under contract. That is, paraprofessionals hired by a third-party contractor to work in a Title I program must work under the direct supervision of a teacher (even though teachers employed by the contractor need not meet NCLB highly qualified teacher requirements). The ED guidance discusses funding sources for the professional development and assessment of paraprofessionals. An LEA must use not less than 5% of its Title I, Part A allocation for the professional development of teachers and paraprofessionals. LEAs may also use their general Title I funds for this purpose. Funds for professional development of paraprofessionals may also be drawn from Title II, Part A (for core subject-matter personnel); from Title III, Part A (for those serving English language learners); from Title V, Part A (for "Innovative" programs); and from Title VII, Part A, subpart 7 (for those serving Indian children). Schools and LEAs identified as needing improvement must reserve additional funds for professional development. Section B-2 of the guidance describes conditions under which LEAs are prohibited from using Title I funds to hire new paraprofessionals. Such a prohibition may be imposed by a state on an LEA that has failed to make progress toward meeting the annual measurable objectives established by the state for increasing the percentage of highly qualified teachers , and has failed to make adequate yearly progress for three cumulative years. Two exceptions to this rule are (1) if the hiring is to fill a vacancy created by the departure of another paraprofessional, and (2) if the hiring is necessitated by a significant increase in student enrollment or an increased need for translators or parental involvement personnel. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia reported data to ED on the qualifications of their paraprofessionals for the 2003-2004 school year. Among them, 10 states reported that fewer than half of their paraprofessionals met the NCLB requirements; four states reported that at least 9 of every 10 of their paraprofessionals met these standards. However, ED officials indicated that most paraprofessionals acquired the minimum qualifications by the June 30, 2006, deadline. NCLB authorized most ESEA programs through FY2007. The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) provided an automatic one-year extension of these programs through FY2008. While most ESEA programs no longer have an explicit authorization, the programs continue to receive annual appropriations and paraprofessional quality requirements continue to be in place. LEAs in states that have received an ESEA flexibility waiver are not restricted in the use of Title I-A funds for failing to meet NCLB teacher quality and student achievement accountability requirements; however, all LEAs still must comply with the law's paraprofessional quality requirements. The 114 th Congress has acted on legislation to reauthorize the ESEA. Possible reauthorization issues concerning the paraprofessional provisions in Title I include the following: Are the assessments used to evaluate paraprofessional quality rigorous enough, and are they adequately tied to academic standards for students? Some consider the ParaPro and WorkKeys tests to be the "easy route," and claim they do not measure a instructional aide's ability to improve classroom instruction. Might a reauthorized ESEA be more explicit about the nature of these tests by linking them to other accountability provisions? Should ED be given greater authority to enforce higher standards for paraprofessional assessments? Should the paraprofessional qualification requirements be applied to a broader group of instructional aide s? For example, should these requirements be applied to all paraprofessionals with instructional responsibilities, not just to those paid with Title I-A funds? Should the exceptions currently made for computer lab assistants, translators, and those assisting with parental involvement be curtailed? Is the language regarding "direct supervision" too vague or too difficult to enforce? Do current provisions for the professional development of instructional aide s adequately encourage states to improve the paraprofessional workforce? Should states be given incentives to adopt paraprofessional certification requirements, as have been adopted in some states? Are there other ways to encourage paraprofessional development beyond the minimum qualifications that would positively affect the overall level of instructional quality? Have the paraprofessional qualification requirements significantly affected the extent to which Title I-A funds are used to hire these staff? In particular, have a significant number of paraprofessionals lost their jobs, or been assigned to non-Title I-A positions, after the end of the 2005-2006 school year because they were unable to meet the paraprofessional qualification requirements? Has this resulted in an overall decline or improvement in the quality of instruction? Should the roles of states versus LEAs in setting policies and implementing these requirements be clarified? Particularly in comparison to the teacher quality requirements of the NCLB, there has been relatively little guidance from ED, or clarity in the statute, on state-versus-LEA roles in the area of paraprofessional qualification requirements. Has the result been a constructive form of flexibility or dysfunctional ambiguity?

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) established minimum qualifications for paraprofessionals (also known as instructional aides) employed in Title I, Part A-funded schools. NCLB required that paraprofessionals must complete two years of college, obtain an associate's degree, or demonstrate content knowledge and an ability to assist in classroom instruction. Prior to the NCLB, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) required only that paraprofessionals possess a high school diploma. These requirements, as enacted through NCLB, apply to all paraprofessionals employed in a Title I-A Schoolwide (§1114) program without regard to whether the position is funded with federal, state, or local funds. In Title I-A programs known as Targeted Assistance (§1115), only those paraprofessionals paid with Title I-A funds must meet the requirements (not those paid with state or local funds). A report by the Education Department (ED) reveals that paraprofessionals accounted for about one-third of instructional staff in Title I-A funded schools and districts. NCLB authorized most ESEA programs through FY2007. The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) provided an automatic one-year extension of these programs through FY2008. While most ESEA programs no longer have an explicit authorization, the programs continue to receive annual appropriations and paraprofessional quality requirements continue to be in place. LEAs in states that have received an ESEA flexibility waiver are not restricted in the use of Title I-A funds for failing to meet NCLB teacher quality and student achievement accountability requirements; however, all LEAs still must comply with the law's paraprofessional quality requirements. This report describes the paraprofessional quality provisions and guidance provided by ED regarding implementation. The report concludes with discussion of issues that may arise as Congress considers reauthorization of the ESEA.

Federal inspectors general (IGs) have been granted substantial independence and powers to combat waste, fraud, and abuse within designated federal departments and agencies. To execute their missions, offices of inspector general (OIGs) conduct and publish audits and investigations—among other duties. In some cases, employees within federal offices or inspectors general are vested with law enforcement authority. For the purposes of this report, law enforcement authority is generally defined as having the legal authority to carry a firearm while engaged in official duties; make an arrest without a warrant while engaged in official duties; and seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence. According to some OIGs vested with law enforcement authority, these authorities are essential to certain missions of the office. In some cases, for example, OIG law enforcement officers conduct investigations that pose potential safety risks. This report provides a list of the statutes and regulations that are used to vest OIGs with law enforcement authority. It also provides resources that add context to what some OIGs say is a need for law enforcement authority in their offices. Each federal agency, including OIGs, has a unique mission, and, therefore, a unique purpose for its law enforcement authority. In some cases, especially when Congress and the public demonstrate concern about the agency's weapons procurement, an agency may release a public statement detailing its law enforcement authority and its need to acquire weapons or ammunition. For example, in August 2012, the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) OIG posted information on its blog explaining an ammunition purchase that garnered public attention. According to an excerpt from the post, Media reports expressed concerns over the type of ammunition ordered. In fact, this type of ammunition is standard issue for many law enforcement agencies. OIG's special agents use this ammunition during their mandatory quarterly firearms qualifications and other training sessions, to ensure agent and public safety. Additionally, the ammunition our agents use is the same type used at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. In another, more recent example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) OIG received inquiries about OIG solicitations for weapons and body armor. The procurement pertained to the OIG's effort to replace automatic firearms with new semi-automatic firearms. On May 19, 2014, Mr. Paul Feeney, deputy counsel at the OIG, sent the following response to questions about the procurement: The Inspector General Act of 1978 authorized OIG to, among other duties, pursue criminal activity, fraud, and abuses impairing USDA's program and operations. The criminal investigation responsibilities and impact of OIG are quite extensive—from fiscal year 2012 through March 2014, OIG investigations pertaining to USDA operations have obtained over 2,000 indictments, 1,350 convictions, and over $460 million in monetary results. OIG Special Agents are authorized to make arrests, execute warrants, and carry firearms. Regarding the need for weapons' procurements, and for defensive vests, USDA OIG's Investigations division conducts hundreds of criminal investigations each year, some of which involve OIG agents, USDA employees, and/or members of the public facing potentially life threatening situations. OIG special agents regularly conduct undercover operations and surveillance. The types of investigations conducted by OIG special agents include criminal activities such as fraud in farm programs; significant thefts of Government property or funds; bribery and extortion; smuggling; and assaults and threats of violence against USDA employees engaged in their official duties. Generally, there are three ways that an OIG can be vested with law enforcement authority. First, and most commonly, an OIG can be vested with law enforcement explicitly pursuant to Section 6(e)(3) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. (IG Act) Appendix, Section 6(e)(4); hereinafter referred to as the IG Act). Second, an OIG can be vested with law enforcement authority by the Attorney General pursuant to criteria articulated in several provisions of Section 6(e) of the IG Act of 1978. Third, an OIG can be vested with law enforcement authority pursuant to statute outside of the IG Act of 1978, as is the case with six federal entities described below. As shown in Table 1 , the IG Act provides direct law enforcement authority to 25 federal entities explicitly named in Section 6(e)(3) of the act. As noted earlier, pursuant to Section 6 of the IG Act, the Attorney General is authorized to delegate law enforcement authority when 1. an OIG "is significantly hampered in the performance of responsibilities ... as a result of the lack of such powers"; 2. "assistance from other law enforcement agencies is insufficient to meet the need for such powers"; and 3. "adequate internal safeguards and management procedures exist to ensure proper exercise of such powers" (5 U.S.C. (IG Act) Appendix, Section 6(e)(2)). The Attorney General has vested the OIGs within the 10 agencies listed below with law enforcement authority. The National Archives and Records Administration Amtrak The Peace Corps The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau The Corporation for National and Community Service The Export-Import Bank of the United States The National Science Foundation The Federal Housing Finance Agency The Securities and Exchange Commission Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. The IG Act authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate guidelines "that govern the use of law enforcement powers" for these OIGs. On December 8, 2003, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft promulgated such guidelines, providing OIGs further detail on their law enforcement authorities' scope and limitations. Within these guidelines, Mr. Ashcroft wrote that employees within the OIGs who qualify for law enforcement authority are required to complete various training, including the Basic Criminal Investigator Training Program (or equivalent) and initial and "refresher firearms training and qualification." OIGs are also required to heed the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) deadly force policy. According to Mr. Ashcroft's guidelines, OIGs vested with law enforcement authority through the IG Act must provide "periodic refresher" training in trial processes; federal criminal and civil legal updates; interviewing techniques and policy; law of arrest, search, and seizure; and physical conditioning and defensive tactics. Additionally, the OIGs are responsible for following other DOJ law enforcement related policies and guidelines, must consult with DOJ before using electronic surveillance, and must receive other approval before beginning an undercover investigation. As shown in Table 2 , five additional OIGs are provided law enforcement authority through laws outside of the IG Act. The Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics maintains a Census on Federal Law Enforcement Officers , which includes data on the number of federal employees who are authorized to carry firearms. The most recent report available states that 33 OIGs had a total of 3,501 agents who were authorized to carry firearms in September 2008. Additionally, the report states that no law enforcement officers within an OIG were assaulted or injured in 2008.

Federal inspectors general (IGs) have been granted substantial independence and powers to combat waste, fraud, and abuse within designated federal departments and agencies. To execute their missions, offices of inspector general (OIGs) conduct and publish audits and investigations—among other duties. Established by public law as permanent, nonpartisan, and independent offices, OIGs exist in more than 70 federal agencies, including all departments and larger agencies, along with numerous boards and commissions and other entities. Many OIGs have been vested with law enforcement authority to assist their investigations. This report provides background on federal offices of inspectors general and their law enforcement authorities in investigations. In this report, law enforcement authority is generally defined as having the legal authority to carry a firearm while engaged in official duties; make an arrest without a warrant while engaged in official duties; and seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence. This report identifies the laws and regulations that vest certain OIGs with law enforcement authority, which permits the use of guns and ammunition. This report also describes some of the requirements and expectations of OIGs that have law enforcement authority, and includes some reasons that OIGs have expressed a need for law enforcement authority.

The Federal Perkins Loan program is one of three postsecondary student financial aid programs that are collectively referred to as the campus-based programs. The Perkins Loan program authorizes the allocation of federal funds to institutions of higher education (IHEs) to assist them in capitalizing revolving loan funds for the purpose of making low-interest loans to students with exceptional financial need. The program is authorized under Title IV, Part E of the Higher Education Act (HEA). It supersedes Title II—Loans to Students in Institutions of Higher Education—of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-864), which was incorporated into the HEA through the Education Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-318). Previously, these loans were known as National Defense Student Loans and National Direct Student Loans. Institutions capitalize revolving loan funds created under the program with a combination of federal and institutional capital contributions (FCCs and ICCs, respectively). Each institution's ICC must equal one-third of the FCC received. The FCC is allocated according to statutorily prescribed procedures. After making loans, IHEs recapitalize their loan funds by depositing the principal and interest repaid by students who borrowed under the program, as well as any other charges or earnings associated with the operation of the program. Perkins Loans are available to undergraduate and graduate and professional students. They must be made reasonably available to all eligible students, with priority given to students with exceptional financial need. Interest on Perkins Loans is fixed at a rate of 5% per year, and no interest accrues prior to a student beginning repayment, nor while repayment is suspended during deferment. Individuals who have engaged in a variety of public service endeavors (e.g., full-time elementary or secondary school teachers employed at a public or private nonprofit school in which low-income students are more than 30% of total enrollment, full-time law enforcement officers) are eligible to have part or all of their Perkins Loan cancelled. The Secretary of Education (the Secretary) is required to reimburse IHEs for Perkins Loans cancelled for students engaged in public service. Funds for reimbursing institutions for loan cancellations may not come from appropriations designated for FCCs; rather, these funds are appropriated under a separate authorization. In academic year 2013-2014, approximately 1,500 IHEs disbursed $1.2 billion in new Perkins Loans to approximately 539,000 students. The authorization of appropriations under HEA Section 461(b)(1), for the purpose of enabling the Secretary to make FCCs to IHEs for their revolving Perkins Loan funds, expired at the end of FY2014. However, Section 422 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) provides that, generally, in the absence of legislation to extend or repeal a program administered by the Department of Education (ED), the authorization of appropriations, or the duration of a program, is extended for one additional fiscal year beyond its terminal year. The authorized level of appropriations for a program in the additional year shall be the same as that for the terminal year of the program. Thus, because Congress did not extend or repeal the Perkins Loan program prior to its expiration on September 30, 2014, the authorization of appropriations for the program was automatically extended for an additional year, through FY2015. ED considers the authorization of appropriations under HEA Section 461(b)(1) to control the duration of the Perkins Loan program and has interpreted this section, along with the automatic one-year extension under GEPA Section 422, to mean that the Perkins Loan program is authorized through September 30, 2015. HEA Section 461(b)(1) authorizes discretionary appropriations to enable the Secretary to make FCCs to student loan funds established and operated at individual IHEs. Under this section $300 million in appropriations are authorized annually for FY2009 through FY2014, and through FY2015 under GEPA Section 422. However, discretionary appropriations for FCCs were last provided in FY2004. Along with the regular authorization of appropriations, HEA Section 465(b) states that the Secretary "shall pay to each institution ... an amount equal to the amount of loans from its student loan fund which are cancelled" for employment in specified public service jobs. Although there is no explicit authorization of appropriations language, in the past Congress has appropriated funds specifically for reimbursing IHEs for Perkins Loans cancellation. Funds for the reimbursement of Perkins Loans cancellations were last appropriated in FY2009. Although funds to make new FFCs to the Perkins Loan program have not been appropriated in several years, IHEs continue to extend new Perkins Loans to borrowers. Because Perkins Loan funds are revolving and, thus, institutions recapitalize their loan funds by depositing the principal and interest repaid by students who borrowed under the program, most participating IHEs still have the ability to extend new Perkins Loans and many continue to do so. Additionally, IHEs may transfer up to 25% of their federal allotments under the Federal Work-Study program to their Federal Perkins Loan fund. This transfer of funds may also enable some IHEs to continue extending new loans to students, despite not receiving new FCCs under the Perkins Loan program. Perkins Loan cancellation is considered an entitlement to those individuals who complete the service requirements. Thus, IHEs must cancel those individuals' loan balances. However, because borrowers are relieved of the requirement to repay their Perkins Loans upon completion of their service requirements, the principal and interest that would have been repaid by such borrowers are not deposited into institutions' revolving student loan funds—and because IHEs are not receiving a reimbursement for that lost stream of capital, the revolving loan fund may have less money to extend new Perkins Loans to students. Although IHEs have not been reimbursed for Perkins Loans cancellations in several years, ED annually calculates the reimbursement payments a school would be eligible to receive and maintains a record of those amounts. It is unknown whether IHEs will be reimbursed for costs associated with loan cancellations in the future. As described above, the statutory authority under the HEA to appropriate funds for the Perkins Loan program expired on September 30, 2014, and has been automatically extended through FY2015 under GEPA Section 422, and ED has interpreted this language to control the overall duration of the program. Absent congressional action prior to October 1, 2015, authorization of appropriations for the Perkins Loan program will expire. Recently, ED issued guidance describing the steps IHEs participating in the Perkins Loan programs should take if Congress does not enact legislation extending or repealing authorization of the program before the end of FY2015. Specifically, IHEs may not extend Federal Perkins Loans to new borrowers after September 30, 2015. However, if prior to October 1, 2015, an IHE makes a first disbursement of a Perkins Loan to a student for the 2015-2016 award year, then the IHE may make remaining disbursements on that loan after September 30, 2015. Also, HEA Section 461(b)(2) includes a grandfathering provision that authorizes additional appropriations to enable IHEs to make Federal Perkins Loans to students who received Perkins Loans for academic years ending prior to October 1, 2015. These students may receive Perkins Loans for up to five additional years (through September 30, 2020) to assist them in continuing or completing their courses of study. Borrowers with currently outstanding Perkins Loans would remain responsible for making payments on the balance of those loans. Additionally, because cancellation benefits are considered entitlements to the borrower, written into the terms of the loan agreement, they would remain eligible for cancellation benefits upon completion of service requirements. ED has not yet issued guidance to IHEs regarding how they should treat outstanding Perkins Loans should the program's authorization of appropriations not be extended. However, when IHEs end their participation in the Perkins Loan program, they are required to assign any outstanding loans to ED for collection. This process results in ED becoming the holder of the loans and collecting on balances owed by borrowers. It is possible similar procedures would be used in the event the Perkins Loan program ceases to operate beyond FY2015. HEA Section 466(a) provides that, beginning September 30, 2003, and no later than March 31, 2004, there was to be a capital distribution of the balance of each IHE's Perkins Loan fund (i.e., a distribution of assets). Under this provision, each participating IHE was to pay the Secretary an amount of the fund proportional to the FCCs paid by the Secretary and IHEs would have retained the remaining balance. Similarly, HEA Section 466(b) provides that after October 1, 2012, each participating IHE was to pay the Secretary the same proportion of any borrower payments in principal and interest on student loans made under the program (this is known as a distribution of late collections), with the IHE retaining any remaining balance. Although the HEA required the start of the distribution of assets and late collections by October 1, 2012, at the latest, ED determined that Section 461 of the HEA, which authorized appropriations for the Perkins Loan programs through FY2014, and Section 422 of GEPA, which authorizes an automatic one-year extension of appropriations through FY2015, supersede the October 1, 2012, distribution provisions. Thus, under ED's interpretation, IHEs need not begin a distribution of Perkins Loan assets and late collections until the end of FY2015. Presumably, if a distribution occurs, IHEs would be required to liquidate and close out their Perkins Loan portfolios following procedures similar to those IHEs are required to follow when they end their participation in the program. However, in recent guidance to IHEs regarding future disbursements of Perkins Loans to borrowers, ED stated it intends to provide information on additional wind-down procedures, including the disposition of IHEs' Perkins Loan portfolios. This information has not yet been released. It is not yet clear what the cost would be to the federal government if authorization of appropriations for the Perkins Loan program is extended. Based on the Section 466 distribution of assets and late collections provisions, it could be argued that the federal government is expecting federal funds to be returned to it. If so, then continuing the program could postpone the return of these funds and thereby create a cost to the government, as it would be "losing" an expected stream of revenue. However, the Congressional Budget Office has indicated it has not yet determined how to calculate cost estimates in this novel situation.

The Federal Perkins Loan program authorizes the allocation of federal funds to institutions of higher education to assist them in capitalizing revolving loan funds for the purpose of making low-interest loans to students with exceptional financial need. Institutions participating in the program are required to provide matching funds equal to one-third of the federal funds they receive. Authorization of appropriations for the Perkins Loan program is due to expire at the end of FY2015, and the future operation of the program is uncertain. This report answers several frequently asked questions regarding the current and future status of the Federal Perkins Loan program, including the following: Is the Perkins Loan program currently authorized? What is the funding status of the Perkins Loan program? Without new appropriations, how does the program continue to function? What happens if authorization of appropriations for the Perkins Loan program expires? What would be the cost to the federal government if authorization for the Perkins Loan program is extended? The Federal Perkins Loan program is one of three federal student aid programs authorized by the Higher Education Act, which are collectively known as the campus-based programs. The Federal Work-Study program and the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant program are the two other campus-based programs. For an overview of each of the campus-based programs, see CRS Report RL31618, Campus-Based Student Financial Aid Programs Under the Higher Education Act, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years of age and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Part A of the program, the Hospital Insurance program, covers hospital services, up to 100 days of post-hospital skilled nursing facility services, post-institutional home health visits, and hospice services. Part B, the Supplementary Medical Insurance program, covers a broad range of medical services including physician services, laboratory services, durable medical equipment, and outpatient hospital services. Part B also covers some home health visits. Part C (also known as Medicare Advantage, or MA) provides private plan options, such as managed care, for beneficiaries who are enrolled in both Parts A and B. Part D provides optional outpatient prescription drug coverage. In general, the total payment received by a provider for covered services provided to a Medicare beneficiary is composed of two parts: a program payment from Medicare plus any beneficiary cost-sharing that is required. (The required beneficiary out-of-pocket payment may be paid by other insurance, if any.) Medicare has established specific rules governing its program payments for all covered services as well as for beneficiary cost sharing as described below. Medicare has established specific rules governing payment for covered services. For example, the program pays for most acute inpatient and outpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility services, and home health care under a prospective payment system (PPS) established for the particular service; under PPS, a predetermined rate is paid for each unit of service such as a hospital discharge or payment classification group. Payments for physician services, clinical laboratory services, and certain durable medical equipment covered under Part B are made on the basis of fee schedules. Certain other services are paid on the basis of reasonable costs or reasonable charges. In general, the program provides for annual updates of the program payments to reflect inflation and other factors. In some cases, these updates are linked to the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) or to a provider-specific market basket (MB) index which measures the change in the price of goods and services purchased by the provider to produce a unit of output. However, updates to the physician fee schedule are determined by a statutory formula, known as the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system, which links annual updates to how cumulative actual expenditures compare with a cumulative expenditures target. In addition to premiums, there are two aspects of beneficiary payments to providers: required cost-sharing amounts (coinsurance, copayments, or deductibles) and the amounts that beneficiaries may be billed over and above Medicare's recognized payment amounts for certain services. Almost all persons age 65 and over are automatically entitled to premium-free Medicare Part A, as they, or their spouse, have at least 40 quarters of Medicare covered employment. For Part A, coinsurance and deductible amounts are established annually; these payments include deductibles and coinsurance for hospital services, coinsurance for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), no cost sharing for home health services, and nominal cost sharing for hospice care. For Part B, beneficiaries are generally responsible for monthly premiums, which range from $104.90 to $335.70 in 2013 (depending on the beneficiary's income), a $147 deductible in 2013 (updated annually by the increase in the Part B premium), and a coinsurance payment of 20% of the established Medicare payment amounts. For Part C, cost sharing is determined by the private plans. Through 2005, the total of premiums for basic Medicare benefits and cost sharing (deductibles, coinsurance, and co-payments) charged to a Part C enrollee could not exceed actuarially determined levels of cost sharing for those same benefits under original Medicare. This meant that plans could not charge a premium for Medicare-covered benefits without reducing cost-sharing amounts. Beginning in 2006, the constraint on a plan's ability to charge a premium for basic Medicare benefits was lifted. The bidding mechanism established by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) allows plans to charge a premium to cover basic Medicare benefits if the costs to the plan exceed the maximum amount the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) will pay for Medicare-covered benefits. The MMA eliminated the explicit inverse relationship between cost sharing for basic Medicare benefits and a premium for basic Medicare benefits. Aggregate enrollee cost sharing under Part C is now only constrained by the actuarial value of cost sharing under original Medicare. However, also beginning in 2006, the Secretary has expanded authority to negotiate or reject a bid from a managed care organization in order to ensure that the bid reasonably reflects the plan's revenue requirements. The base beneficiary premium under part D for 2013 is $31.17 per month; however, actual premiums vary by plan and are increased for beneficiaries with incomes above specified thresholds, similar to Part B premiums. Part D cost sharing includes a deductible, co-payments, and catastrophic limits on out-of-pocket spending. For most services, there are rules on amounts beneficiaries may be billed over and above Medicare's recognized payment amounts. Under Part A, providers agree to accept Medicare's payment as payment in full and cannot bill a beneficiary amounts in excess of the coinsurance and deductibles. Under Part B, providers and practitioners are subject to limits on the amounts they can bill beneficiaries for covered services depending on their participation status in the Medicare program. A participating physician agrees to accept the approved fee schedule amount as payment in full (assignment) for all services delivered to Medicare beneficiaries, of which 80% is paid by the Medicare program and the beneficiary is responsible for the 20% coinsurance plus any unmet deductible. Physicians who do not agree to accept assignment on all Medicare claims in a given year are referred to as nonparticipating physicians . Nonparticipating physicians may or may not accept assignment for a given service. If they do not, they may charge beneficiaries more than the fee schedule amount on nonassigned claims; for physicians, these balance billing charges are subject to certain limits. Assignment is mandatory for some providers, such as nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and clinical laboratories; these providers can only bill the beneficiary the 20% coinsurance and any unmet deductible. For other Part B services, such as durable medical equipment, assignment is optional; providers may bill beneficiaries for amounts above Medicare's recognized payment level and may do so without limit. Because of its rapid growth, both in terms of aggregate dollars and as a share of the federal budget, the Medicare program has been a major focus of legislative attention, as outlined below. With a few exceptions, savings in program spending have been achieved largely through reductions in the updates to provider payments, primarily hospitals, physicians, and MA plans. However, even when payments are frozen (as has been the case in some years with payments to acute care hospitals, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, long term care hospitals, and with the physician fee schedule), Medicare spending continues to increase each year as the number of beneficiaries increases, and the number and complexity of services becomes greater. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 as amended, ACA), is estimated to achieve substantial program savings through, permanent reductions in the maximum amount paid to MA plans, and reductions in the annual updates to Medicare's fee-for-service (FFS) providers (other than physicians' services), among other provisions. The anticipated savings from payment changes to FFS providers is substantially due to the application of a productivity adjustment. (Productivity, in general, is a measure of output produced relative to the amount of work required to produce it.) The ACA productivity adjustment marks a departure from most previous legislative actions to reduce Medicare program spending in two specific respects. First, it is a permanent, rather than time-limited, adjustment to (non-physician) payment updates. Second, in general, it specifies that the adjustment allows for negative payment updates and as such, payment rates for a year may be less than for a preceding year. At the time of passage, the ACA was estimated to achieve net Medicare savings of approximately $430 billion over the 10-year budget window (FY2010-FY2019), based on a CRS analysis of the Congressional Budget Office estimates for provisions affecting the Medicare program. Though the ACA payment changes to Medicare providers and plans is expected to slow the growth in Medicare spending and extend the solvency of the Hospital Insurance (Part A) Trust Fund, some have suggested that such a policy may not be sustainable in the long run, "without unprecedented improvements in health care provider productivity." Once the impact of the provider payment changes from the ACA is known, Congress may wish to revisit the issue of the productivity adjustments to determine whether rates are much higher or much lower than originally estimated. As in the case of physician payment updates, it is unclear whether Congress will allow providers to be paid less than in a previous year under this new provision. In addition, the ACA created an Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), and charged it with developing proposals to "reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare" if spending goes above targets specified in the statute. IPAB is prohibited from recommending changes that would reduce payments to certain providers before 2020 and is also prohibited from recommending changes in premiums, benefits, eligibility, and taxes or other changes that would result in rationing. Unlike other agencies that advise Congress, IPAB's recommendations are to be automatically implemented unless Congress acts. Congress can alter the Board's proposals, within limitations, or discontinue the automatic implementation of proposals. The Board is to be appointed by the President in consultation with congressional leadership and with the advice and consent of the Senate. It is to submit its first set of recommendations to the President and to Congress, if required, by January 15, 2014. However, the CBO has projected that the IPAB trigger may not be activated in the near future. Provisions in the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 , BCA) impact Medicare payments in 2013. The BCA established a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction and tasked it with providing to Congress by November 23, 2011 recommendations on ways to reduce the deficit over the subsequent 10 years. When the Committee did not provide the recommendations, this triggered a government-wide sequestration process to reduce Federal spending beginning in 2013. Payments for most Medicare benefits will be subject to a maximum 2% reduction each year from March 2013 through 2021. Starting April 1, 2013, for payments made to providers and suppliers under Medicare Parts A and B, the percentage reduction applies to individual payments for items and services provided. In the case of Medicare Parts C and D, reductions are made to the monthly payments made to the private plans that administer these parts of the program. Certain parts of Medicare, however, are exempt from sequestration. These include (1) the Part D low-income subsidies; (2) the Part D catastrophic subsidy; and (3) Qualified Individual (QI) premiums. Outlays for certain Medicare administrative expenditures (non-benefit spending) are not subject to the 2% limit. Provider-specific sequestration adjustments are not reflected in the tables that follow because they are temporary adjustments to payment systems. In addition, the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (TPTCCA, P.L. 112-78 ), the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (MCTRJCA, P.L. 112-96 ), and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ) extended certain time-limited payment adjustments to specified Medicare providers. This report provides a guide to Medicare payment rules by type of benefit. The information is presented through a series of tables, each representing a provider type, such as physicians, or Medicare Advantage plans. The first column in each table lists the type of payments that may be received by the provider (e.g., the separate operating and capital payments paid to short-term general hospitals under the prospective payment system as described in Medicare Payment Policies ( Table 1 ), or lists subcategories of providers under the general provider category (such as the different types of non-physician providers that are all listed in Table 7 ). The second column of each table discusses the general policy for determining payments while column three describes how the general payment amounts are updated, or adjusted each year (e.g., amounts may be updated by a measure of inflation, economy-wide productivity, or statutorily specified reductions to updates). The final column presents the most recent update amounts. A complete list of acronyms used in this report is included the Appendix . This report is updated to reflect the most recent legislative changes to the program and payment updates available through January 2013. The following table includes health care acronyms used in this report. It also includes acronyms for laws that have amended Medicare since 1997.

Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays for covered health services for most persons 65 years of age and older and for most permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Part A of the program, the Hospital Insurance program, covers hospital, post-hospital, and hospice services. Part B, the Supplementary Medical Insurance program, is optional and covers a broad range of complementary medical services including physician, laboratory, outpatient hospital services, and durable medical equipment. Part C provides private plan options for beneficiaries enrolled in both Parts A and B. Part D is an optional outpatient prescription drug program. Medicare has established specific rules for payment of covered benefits. Some, such as physician services and most durable medical equipment, are based on fee schedules. A fee schedule is a list of Medicare payments for specific items and services, which are calculated according to statutorily specified formula and take into account the actual amount of care provided. Many services, including inpatient and outpatient hospital care, are paid under different prospective payment systems (PPSs). A prospective payment system is a method of paying hospitals, or other providers, amounts or rates of payment that are established in advance for a defined period and are generally based on an episode of care, regardless of the actual amount of care used. Other payments are based, in part, on a provider's bid (an estimate of the cost of providing a service) relative to a benchmark (the maximum amount Medicare will pay). Bids and benchmarks are used to determine payments in Medicare Parts C and D. Payments for some items of durable medical equipment in specified locations are also based on the bids of competing providers. In general, the program provides for annual updates to these payment amounts. The program also has rules regarding the amount of cost sharing, if any, that beneficiaries can be billed in excess of Medicare's recognized payment levels. Unlike other services, Medicare's outpatient prescription drug benefit can be obtained only through private plans. Further, while all Part D plans must meet certain minimum requirements, they differ in terms of benefit design, formulary drugs, premiums, and cost-sharing amounts. Medicare payment policies and potential changes to these policies are of continuing interest to Congress. The Medicare program has been a major focus of deficit reduction legislation since 1980. In each Congress since the 105th Congress, laws have been passed to both increase, but more often slow, the rate of growth of payments to Medicare providers and private plans. Perhaps of particular interest in the 113rd Congress is the update to the Medicare physician fee schedule. The method for updating the physician fee schedule amount, known as the sustainable growth rate (SGR), would have resulted in negative updates for physician payments in recent years, except that Congress has stepped in to stop the updates. Physician payment rates, which would have fallen 26.5% in the absence of congressional action, are frozen through December 31, 2013. Under current law, Medicare physician fee schedule payments are to be reduced by 24.4% beginning January 2014. This report provides an overview of Medicare payment rules by type of service, outlines current payment policies, and summarizes the basic rules for payment updates. In addition to the payment information provided in the tables of this report, Medicare is subject to a maximum 2% payment reduction due to sequestration. This report will be updated twice a year to reflect recent fiscal year and calendar year changes, and will be updated to reflect the details of how the 2% reduction in payments will be applied.

As in past disasters, the Secretary of HUD issued a number of waivers to permit local communities to redirect their existing HUD housing and community development grant funds to meet their emergency needs shortly after the storm. Waivers were issued for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program , the HOME Investments Partnerships Program (HOME), the Emergency Shelter Grants Program (ESG), and the Housing for Persons with AIDS Program (HOPWA). Waivers issued ranged from extensions in the amount of time grantees had to spend their funds to easing of benefit eligibility requirements. HUD also issued $2 million in base program funding as "Imminent Threat" funding to Indian Community Development Block Grant recipient communities affected by the storm. The Administration was proactive in making existing housing programs and assistance available to victims of Katrina. Immediately after the storm, HUD created a toll-free number that allowed displaced HUD-assisted families (e.g., public housing residents and Section 8 rental housing voucher holders) to reestablish their benefits. In conjunction with that number, HUD identified a number of vacant units across the country in which to house displaced tenants, both formerly assisted and unassisted. HUD also issued a notice summarizing waivers available to public housing authorities (PHAs), including suspensions of reporting deadlines, loosening of quality standards and income determination rules, and increases in subsidy limits for public housing authorities affected by the storm. The department also made emergency capital reserve funds available to local PHAs to repair damaged public housing units. FEMA-HUD Joint Initiative . On September 24, 2005, the Secretaries of HUD and Homeland Security announced a joint transitional housing assistance initiative for Hurricane Katrina evacuees. The initiative provided two types of assistance, both funded by emergency funds provided to FEMA in a supplemental appropriation shortly after the storm. The first was a type of individual and household grant administered by FEMA. Displaced homeowners and renters (except for HUD-assisted renters) received a cash grant of $2,358 to be used for housing-related expenses. The amount was meant to represent three months of housing costs and was calculated using the national average fair-market rent (FMR) for a two-bedroom apartment. The assistance could be extended for up to 18 months. Second, for families who were homeless or receiving HUD assistance before the storm, FEMA initially provided funding to HUD, through a mission assignment, to administer the HUD Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP). It provided ongoing rental assistance, for up to 18 months, to displaced HUD-assisted renters (including Section 8 voucher holders, families who had lived in public housing, and families who had lived in other forms of HUD-assisted rental housing) and displaced homeless families. It was administered by local PHAs and was calculated at 100% of the local area FMR. Families were required to pay any difference between the rental assistance amount and the actual rent for the unit they selected. This program had no income eligibility or targeting requirements, and families' eligibility was determined after they registered for FEMA assistance and contacted HUD. Disaster Voucher Program . Language included in the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-148 ) transferred $390 million in FEMA funds to HUD to administer a modified form of KDHAP called the Disaster Voucher Program. The act also included administrative provisions permitting housing authorities to combine their public housing and Section 8 voucher funds, and directed the Secretary, to the extent feasible, to preserve all assisted housing damaged by the storm. On August 31, 2005, HUD issued mortgagee letter 2005-33, reminding HUD-approved lenders that when the President declares a disaster, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, it automatically triggers certain procedures with regard to FHA-insured mortgages in the affected areas. The following procedures become effective for one year from the date of declaration: (1) a moratorium on foreclosures for 90 days from the date of declaration ; (2) lenders are encouraged to offer special forbearance, mortgage modification, refinancing, and waiver of late charges to affected borrowers; (3) families whose residences were destroyed or severely damaged are eligible for 100% financing under the Section 203(h) program for the cost of reconstruction or replacement; (4) damaged properties become eligible for Section 203(k) financing, under which costs to purchase and rehabilitate the property are included in one loan and HUD waives the requirement that the property has been completed for more than one year prior to application for the mortgage; (5) underwriting guidelines are relaxed to permit disaster victims to qualify for loans even if their total monthly debt, including the proposed mortgage, would equal 45% of gross income; and (6) lenders must ensure that hazard claims are expeditiously filed and settled, and lenders may not retain hazard insurance proceeds to make up an existing arrearage without written consent of the borrower. The Section 203(h) program is available for borrowers who already own homes in the affected area. The loans are limited to the FHA loan limit for the area, subject to the provision that the loan may not exceed 100% of the appraised value of the property. In some cases it may not be possible to obtain 100% financing. It may often be the case that the cost to repair or replace the property exceeds the appraised value of the property. This is the reason that most lenders require borrowers to obtain hazard insurance that covers the replacement cost of the property instead of its appraised value. The Section 203(k) program permits borrowers who do not already own homes to purchase and rehabilitate properties in the area that are either abandoned by owners, or are being sold by owners who do not want to repair them and remain in the area. The current FHA underwriting guidelines provide that a prospective borrower's total debt, including the proposed mortgage payment, may not exceed 41% of the borrower's gross monthly income. In recognition of the fact that borrowers in these programs (§203 (h) and (k)) may have to incur debt to replace personal property, the underwriting guidelines are relaxed to permit loans to borrowers whose total debt is up to 45% of gross monthly income. The limit may even be exceeded if justified by compensating factors. On December 5, 2005, HUD announced the Mortgage Assistance Initiative (MAI), under which HUD will make mortgage payments for up to 12 months on behalf of borrowers who have FHA-insured mortgages on their homes and who have been displaced or are unemployed because of the recent disasters. Eligible borrowers must: (1) have homes that are repairable and are located within parts of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas declared eligible for individual assistance as a result of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, or Wilma; (2) have missed between four and 12 payments on an FHA-insured home loan; (3) be temporarily unable to make mortgage payments but have the expectation to resume full mortgage payments; and (4) the homes must be the primary residences of the borrowers and the borrowers must be committed to continued occupancy of the properties as primary residences. No interest is charged on the MAI loans, and repayment is not required until the original FHA-insured loans are repaid. The program is scheduled to expire18 months after it began, and is expected to assist about 20,000 families. FHA notes that more than 52,000 FHA-insured loans were delinquent due to the storms. In April 2005, before Hurricane Katrina struck, HUD augmented its existing 203(k) program by announcing the "Streamline(k) Limited Repair Program" to facilitate the purchase of properties needing minor rehabilitation (HUD Mortgagee Letter 2005-19). Eligible properties were those needing repairs costing at least $5,000 but not more than $15,000. The program was amended in December to, among other changes, eliminate the minimum repair cost, increase the maximum repair cost to $35,000, and make lead-based paint stabilization an eligible work item (HUD Mortgagee Letter 2005-50). The Streamline(k) program is not directed specifically at properties damaged by Katrina, but could facilitate the purchase and repair of such properties that meet program requirements. Congress enacted several emergency supplemental funding bills following the hurricanes, two of which provided CDBG funds to affected communities. The Defense Appropriations Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) provided $11.5 billion for CDBG for "necessary expenses related to disaster relief, long-term recovery, and restoration of infrastructure in the most impacted and distressed areas" in the five states impacted by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. The act allowed the affected states to use up to 5% for administrative costs; HUD to grant waivers of program requirements (except those relating to fair housing, nondiscrimination, labor standards, and the environment); Mississippi and Louisiana, the most affected states, to use up to $20 million for local community development corporations; and the Governor of each state to designate multiple entities to administer either a portion or all of a state's share of the $11.5 billion. The act also lowered the income targeting requirement for activities benefitting low- and moderate-income persons from 70% to 50% of the state's allocation; limited the maximum amount of assistance any of the five states may receive to no more than 54% of the total amount appropriated; and required each state to develop, for HUD's approval, a plan detailing the proposed use of funds, including eligibility criteria and how the funds will be used to address long-term recovery and infrastructure restoration activities. On January 25, 2006, HUD announced its allocation of the funds. Using data from FEMA and several other agencies, HUD calculated the extent of each state's unmet housing needs and areas of concentrated distress for each of the five states. HUD allocated 55% of the funds based on each state's unmet housing needs and the remaining 45% on the degree of concentrated distress as measured by each state's share of damaged and destroyed housing stock, and business and infrastructure damage. On February 13, 2006, HUD published a notice of allocations, waivers, and alternative requirements governing the CDBG disaster recovery assistance. In addition to providing waivers allowing the states to allocate funds to CDBG entitlement communities and directly administer the program, the notice also included language stating that "Funds allocated are intended by HUD to be used toward meeting unmet housing needs in areas of concentrated distress." The language included in the act did not restrict the use of these funds to unmet housing needs. Rather, the act provided some level of flexibility allowing funds to be used for long-term recovery and infrastructure restoration in the areas most affected by the Gulf Coast Hurricanes of 2005. On June 15, 2006, the President signed P.L. 109-234 , a second emergency supplemental appropriations act, providing funds for Gulf Coast recovery efforts. The law included $5.2 billion in additional CDBG assistance for the states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. It limited the amount that any one state could receive to $4.2 billion, and encouraged states to target assistance to infrastructure reconstruction and activities that would spur the redevelopment of affordable rental housing, including federally assisted housing and public housing. The law contained provisions regarding the use and administration of funds, including most of the provisions that applied to the funds authorized by P.L. 109-148 , as well as provisions that required that at least $1 billion of the CDBG amount be used for repair and reconstruction of affordable rental housing in the impacted areas; ensured that each state's plan gives priority to activities that support infrastructure development and affordable rental housing activities; required each state to file quarterly reports with House and Senate Appropriations Committees detailing the use of funds; required HUD to file quarterly reports with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees identifying actions by the department to prevent fraud and abuse, including the duplication of benefits; and prohibited the use of CDBG funds to meet matching fund requirements of other federal programs. On July 11, 2006, HUD announced that $4.2 billion of the $5.2 billion supplemental appropriation for CDBG would be allocated to Louisiana, and on August 18, it announced how funds would be distributed to the remaining states (see Table 1 ). HUD determined the distribution of funds for Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas based on unmet need, analyzing data from FEMA and the Small Business Administration. It then invited each state to provide their own data on remaining recovery needs in order to make its decision. Two important developments related to HUD's role in response to the 2005 hurricanes occurred after the initial response period that is the focus of this report. First, in July 2007, FEMA announced it would transfer responsibility for ongoing housing assistance for families displaced by the 2005 hurricanes to HUD, noting HUD's expertise in assisting families with long-term housing needs through its existing infrastructure of PHAs. Additional funding related to this added responsibility was provided to HUD in FY2008 and FY2009, as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 . Second, in November 2007 Congress provided another $3 billion in emergency supplemental CDBG funding to Louisiana for its recovery needs ( P.L. 110-116 ).

The catastrophic devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005, and to a lesser degree, Hurricanes Wilma and Rita, led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of families. Following the storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) took primary responsibility for meeting the emergency housing needs of displaced families. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the nation's housing agency, also played a role. HUD modified its existing grant programs—primarily through waivers—to make them more flexible for communities wishing to serve displaced families. The department also took steps to aid displaced families that had been homeless or receiving HUD assistance prior to the storm by developing a new voucher program, and by issuing guidance to lenders offering protections for homeowners with FHA-insured mortgages. Finally, Congress has used HUD programs, particularly the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, as a conduit for providing relief and recovery funds to devastated communities. This report details HUD's efforts to provide assistance to affected families and communities immediately after the storm and in the initial rebuilding stages. It will not track HUD's role in the longer-term rebuilding of the devastated areas.

Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides tax-exempt status to "political organizations," while the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates "political committees." The definitions of the two terms are similar, but they do not perfectly coincide. The term "political organization" includes entities intending to influence federal, state, and local elections, along with the selection of non-elective offices. The term "political committee" is narrower, covering only those entities participating in federal election activities. While political committees are a type of political organization, not all political organizations are political committees. In general, Section 527 political organizations are required to report tax-related information to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Other information, such as disclosure of contributions and expenditures, is reported to either the IRS or the Federal Election Commission (FEC) depending on whether the political organization is also a political committee. Those that are political committees report to the FEC; while political organizations that are not political committees report to the IRS. Section 527 political organizations include the entities colloquially known as "527s" or "527 groups" that have been controversial during recent election cycles. These groups, which benefit from Section 527 tax-exempt status, seemingly intend to influence federal elections in ways that may place them outside the FECA definition of "political committee." Because these groups are not registered as political committees under FECA, they are required to report information to the IRS, instead of the FEC. The following chart compares the timing of election activity reporting requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Code and the Federal Election Campaign Act. No legislation has yet been introduced in the 111 th Congress that would amend the timing of the reporting requirements in the IRC or FECA. In the 110 th Congress, H.R. 1204 (527 Transparency Act of 2007) would have no longer allowed Section 527 political organizations to file the periodic contribution and expenditure reports with the IRS on a non-monthly basis. Instead, all political organizations that report to the IRS would have been required to file monthly reports, in addition to pre-election, post-general election, and year-end reports. An organization that failed to file in a timely fashion would have faced a penalty equal to 30% of the expenditures and contributions that were not adequately reported, with the organization's managers jointly and severally liable for the penalty. Additionally, contributions to that organization would have been subject to the gift tax. The organizations would have been required to notify their contributors about the failure within 90 days of the IRS's final determination that the failure had occurred. Finally, the bill would have required that the reports be simultaneously filed with the FEC.

One way that federal law regulates groups participating in election activities is by requiring them to report information on such things as their contributions and expenditures. Reporting requirements are imposed on "political organizations" by the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and "political committees" by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). Some of the requirements are similar; in which case, entities are generally subject to either the ones in the IRC (and report to the Internal Revenue Service) or those in FECA (and report to the Federal Election Commission). Included in the entities that report to the IRS are those colloquially known as "527s" or "527 groups." No legislation has yet been introduced in the 111th Congress that would affect the timing of the reporting requirements under the IRC or FECA.

RS21342 -- Immigration: Diversity Visa Lottery Updated April 26, 2004 The purpose of the diversity visa lottery is, as the name suggests, to encourage legal immigration from countries other than the majorsending countries of current immigration to the United States. The law weighs allocation of immigrant visas heavilytowards alienswith close family in the United States and, to a lesser extent, aliens who meet particular employment needs. Thediversity immigrantcategory was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by the Immigration Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-649 )to stimulate "newseed" immigration (i.e., to foster new, more varied, migration from other parts of the world). (1) The current diversity lottery began inFY1995 following three transitional years with temporary lotteries. (2) The diversity lottery makes 55,000 visas available annually to natives of countries from which immigrantadmissions were lower thana total of 50,000 over the preceding five years. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau(USCIS) generatesthe formula for allocating visas according to the statutory specifications: visas are divided among six geographicregions according tothe relative populations of the regions, with their allocation weighted in favor of countries in regions that wereunder-representedamong immigrant admissions to the United States. The Act limits each country to 7%, or 3,850, of the visa limit,and provides thatNorthern Ireland be treated as a separate foreign state. Recipients of the visas become legal permanent residents(LPRs) of the UnitedStates. While the diversity lottery has not been directly amended since its enactment in 1990, the Nicaraguan Adjustment and CentralAmerican Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA) temporarily reduces the 55,000 annual ceiling by up to 5,000 visasannually. Beginning inFY1999, the diversity ceiling became 50,000 to offset immigrant visa numbers made available to certainunsuccessful asylum seekersfrom El Salvador, Guatemala, and formerly communist countries in Europe who are being granted LPR status underspecial rulesestablished by NACARA. While the offset is temporary, it is not clear how many years it will be in effect to handlethese adjustmentsof status. In FY2002, there were 42,829 persons actually admitted or adjusted as LPRs with diversity visas, according to the FY2002 USCISadmissions data. This number represents 4% of all LPRs in FY2002 and is comparable to FY2001, when 42,105diversity immigrantscomprised 3.9% of all LPRs. The top five countries in FY2002 (the latest year for which detailed data are available)were Albania,Ethiopia, Nigeria, Poland, and the Ukraine. As Table 1 details, these five countries have consistently ranked among the top diversity visa sending countries, along withBangladesh, Bulgaria, Morocco, Romania, and Russia. Citizens of Ireland, Poland, and the former Soviet Unionwon the most visasin the mid-1990s, but their participation in the lottery has fallen in recent years. Albania ranks as the top sendingcountry for thisentire period, followed by Nigeria. The numbers for Russia and Ukraine may be understated because nationals whoqualified fromsome of the post-Soviet nations reported that they were born in the Soviet Union. Table 1. Top Diversity Visa Sending Countries, FY1997-FY2002 Source: CRS analysis of USCIS admissions data, reported by DHS Office of Immigration Statistics. PDF version The sending world regions for diversity visas, as intended, differ substantially from the sending regions for family-based andemployment-based immigration. As Figure 1 illustrates, European immigrants comprised 39.4%of the diversity visa recipients incontrast to 10.4% of the family-based and employment-based immigrants in FY2002. African immigrants received38.1% of thediversity visas in contrast to 3.6% of the family-based and employment-based visas. Caribbean, Latin American,and Asianimmigrants dominated family-based and employment-based immigration, and as a result, made up much smallerpercentages of thediversity visa immigrants. (3) To be eligible for a diversity visa, the INA requires that an alien must have a high school education or the equivalent, or two yearsexperience in an occupation which requires at least two years of training or experience. (4) The alien or the alien's spouse must be anative of one of the countries listed as a foreign state qualified for the diversity visa lottery. Diversity lottery winners, like all other aliens wishing to come to the United States, must undergo reviews performed by Departmentof State consular officers abroad and DHS inspectors upon entry to the U.S. (5) These reviews are intended to ensure that they are notineligible for visas or admission under the grounds for inadmissibility spelled out in the INA. (6) These criteria for exclusion aregrouped into the following categories: health-related grounds; criminal history; security and terrorist concerns; public charge (e.g., indigence); seeking to work without proper labor certification; illegal entrants and immigration law violations; ineligible for citizenship; and, aliens previously removed. The State Department announced the FY2005 lottery on August 19, 2003. The 60-day application period began on November 1, 2003and ended on December 30, 2003. (7) For the first time,applications for the diversity lottery must have been submitted electronically. Entrants received an electronic confirmation notice upon receipt of a completed entry form. Paper forms were notaccepted. Sincethe objective of the diversity lottery is to encourage immigration from regions with lower immigration rates, nativesof countries withhigh admissions are usually ineligible. For FY2005, the ineligible countries were: Canada, China (mainland born),Columbia,Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, South Korea,the United Kingdomand dependent territories, and Vietnam. (8) When applying for a diversity visa, petitioners had to follow the instructions issued by the State Department precisely. If there wereany mistakes or inconsistencies with the petition, it may have been disqualified by the State Department. In theFY2003 lottery, over2 million of the 8.7 million applications were disqualified for failure to comply with the instructions. (9) Aliens who submit more thanone application are supposed to be disqualified, but husbands and wives may submit separate entries even thoughspouses andunmarried children under the age of 21 qualify as derivative beneficiaries of successful applicants. Any derivativebeneficiary must belisted on the petition when it is initially filed, and the derivative beneficiary visas are counted against the 50,000visa cap. If adiversity lottery winner dies before obtaining LPR status, the visa is automatically revoked and derivativebeneficiaries are no longerentitled to diversity visa classification. (10) Once all acceptable applications were received by the visa center, the winners were selected randomly by computer. Petitioners whowere not selected were not notified by the State Department. The State Department is expected to notify the winnersof the FY2005diversity lottery by mail between May and July 2004, and their visas will be issued between October 1, 2004 andSeptember 30, 2005. Winning the first round of the FY2005 lottery does not guarantee a visa, because the State Department draws moreapplications thanthe number of visas available. Therefore, winners must be prepared to act quickly to file the necessarydocumentation demonstratingto the State Department that they are admissible as LPRs. The applications are processed on a first-come,first-served basis. Aliensmust complete this process before September 30, 2005 to receive visas. (11) In person interviews are expected to begin in October2004. Some question the continuation of the diversity visa lottery, given that family members often wait years for a visa to immigrate to theUnited States. They state a preference that the 55,000 visas be used for backlog reduction of the other visacategories. Supporters ofthe diversity visa, however, point to the immigration dominance of nationals from a handful of countries and arguethat the diversityvisa provides "new seed" immigrants for an immigration system weighted disproportionately to family-basedimmigrants. Some are arguing that the INA should be amended to prevent nationals from countries that the United States identifies as sponsors ofterrorism from participating in the diversity visa lottery. These critics maintain that the difficulties of performingbackground checksin these countries as well as broader concerns about terrorism should prompt this change. Supporters of current lawobserve thatLPRs coming to the United States in other visa categories are not restricted if they come from nations that sponsorterrorism andargue that the policy should be uniformly applied. Who should bear the costs of operating the lottery has also arisen as a issue. Those aliens who win the lottery pay a fee with their visaapplication, but some argue that a fee should be charged to enter the lottery as well. The diversity visa has beencriticized asvulnerable to fraud and misuse, but the State Department maintains that they are addressing these concerns.

The diversity visa lottery offers an opportunity for immigration to nationals of countriesthat do not have high levels of immigration. Aliens from eligible countries had until noon on December 30, 2003to submit theirapplications for the FY2005 diversity visa lottery. Aliens who are selected through the lottery, if they are otherwiseadmissible underthe Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), may become legal permanent residents of the United States. Participation in the diversityvisa lottery is limited annually to 55,000 aliens from countries that are under-represented among recent immigrantadmissions to theUnited States. In FY2001, over 8 million aliens from around the world sent in applications for the FY2003 lottery. Of the diversityvisas awarded in FY2002, European immigrants comprised 39.4% of the diversity visa recipients and Africanimmigrants received38.1%. This report does not track legislation and will not be regularly updated.

As shown in figure 2, Congress and executive branch agencies have made progress in addressing or partially addressing many actions we identified from 2011 to 2016. As of March 2017, 82 percent of the 645 total actions we had identified since 2011 have been addressed or partially addressed. See our online Action Tracker for the status of all actions. Congress and executive branch agencies have addressed 329 (51 percent) of the 645 actions we identified from 2011 to 2016 (see table 3). We found that these efforts have resulted in roughly $136 billion in financial benefits—$75 billion from 2010 through 2016, with at least an additional $61 billion in estimated benefits projected to be accrued in future years. The progress Congress and executive branch agencies have made in addressing our open actions has resulted in significant financial benefits. Table 4 highlights examples of these results. Congress has also implemented a number of key government-wide statutory requirements in recent years that could help identify areas of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication, or help address issues we raise in this report, including the following: The Program Management Improvement Accountability Act. The act seeks to improve program and project management in certain federal agencies. Among other things, the act requires the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to adopt and oversee implementation of government-wide standards, policies, and guidelines for program and project management in executive agencies. It further creates a Program Management Policy Council to act as an interagency forum for improving practices related to program and project management. This interagency collaboration and strengthened program management could help reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication among federal agencies. The Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act). The DATA Act expands on previous federal transparency requirements to link federal agency spending to federal program activities so that taxpayers and policymakers can more effectively track federal spending. Full and effective implementation of the act offers the promise of a much more complete and accurate understanding of federal spending by enabling—for the first time—the federal government as a whole to track these funds at multiple points in the federal spending life cycle, and significantly increasing the types and transparency of data available to Congress, agencies, and the general public. In what will be the first reporting of data in compliance with the act’s requirements, agencies must submit second-quarter fiscal year 2017 data in compliance with the act’s requirements for inclusion on USASpending.gov in May 2017. This information could potentially help identify areas of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. Information Technology (IT) acquisition reform, known as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA). The effective and efficient acquisition and management of IT investments has been a long-standing challenge in the federal government. FITARA holds promise for improving agencies’ acquisition of IT and enabling Congress to monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings. FITARA includes several specific requirements related to existing areas in our fragmentation, overlap, and duplication work, such as implementing the federal data-center consolidation initiative, enhancing transparency, improving risk management, and maximizing the benefits of government-wide software purchasing and the federal strategic sourcing initiative. The Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA). Improper payments are a long-standing, widespread, and significant problem in the federal government— totaling over $1.2 trillion since reporting requirements first began at some agencies in 2003. IPERIA requires agencies to ensure that a thorough review of available databases occurs prior to the release of federal funds. We have identified numerous actions to reduce improper payments in several areas, such as Medicare improper payments, Medicaid improper payments, and refundable tax credits. While Congress and executive branch agencies have made progress toward addressing the 724 total actions we have identified since 2011, further steps are needed to fully address the 395 actions that remain open (i.e., partially or not addressed). We estimate that tens of billions of dollars in additional financial benefits could be realized should Congress and executive branch agencies fully address open actions. In addition to producing financial benefits, these actions make government more efficient; improve major government programs or agencies; reduce mismanagement, fraud, waste, and abuse; and increase assurance that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent. Congress has used our work to identify legislative solutions to achieve cost savings, address emerging problems, and find efficiencies in federal agencies and programs. Our work has contributed to a number of key authorizations and appropriations. Congressional oversight has been critical in realizing the full benefits of our suggested actions, and it will continue to be critical in the future. In our 2011 to 2017 annual reports, we directed 97 actions to Congress, including 2 new congressional actions we identified in 2017. Of the 97 actions, 61 remained open (9 were partially addressed and 52 were not addressed) as of March 2017. Table 5 highlights areas with significant open actions directed to Congress. In our 2011 to 2017 annual reports, we directed 627 actions to executive branch agencies, including 77 new actions identified in 2017. Of the 627 actions, over half—334—remained open (192 were partially addressed and 142 were not addressed) as of March 2017. While these open actions span the government, a substantial number of actions are directed to seven agencies that made up 84 percent—$3.6 trillion—of federal outlays in fiscal year 2016; see figure 3. As shown in figure 4, 10 agencies have at least 20 open actions. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 168 actions to the Department of Defense (DOD) in areas that contribute to DOD’s effectiveness in providing the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the United States. As of March 2017, 95 of these 168 actions remained open. DOD represented about 15 percent of federal spending in fiscal year 2016, with outlays totaling about $637.6 billion. Our work suggests that effectively implementing our open actions, including those related to areas listed in table 6, could yield substantial financial benefits. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 98 actions to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in areas that contribute to HHS’s mission to enhance the health and well-being of Americans. HHS administers Medicare, which in fiscal year 2016 financed health services for over 57 million beneficiaries at an estimated cost of $696 billion. HHS also administers Medicaid, which covered an estimated 72.2 million low- income people in fiscal year 2016 at a cost of $575.9 billion. HHS represents about 28 percent of the fiscal year 2016 federal budget, with outlays totaling about $1.2 trillion. As of March 2017, 56 of HHS’s 98 actions remained open. Our work suggests that effectively implementing these actions, such as those related to areas listed in table 7, could yield substantial financial benefits. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 83 actions to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in areas that contribute to effectively and efficiently providing quality service to taxpayers and enforcing the law with integrity and fairness to all. As of March 2017, 43 of these 83 actions remained open. The funding of the federal government depends largely upon IRS’s ability to collect taxes—in fiscal year 2016, IRS collected about $3.3 trillion. Our work suggests that effective implementation of our open actions, such as those related to areas listed in table 8, could substantially increase revenues and result in other financial benefits. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 78 actions to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in areas that contribute to the effective implementation of its mission to, among other things, prevent terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States, reduce U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, and help the nation recover from any attacks that may occur. In fiscal year 2016, DHS spent about $57.6 billion, about 1.3 percent of federal outlays. As of March 2017, 37 of the 78 actions to DHS remained open. Fully implementing these actions, such as those related to areas listed in table 9, could result in financial benefits and substantial improvements in operations. Many of the results the federal government seeks to achieve require the coordinated effort of more than one federal agency, level of government, or sector. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) manages and coordinates many government-wide efforts. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 64 actions to OMB in areas to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government-wide programs and activities. As of March 2017, 34 of the 64 actions to OMB remained open. Fully implementing these actions, such as those related to areas listed in table 10, could yield substantial financial benefits and program improvements. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 28 actions to the Social Security Administration (SSA) in areas that contribute to SSA providing financial assistance to eligible individuals through Social Security retirement and disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments. As of March 2017, 25 of these 28 actions remained open. In fiscal year 2016, SSA spent about $979.7 billion, roughly 23 percent of federal outlays. While most of SSA’s funding is used to pay Social Security retirement, survivors, and disability benefits from the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund, our work suggests that effective implementation of these actions, such as the examples listed in table 11, could yield substantial benefits. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 44 actions to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in areas that contribute to VA effectively and efficiently achieving its mission to promote the health, welfare, and dignity of all veterans by ensuring that they receive medical care, benefits, and social support. As of March 2017, 24 of these 44 actions remained open. In fiscal year 2016, VA spent about $179.6 billion—about 4 percent of federal outlays—for veterans’ benefits and services. Our work suggests that effective implementation of these actions, such as those related to areas listed in table 12, could yield cost savings and efficiencies that would improve the delivery of services. We will continue to look for additional or emerging instances of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication and opportunities for cost savings or revenue enhancement. Likewise, we will continue to monitor developments in the areas we have already identified. We stand ready to assist this and other committees in further analyzing the issues we have identified and evaluating potential solutions. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer questions. For further information on this testimony or our April 26, 2017 report, please contact J. Christopher Mihm, Managing Director, Strategic Issues, who may be reached at (202) 512-6806 or [email protected], and Jessica Lucas-Judy, Acting Director, Strategic Issues, who may be reached at (202) 512-9110 or [email protected]. Contact points for the individual areas listed in our 2017 annual report can be found at the end of each area in GAO-17-491SP. Contact points for our Congressional Relations and Public Affairs offices may be found on the last page of this statement. In our 2011 to 2017 annual reports, we directed 97 actions to Congress, of which 61 remain open. Of the 61 open congressional actions, 9 are partially addressed and 52 are not addressed, as of March 1, 2017. See table 13.

The federal government faces a long-term, unsustainable fiscal path based on an imbalance between federal revenues and spending. While addressing this structural imbalance will require fiscal policy changes, in the near term opportunities exist in a number of areas to improve this situation, including where federal programs or activities are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative. To call attention to these opportunities, Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to identify and report on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives—either within departments or government-wide—that have duplicative goals or activities. GAO also identifies areas that are fragmented or overlapping and additional opportunities to achieve cost savings or enhance revenue collection. GAO's 2017 annual report is its seventh in this series (GAO-17-491SP). This statement discusses: new issues GAO identifies in its 2017 report; the progress made in addressing actions GAO identified in its 2011 to 2016 reports; and examples of open actions directed to Congress or executive branch agencies. To identify what actions exist to address these issues, GAO reviewed and updated prior work, including recommendations for executive action and matters for congressional consideration. GAO's 2017 annual report identifies 79 new actions that Congress and executive branch agencies can take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government in 29 new areas. Of these, GAO identified 15 areas in which there is evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. For example, GAO found that the Army and Air Force need to improve the management of their virtual training programs to avoid fragmentation and better acquire and integrate virtual devices into training to potentially save tens of millions of dollars. GAO also identified 14 areas to reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenues. For example, GAO found that the Department of Energy could potentially save tens of billions of dollars by improving its analysis of options for storing defense and commercial high-level nuclear waste and fuel. Congress and executive branch agencies have made progress in addressing the 645 actions that GAO identified from 2011 to 2016. Congressional and executive branch efforts to address these actions over the past 6 years have resulted in roughly $136 billion in financial benefits, of which $75 billion has accrued and at least an additional $61 billion in estimated benefits is projected to accrue in future years. Status of 2011–2016 Actions as of March, 2017 Further steps are needed to fully address the remaining actions GAO identified. GAO estimates that tens of billions of additional dollars would be saved should Congress and executive branch agencies fully address the 395 actions that remain open, including the 79 new actions GAO identified in 2017. While these open actions span the government, a substantial number of them are directed to seven agencies: the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, the Internal Revenue Service, Office of Management and Budget, and the Social Security Administration. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services could potentially save over a billion dollars annually by better aligning its payments to hospitals for the uncompensated care they provide to uninsured and low-income patients.

Democratic Conference: The conference is the caucus of all Democratic Senators and serves as the central coordinating body. It operates through the Democratic leader's office and is responsible for communicating the party's message. The Democratic leader serves as chair of the conference, which is also led by a vice-chair and a secretary. Democratic Policy Committee: The policy committee is responsible for the formulation of overall legislative policy. It provides background and analysis of pending legislation, and organizes briefings and strategy meetings for Democratic Members and staff. The policy committee is led by a chair, appointed by the Democratic leader and includes regional chairs and members. Democratic Steering and Outreach Committee: Often referred to as the steering committee, this group maintains liaison between the Democratic leadership and Democratic elected officials around the country. It also is responsible for making committee assignment recommendations. It is led by a chair, appointed by the Democratic leader, who is assisted by an executive committee. Democratic Committee on Committee Outreach: This group provides a voice in the Democratic leadership for committee chairs. An appointed chair and vice-chair coordinate the committee work. Democratic Committee on Rural Outreach: This group guides rural outreach and tries to find new ways to reach rural, suburban, and ex-urban communities. It is led by an appointed chair. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee: This panel is the fund-raising arm of the Senate Democrats that provides financial and research assistance to Democratic Senators seeking reelection and to non-incumbent Democratic Senate nominees. It is led by a chair appointed by the Democratic leader, vice-chair, treasurer, and a board of trustees. Republican Conference: The Republican Conference is the organizational vehicle for Republican Members and their staff. It hosts periodic meetings of Senate Republicans and is the primary vehicle for communicating the party's message. The conference is led by an elected chair and vice-chair. Republican Policy Committee: The policy committee assists Senate leaders and committee chairs in designing, developing, and executing policy ideas. The policy committee hosts a weekly lunch meeting of Republican Senators and provides summaries of major bills and amendments, prepares analyses of rollcall votes, and distributes issue papers. It is led by an elected chair, and comprises members of the party leadership, the chairs of selected committees, and members designated by the Republican leader to serve on an executive committee. Republican Steering Committee: The steering committee is responsible for making committee assignment recommendations. It is led by a chair appointed by the Republican leader and an executive committee. Republican Senatorial Committee: The campaign committee oversees the political and fund-raising efforts of Senate Republicans. It is led by a chair appointed by the Republican leader and an executive committee.

Each Congress, Senators meet to organize the chamber and select their party leaders. In addition to the majority and minority leaders and party whips are numerous entities created by the party to assist with the work of the party.

Lack of regular dental care can result in pain, infection, and delayed diagnosis of oral diseases. During the 2001-2004 period, one-fourth to one-third of children ages 2 to 19 in families with income below 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL) experienced untreated dental caries (decay), a sign that needed dental care was not received. In 2005, about one-third of all children living below 200% FPL did not have a recent dental visit. In a related study, GAO found that during the 1999-2004 period, roughly one in three Medicaid children ages 2 through 18 had untreated tooth decay, and data from 2004 through 2005 indicated that only 37% received any dental care over a one-year period. With respect to receipt of dental services, insurance matters. In 2006, 50.9% of individuals under the age of 21 in the United States had private dental coverage, another 30.4% had public dental coverage (primarily Medicaid and SCHIP), and 18.7% had no dental coverage. The percentage of individuals under age 21 that had a dental visit in 2006 varied by type of coverage—58.0% with private dental coverage had a dental visit that year, compared with 35.1% of those with public dental coverage and 26.3% of the subgroup with no dental coverage. The American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry (AAPD) recommends that every child be seen by a dentist following the eruption of the first tooth, but not later than 12 months of age. All other children should have additional periodic dental exams every six months (i.e., twice a year). Under Medicaid, states must adopt a dental periodicity schedule, which can be state-specific based on consultation with dental groups, or may be based on nationally recognized dental periodicity schedules, such as the AAPD's guidelines. One goal of the Healthy People 2010 initiative, a federal effort to increase quality and years of healthy life and eliminate health disparities, is that at least 66% of low-income children receive a preventive dental visit each year. Most Medicaid children under age 21 are entitled to Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) services. The Medicaid statute (Section 1905(r)) defines required EPSDT screening services to include dental services that, at a minimum, include relief of pain and infections, restoration of teeth, and maintenance of dental health. In addition, care that is necessary to correct or ameliorate identified problems must also be provided, including services that states do not otherwise cover in their Medicaid programs. Beneficiary cost-sharing for services such as dental care is prohibited for children under age 18, and is optional for those ages 18-20. Federal law is intended to eliminate or significantly reduce major barriers to dental services for Medicaid children. Nonetheless, the research literature has identified several factors that affect the use of dental services among children. From a beneficiary perspective, barriers include, for example, ability to pay for care, navigating government assistance programs, finding a dentist who will accept Medicaid, locating a dentist close to home (especially in inner-city and rural areas), getting to a dentist office, cultural or language barriers, and lack of knowledge about the need for periodic oral health care. Most of the dental care provided in the United States is delivered by private dentists. In contrast to physician services, about half of all payments for dental services are made out-of-pocket, rather than through insurance. In addition, overhead in dental practices is high, averaging about 60 cents for every dollar earned, due in part to the need for expensive equipment. New dentists also face substantial debt because of the high cost of dental education. While there are questions about whether there is an overall shortage of dentists in the United States, there is general agreement that too few provide services to those who are publicly funded and those with special needs. Federal Medicaid law and regulations require that payment rates be sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services are available at least to the same extent that such services are available to the general population in the geographic area. Nonetheless, reimbursement rates are an obstacle to such participation. In addition to reimbursement rates, dentists typically cite two other reasons for their low participation rates in Medicaid: burdensome administrative requirements and patient behavior (e.g., infrequent care-seeking behavior and high no-show rates for dental appointments). A recent study of physicians also shows a negative relationship between administrative issues (delays in receiving payments) and participation in Medicaid. The Medicaid statute (Section 1902(a)(43)) requires states to inform and arrange for the delivery of EPSDT services to eligible children, and also includes annual reporting requirements for states. The tool used to capture these required EPSDT data is called the CMS-416 form. The current CMS-416 form (effective as of FY1999) includes the unduplicated count of EPSDT eligibles by age and basis of eligibility who receive (1) any dental services, (2) preventive dental services, and (3) dental treatment services. Classification into one of these measures is based on specific dental procedure codes recorded on provider claims. Across states in FY2006, use of dental services among Medicaid children was generally low, as shown in Table 1 . Receipt of any dental services among Medicaid children eligible for EPSDT ranged from 18.9% (in North Dakota) to 55.7% (in West Virginia). Receipt of preventive dental services ranged from 6.7% (in Utah) to 51.0% (in Vermont). Finally, receipt of dental treatment services ranged from 6.4% (in Nevada) to 40.8% (in West Virginia). During routine immunization and well-child visits, there are a number of opportunities for physicians to inform parents about the need for dental services for their children. Guidance from the American Academy of Pediatrics for well-child visits during 2006 (in effect since 2000) called for initial dental referrals at age three years, or as early as one year of age when indicated. Table 2 provides a more detailed analysis of the receipt of preventive dental services by age in FY2006. Across age groups within each state and for all reporting states as a whole, utilization patterns resembled a bell-shaped curve (see Figure 1 ). That is, children at the age extremes tended to receive fewer preventive dental services than children in the middle of the age range. Among nearly all states, the highest rates of preventive dental care were observed for the six- to nine-year-old age group. For this age group, 10 states had preventive dental rates over 50%, and one state (Vermont) met the Healthy People 2010 goal that at least 66% of such children receive a preventive dental visit. The higher rates of preventive dental care among children aged six to nine may be related in part to school entry requirements for childhood immunizations. In order to attend kindergarten at ages five and six, for example, all states require that children have received common childhood immunizations (e.g., vaccinations for diphtheria, tetanus, and acellular pertussis, or DTaP; measles, mumps, and rubella, or MMR; and polio). When children receive those immunizations, health care providers may make referrals for other health services, including dental care. Many states recognize that dental care is underutilized across most Medicaid sub-populations. In a September 2008 hearing before the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, state officials and other representatives from Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, and from the dental profession, described recent state actions to improve dental care for Medicaid children. Their recommendations included the following: increase dental reimbursement rates to make them more in line with private market-based rates; remove administrative barriers (e.g., prior authorization for certain procedures, simplified claims, and use of electronic billing); carve out dental benefits from managed care contracts and use a single dental vendor to establish a more stream-lined approach to processing claims and paying providers; when designing new dental program features, involve dentists and professional dental organizations; establish dedicated dental units in state governments to help guide policy decisions; and establish "dental extenders" to increase service capacity, including for example, (1) primary care medical professionals to provide oral evaluation and risk assessment, counseling for parents about oral hygiene, and application of fluorides, and (2) other allied dental providers that can do community outreach and education, and perform preventive services such as fluoride and sealant application, potentially expanding to additional dental treatment services. Other states may draw lessons from these experiences and recommendations. With respect to the final point above, provider groups hold varying opinions about the extent to which non-dentists can and should provide certain dental services. States may need to address such issues if they wish to expand access to dental care under Medicaid for children and other sub-groups.

According to guidelines published by the American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, all youth should see a dentist for routine dental screening and preventive care twice a year. Dental care is a mandatory benefit for most Medicaid eligibles under the age of 21, however, nationwide, the majority of low-income children enrolled in Medicaid do not receive any dental services in a given year. There are many beneficiary and provider-related issues that contribute to inadequate access to and delivery of dental care. To address this problem, some states have undertaken new Medicaid initiatives to attract and retain dental providers that may serve as models for other state Medicaid programs.

Medicare is a federal health insurance program designed to assist elderly and disabled beneficiaries. Hospital insurance, or part A, covers inpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility, hospice care, and certain home health services. Supplemental medical insurance, or part B, covers physician and outpatient hospital services, laboratory and other services. Claims are paid by a network of 49 claims administration contractors called intermediaries and carriers. Intermediaries process claims from hospitals and other institutional providers under part A while carriers process part B claims. The intermediaries’ and carriers’ responsibilities include: reviewing and paying claims; maintaining program safeguards to prevent inappropriate payment; and educating and responding to provider and beneficiary concerns. Medicare contracting for intermediaries and carriers differs from that of most federal programs. Most federal agencies, under the Competition in Contracting Act and its implementing regulations known as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), generally may contract with any qualified entity for any authorized purpose so long as that entity is not debarred from government contracting and the contract is not for what is essentially a government function. Agencies are to use contractors that have a track record of successful past performance or that demonstrate a current superior ability to perform. The FAR generally requires agencies to conduct full and open competition for contracts and allows contractors to earn profits. Medicare, however, is authorized to deviate from the FAR under provisions of the Social Security Act enacted in 1965. For example, there is no full and open competition for intermediary or carrier contracts. Rather, intermediaries are selected in a process called nomination by provider associations, such as the American Hospital Association. This provision was intended at the time of Medicare’s creation to encourage hospitals to participate by giving them some choice in their claims processor. Currently, there are three intermediary contracts, including the national Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, which serves as the prime contractor for 26 local member plan subcontractors. When one of the local Blue plans declines to renew its subcontract, the Association nominates the replacement contractor. Carriers are chosen by the Secretary of Health and Human Services from a small pool of health insurers, and the number of such companies seeking Medicare claims-processing work has been dwindling in recent years. The Social Security Act also generally calls for the use of cost-based reimbursement contracts under which contractors are reimbursed for necessary and proper costs of carrying out Medicare activities but does not expressly provide for profit. Further, Medicare contractors cannot be terminated from the program unless they are first provided with an opportunity for a public hearing––a process not afforded under the FAR. Medicare could benefit from various contracting reforms. Freeing the program to directly choose contractors on a competitive basis from a broader array of entities able to perform needed tasks would enable Medicare to benefit from efficiency and performance improvements related to competition. It also could address concerns about the dwindling number of insurers with which the program now contracts. Allowing Medicare to have contractors specialize in specific functions rather than assume all claims-related activities, as is the case now, also could lead to greater efficiency and better performance. Authorizing Medicare to pay contractors based on how well they perform rather than simply reimbursing them for their costs, as well as allowing the program to terminate contracts more efficiently when program needs change or performance is inadequate, could also result in better program management. Since Medicare was implemented in 1966, the program has used health insurers to process and pay claims. Before Medicare’s enactment, providers feared that the program would give the government too much control over health care. To win acceptance, the program was designed to be administered by health insurers like Blue Cross and Blue Shield. Subsequent regulations and decades of the agency’s own practices have further limited how the program contracts for claims administration services. The result is that agency officials believe they must contract with health insurers to handle all aspects of administering Medicare claims, even though the number of such companies willing to serve as Medicare contractors has declined and the number of other entities capable of doing the work has increased. While using only health insurers for claims administration may have made sense when Medicare was created, that may be much less so today. The explosion in information technology has increased the potential for Medicare to use new types of business entities to administer its claims processing and related functions. Additionally, the need to broaden the pool of entities allowed to be contractors has increased in light of contractor attrition. Since 1980, the number of contractors has dropped by more than half, as many have decided to concentrate on other lines of business. This has left the program with fewer choices when one contractor withdraws, or is terminated, and another must be chosen to replace it. Since 1993, the agency has repeatedly submitted legislative proposals to repeal the provider nomination authority and make explicit its authority to contract for claims administration with entities other than health insurers. Just this month, the Secretary of Health and Human Services told the Senate Finance Committee that CMS should be able to competitively award contracts to the entities best qualified to perform these functions and stated that such changes would require legislative action. With such changes, when a contractor leaves the program, CMS could award its workload on a competitive basis to any qualified company or combination of companies—including those outside the existing contractor pool, such as data processing firms. Allowing Medicare to have separate contractors for specific claims administration activities—also called functional contracting—could further improve program management. Functional contracting would enable CMS to select contractors that are more skilled at certain tasks and allow these contractors to concentrate on those tasks, potentially resulting in better program service. For example, the agency could establish specific contractors to improve and bring uniformity to efforts to educate and respond to providers and beneficiaries, efforts that now vary widely among existing contractors. Currently, CMS interprets the Social Security Act and the regulations implementing it as constraining the agency from awarding separate contracts for individual claims administration activities, such as handling beneficiary inquiries or educating providers about program policies. Current regulations stipulate that, to qualify as an intermediary or carrier, the contracting organization must perform all of the Medicare claims administration functions. Thus, agency officials feel precluded from consolidating one or more functions into a single contract or a few regional contracts to achieve economies of scale and allow specialization to enhance performance. CMS has had some experience with functional contracting under authority granted in 1996 to hire entities other than health insurers to focus on program safeguards. CMS has contracted with 12 program safeguard contractors (PSC) who compete among themselves to perform task- specific contracts called task orders. These entities represent a mix of health insurers, including many with prior experience as Medicare contractors, along with consulting organizations, and other types of firms. The experience with PSCs, however, makes clear that functional contracting has challenges of its own, which are discussed later in this testimony. Allowing Medicare to offer financial incentives to contractors for high- quality performance also may have benefits. According to CMS, the Social Security Act now precludes the program from offering such incentives because it generally stipulates that payments be based on costs. Contractors are paid for necessary and proper costs of carrying out Medicare activities but do not make a profit. Repeal of cost-based restrictions would free CMS to award different types of contracts–– including those that provide contractors with financial incentives and permit them to earn profits. CMS could test different payment options to determine which work best. If effective in encouraging contractor performance, such contracts could lead to improved program operations and, potentially, to lower administrative costs. Again, implementing performance-based contracting will not be without significant challenges. Allowing Medicare to terminate contractors more efficiently may also promote better program management. The Social Security Act now limits the agency’s ability to terminate intermediaries and carriers, and the provisions are one-sided. Intermediaries and carriers may terminate their contracts without cause simply by providing CMS with 180 days notice. CMS, on the other hand, must demonstrate, that (1) the contractor has failed substantially to carry out its contract or that (2) continuation of the contract is disadvantageous or inconsistent with the effective administration of Medicare. CMS must provide the contractor with an opportunity for a public hearing prior to termination. Furthermore, CMS may not terminate a contractor without cause as can most federal agencies under the FAR. In past years, the agency has requested statutory authority to eliminate the public hearing requirement and the ability of contractors to unilaterally initiate contract termination. Such changes would bring Medicare claims administration contractors under the same legal framework as other government contractors and provide greater flexibility to more quickly terminate poor performers. Eliminating contractors’ ability to unilaterally terminate contracts also may help address challenges the agency faces in finding replacement contractors on short notice. While Medicare could benefit from greater contracting flexibility, time and care would be needed to implement changes to effectively promote better performance and accountability and avoid disrupting program services. Competitive contracting with new entities for specific claims administration services in particular will pose new challenges to CMS–– challenges that will likely take significant time to fully address. These include preparing clear statements of work and contractor selection criteria, efficiently integrating the new contractors into Medicare’s claims processing operations, and developing sound evaluation criteria for assessing performance. Because these challenges are so significant, CMS would be wise to adopt an experimental, incremental approach. The experience with authority granted in 1996 to hire special contractors for specific tasks related to program integrity can provide valuable lessons for CMS officials if new contracting authorities are granted. If given authority to contract competitively with new entities, CMS would need time to accomplish several tasks. First among these would be development of clear statements of work and associated requests for proposals detailing work to be performed and how performance will be assessed. CMS has relatively little experience in this area for Medicare claims administration because current contracts instead incorporate by reference all regulations and general instructions issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to define contractor responsibilities. CMS has experience with competitive contracting from hiring PSCs. It did take 3 years to determine how best to implement the new authority through its broad umbrella contract, develop the statement of work, issue the proposed regulations governing the PSCs, develop selection criteria, review proposals, and select contractors. Program officials have told us they are optimistic about their ability to act more quickly if contracting reform legislation were enacted, given the lessons they have learned. However, we expect that it would take CMS a significant amount of time to develop its implementation strategy and undertake all the necessary steps to take full advantage of any changes in its contracting authority. CMS took an incremental approach to awarding its PSC task orders, and the same would be prudent for implementing any changes in Medicare’s claims administration contracting authorities. Even after new contractors are hired, CMS should not expect immediate results. The PSC experience demonstrates that it will take time for them to begin performing their duties. PSCs had to hire staff, obtain operating space and equipment, and develop the systems needed to ultimately fulfill contract requirements––activities that often took many months to complete. Without sufficient start-up time, new contractors might not operate effectively and services to beneficiaries or providers could be disrupted. Developing a strategy for how to incorporate functional contractors into the program and coordinate their activities is key. While there may be benefits from specialization, having multiple companies performing different claims administration tasks could easily create coordination difficulties for the contractors, providers, and CMS staff. For example, between 1997 and 2000, HCFA contracted with a claims administration contractor that subcontracted with another company for the review of the medical necessity of claims before they were paid. The agency found that having two different contractors perform these functions posed logistical challenges that could make it difficult to complete prepayment reviews without creating a backlog of unprocessed claims. The need for effective coordination was also seen in the PSC experience. PSCs and the claims administration contractors need to coordinate their activities in cases where the PSCs assumed responsibility for some or all of the program safeguard functions previously performed by the contractors. In these situations, HCFA officials had to ensure that active claims did not get lost or ignored while in the processing stream. Coordination is also necessary to ensure that new efficiencies in one program area do not adversely affect another area. For example, better review of the medical necessity of claims before they are paid could lead to more accurate payment. This would clearly be beneficial, but could also lead to an increase in the number of appeals for claims denials. Careful planning would be required to ensure adequate resources were in place to adjudicate those appeals and prevent a backlog. CMS has not stated how claims administration activities might be divided if the agency could do functional contracting. It would be wise for CMS to develop a strategy for testing different options on a limited scale. In our report on HCFA’s contracting for PSC services, we recommended, and the agency generally agreed, that it should adopt such a plan because HCFA was not in a position to identify how best to use the PSCs to promote program integrity in the long term. Taking advantage of benefits from competition and performance-based contracting hinges on being able to identify goals and objectives and to measure progress in achieving them. Specific and appropriate evaluation criteria would be needed to effectively manage any new arrangements under contracting reform. Effective evaluations are dependent, in part, upon clear statements of expected outcomes tied to quantifiable measures and standards. Because it has not developed such criteria for most of its PSC task orders, we reported that CMS is not in a position to effectively evaluate its PSCs’ performance even though 8 of the 15 task orders had been ongoing for at least a year as of April 2001. If CMS begins using full and open competition to hire new entities for other specific functions, it should attempt to move quickly to develop effective outcomes, measures, and standards for evaluating such entities. Effective criteria are also critical if financial incentives are to be offered to contractors. Prior experiments with financial incentives for Medicare claims administration contractors generally have not been successful. This experience raises concerns about the possibility for success of any immediate implementation of such authority without further testing. For example, between 1977 and 1986, HCFA established eight competitive fixed-price-plus-incentive-fee contracts designed to consolidate the workload of two or more small contractors on an experimental basis. Contractors could benefit financially by achieving performance goals in certain areas at the potential detriment of performance in other activities. In 1986, we reported that two of the contracts generated administrative savings estimated at $48 million to $50 million. However, the two contractors’ activities also resulted in $130 million in benefit payment errors (both overpayments and underpayments) that may have offset the estimated savings. One of these contractors subsequently agreed to pay over $140 million in civil and criminal fines for its failure to safeguard Medicare funds. Removing the contracting limitations imposed at Medicare’s inception to promote full and open competition and increase flexibility could help to modernize the program and lead to more efficient and effective management. However, change will not yield immediate results, and lessons learned from the experience with PSC contractors underscore the need for careful and deliberate implementation of any reforms that may be enacted. This concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that either Subcommittee Chairman or Members may have. For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at (312) 220-7600. Sheila Avruch, Bonnie Brown, Paul Cotton, and Robert Dee also made key contributions to this statement.

Discussions about how to reform and modernize the Medicare Program have, in part, focused on whether the structure that was adopted in 1965 is optimal today. Questions have been raised about whether the program could benefit from changes to the way that Medicare's claims processing contractors are chosen and the jobs they do. Medicare could benefit from full and open competition and its relative flexibility to promote better performance and accountability. If the current limits on Medicare contracting authority are removed, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services could (1) select contractors on a competitive basis from a broader array of entities capable of performing needed program activities, (2) issue contracts for discrete program functions to improve contractor performance through specialization, (3) pay contractors based on how well they perform rather than simply reimbursing them for their costs, and (4) terminate poor performers more efficiently.

The Results Act is the centerpiece of a statutory framework to improve federal agencies’ management activities. The Results Act was designed to focus federal agencies’ attention from the amounts of money they spend or the size of their workloads to the results of their programs. Agencies are expected to base goals on their results-oriented missions, develop strategies for achieving their goals, and measure actual performance against the goals. The Results Act requires agencies to consult with the Congress in developing their strategic plans. This gives the Congress the opportunity to help ensure that their missions and goals are focused on results, are consistent with programs’ authorizing laws, and are reasonable in light of fiscal constraints. The products of this consultation should be clearer guidance to agencies on their missions and goals and better information to help the Congress choose among programs, consider alternative ways to achieve results, and assess how well agencies are achieving them. fiscal year 1999 budget submissions, which were due to OMB by September 8, 1997. OMB, in turn, is required to include a governmentwide performance plan in the President’s fiscal year 1999 budget submission to the Congress. As required by the Results Act, GAO reviewed agencies’ progress in implementing the act, including the prospects for agency compliance. VA’s August 15, 1997, draft strategic plan represents a significant improvement over the June 1997 draft. The latest version is clearer and easier to follow, more complete, and better organized to focus more on results and less on process. At the same time, VA has still not fully addressed some of the key elements required by the Results Act; the draft plan has a lack of goals focused on the results of VA programs for veterans and their families, such as assisting veterans in readjusting to civilian life; limited discussions of external factors beyond VA’s control that could affect its achievement of goals; a lack of program evaluations to support the development of results-oriented goals; and insufficient plans to identify and meet needs to coordinate VA programs with those of other federal agencies. The draft strategic plan, acknowledging that three of these four elements (results-oriented goals, program evaluations, and agency coordination) have not been fully addressed, does plan to address them. VA has indicated that it views strategic planning as a long-term process and intends to continue refining its strategic plan in consultation with the Congress, veterans service organizations, and other stakeholders. Another challenge for VA is to improve its financial and information technology management, so that the agency’s ongoing planning efforts under the Results Act will be based on the best possible information. VA’s draft strategic plan addresses several financial and information technology issues, such as the need for cost accounting systems for VA programs and the need to improve VA’s capital asset planning. results. VA officials indicated that, based on consultations with staff from the House and Senate Veterans’ Affairs committees, which included input from GAO, the draft strategic plan would be revised to make it clearer, more complete, and more results-oriented. The August 15, 1997, version reflects significant progress in these areas. Instead of presenting four overall goals, three of which were process-oriented, VA has reorganized its draft strategic plan into two sections. The first section, entitled “Honor, Care, and Compensate Veterans in Recognition of Their Sacrifices for America,” is intended to incorporate VA’s results-oriented strategic goals. The second section, entitled “Management Strategies,” incorporates the three other general goals, related to customer service, workforce development, and taxpayer return on investment. In addition, VA has filled significant gaps in the discussions of program goals. The largest gap in the June 1997 draft was the lack of goals for four of the five major veterans benefit programs. The current plan includes goals for each of these programs, stating them in terms of ensuring that VA benefit programs meet veterans’ needs. Finally, the reorganized draft plan increases the emphasis on results. The June 1997 draft appeared to make such process-oriented goals as improving customer service and speeding claims processing equivalent to more results-oriented goals such as improving veterans’ health care. In the August 1997 version, the process-oriented goals remain but have been placed in their own process-oriented section supplementing the plan’s results orientation. At the same time, VA believes that the process-oriented portions of the plan are important as a guide to VA’s management. It considers customer service very important because VA’s focus is on providing services to veterans and their families. The Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning, in written comments on a draft of our July 1997 letter, stated that VA continues to believe “that processes and operations are important to serving veterans and [VA] will continue to place appropriate emphasis on the areas of customer service, workforce development, and management issues.” VA also contends that the Results Act does not preclude process-oriented goals from its strategic plan. We agree that many of the process issues VA raises are important to its efficient and effective operation and can be included in VA’s strategic plan as long as they are integrated with the plan’s primary focus on results. Perhaps the most significant deficiency in VA’s draft strategic plan, in both the June 1997 and current versions, is the lack of results-oriented goals for major VA programs, particularly for benefit programs. While discussions of goals for benefit programs have been added to the current version, they are placeholders for results-oriented goals that have not yet been developed. The general goals for 4 of the 5 the major benefit program areas—compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation, and housing credit assistance—are stated in terms of ensuring that VA is meeting the needs of veterans and their families. The objectives supporting VA’s general goal for its compensation and pension area are to (1) evaluate compensation and pension programs to determine their effectiveness in meeting the needs of veterans and their beneficiaries; and (2) modify these programs, as appropriate. For the three other major benefit program areas, the objectives suggest possible results-oriented goals and are supported by strategies aimed at evaluating and improving programs. For example, the objectives under vocational rehabilitation include increasing the number of disabled veterans who acquire and maintain suitable employment and are considered to be rehabilitated. The strategies under this objective include evaluating the vocational rehabilitation needs of eligible veterans and evaluating the effect of VA’s vocational rehabilitation program on the quality of participants’ lives. VA has noted that developing results-oriented goals will be difficult until program evaluations have been completed. Given the program evaluation time periods stated in the draft strategic plan, which calls for evaluations to continue through fiscal year 2002, results-oriented goals may not be developed for some programs for several years. Another difficulty VA has cited is that, for many VA programs, congressional statements of the program purposes and expected results are vague or nonexistent. VA officials cited VA’s medical research and insurance programs as examples of programs with unclear purposes. This is an area where VA and the Congress can make progress in further consultations. individual goals generally did not link demographic changes in the veteran population to VA’s goals. VA’s current draft has added discussions of the implications of demographic changes on VA programs. For example, VA notes that the death rate for veterans is increasing, which will lead VA to explore various options for meeting increased demands for burials in VA and state veterans’ cemeteries. Meanwhile, the goal to ensure that VA’s burial programs meet the needs of veterans and their families is accompanied by a detailed list of specific cemetery construction and land acquisition projects and by a specific target for expanding burials in state veterans’ cemeteries. The discussion of external factors related to this goal focuses on the Congress’ willingness to fund VA’s proposed projects and the cooperation of the states in participating in the State Cemetery Grants Program. What is missing in the draft is a link between the projected increase in veteran deaths and the proposed schedule of specific cemetery projects. Similarly, we recently reported that National Cemetery System strategic planning does not tie goals for expanding cemetery capacity to veterans’ mortality rates and their preferences for specific burial options. We noted that the goals in VA’s June 1997 draft strategic plan were not supported by formal program evaluations. Evaluations can be an important source of information for helping the Congress and others ensure that agency goals are valid and reasonable, providing baselines for agencies to use in developing performance measures and performance goals, and identifying factors likely to affect agency performance. As noted above, VA cites the lack of completed evaluations as a reason for not providing results-oriented goals for many of its programs. The first general goal of VA’s plan is to conduct program evaluations over a period of several years. VA plans to identify distinct programs in each of its 10 major program areas and then prioritize evaluations of these programs in consultation with the Congress, veterans’ service organizations, and other stakeholders. VA expects to complete this prioritization sometime in fiscal year 1998, complete the highest-priority evaluations by the end of fiscal year 2000, and complete at least one evaluation in each of the 10 major program areas by fiscal year 2003. In our comments on the June 1997 draft strategic plan, we noted that VA has not clearly identified the areas where its programs overlap with those of other federal agencies, nor has it coordinated its strategic planning efforts with those of other agencies. Three areas where such coordination is needed (and the relevant key federal agencies) are employment training (Department of Labor), substance abuse (departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Housing and Urban Development), and telemedicine (Department of Defense). In addition, we noted that VA relies on other federal agencies for information; for example, VA needs service records from the Department of Defense to help determine whether veterans have service-connected disabilities and to help establish their eligibility for Montgomery G.I. Bill benefits. VA’s current draft strategic plan addresses the need to improve coordination with other federal agencies and state governments. This will involve (1) identifying overlaps and links with other federal agencies, (2) enhancing and improving communications links with other agencies, and (3) keeping state directors of veterans’ affairs and other state officials apprised of VA benefits and programs and of opportunities for collaboration and coordination. As we noted in our comments on VA’s June 1997 draft strategic plan, VA has made progress in financial management and information technology. Like other federal agencies, VA needs accurate and reliable information to support executive branch and congressional decision-making. The “Management Strategies” section of VA’s current draft strategic plan addresses some financial management and information technology issues. Since VA has identified the need to devote a portion of its strategic plan to process-oriented goals, it is appropriate that some of these goals should focus on improving its management in these areas. much of its costs were attributable to each of the benefit programs it administers. According to the plan, this system would include two cost accounting systems already in development: VHA’s Decision Support System (DSS) and VBA’s Activity Based Costing (ABC) system. Another goal in the current draft plan is to establish a VA capital policy that ensures that capital investments, including capital information technology investments, reflect the most efficient and effective use of VA’s resources. Achieving this goal involves developing a VA-wide Agency Capital Plan and establishing a VA Capital Investment Board to generate policies for capital investments and to review proposed capital investments based on VA’s mission and priorities. Still another goal is designed to address the need for VA-wide information technology management to facilitate VA’s ability to function as a unified department. Achieving of this goal involves developing a VA-wide information technology strategic plan and a portfolio of prioritized information technology capital investments. In addition, the plan calls for the promotion of crosscutting VA information technology initiatives in order to improve services to veterans. The draft plan’s discussion of information technology addresses one of the information technology issues we have identified as high-risk throughout the federal government—the year-2000 computer problem. Unless corrections are made by January 1, 2000, VA’s computers may be unable to cope with dates in 2000, which could prevent VA from making accurate and timely benefit payments to veterans. VA’s draft plan includes as a performance goal that full implementation and testing of compliant software (that is, software capable of processing dates beyond 1999) will be completed by October 1999. Mr. Chairman, this completes my testimony this morning. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.

GAO discussed the draft strategic plan developed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. GAO noted that: (1) VA has made substantial progress in its strategic planning, based in part on consultations with the Congress; (2) however, as with many other agencies, VA's process of developing a plan that meets the requirements of the Results Act is an evolving one that will continue well after the September 30, 1997, deadline for submitting its first strategic plan to the Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); (3) the August 15, 1997, draft that VA submitted to OMB for review is an improvement over the June 1997 version, because it is easier to follow, places more emphasis on results and less on process, and fills in some major gaps in the June 1997 draft; (4) however, the latest draft strategic plan continues to lack some of the key elements expected under the Results Act; and (5) as with the June 1997 draft, the August 15, 1997, draft lacks results-oriented goals for several major VA programs, lacks a program evaluation schedule, and contains inadequately developed discussions of external factors and the need to coordinate with other federal agencies.

Coast Guard operators and commanding officers told us that the National Security Cutter, Fast Response Cutter, and HC-144 are performing well during missions and are an improvement over the vessels and aircraft they are replacing. Operators primarily attribute the performance improvements to better endurance and communications capabilities, which help to position and keep these assets in high-threat areas. Specifically, these new assets have greater fuel capacity and efficiency, engine room and boat launch automation, handling/seakeeping, and food capacity, all of which increase endurance and effectiveness. To date, the improved capabilities of the four newly fielded assets have led to mission- related successes, according to Coast Guard asset commanders. In addition to performance in the field, each major acquisition is required to undergo operational testing by an independent test agency—in this case, the Navy’s Commander of Operational Test and Evaluation Force. Operational testing is important, as it characterizes the performance of the asset in realistic conditions. During operational testing, the test agency determines whether the asset is operationally effective (whether or not an asset can meet its missions) and operationally suitable (whether or not the agency can support the asset to an acceptable standard). The Fast Response Cutter and the HC-144 completed initial operational testing in September 2013 and October 2012, respectively. Based on the results, neither asset met all key requirements during this testing. The Fast Response Cutter partially met one of six key requirements, while the HC-144 met or partially met four of seven key requirements. The Fast Response Cutter was found to be operationally effective (with the exception of its cutter boat) though not operationally suitable, and the HC- 144 was found to be operationally effective and suitable. It is important to recognize that this was the initial operational testing and that the Coast Guard has plans in place to address most of the major issues identified. For example, in order to address issues with the seaworthiness of the Fast Response Cutter’s small boat, the Coast Guard will supply the Fast Response Cutter with a small boat developed for the National Security Cutter. However, DHS officials approved both assets to move into full rate production, and we found that guidance is not clear regarding when the minimum performance standards should be met—or what triggers the need for a program manager to submit a performance breach memorandum indicating that certain performance parameters were not demonstrated. The Coast Guard did not report that a breach had occurred for the HC-144 or the Fast Response Cutter, even though neither of these programs met certain key performance parameters during operational testing. Without clear acquisition guidance, it is difficult to determine when or by what measure an asset has breached its key performance parameters and, therefore, when DHS and certain congressional committees are to be notified. We recommended that DHS and the Coast Guard revise their acquisition guidance to specify when minimum performance standards should be met and clarify the performance data that should be used to determine whether a performance breach has occurred. DHS concurred with these recommendations and stated that it plans to make changes to its acquisition guidance by June 30, 2015. By not fully validating the capabilities of the National Security Cutter until late in production, the Coast Guard may have to spend more to ensure the ship meets requirements and is logistically supportable. The Coast Guard recently evaluated the National Security Cutter through operational testing, even though 7 of 8 National Security Cutters are under contract, but results are not expected until early fiscal year 2015. Coast Guard program officials stated that, prior to the operational test, the National Security Cutter had demonstrated most of its key performance parameters through non-operational tests and assessments, but we found that a few performance requirements, such as those relating to the endurance of the vessel and its self-defense systems, have yet to be assessed. Further, several issues occurred prior to the start of operational testing that required retrofits or design changes to meet mission needs. The total cost to conduct some of these retrofits and design changes has not yet been determined, but the cost of major changes for all eight hulls identified to date has totaled approximately $140 million, which is about one-third of the production cost of a single National Security Cutter. The Coast Guard continues to carry significant risk by not fully validating the capabilities of the National Security Cutter until late in production, which could result in the Coast Guard having to spend even more money in the future, beyond the changes that have already been identified. The Coast Guard has not yet evaluated the C4ISR system through operational testing even though the system has been fielded on nearly all new assets. Instead of evaluating that system’s key performance parameters, Coast Guard officials decided to test the system in conjunction with other assets—such as the HC-144 and the Fast Response Cutter—to save money and avoid duplication. However, the C4ISR system was not specifically evaluated during the HC-144 and Fast Response Cutter tests because those assets’ test plans did not fully incorporate testing the effectiveness and suitability of the C4ISR system. The Coast Guard now plans to test the key performance parameters for the next generation C4ISR system when follow on testing is conducted on the National Security Cutter; this testing has yet to be scheduled. By not testing the system, the Coast Guard has no assurance that it is purchasing a system that meets its operational needs. To address this issue, we recommended that the Coast Guard assess the C4ISR system by fully integrating this assessment into other assets’ operational test plans or by testing the C4ISR program on its own. In response, the Coast Guard stated that it now plans to test the C4ISR system’s key performance parameters during follow on testing for the National Security Cutter. As the Coast Guard continues to refine cost estimates for its major acquisitions, the expected cost of its acquisition portfolio has grown. There has been $11.3 billion in cost increases since 2007 across the eight programs that have consistently been part of the portfolio—the National Security Cutter, the Offshore Patrol Cutter, the Fast Response Cutter, the HC-144, the HC-130H/J, HH-65, C4ISR, and Unmanned Aircraft System. These cost increases are consuming a large portion of funding. Consequently, the Coast Guard is farther from fielding its planned fleet today than it was in 2009, in terms of money needed to finish these programs. Senior Coast Guard acquisition officials told us that many of the cost increases are due to changes from preliminary estimates and that they expect to meet their current cost estimates. However, the Coast Guard has yet to construct the largest asset in the portfolio—the Offshore Patrol Cutter—and if the planned costs for this program increase, difficulties in executing the portfolio as planned will be further exacerbated. Figure 1 shows the total cost of the portfolio and cost to complete the major programs included in the Coast Guard’s 2007 baseline in 2009 and 2014. Coast Guard, DHS, and OMB officials have acknowledged that the Coast Guard cannot afford to recapitalize and modernize its assets in accordance with the current plan at current funding levels. According to budget documents, Coast Guard acquisition funding levels have been about $1.5 billion for each of the past 5 years, and the President’s budget requests $1.1 billion for fiscal year 2015. To date, efforts to address this affordability imbalance have yet to result in the significant trade-off decisions that would be needed to do so. We have previously recommended that DHS and the Coast Guard establish a process to make the trade-off decisions needed to balance the Coast Guard’s resources and needs. While they agreed with the recommendation, they have yet to implement it. In the meantime, the extent of expected costs—and how the Coast Guard plans to address them through budget trade-off decisions—is not being clearly communicated to Congress. The mechanism in place for reporting to certain congressional committees, the Capital Investment Plan, does not reflect the full effects of these trade-off decisions on the total cost and schedule of its acquisition programs. This information is not currently required by statute, but without it, decision makers do not have the information to understand the full extent of funding that will be required to complete the Coast Guard’s planned acquisition programs. For example, in the Fiscal Years 2014 through 2018 Capital Investment Plan, cost and schedule totals did not match the funding levels presented for many programs. The plan proposed lowering the Fast Response Cutter procurement to two per year but still showed the total cost and schedule estimates for purchasing three or six per year—suggesting that this reduced quantity would have no effect on the program’s total cost and schedule. Given that decreasing the quantity purchased per year would increase the unit and total acquisition cost, the Coast Guard estimated that the decision to order fewer ships will likely add $600 to 800 million in cost and 5 years to the cutter’s final delivery date, but this was absent from the plan. Reporting total cost and delivery dates that do not reflect funding levels could lead to improper conclusions about the effect of these decisions on the program’s total cost and schedule and the overall affordability of the Coast Guard’s acquisition portfolio. In our report, we suggest that Congress consider amending the law that governs the 5- year Capital Investment Plan to require the Coast Guard to submit cost and schedule information that reflects the impact of the President’s annual budget request on each acquisition across the portfolio. To address budget constraints, the Coast Guard is repeatedly delaying and reducing its capability through its annual budget process. However, the Coast Guard does not know the extent to which its mission needs can be tailored through the annual budget process and still achieve desired results. In addition, this approach puts pressure on future budgets and delays fielding capability, which is reducing performance. Thus, the Coast Guard’s ability to meet future needs is uncertain and gaps are materializing in its current fleet. In fact, the Coast Guard has already experienced a gap in heavy icebreaking capability and is falling short of meeting operational hour goals for its major cutter fleet—comprised of the National Security Cutter and the in-service high and medium endurance cutters. These capability gaps may persist, as funding replacement assets will remain difficult at current funding levels. Without a long-term plan that considers service levels in relation to expected acquisition funding, the Coast Guard does not have a mechanism to aid in matching its requirements and resources. For example, the Coast Guard does not know if it can meet its other acquisition needs while the Offshore Patrol Cutter is being built. According to the current program of record, acquisition of the Offshore Patrol Cutter will conclude in about 20 years and will account for about two-thirds of the Coast Guard’s overall acquisition budget during this time frame. In addition, as we have previously found, the Coast Guard is deferring costs—such as purchasing unmanned systems or replacing its Buoy Tender fleet—that could lead to an impending spike in the requirement for additional funds. The Coast Guard has no method in place to capture the effects of deferring such costs on the future of the acquisition portfolio. The Coast Guard is not currently required to develop a long-term fleet modernization plan that considers its current service levels for the next 20 years in relation to its expected acquisition funding. However, the Coast Guard’s acquisition guidance supports using a long range capital planning framework. According to OMB capital planning guidance referenced by the Coast Guard’s Major Systems Acquisition Manual, each agency is encouraged to have a plan that defines its long-term capital asset decisions. This plan should include, among other things, (1) an analysis of the portfolio of assets already owned by the agency and in procurement, (2) the performance gap and capability necessary to bridge the old and new assets, and (3) justification for new acquisitions proposed for funding. OMB officials stated that they support DHS and the Coast Guard conducting a long term review of the Coast Guard’s acquisitions to assess the capabilities it can afford. A long-term plan can enable trade-offs to be seen and addressed in advance, leading to better informed choices and making debate possible before irreversible commitments are made to individual programs. Without this type of plan, decision makers do not have the information they need to better understand the Coast Guard’s long-term outlook. When we discussed such an approach with the Coast Guard, the response was mixed. Some Coast Guard budget officials stated that such a plan is not worthwhile because the Coast Guard cannot predict the level of funding it will receive in the future. However, other Coast Guard officials support the development of such a plan, noting that it would help to better understand the effects of funding decisions. Without such a plan, we believe it will remain difficult for the Coast Guard to fully understand the extent to which future needs match the current level of resources and its expected performance levels—and capability gaps—if funding levels remain constant. Consequently, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service and the fiscal resources necessary to build the identified assets. While DHS concurred with our recommendation, the response does not fully address our concerns or set forth an estimated date for completion, as the response did for the other recommendations. We continue to believe that a properly constructed 20- year fleet modernization plan is necessary to illuminate what is feasible in the long term and will also provide a basis for informed decisions that align the Coast Guard’s needs and resources. Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please contact Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are Katherine Trimble, Assistant Director; Laurier R. Fish; Peter W. Anderson; William Carrigg; John Crawford; Sylvia Schatz; and Lindsay Taylor. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's June 2014 report, entitled Coast Guard Acquistions: Better Information on Performance and Funding Needed to Address Shortfalls , GAO-14-450 . The selected Coast Guard assets that GAO reviewed are generally demonstrating improved performance--according to Coast Guard operators--but GAO found that they have yet to meet all key requirements. Specifically, two assets, the HC-144 patrol aircraft and Fast Response Cutter, did not meet all key requirements during operational testing before being approved for full-rate production, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard guidance do not clearly specify when this level of performance should be achieved. Additionally, the Coast Guard changed its testing strategy for the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system and, as a result, is no longer planning to test the system's key requirements. Completing operational testing for the C4ISR system would provide the Coast Guard with the knowledge of whether this asset meets requirements. As acquisition program costs increase across the portfolio, consuming significant amounts of funding, the Coast Guard is farther from fielding its planned fleet today than it was in 2009, in terms of the money needed to finish these programs. In 2009, GAO found that the Coast Guard needed $18.2 billion to finish its 2007 baseline, but now needs $20.7 billion to finish these assets. To inform Congress of its budget plans, the Coast Guard uses a statutorily required 5-year Capital Investment Plan, but the law does not require the Coast Guard to report the effects of actual funding levels on individual projects and, thus, it has not done so. For example, the Coast Guard has received less funding than planned in its annual budgets, but has not reflected the effects of this reduced funding in terms of increased cost or schedule for certain projects. Without complete information, Congress cannot know the full cost of the portfolio. The Coast Guard has repeatedly delayed and reduced its capability through its annual budget process and, therefore, it does not know the extent to which it will meet mission needs and achieve desired results. This is because the Coast Guard does not have a long-term fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to meet mission needs over the next two decades within available resources. Without such a plan, the Coast Guard cannot know the extent to which its assets are affordable and whether it can maintain service levels and meet mission needs. Congress should consider requiring the Coast Guard to include additional information in its Capital Investment Plan. In addition, the Secretary of DHS should clarify when minimum performance standards should be achieved, conduct C4ISR testing, and develop a long-term modernization plan. DHS concurred with the recommendations, but its position on developing a long-term plan does not fully address GAO's concerns as discussed in the report.